Kennedy and Latin America

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The Cold War marked the post-World War II conflict between capitalism and communism manifested through the United States and the USSR. This conflict came nearest to armed fruition in 1962, in a period known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy's term proved to be the most volatile period of the Cold War, marked with both the blunder at the Bay of Pigs and the relative success during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The crisis epitomizes the Cold War; it resulted from the competitive arms race, exemplified each country's diplomatic tactic and possibly foreshadowed American victory.

Contents 1 The Bay of Pigs & Building Up To The Cuban Missile Crisis 2 The Cuban Missile Crisis 3 Kennedy's Legacy 4 References

[edit] The Bay of Pigs & Building Up To The Cuban Missile Crisis

President Kennedy carefully navigated the nation through a time of imminent danger. Even under pressures from advisors, he managed to make his own decisions and seek the most peaceful solution. Similar to Thomas Jefferson, Kennedy avoided the traps of the likes of War Hawks in order to effectively save the country. Kennedy displayed wisdom as well as powers of delegation in his methods dealing with the Soviet Union. The clearest example of Kennedy's wisdom can be seen in the crisis's end result, prevention of nuclear conflict in precarious conditions.

American involvement in Latin America can be traced back to the days of the Monroe Doctrine. For over a century the United States had been adamant in its need to effectively control Latin American politics. President Kennedy had plans of his own to deal with countries south of the border which became evident in his proposed "Alliance for Progress."1 When Kennedy proposed this alliance on March 13, 1961 in an address to Latin American diplomats and members of Congress, he euphemized its purpose as an alliance "to satisfy the basic needs of the [Latin] American people for homes, work and land, health and schools."2 This statement carried with it the same implication seen in nearly every Latin American intervention act from the Monroe Doctrine to the Roosevelt Corollary, one of American interests masked by apparent good will. Kennedy had a plan to "transform the 1960's into an historic decade of democratic progress." Later in his speech, the president rang the familiar bell of independence heard in the Good Neighbor policy. "We reaffirm our pledge to come to the defense of any American nation whose independence is endangered."3

This seeming idealism radiating from Kennedy's proposed Alliance for Progress directly relates to his policies on Cuba and Lyndon Johnson's policies towards the Dominican Republic. Kennedy, like his predecessors wanted to stop the proliferation of communism, especially into the Western Hemisphere. By pledging to defend the independence of Latin American countries under the façade of a humanitarian and progressive movement, Kennedy gave himself the power to intervene if communism were to take over. This is because Kennedy defined communism as the "repression of freedom". Thus, under such a policy, Cuba would be subjected to intervention. Kennedy even went as far to express a "special friendship to the people of Cuba" hoping that "they will soon rejoin the society of free men, uniting with us in our common effort."4

Kennedy's policies soon saw reality with an operation to directly usurp Fidel Castro from power. This coup d'etat was named Operation Mongoose. Operation Mongoose was to have "the United States ... help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace."5 This statement clearly shows the reason behind American policies in Latin America especially interventionist policies towards Cuba. The mission was to establish a government that can live peacefully with the United States, essentially an anti-communist regime. The goal was to extinguish communism from the Western Hemisphere. This statement was never made public because of its inference that Kennedy's policies were purely motivated by an anti-soviet feeling.

Operation Mongoose was to have eleven phases in which Cuban refugees would re-enter Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and attempt to overthrow the regime with the help of fellow Cuban nationals.6 The Bay of Pigs invasion failed miserably and the guerillas could not rally the support they anticipated. Failure was due to a lack of intelligence. Kennedy was well aware of this, evident by Brigadier General Lansdale's statement "We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba."7 Kennedy, however, chose to continue with the invasion under pressure from his staff. This military blunder would forever serve as a reminder to Kennedy and would greatly influence his future decisions.

