Khandan Kadir

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Khandan Kadir is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 831. Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1969, in Safra-andarikhail, Afghanistan.

[edit] Identity

The US Department of Defense was forced, by court order, to release the names of the captives taken in the "war on terror" who were held in Guantanamo. On April 20, 2006 they released a list of 558 names, nationalities and ID numbers, of all the captives whose status as "enemy combatants" had been reviewed by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[2] Twenty-five days later they released a list of 759 names, nationalities, ID numbers, dates of birth, and places of birth, of all captives who had been held in military custody in Guantanamo.^[1]

• Captive 831's name was listed as Khandan Kadir on the official lists released on April 20, 2006 and May 15, 2006.^[2][1]
• A Guantanamo captive named Kadeer Khandan was listed on a May 19, 2007 habeas corpus request.^[3]

[edit] Summary

Khandan Kadir was captured approximately a year after the Taliban were overthrown.

The allegations against him were that he was an ally of an Afghan warlord named Pacha Khan. Khan had raised local forces to rise up against the Taliban when the Americans and Northern Allicance invaded. He was rewarded with official administrative control over an area of Afghanistan. But he quarreled with other administrators, and eventually quarreled with the Americans. Open fighting eventually broke out, and he became considered a renegade. Guantanamo analysts have justified the continued detention of captives who knew him, even if their own capture predates the time when he stopped being an ally and started being an enemy.

Khandan Kadir's account was that he had worked as a pharmacist during the Taliban regime. He said he hated them and avoided them, and that anyone who lived in Khowst would testify that he took risks in letting his disdain for the Taliban show, by cutting his beard short, listening to music — a prohibited activity under the Taliban, and avoiding the mosque, when a member of the Taliban was leading the service.

According to Khandan Kadir, after the Taliban were overthrown he was appointed the local director of the anti-drug branch of the National Department of Security — a more junior position that Pacha Khan's, but one senior enough for him to form working relationship with the local American agents. He claimed he was having conflict with Pacha Khan long before his conflict with the Americans experienced enough problems to class him as a renegade.

Khandan Kadir said that his capture was due to a false denunciation from Pacha Khan, and Pacha Khan's nephew Jan Baz lead a mixed force of American forces and Pacha Khan's forces, to his home. He said the documents he was captured with fully supported his account.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[4][5] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[6]

The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007) Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Kadir chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[7]

[edit] Witness requests

Khandan Kadir requested the testimony of two witnesses. At the time of his Tribunal the rules did not permit him to question his witnesses, in person, even if they were fellow Guantanamo captives.

[edit] Allegations

The allegations Khandan Kadir faced, during his Tribunal, were:

a. The detainee is a member of forces associated with the Taliban.

1. The detainee was captured in the company of Jan Baz, the nephew of Pacha Khan.
2. Pacha Khan, a renegade Pashtun Commander, has conducted military operations against the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) and coalition forces.
3. The detainee claims to have worked as the head of Office Number 7, for the Afghan National Security Division (NDS) in Khowst.
4. The NDS denied that the detainee was an officer in their service and they do not consider him a recruited source.
5. The detainee ran a safe house for members of the Karim explosive cell in Khowst.
6. The detainee was arrested by Americans at his neighbor's house in Khowst, Afghanistan on 20 September 2002, attempting to elude capture by hiding with a group of women.

[edit] Response to the allegations

• Khandan Kadir denied ever working with Pacha Khan or Jan Baz. He said they were his personal enemies. Further, he wasn't captured in the company of Jan Baz. He was still in detention at Bagram, when Jan Baz was captured, four months after he was. He believed that his detention was due to a false denunciation, engineered by Jan Baz.
• Khandan Kadir said he knew Pacha Khan a long time, and he had become enemies long before he became the Americans enemy.
• Khandan Kadir confirmed that he had headed the Khowst office of the Afghan National Security Division, a branch of Hamid Karzai's government, for nine months, prior to his apprehension. He said the documentary evidence on hand in Guantanamo confirmed his employment with the NDS:

  "A letter that kind of says exactly what I just said as part of my evidence, I was the head of that department. My identifications, my driving privileges, my memberships and permits were all apart of my evidence and was given by the government of Karzai to me to not only in a particular, but in throughout the whole Afghanistan they were apart of my evidence and if you do not physically have them, they are registered in the computer when I was caught. I also had a pistol and a radio for my office so they could get in contact with me. It had all the numbers and everything, my employment number and my private driver's license number, and my identification number."

