Talk:Kavod HaBriyot

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[edit] Origins and context of the notion of Kavod HaBriyot

Hi IZAK. The source for this concept is a very specific Gemarrah in Berachot 19b that specifically identifies the concept by name, and specifically states that Kavod HaBriyot can override a negative injunction. Pirkei Avot simply has nothing to do with this specific Talmudic concept, saying it's the origin or is even connected appears to me to be simply WP:OR. No authority I know of who discusses the concept begins there, all begin with Berachot 19b. Would you agree to changing accordingly? Best, --Shirahadasha 22:40, 25 December 2006 (UTC)


Hi Shira: Good hearing from you. Have you actually studied the entire subject in that Gemara and the context of the citation from Berachot 19b? If you have, you will see that the citation you mention is from only one isolated baraita that the Gemara eventually rejects! In that sugya in Berachot 19b it's cited as part of an attempt to challenge an earlier statement by Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav that someone who discovers that he is wearing a garment with shatnez in it must remove the garment even if he is standing in the middle of the marketplace. "Why so?" he asks, and answers by citing from the verse in the Book of Proverbs 21:30 אֵין חָכְמָה, וְאֵין תְּבוּנָה וְאֵין עֵצָה, לְנֶגֶד יְהוָה "There is no wisdom nor understanding nor counsel against the Lord" [1] and reinforces it by declaring that this teaches that wherever there is the threat of Chillul Hashem one does not worry about giving honor ("kavod") to one's (or any) teacher (see ArtScroll commentary on Berachot 19b1 point 9: "...considerations of human dignity cannot weigh against the desecration of God's Name that results from transgressing one of His commandments. Therefore discovering a forbiden mixture of wool and linen [shatnez] one must immediately shed the offending garment, despite the indignity involved") and it's then that the Gemara launches a series of questions against Rav's statement (including the baraita (alone) with the quote about Kavod HaBriyot that says: תא שמע גדול כבוד הבריות שדוחה לא תעשה שבתורה "great is honor of people that it pushes aside a negative commandment in the Torah") with the Gemara rejecting the premises of all of them, and Rav's statement in the Halakha becomes the basis of a definitive ruling in the Shulkhan Arukh (see below).

In fact, the Gemara (Berachot 20a) had gone even further, when it reinforces a statement by Abaye "that earlier generations sacrificed themselves for Kiddush Hashem and that is why God performed miracles for them" and the Gemara gives an example in an episode that happened to Rav Adda bar Ahavah who "saw a Cuthean woman who was wearing a karbalta (an ostentatious type of garment; it is mentioned in Daniel 3:21 [ArtScroll Berachot 20a2:14]) in the street. He mistook her for a Jewess and arose and tore it from her. It was then discovered that she was really a Cuthean woman and he had to pay a fine. They evaluated his fine at four hundred zuz. He asked her: What is your name? She answered him: My name is Matun. He said to her: Matun matun was worth four hundred zuz to me!" (Matun resembles the Aramaic word matan, which is 200. Thus the woman's name portended this outcome, 2x200=400 [ArtScroll Bercahot 20a2:17].) The Gemara is thus clearly reinforcing its point that "Kavod HaBriyot" is not some kind of "ironclad" rule that can never be breeched because, on the contrary, the sages of the Talmud were not afraid nor ashamed to act in a manner that would defy a false application of the notion of Kavod HaBriyot when the honor the mitzvot, the Torah, and God are at stake.

The Rishonim and Acharonim accept Rav's statement and conclusions, and carify them further, showing where there may be delays or alternatives to immediate action, based on Kavod HaBriyot, but not that Kavod HaBriyot can be summoned to justify or rationalize acts and actions that were neither widely practiced nor accepted by Jews during Jewish history.