There are mixed stances on the consequences of Operation Mongoose. Some historians agree that "this defeat did not significantly alter U.S. policy toward Cuba, which remained to undermine Castro by all means short of occupation by American forces, and to deter the Soviets from converting the island into an offensive military base."8 However at the time many top officials agreed to shift U.S. policy, as noted in a CIA briefing with Attorney General Robert Kennedy: "After failure of the [Bay of Pigs] invasion, the United States Government became less active on the theory `better to lay low'."9 A fact that most agree upon is Kennedy's new precautious attitude, which became especially more wary with the Joint Chiefs. Operation Mongoose also had effects abroad. "In Havana and in Moscow Operation Mongoose was taken, not unreasonably, as preparation for invasion by U.S. forces."10 Premier Khrushchev felt a need to protect his asset, since an American invasion of Cuba would cost the Soviets a Communist ally. Khrushchev wanted to allow Cuba to defend itself, in order to do so he wanted to give it nuclear missiles. Castro, however, was not as welcoming towards this idea. "When Castro and I [Khrushchev] talked about the problem [allowing Soviet nuclear missiles into Cuba], we argued and argued. Our argument was very heated. But, in the end, Fidel agreed with me."11 Perhaps the most major consequence of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion was not domestic; rather it served as a step towards placing nuclear missiles in Cuba.

[edit] The Cuban Missile Crisis

On October 16, 1962 an intelligence briefing landed on President Kennedy's desk. In this daily briefing there showed pictures taken by a U2 earlier that morning providing evidence that Russia was placing nuclear weapons in Cuba. Thus began the thirteen days of extreme tension between the USSR and the United States. What happened during those thirteen days was extremely dense, and for the sake of clarity and brevity will not be fully explored. In short, the President was given several options, ranging from peaceful diplomacy to full invasion. Kennedy knew that simply talking to Russia would not solve the problem, and even if it did, it would take too long; Kennedy was racing to find a solution before the nuclear missiles became operational. Kennedy was also well aware of the history of attempted peaceful diplomacy. He recalled London's blunders in World War II and the failure of appeasement towards totalitarian regimes.12 This would influence his decision to use some military force. Kennedy decided on a naval blockade of Cuba, properly euphemized as a "quarantine" in order to avoid the martial connotation. He knew also of the importance of international support and therefore turned to the Organization of American States. "The diplomatic effort was of great significance. We were able to establish a firm legal foundation for our action under the OAS Charter, and our position around the world was greatly strengthened when the Organization of American States unanimously supported the recommendation for a quarantine."13 The quarantine was in effect but that still left the problem of the missiles already in Cuba. Kennedy was being bullied by the Joint Chiefs into an air strike followed by an invasion. Fresh in his mind however, was the failed Operation Mongoose. The president and the Joint Chiefs soon became on two opposite extremes with hostilities running high. Kennedy said "If we... do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them that they were wrong."14 The Chiefs wanted to invade both to show their military might and also to make up for the loss at the Bay of Pigs. Kennedy was smart and knew that this was not the time for rash military action. In his mind he knew how the situation would play out if the generals had their way: the United States would invade Cuba; Russia, not wanting to immediately launch nuclear missiles from Cuba, would invade Berlin; the United States would be bound by treaty to defend Berlin, with plans involving the use nuclear missile; once the United States launched its missiles Russia would fire theirs. Kennedy fully understood the horrid danger of this scenario and accordingly treaded very carefully. Interestingly, both the USSR and the United States were in similar circumstances. "'One of the ironic things,' Kennedy Observed in the spring of 1963, "... is that Mr. Khrushchev and I occupy approximately the same political positions inside our governments. He would like to prevent a nuclear war but is under severe pressure from his hard-line crowd, which interprets every move in that direction as appeasement. I've got similar problems.... The hard-liners in the Soviet Union and the United States feed on one another.'"15 Kennedy displayed his wisdom when he positioned himself firmly against any direct military involvement. Together with his brother Robert and special adviser Kenny O'Donnell, he moved towards a peaceful exchange after the quarantine.

The United States had in its arsenal several outdated nuclear missiles in Turkey. (A possible justification for the installment of missiles in Cuba was that the U.S. was doing the same in Turkey, a country with similar proximity to the opponent country.) When Adlai Stevenson, the United States delegate to the United Nations, proposed the idea of trading American missiles in Turkey for the ones in Cuba he was greatly criticized by the Joint Chiefs. Even Kennedy primarily saw it as "selling out one of our friends to protect ourselves."16 Though as days passed this option became more appealing.