  In response to the allegation that he provided a safe house for the "Karim explosive cell" Khandan Kadir said he only knew one Karim. Prior to taking the position with the NDS Kadir was a certified pharmacist, and had owned and run a pharmacy. The one Karim he knew had a shop near his. He knew him well enough to say "hello" — but he didn't really know him well. When Khandan Kadir said that the one Karim he knew was also in detention in Guantanamo, and suggested his Tribunal ask him about the cell himself, his Tribunal's President called for a recess.

• When the session reconvened Khandan Kadir went on, and testified that Karim could testify that he had taken risks to denounce the Taliban, even when they were still in power.
• Khandan Kadir described his capture, in detail.
  • He said he was told to tell all the women in his household to retire to a single room, while the rest of his house was searched. He suggested, instead, that they search that single room first, then he would lead his women to that room.
  • The Americans who came to search his house were accompanied by Jan Baz, and by soldiers under the command of Pacha Khan. He describes realizing that the search of his house must be due to a false allegation from Pacha Khan, to fulfill the threats he had been receiving from him.
  • Khandan Kadir told his younger brother to go quickly, and tell the Governor that Pacha Khan was up to his old tricks. But neighbourhood children ran in, and told him that his brother had been seized by the Americans, and they had tied him up.
  • When the Americans entered his house they tied him up too. He denied he was hiding with the women. He denied he was hiding at all.

[edit] Response to Tribunal questions

• Khandan Kadir's Personal Representative asked him questions to confirm that an American soldier had entered his home, and instructed him, through an Afghan interpreter, to send the women in his household to a separate room — establishing that he had not hid from the Americans.
• Khandan Kadir's Personal Representative asked him to tell the Tribunal about Sudar, another nephew of Pacha Khan. Khandan Kadir told the Tribunal that when Sudar was held in Bagram, he had told his interrogators that Pacha Khan had told him, three times, to find a way to denounce Khandan Kadir to the Americans. Khandan Kadir said he was present when Sudar identified him to his interrogators, and when he testified that he had been ordered to denounce him to the Americans.
• In response to questions as to why he agreed to join the security service when he had been happy working as a pharmacist, Khandan Kadir explained that working in security was not considered that honorable an occupation. But his education made him more worldly, so he could see it was an important job. And his education as a pharmacist enable him to recognize illicit drugs — necessary skills that were hard to find in the general Afghan population.
• Khandan Kadir was asked to explain why, when contacted, the NDS did not acknowledge that he was a member. He speculated that the person making the query to the NDS, or the person answering the query from within the NDS, did not realize he worked within its secret divisions.
• Khandan Kadir said that his boss, responsible for all twelve branches of the NDS in Khowst was engineer Hazrat-U-Din.
• Khandan Kadir was asked to explain who Kiat Ali Goul, one of his witnesses was, and what testimony he thought he could have provided if he had been able to provide his testimony. He repliade that Kiat Ali Goul could have testified:
  • Kiat Ali Goul would have confirmed that he was in charge of the Khowst office of the anti-drug portion of the NDS.
  • Kiat Ali Goul would have confirmed that Pacha Khan was his enemy.
  • Kiat Ali Goul would have confirmed that Pacha Khan had seized two of the vehicles assigned to his office.
• Khandan Kadir confirmed that it was not unusual for him to entertain guests, in his separate guest house.
• Khandan Kadir testified that he had gone to Pakistan to study, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was in Pakistan he earned his Pharmacy degree.
• Khandan Kadir confirmed he had never had any military training. He confirmed that, in addition to his official pistol he had a shot-gun he used to protect his shop. Both their serial numbers were registered .And he had seen both weapons during his interrogation in Bagram.
• Khandan Kadir explained that he was in one of the American's vehicles while they searched his house, so he could not confirm what they took away following the search.
• Khandan Kadir explained that it was not the responsibility of his branch to capture Taliban or al Qaeda fighters. Rather he captured drug dealers, drug users. He had also captured some kids, who had triggered suspicion by sneaking out of school, even though the illicit activity they turned out to be engaged in was "watching porn videos".
• Khandan Kadir confirmed that he had told his boss of Pacha Khan's capture of his cars and drivers. He said that his boss was afraid of Pacha Khan, and told him to watch out, that he thought Khan might try to kill him. He said even the local Governor was afraid of Khan.