For example, Maimonides in the Mishneh Torah, Zera'im, Hilchot Kilayim 10:29 states (full quote):

כט. הרואה כלאים של תורה על חבירו אפילו היה מהלך בשוק קופץ לו וקורעו עליו מיד ואפילו היה רבו שלמדו חכמה שאין כבוד הבריות דוחה איסור לא תעשה המפורש בתורה ולמה נדחה בהשב אבדה מפני שהוא לאו של ממון ולמה נדחה בטומאת מת הואיל ופרט הכתוב ולאחותו מפי השמועה למדו לאחותו אינו מטמא אבל מטמא הוא למת מצוה אבל דבר שאיסורו מדבריהם הרי הוא נדחה מפני כבוד הבריות בכ"מ ואף על פי שכתוב בתורה לא תסור מן הדבר הרי לאו זה נדחה מפני כבוד הבריות לפיכך אם היה עליו שעטנז של דבריהם אינו קורעו עליו בשוק ואינו פושטו בשוק עד שמגיע לביתו ואם היה של תורה פושטו מיד[2]

"One who sees Kilayim (shatnez) forbidden by the Torah on his friend even if he was walking in the marketplace, he jumps on him and tears (his clothing with shatnez in it) from him immediately, even if it was his rabbi who had taught him the majority of his (Torah) wisdom because honoring people (Kavod HaBriyot) does not push aside a negative commandment that was specified in the Torah ("Thou shalt not wear a mingled stuff, wool and linen together" Deuteronomy 22:11 [3])...but that which is forbidden by rabbinical decree (divreihem) can be pushed aside by the principle of Kavod HaBriyot in every place...therefore if someone was wearing shatnez forbidden by the rabbis one does not tear it from him in the marketplace and does not remove it from him in the market place until he gets home and if it was indeed from the Torah he removes it immediately"

Maimonides is thus making a number of differentiations between negative commandments (lavin) and positive ones (esehs) and betweeen commandments of the Torah (de'oraisas) and those from the rabbis (derabanans) so one would need to be very highly regarded qualified Posek and Torah scholar with wide universal acceptance to arrive at the conclusions that you have done when initially composing this article. One cannot imagine, under any circumstances, that Maimonides or anyone in the Talmud would use the rationales and reasonings that you mention to justify women getting aliyot, or accepting gay rabbis and homosexuality, something which the Torah itself calls an abomination ("And if a man lie with mankind, as with womankind, both of them have committed abomination (toeivah תּוֹעֵבָה): they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them" Leviticus 20:13 [4]) when you can see that the Torah itself sentences people to death, a very obvious "disregard" for an interpretation of "Kavod HaBriyot." So it's a huge mistake to apply "Kavod HaBriyot" as a fig leaf or a false license to breech and break the Torah's commandments, a logical impossibility. This type of reasoning would be condemned as naval birshus hatorah (Nahmanides at the beginning of Parshas Kedoshim [5]) and megaleh panim batorah [shelo kehalachah] (Sanhedrin 99a, and Mishneh Torah Mada, Hilchot Teshuva 3:11)

Kindly note that the Halakha in the Shulkhan Arukh goes according to Rav (as quoted above):

Shulkhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 303:1 "[That it is] Permissible to remove kilayim from [his] friend even in [the] marketplace:
[Mechaber]: One who sees kilayim of (forbidden by) the Torah on his friend even if they were walking in the marketplace [he] jumps upon him and tears it from upon him immediately even if he was his rabbi
[Ramo]: And there are those who say that if had worn them in error then he does not need to tell him about it in the markerplace because of Kavod HaBriyot he [should] remain silent and not remove it it due to [the] error [of the wearer] (Tur in the name of the Rosh)
[Mechaber]: And if it was [forbidden] by the words [of the rabbis] (divreihem) he does not tear it from him and he does not remove it in the marketplace until he arrives at home
[Ramo]: And also (likewise) in the Beth midrash there is no need to hurry to leave (Tur)
[Mechaber]: But if it was from (forbidden by) the Torah he removes immediately.

It is hard to see how any of the so-called modern-day opinions stemming from the people you cite have any meaningful connection with the above sources and rulings.

I also find your comments totally incredulous, that: "Pirkei Avot simply has nothing to do with this specific Talmudic concept, saying it's the origin or is even connected appears to me to be simply WP:OR. No authority I know of who discusses the concept begins there, all begin with Berachot 19b." Is this discussion of "authorities" only? Which "authority" do you mean? Were the sages of the Mishnah and Talmud not rooted in the entirety of the written and Oral Torah?

I cannot fathom what you are saying! Are you saying that one day, when the rabbis of the Gemara, and not related to anything else, sat down to discuss this topic they "invented" the notion of "Kavod HaBriyot"? I think you are confusing the specific mention of it as part of a dialogue recorded in a Gemara, with the fact that the notion of Kavod HaBriyot has deep roots and is an old foundation from the earliest times and sources.