President Kennedy sent his brother to meet with the Soviet diplomat Dobrynin with the intention of striking a deal. Robert Kennedy proposed trading the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, along with a promise not to invade Cuba, for the removal of nuclear missiles from Cuba. Behind the backs of the Joint Chiefs, Kennedy made the deal with the Soviets which was later sanctioned by the U.N. The next day Premier Khrushchev issued a withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba and the world breathed a sigh of relief.

[edit] Kennedy's Legacy

The Cuban Missile Crisis taught both the United States and the Soviet Union to be less aggressive in their dealings with one another. Having been so close to the brink of war they learned of the dangerous potential outcomes. Accordingly, they took precautionary measures to insure that direct conflict would not occur. The crisis was a step towards détente, evident by the establishment of the "hot line" between Washington and the Kremlin.17 The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 recognized the danger of nuclear weapons and was a step towards disarmament.18 The two nations would avoid such direct confrontation forever, though they would face each other indirectly in distant battlefields as in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. 19

After Kennedy was assassinated, President Lyndon B. Johnson would sternly strengthen the United States's Latin American policy. His policies are exemplified in the affair with the Dominican Republic. Latin America was a volatile region which could at any time turn to communism. For this reason Eisenhower set up the Progress Trust fund to help raise the standards of living in Latin America. "It was hoped that this would prevent the extremism that fueled Marxist sympathies among poor Latin Americans."20 the Cuban Revolution had inflamed the volatility of the region and soon the Dominican Republic was on the verge of becoming Communist. Johnson's main goal was to support nations which brought stability to the area. He therefore sent 500 Marines into the Dominican Republic. Their mission was to stop communism from spreading into the country because President Johnson did not want another incident like Cuba. 21 Johnson's strategy was more aggressive; however his situation did not call for the caution required in the Missile Crisis.

Kennedy's presidency saw the closest and most volatile encounter with the Soviet Union. Such high tension and turbulence informed each nation of the risk of global nuclear war. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis helped steer relations between the US and the USSR towards gradual disarmament. True steps toward détente however, would not come into full fruition until President Nixon, one decade later.

[edit] References

1. Address by President Kennedy at a White House Reception for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961 from The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1136 (April 3, 1961), pp, 471.

2. Address by President Kennedy at a White House Reception for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961 from The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1136 (April 3, 1961), pp, 471.

3. Address by President Kennedy at a White House Reception for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961 from The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1136 (April 3, 1961), pp, 472.

4. Address by President Kennedy at a White House Reception for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress, March 13, 1961 from The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1136 (April 3, 1961), pp, 474.

5. Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale. SENSITIVE/TOP SECRET. De-Classified 1998. Operation Mongoose: The Cuba Project. 20 February 1962.

6. Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale. SENSITIVE/TOP SECRET. De-Classified 1998. Operation Mongoose: The Cuba Project. 20 February 1962.

7. Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale. SENSITIVE/TOP SECRET. De-Classified 1998. Operation Mongoose: The Cuba Project. 20 February 1962.

8. Weisbrot, Robert. Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence. Dee, Ivan R. Publisher. New York. 2001

9. CIA, Minutes, TOP SECRET, "Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba," 19 January 1962 (Richard Helms)

10. Schlesinger Jr., Arthur, Thirteen Days. Norton & Company, New York, NY. 1999 pp. 9

11. N. S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev remembers: The Last Testament (Boston, 1974.) pp. 511

12. Kennedy, John F.. Why England Slept. 1940. New York: Greenwood Publishing, 1993

13. Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. New York, NY. 1971

14. Kenneth O'Donnell and David F Powers, Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye. (Boston, 1974) pp. 318

15. Norman Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate. (New York, 1972), pp. 114

16. Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W. W. Norton and Company, Inc. New York, NY. 1971 pp. 56

17. Lafeber, Walter; 1980. America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1980 (John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, USA)

18.Cohen, Warren I.; 1993. The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume IV: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)

19. Gaddis, John Lewis; 1990. Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History (McGraw-Hill, Boston, Massachusetts, USA) pp. 62

20. Gudicello, Dean. Security at Any Cost. Dissertation Boston College, 2004. Boston: UMI, 2004 pp. 48

21. Gudicello, Dean. Security at Any Cost. Dissertation Boston College, 2004. Boston: UMI, 2004 pp. 52