[edit] Abuse reports

After the Tribunal concluded its questions Khandan Kadir informed them of the abuses he had undergone, while in American custody. His Tribunal's President assured him his complaints would be recorded.

• During the first two days and three nights he was in American custody, in Khowst, he wasn't fed or given anything to drink. He was bound, with a bag over his head.
• When he first arrived at the Bagram airfield detention facility he was strapped in a standing position, wearing blackout goggles, ear-plugs, and with a bag over his head, 24 hours a day, for fifteen days. A soldier gave him water. But he was not given any food. The constant standing raised his blood pressure that he would bleed from his nose and eyes.
• When he was finally released the constant standing had caused his legs to swell so much he couldn't walk.
• He said that he saw four other captives die, in front of him, during his time in Bagram.
• His treatment improved when he was sent to Kandahar Airfield, and he had not been abused in Guantanamo.

Main article: Bagram torture and prisoner abuse

[edit] Witness statements

Statements from two witnesses, exhibits D-B and D-C, were read into the record. There was a policy change, over the course of the Trunals. Following the policy change when detainees called for the testimony of witnesses who were kept at a different security classification than their own, those witnesses were not allowed to testify in front of the Tribunal, in person. The detainee had to rely on their Personal Representative taking a statement.

A hand-written transcription of their statements was attached to the transcript.

[edit] Exhibit D-B: a witness statement

The following is a statement obtained orally from ############ ########### regarding ############## #########. It was obtained freely on 5 Jan 05 and translated back to him for verification prior to him signing its truthfulness.^[8]

"I met ############ when he was working for Karzai's government in the National Security or Secret Service. He was not against Karzai because he worked for Karzai's government. I was responsible for guarding the building where ########### worked. He was against ############# because he put him in jail.

"I do not know what his thought are about the Taliban. I don't know if he fought the Taliban in the Khost ^[sic] area. If he works for Karzai then he is for America. I knew him for our mutual employment for Karzai — a working relationship. I saw him daily at the National Security building.

"I ############# swear by all mighty Allah that what I have said today is the truth."

[edit] Exhibit D-C: a witness statement

The following is a statement obtained orally from ################## regarding ##################### it was obtained freely on 5 Jan 05 and translated back to him for verification prior to him signing its truthfulness.^[9]

"######## owned a pharmacy in ###### acted as a physician. I don't know him as Taliban. I owned a flower shop and cooking post shop across the street for five years before my arrest. ####### already owned the pharmacy before I got there. He was always involved with the pharmacy and nothing else. I never heard of any explosive cells in ######.

"######## worked just after sunrise until sunset. He and I would see each other during the day to go pray at the mosque about 5-6 minutes walk. My relationship was casual, not close. I've never seen him do anything except work 100% in his profession.

"I, ################ swear by all mighty Allah that what I have said today is the truth."

[edit] Exhibit D-D: letter from his brother

A letter from his brother, bearing the date July 5, 2004, was submitted into evidence. One paragraph from the letter was translated, and appended to his Transcript.^[10]

Translation of highlighted portion of a letter from the brother of Detainee, ###

"We are not facing problems. Security is reliable. Each person does his own thing. Your friends, some have their jobs, some have been transferred to different jobs. If they're not working on your release, that is upon their fairness and dignity. Other than that, do not worry about us. Merciful God will one day release you because you are an innocent person and not a criminal and a member of the transitional Islamic Karzai government. God is kind. You will be released soon."

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Kadir chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[11]

[edit] Enemy Combatant Election Form

Kadir's Assisting Military Officer, referring to Kadir's Enemy Combatnat Election Form, told his Board they first met on November 30, 2005, for 62 minutes. Kadir told his Assisting Military Officer he wanted to present six letters to his Board. And they met, a second time, on December 1, 2005 for Kadir to bring in his letters.

Kadir's Assisting Military Officer told his Board that Kadir was "cooperative and polite throughout both interviews".