I deliberately avoided writing how Kavod HaBriyot is connected to the concept of the Tselem Elokim (the "image of God" or "Godly image") in every person, based on the Torah in Genesis stating that Man was/is created in the image of God (the Tselem Elokim): "And God said: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness (בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ)..." Genesis 1:26 [6]; "And God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." (וַיִּבְרָא אֱלֹהִים אֶת-הָאָדָם בְּצַלְמוֹ, בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים בָּרָא אֹתוֹ: זָכָר וּנְקֵבָה, בָּרָא אֹתָם.) Genesis 1:27 [7]; "Then the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." (וַיִּיצֶר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת-הָאָדָם, עָפָר מִן-הָאֲדָמָה, וַיִּפַּח בְּאַפָּיו, נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים; וַיְהִי הָאָדָם, לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה) Genesis 2:7 [8] Thus when God breathed his spirit into Adam giving him life, Adam is an "extension" of God through the spirit that God breathed into him, so that when we honor any human we are also honoring God.

What about the many episodes in the Torah such as Shem and Japhet covering the naked Noah and not looking at his state, is that not "Kavod HaBriyot"? Or, Abraham praying for Sodom and Gemora worrying about the fate of possible innocents, is that not "Kavod HaBriyot"? Or Rachel not wanting to embarrass her sister Leah by allowing Jacob to marry Leah unwittinly, is that not "Kavod HaBriyot"? And what about the commandment of "...thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord" (וְאָהַבְתָּ לְרֵעֲךָ כָּמוֹךָ) Leviticus 19:18 [9] which is probably the most important source from the Torah for Kavod HaBriyot. Indeed the entire Torah is based on inculcating the concept of Kavod for others. Why was the Flood brought to the world and were the people of the Tower of Babel dispersed, if nor because they did not honor each other. And subsequently, in a similar vein, why did the 24,000 students of Rabbi Akiva die? Because they did not honor each other.

Is not the Mishnah the foundation of the Gemara and together they become the Talmud? Is not Pirkei Avoth an inherent part of the Mishnah (and part of Seder Nezikin)? Is not Pirkei Avot the most important collection of definitive THE authoritative guideline, source and reference for all of the Mishnah's and Talmud's jurisprudence?

Finally, it's obvious and self-evident that the Tannaim and certainly all Amoraim themselves were aware of, did not argue with, and fully accepted, and applied the following, not only into Kavod HaBriyot but into many other principles and guidelines of Jewish law and life:

"Ben Zoma says: איזהו מכובד? המכבד את הבריות Who is honored (mechubad)? He who honors (mechabed) others habriyot, as it is said: 'For those who honor Me (God) I will honor, and those who scorn Me shall be degraded' (Samuel I 2:30)" (Avot 4:1) [10]

Here you have it, a few hundred years before the Gemara in Berachot, the Tana Ben Zoma says, as codified in the Mishnah by Rebbe Yehudah HaNasi, using the same words, "Who is honored מכובד one who honors מכבד, other people, here called the "Briyot" הבריות.

The above is an explanation for the origins, context, and relationship to the entirety of classical Judaism concerning the notion of "Kavod HaBriyot" which needs to be incorporated into the article ASAP. Does any "authoritative" rabbi dispute any of the above? I look forward to hearing from you. IZAK 17:40, 26 December 2006 (UTC)

