Khalid Mallah Shayi Al Jilba Al Qahtani

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Khalid Malluh Shayi Al Jilba Al Qahtani (also transliterated as Khalid Malu Shia Al Ghatani) is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention] in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 439. The Department of Defense estimates that Al Qahtani was born in 1984, in Al Arib, Saudi Arabia.

Main article: minors detained in the global war on terror


Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 439 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conductI competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Khalid Mullah Shayi al-Jilba Al Qahtani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 31 August 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. Detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban.
  1. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan in the fall of 2000 to answer the Fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud.
  2. Detainee stayed at a Taliban safehouse in Quetta, Pakistan, while traveling to Afghanistan.
  3. Detainee received weapons training at Pakistani Center 5 for approximately five months. He was instructed in the use RPGs and Kalashnikov [sic] rifles and was regularly assigned guard duty while at this camp.
  4. Detainee was at the al-Farouq training camp.
b. Detainee engaged in hostilities against the United States.
  1. Detaiene was sent to Konduz and spent six months on the Khawaja Ghar front line.
  2. Detainee guarded sleeping bunkers for Pakistani forces fighting at the front lines in Hawajager, Afghanistan (Khawaja Ghar).
  3. Detainee was shot in the arm by a sniper, received medical treatment in Konduz and surrendered to Northern Alliance forces at Mazar e-Sharif [sic] .

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Al Qahtani participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[4]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Khalid Mallah Shayi Al Jilba Al Qahtani's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 31 March 2005.[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in the fall of 2000 to answer the Fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud [sic] .
  2. Sheikh Hamoud al Uqqla [sic] is a Saudi Mufti who issued fatwas, including a fatwa calling for jihad in Afghanistan, and encouraged people to fight jihad against the Christians and Jews. Al Uqqla condoned the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, and helped raise money for Usama Bin Laden until al Uqqla’s death in Saudi Arabia in 2001.
  3. The detainee stayed at a Taliban safehouse in Quetta, Pakistan, while traveling to Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee was shot in the arm by a sniper, received medical treatment in Konduz, and surrendered to Northern Alliance forces at Mazar-e-Sharif [sic] .
b. Training
  1. The detainee received weapons training at Pakistani Center #5 for approximately five months. He was instructed in the use of RPGs and Kalashnikov [sic] rifles and was regularly assigned guard duty while at this camp.
  2. The detainee’s alias was on a document issued by the office of Mujahideen Affairs listing over 150 al Qaida members scheduled for tactics, artillery, security, snipers and anti-aircraft training.
  3. The detainee was identified as having attended al Farouq training camp.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee’s name was found on a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from safehouse raids associated with suspected al Qaida in Karachi, Pakistan.
  2. The detainee’s name was found on a document (floppy disk) containing a list of names, safety deposit boxes and contents recovered from raids of a suspected al Qaida safehouse.
  3. The detainee’s name was found in the pocket litter of an Arab Mujahidin who entered Croatia from Bosnia in 1996.
  4. The detainee traveled to Tora Bora where he stayed for approximately two days with nine other Mujahadeen fighters in a stone house that was built into the mountain. Approximately two weeks later Usama Bin Laden came and stayed at the stone house.
d. Intent
  1. The detainee was sent to Konduz and spent six months on the Khawaja Ghar front line.
  2. The detainee guarded sleeping bunkers for Pakistani forces fighting at the front lines in Hawajager, Afghanistan (Khawaja Ghar).
e. Detainee Conduct
The detainee has been cited for assault, hostile activity, and harassment of guards on numerous occasions. He was cited on one occasion for making a weapon.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee did not fire his weapon at any soldiers or persons. He had no prior knowledge of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, or against the American people or anywhere else in the United States or the world.
b.

The detainee stated that he did not go to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, but to receive weapons training “and stand guard.”

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Khalid Malu Shia Al Ghatani's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 13 March 2006.[6] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. In the Ramadan season of 2000 he decided to travel to Mecca for the Uma.
  2. The detainee and another individual discussed a fatwa issued by Sheik Hamoud. The detainee understood this fatwa to mean that he had a duty to stand and defend Islam. The other individual suggested to the detainee that this fatwa could be performed by traveling to Afghanistan to fight the jihad with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The detainee took this advice and left for Afghanistan as soon as Uma ended. The other individual provided the detainee with instructions on how to travel to Afghanistan, as well as with financial support.
  3. The detainee stayed in a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan for four to five days with the money he had received.
  4. From Karachi, Pakistan the detainee took a bus to Quetta where he would stay at the Taliban House.
  5. The detainee remained in Kabul, Afghanistan for one day, at which time the detainee traveled to a camp that was named Pakistani Center #5.
  6. The detainee stayed at this camp approximately five to six months.
  7. After a period of time the detainee was sent to Konduz, Afghanistan to a place known as Khawaja Ghar; this place was known as another front line. The detainee remained at this location for approximately six months.
  8. The detainee guarded sleeping quarters/bunkers for Pakistani troops who fought at the front lines in Hawajager, Afghanistan.
b. Training
The detainee received weapons training with the Kalashnikov [sic] rifle, the PK machine gun, and the RPG rocket propelled grenade launcher.
c. Connections/Associations
The detainee's name was found among several floppy disks, with files listing the names, safety deposit boxes and contents, discovered during a joint raid at an alleged al Qaida residence.
d. Intent
  1. When asked why the detainee went to Afghanistan if the detainee did not intend to fight, the detainee repeated he wanted weapons training and that he wanted to stand guard for God's Way.
  2. The detainee repeated he did not go to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, but to receive weapons training and stand guard. The detainee claims he received this weapons training and support at safe houses without any obligation of military service on the front lines with the Taliban. The detainee claims he was free to go his own way when his weapons training was completed.
e Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee was entering a secure location when the detainee was shot in the left arm by a sniper. The detainee was given medical treatment in Konduz.
  2. The detainee spent approximately one week in a a hospital, then moved to a clinic in Konduz because the hospital was full. The detainee said he was then on his way to Mazar-e-Sharif [sic] , because the detainee wanted to make his way back to Saudi Arabia. In Mazar-e-Sharif, the detainee was taken prisoner by the Dostum forces. The detainee said he was held in Kandahar for about one week, and then moved to Camp X-Ray.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee had no prior knowledge of the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, or against the American people, or anywhere else in the United States or the World.
b.

The detainee said he did not fire his weapon at any soldiers or persons.

[edit] Repatriated on December 29, 2007

A captive named "Khaled Mulawwah Al-Qahtani" was repatriated on December 29, 2007, with nine other men.[7]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ a b OARDEC (31 August 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Qahtani, Khalid Mullah Shayi al-Jilba pages 104-105. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.
  3. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
  4. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  5. ^ OARDEC (31 March 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of pages 2-4. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.
  6. ^ OARDEC (13 March 2006). [? Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Ghatani, Khalid Malu Shia] pages 62-64. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.
  7. ^ P.K. Abdul Ghafour. "10 More Return From Guantanamo", Arab News, December 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2007-12-29.