Kadir was given a copy of his Unclassified Summary of Evidence memo, translated into the Pashto language.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he support ^[sic] Hizb-e-Isalmi Gulbuddin ^[sic] and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, as did the United States during the Soviet invasion. However, Hizb-e-Isalmi Gulbuddin ^[sic] is now considered the enemy.
2. During the Russian Jihad, the detainee was a nurse for Hizb-e-Isalmi Gulbuddin ^[sic] but has no involvement with Hizb-e-Isalmi Gulbuddin ^[sic] since 1992.

b. Intent

1. The detainee related that he owned a Kalashnikov and a pistol. The detainee stated that he never used these weapons against the United States. The detainee only has the weapons for protection. The detainee said that is is common in his town to carry a Kalashnikob. His job requires that he carry a Kalashnikob.
2. The detainee is suspected of running a safe house in Khowst. This safe house is believed to be his home on in close proximity.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured in Khowst in his house on 19 September 2002. He had been on duty all week and came home on Friday. The detainee claims his enemy had him arrested.
2. Various documents, allegedly from government officials, were found. They authorized unimpeded movements through checkpoints and security and offer ^[sic] vehicle clearance.
3. The detainee was authorized to carry a weapon.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee claimed he has never attended any military schools or received any military training.
b.	The detainee was very forthcoming during the interview. The detainee is of above average intelligence and cooperated throughout. The detainee strongly believes that he has been wrongfully imprisoned, because an individual threatened to have the detainee arrested by the Americans.
c.	The detainee related that he has never been a member of any terrorist organization. The only terrorist organization that he has knowledge of is the Taliban.
d.	The detainee stated that he is against the Taliban because they do not build or help his community by building roads, schools, lighting, etc. The Taliban terrorizes the people and have destroyed schools.
e.	The detainee was asked about the Usama bin Laden tape found in his house. The detainee claimed it was not a tape but only a cover from a tape. The detainee claimed that his enemy Pasha Khan left the tape cover at his house.
f.	The detainee related he worked with Americans before his detainment. The detainee identified a journalist/reporter whom later stated his worked for American Intelligence.
g.	The detainee stated, when American Forces entered the country, he was approached and worked with Americans who said they worked for American Intelligence. The Americans stayed at his house for 15 days before moving to the airport.
h.	When asked his thoughts on Afghanistan's future, the detainee replied his goal was was to assist in the development of Afghanistan. The detainee wants better resources, schools, roads and broad-based, established democratic government. Additionally, the detainee would also like to see Afghanistan develop relationships with foreign countries.
i.	The detainee seems to not like the Taliban, al Qaida or the Jama'at Tablighi. The detainee volunteered to work with Americans against these groups if could return to Afghanistan.
j.	The detainee is not upset with the United States, but is frustrated with the methods used to capture people. The detainee claims other Afghans who have a grudge against someone else are just accusing people because of personal rivalries and are making up stories about people who are actually innocent. The detainee claims that a person by the name of Jan Baz turned him in to United States Forces for a reward.
k.	The detainee claimed to be a Jama'at Islami member. The detainee explained that the group opposes the Taliban Forces. The Jama'at Islami used to pass out anti-al Qaida posters offering monetary rewards in exchange for information to the schools in the area.
l.	In the spring of 2002, the detainee stated he was offered a job with the new Afghanistan government of Karzai. The detainee also state that he was made the director of the 7th Division of the Afghanistan National Security Office in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee claims a letter of appointment to this post is among his belongings held by United States Forces. His responsibilities included monitoring media, hospitals, schools and tracking narcotics trafficking.

[edit] Response to the factors favoring continued detention

[edit] Response to the factors favoring release or transfer

[edit] Documents submitted

[edit] Habeas corpus submission

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Gherebi, et al. v. Bush, January 31st 2007

Khandan Kadir is one of the sixteen Guantanamo captives whose amalgamated habeas corpus submissions were heard by US District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton on January 31, 2007.^[3]

Further information: Gherebi, et al. v. Bush

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b c} list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b} list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
3. ^ ^{a b} Reggie B. Walton (January 31, 2007). Gherebi, et al. v. Bush. United States Department of Justice. Retrieved on May 19, 2007.
4. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
5. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
6. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
7. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Khandan Kadir's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 9-31
8. ^ Exhibits D-B, D-C: Witness statements (.pdf), from Khandan Kadir's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - page 30, January 5, 2005
9. ^ Exhibits D-B, D-C: Witness statements (.pdf), from Khandan Kadir's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - page 31, January 5, 2005
10. ^ Exhibit D-D: Letter from his brother. (.pdf), from Khandan Kadir's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - page 29
11. ^ ^{a b c} Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Khandan Kadir's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 1-21
12. ^ Three family photos (.pdf), submitted by Khandan Kadir to his Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 24-26
13. ^ more photos (.pdf), submitted by Khandan Kadir to his Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 27-28