Hi IZAK! Good to hear from you and glad to hear you are well. It seems to me that your exposition above accepts that the origin of the concept is this Gamarrah, so it sounds like we're agreement on that. You strongly disagree that the concept can legitimately be applied to the things the group of Conservative rabbis attempted to apply it to. And of course you're entitled to do that! Even a lot of Conservative rabbis thought the argument they made was shaky. You'll notice I quoted a Conservative rabbi who made an argument very similar to one you made above, that the context in which the idea comes up in the Gemarrah (as well as its subsequent use) demonstrates that it only involves someone else's honor, and it is completely illegitimate to cite the concept as part of an attempt to put one's own honor above HaShem's. Be that as it may, Both Daniel Sperber and these Conservative rabbis took an existing concept -- one that has seen some accepted Orthodox application, such as the teshuvah on wearing a hearing aid on Shabbat -- and attempted to extend it. Their attempt and their arguments are notable. So are the arguments that such approaches are anything from dubious to a shonda. Best, --Shirahadasha 01:17, 28 December 2006 (UTC)
As to connection of concept with Pirkei Avot etc. -- the folks making these arguments root them in Berachot 19b. Remembering the rules about WP:OR, the article is on this very specific Talmudic concept, not some generic topic like "Human digity in Judaism". If you have reliable sources that this specific idea that negative rabbinic laws can be nullified under certain circumstances because of something called "kavod habriyot" is connected with other passages in the Talmud, what are your sources? One can of course connect the idea with many things oneself, but what have others actually done? Remember that the principle argument your making is that the concept means something specific that's rooted in its Talmudic context, and can't be made to mean, simply by bringing in other nice-sounding sources and claiming that they're relevant, whatever one wants it to mean. Best, --Shirahadasha 04:46, 28 December 2006 (UTC)

Hi Shira: You make me laugh! So is the Shulkhan Arukh also "guilty" of "original research" when it says the following? IZAK 19:23, 31 December 2006 (UTC):

Shulkhan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 303:1 "[That it is] Permissible to remove kilayim from [his] friend even in [the] marketplace:
[Mechaber]: One who sees kilayim of (forbidden by) the Torah on his friend even if they were walking in the marketplace [he] jumps upon him and tears it from upon him immediately even if he was his rabbi
[Ramo]: And there are those who say that if had worn them in error then he does not need to tell him about it in the markerplace because of Kavod HaBriyot he [should] remain silent and not remove it it due to [the] error [of the wearer] (Tur in the name of the Rosh)
[Mechaber]: And if it was [forbidden] by the words [of the rabbis] (divreihem) he does not tear it from him and he does not remove it in the marketplace until he arrives at home
[Ramo]: And also (likewise) in the Beth midrash there is no need to hurry to leave (Tur)
[Mechaber]: But if it was from (forbidden by) the Torah he removes immediately.

IZAK, As far as I know everyone agrees that the Baraita is rejected in the sense that Kavod HaBriyot can be extended only to (certain kinds of) Rabbinic prohibitions. Even the Conservative opinion acknowledged this much. I think the two key problems with the Conservative opinion were (1) they claimed that the Torah prohibition is as limited only to anal sodomy and that all other types of homosexual conduct are prohibited by Rabbinic injuction only, and (2) they claimed that Kavod HaBriyot applies to these Rabbinic injunctions because (in their view) prohibiting homosexual conduct is "undignified". Sources objecting to both claims are readily available. The Conservative dissent strongly disputed both of them, and particularly the claim that Kavod HaBriyot had any business being used in such a manner. It noted that Kavod HaBriyot applies only to respect for other people's honor, and argued that the idea that one can set aside a mitzvah because of ones own honor is foreign to Judaism. But it's inappropriate to present, as Wikipedia's opinion, a particular idea of the concept, or to say as fact that the Conservative opinion is wrong based ones own general type of interpretation or even the ArtScroll commentary. Best, --Shirahadasha 00:42, 1 January 2007 (UTC)

  • You know Shira it boggles the mind that you make the jump from a serious discussion in the Talmud to modern-day disruptions to Judaism by people who don't really care what the Talmud or the classical rabbis said or did not say. Do the Conservatives really need "justifications" from the Talmud for what they want to do (regarding anal sex and the like) when all they are trying to do is to emulate Reform Judaism's practices, who in turn just emulate what is going on in left-wing circles? At least the Reform don't make up lame and cockamamy "reasons" based on this-or-that out-of-context misinformed usage of the Talmud. This is how Reform makes their innovations: They wake up one morning and see headlines and op-eds in the New York Times about women's rights, gay rights, left-wing causes, anti-Israel issues, and whatnot, and they say, hey why aren't we doing this, and they then go ahead and do it. Now that is honest, if not based on Judaism (as far as anyone knows it to be.) So now the Conservatives don't have the guts to be so brazen so they rummage around for this or that teaching, quote it out context, cut it off from the totality of what the Torah and Torah scholars have been saying for thousands of years, publish it in a nice shiny new book, get the JTS to send out a few hundred copies to some people, that then gets quoted as a "source" on Wikipedia where people who don't know much about Judaism or Torah study assume it's a "good" book and hey, presto, there is Conservative responsa to refer to. If only it was that easy. Sorry, you will have to do better than quoting silly Conservativce rabbis and dubious authors in the face of what the raw sources in the Oral Torah, the Talmud, Shulkhan Arukh and in rabbinical literature say. IZAK 03:47, 2 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Requesting Comments

Repeating comment on Wikipedia Talk:WikiProject Judaism#Kavod HaBriyot article:

Hello, IZAK and I are having one of our occassional disagreements where outside comment might be helpful, this time about the Kavod HaBriyot article. I recently started the article because the concept has gotten increased notability as a result of its use in a Conservative opinion on homosexuality. It was previously used by Daniel Sperber as a basis for an opinion on women's aliyot. Before then Orthodox rabbis used it for much more mundane topics like whether a deaf person can use a hearing aid on Shabbat. These rulings are based on a particular Bareitah and related discussion in Berachot 19b beginning with "Great is kevod habriyot, which can override a negative prohibition of the Torah." IZAK has rewritten the article (a) to claim that the concept as we know it today is really based on statements in Pirkei Avot and elsewhere, and (b) to present as fact his view that the Rabbis of the Gemorrah eventually rejected the Baraitah in toto, so that it has no legitimate application in Halachah, period. Whatever one makes of this, I presented sources that contemporary rabbis (on the mundane as well as the controversial topics) looked to Berachot 19b as their source, saw it as still having some life (although addressing at most Rabbinic rather than Torah prohibitions), and used it in contemporary opinions. Although I respect both his passionate attachment and his scholarship, IZAK's essay seems to me to be essentially Original research. What do others make of this? IZAK has put a lot of work into this, and I'd appreciate other's opinions before any more attempts to revert each other are made. Obviously this is a controversial topic with multiple views, and I myself find some interpretations more dubious than others. Please comment on Talk:Kavod HaBriyot#Requesting Comments. Thanks. Hope you had a tzom kal and have a Happy New Year, --Shirahadasha 00:14, 1 January 2007 (UTC)
  • Nothing I have added to the article is "original." If anything I have quoted verbatim the sources, the Shulkhan Arukh, and the meforshim. With all due respect, Kavod Habriyot is not about aliyas for women or what Daniel Sperber or any modern writer thinks it's about. This is a serious topic in Torah. IZAK 03:32, 2 January 2007 (UTC)
    • I agree with IZAK. The Shulkhan Arukh and other poskim cited can certainly be viewed as a secondary sources vis-a-vis the Talmud. Sperber, et al., are insignificant in determining mainstream Orthodox halacha and can't revise the bounds of dispute on Kavod HaB'riyyot over the centuries. HKTTalk 04:24, 4 January 2007 (UTC)
      • Completely agree the Shulkhan Arukh section is proper. There's no maintenance tag on the section, so this section isn't being disputed. FYI, Shulchan Aruch section isn't germane to any contemporary dispute, because it involves a Torah prohibition. All contemporary sources accept that the Kavod HaBriyot concept can cover only rabbinic prohibitions. The controversial contemporary opinions all make a claim that the conduct they seek to legitimate is only rabinically prohibited. --Shirahadasha 04:44, 4 January 2007 (UTC)
  • I have no previous knowledge of this topic, and to be honest, had never heard of the term before, but in terms of the dispute, it seems fairly straightforward to me. If IZAK and Shirahadasha can both find verifiable and reliable sources that support their interpretation, than both interpretations should be included into its own section of the article as that would mean that both hold some sway in various segments of the community. I can't attest to whether IZAK's contributions are OR as Shira claims, but the onus, as always, is on the person adding commentary to provide references for the interpretation they are putting forward. Thus, providing primary sources such as the Shulchan Aruch, is not sufficient unless the SA contains a commentary on the original thing, rather than the thing itself. Just keep in mind the issues with primary source and OR. -- Chabuk [ T • C ] 04:48, 2 January 2007 (UTC)
  • Kavod HaBriyot is not a halachic issue at all... Of whether the Baraitah refers to a concept that can over overide negative prohobitions or not. The difference in opinion here lies in Shira's statement that this 'concept has gotten increased notability as a result of its use in a Conservative opinion'. In my opinion an ancient concept from the Talmud can't be refurbished for a concept that wasnt clearly outlined in the Talmud or whereever the term originated. This article need not establish every whim of a modern scholar to enterpret a vague ancient concept the way he likes. frummer 13:51, 2 January 2007 (UTC)
    • Do you have sources for the view that the concept isn't a halakhic issue at all? In addition to the very controversial opinions, there's also the one from the Tzitz Eliezer, a well-respected Orthodox Posek, who uses the concept to permit wearing a hearing aide on Shabbat in a widely-accepted work on Halacha. Best, --Shirahadasha 05:18, 4 January 2007 (UTC)
    • Fummer is incorrect. Kavod HaBriyot was always a halakhic issue, long before it was cited by Conservative rabbis. Being used by them in the 21st century does not retroactively rewrite Jewish history. We should be careful not to "be more Catholic than the Pope." In his urge to delegitimize a proposed halakhic change, he deligitimizes a part of classical halakhah itself.
    • On a separate note, do Conservative Jews really make any more change on homosexuality (in public) than an increasing minority of Modern Orthodox Jews do (in private conversations, which they take great pains not to publicise.) The Conservative' worst sin may be opening their big mouths. Let's look at Modern Orthodoxy in 40 years, when this decision may be accepted as mainstream, but with a very slowly changing set of arguments, coupled with "This has been the proper understanding of this issue all along, as it is rightly seen under the category of X, with the necessary limitations being Y and Z, and only with a heter on an individual basis, etc, etc." Mark3 18:37, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

I think this is a generic concept similar to Adam Nivra Betzelem Elukim... it serves as a moral directive but not in the place of specific halachot. Izak is correct that "There can be no better primary source on a matter pertaining to Halakha than the Shulkhan Arukh", that's obviously true. Amoruso 10:35, 7 January 2007 (UTC)

If it were "obviously true" then many facts cited in our article on the Shulkhan Arukh would be non-existent. Why would the huge responsa literature exist after the Mishneh Torah, and especially after the Shulkhan Arukh, if Izak is totally correct? Take care to distinguish Orthodox Judaism and classical Judaism, from "Shulkhan Arukh" Judaism. Otherwise you will end up like the small Yemenite sects which ended Judaism after the Mishneh Torah. In their zeal to maintain halakhah, they may have freeze-dried it. Mark3 18:37, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Menachem Elon material

Removed the following material to Talk:

Rules about human dignity play a role in various halkhic contexts. Menachem Elon, in his Encyclopaedia Judaica article on Takkanot, states that rabbis may enact takkanot ("legislative acts") that contravene not only rabbinic law, but even a Torah mitzvah:
by way of "arise and do," when this need is dictated by the exigencies of the time, that is when such enactment amounts, in the words of the Babylonian amoraim, to making a safeguard for the Torah (migdar milta)....At the same time the scholars stressed the need to guard, in the exercise of such wide legislative authority, against doing undue injury to man's image and dignity: "all these matters apply to the extent that the dayyan shall find them proper in the particular case and necessitated by the prevailing circumstances; in all matters he shall act for the sake of Heaven and he shall not lightly regard the dignity of man... "(Yad, Sanhedrin 24:10; see also Resp. Rashba, vol. 5, no. 238).

Did this for the identical reason as for dispute about IZAK's material. This is not a place for a general essay about "honor" or "dignity" in Judaism and Jewish law or about general reasons for enacting Takkanot. This is an article about a specific Talmudic concept, Kavod HaBriyot. The "arise and do" principle in Sanhedrin is a different Halakhic principle from the Kavod HaBriyot principle. Is there any evidence from actual reliable source that Menachem Elon was writing about the principle of Kavod HaBriyot, or is a connection between this idea and Menachem Elon's writings about Takkanot simply a product of an author's own (possibly insightful) original research? Best, --Shirahadasha 04:20, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

I do not think I understand the intent, the focus of this article. I was under the imperssion that this is the article for a discussion about the use of Kavod ("dignity", "honor") in halakhah. If that isn't the article topic, then is it only about the use of dignity when it has that one particular phrasing, "kavod habriyot"? And only when used in the Talmud? If so, then wouldn't this article become so limited in scope as to be unencyclopedic? I just want to be clear what this article is about; and if this isn't the correct article for this topic, then what article would be?
We don't need evidence that Orthodox Professor Rabbi Menachem Elon was writing about the use of human dignity in Jewish law and takkanot; that is the point of his article. I agre that we would need evidence that he was talking about the use of this specific phrasing, "Kavod HaBriyot" but then see my above question about the specific topic of this article. As I understand it, Elon's background is very pro-Orthodox, and I have been told anti-Conservative. (Though he does have an affinity for writing about halakhah developing in a historical context, which makes him Modern Orthodox as opposed to Haredi.)
I do have a feeling that bringing forth sources on this topic will now be viewed with some skepticism, even if we restrict ourseoves to solely Orthodox writings. There is a tendency in some segments of Orthodoxy to begin re-interpret categories of halakhah once they are cited by non-Orthodox Jews. Mark3 17:49, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

No knowledgeable Orthodox Jew would deny the halachic relevance of KhB vis-a-vis justifying leniency in the face of certain restrictions. But that is not to say that the concept of KhB is different from the one IZAK is expressing. It is merely a different application of the same concept. All applications of KhB should be addressed in the article. HKTTalk

I agree with you. That is is why I added Izak's informative quote to the main body of the article. Does this mean that we also agree on the focus of this article? As I understand it, this article is about the concept variously expressed as Kavod HaBriyot, Mechabed HaBriyot (and in other parallel formulations.) This article would cover the literary, theological and halakhic importance of human dignity. As such, the quote from Rabbi Menachem Elon would be a valuble addition.
If I understand Shirhadasha correctly, another possibility is that this article is limited to a discussion of such topics concerning the phrase kavod habriyot'. This seems too limited. We'd then end up with four or five similar articles that would have to be linked together. Please note that I am not disagreeing with anyone on content; I just wish to clarify organizational issues.
Upon reading the previous comments here (and noting their timing) it seems that this article is a reaction to the new CJLS responsa on homosexuality. As such, the article took shape before its focus was firmly defined (a phenomenon understandably common to new Wikipedia articles.) As such, it is no surprise that my question abou focus is only emerging now. Mark3 20:54, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
There is a debate going on in both Modern Orthodox and Conservative Judaism about the term Kavod HaBriyot. One side says that the term has a specific meaning rooted in a Talmudic context and means something specific when used in halakhic argument. The other side says that the term has a broader meaning which can change with social circumstances (in Daniel Sperber's argument) or evolving conceptions of morality (in the Dorff argument). Only in the latter arguments does the term equate with "human dignity" in its modern, general sense. My intention is to have both sides of this controversy clearly and fairly presented without Wikipedia representing either position as fact or as taken-for-granted narrative. I don't believe it's true that the article "has" to take or be based on the latter position, or that a neutral article on this notable controversy that in many ways stands at the crossroads of traditional and modern religious thought would be too "limited in scope" or "encyclopedic". WP:SOAP prohibits the use of articles to advance positions, no matter how creatively this is done. In this article, a broader definition is welcome in the sections describing the viewpoint of people who argue for a broader definition (and attributed to those people) but it should not be presented unattributed or as fact in background narrative. The idea that the concept of Kavod HaBriyot is related to this broader set of things is a position, not a fact, and must be presented as such. Best, --Shirahadasha 22:54, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
As an analogy, suppose an editor on the Due Process article insisted the term be used interchangably with Fairness and added a lot of material about general theories of fairness and presented them as being about due process. In the context of constitutional argument, the concept of Due Process has traditionally had a more specific scope, involving only state action (and certain kinds at that) rather than private action. Wikipedia should certainly present arguments by people who believe the concept ought to be broader and describe the controversy between people who argue for a narrower and people who argue for a broader scope. But a claim that the "Due Process" article must present the broadest possible interpretation as background fact on grounds that a narrower viewpoint is too "limited in scope" or not "encyclopedic" would reflect a misunderstanding of Wikipedia's NPOV policy. --Shirahadasha 23:20, 16 January 2007 (UTC) One more analogy: Suppose an editor took a work on fairness and presented it in the Due Process article as a statement about Due Process. Unless there's evidence the source believed the two concepts were interchangable or otherwise actually intended to say something about Due Process, such a representation would be WP:OR. Best, --Shirahadasha 23:31, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

Shirhadasha writes "There is a debate going on in both Modern Orthodox Judaism and Conservative Judaism about the term Kavod HaBriyot." Yes, but my question isn't about this. Rather, my question is What is this article about? Are you saying that this article is only about Kavod HaBriyot, and that we must have separate articles for Mechabed HaBriyot, and for other articles about halakhic concepts of human dignity? Mark3

I am still waiting for people to respond to this. What is this article supposed to be about, specifically? Unless we agree on the scope of this article, we cannot make progress. Mark3 13:32, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Proposed addition

I do have a major quibble with this:

The other side says that the term has a broader meaning which can change with social circumstances (in Daniel Sperber's argument) or evolving conceptions of morality (in the Dorff argument). Only in the latter arguments does the term equate with "human dignity" in its modern, general sense.

But isn't this itself an Orthodox point of view? Conservative rabbis would state that it has always been about human dignity, and clearly so. Orthodox rabbis such as Menachem Elon also seem to hold this way. (And perhaps many early Conservative rabbis, and some like Joel Roth today, would hold by the "orthodox" point of view?) So we do not even have an Orthodox versus Conservative interpretation. I do see a good phrasing we can use, based on your above summary. State within the article something like this: (Note that I am not making distinctions based on denominations, but rather on how the idea is understood.)

(paragraph moved down a few paragraphs, and also revised, by Mark3)

Saying that KhB is a broad concept (in that it can apply to anything from being a generally respectful person to, in the role of Chazal, withholding a restriction on moving stones in a karmelit) doesn't mean that you believe in evolving morality. HKTTalk 01:14, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
The issue is not whether Kavod HaBriyot is a broad or narrow concept, nor whether a particular concept is Orthodox or Conservative. The narrow question here is on the appropriateness of Menachem Elon's material for this article. The text referred to the concept of "human dignity" but appeared at first glance to be written in a different context. The reason I questioned its use here is that I am not certain that Menachem Elon was intending to express an opinion about Kavod HaBriyot, and I'm concerned about the possibility of authors' opinions about "human dignity" (or "the dignity of Man") being inserted into an article on Kavod HaBriyot and presented as being an opinion about Kavod HaBriyot (a possibly narrower concept, if one takes one side of the debate), without some evidence that this was intended by the author. This is my concern. Best --Shirahadasha 01:52, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
That is a valid concern. Elon's discussion aside, however, what about adding a paragraph like the one I proposed above? Mark3
The Rambam cited by Rabbi Elon indeed refers to KhB. Someone translated this as human dignity, but it addresses the exact topic being discussed here. The cited Rambam follows (Hil. Sanhedrin 24:10): "...[T]hey shouldn't treat Kavod HaB'riyyot lightly, for it can supersede a rabbinic restriction...." HKTTalk 22:18, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
Ok, then this means that Elon's view is appropriate for this article. It is especially useful for us, because ideally we want to use sources that were written before the liberal CJLS teshuvah on homosexuality was accepted. I am concerned (overly so?) that articles on kavod habriyot written shortly after this responsum (for the next couple of years?) might be biased so as to legitimize or delegitimize the CJLS decision. (No, of course all articles won't be like this. I am just trying to be cautious.) —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Mark3 (talk • contribs) 20:06, 18 January 2007 (UTC).
This addresses my concern. --Shirahadasha 22:50, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
In general I agree with it, although it's not clear to me Daniel Sperber unambiguously belongs in the open-ended camp or went as far as Dorff et al. Although his article didn't address the issue of the concept's limitations and could certainly be interpreted consistent with the more liberal approach, making such a call without some reliable source indicating one way or the other could be WP:OR. Note that if pushed I would argue (as a matter of my own OR opinion) that the one application R' Sperber used (women's aliyot) could be made to narrowly squeeze by Joel Roth's objections, because (a) the prohibition is unambiguously rabbinic, and (b) there is substantial precedent that if a women is called, she can accept the aliyah, hence the prohibition "but we do not call..." can be characterized as applying to the caller but not the callee. As long as the person with the obligation (the caller) is a different person from the one whose honor is at stake (the callee), others' honor rather than ones own is involved. --Shirahadasha 23:43, 18 January 2007 (UTC)
I agree with you that we shouldn't assume that Sperber agrees with Nievens, Dorff & Reisner. I didn't even mean to imply it. I'm just trying to hash out a good summary of the array of views.


[edit] Proposed paragraph Rev 1/18/07

There is a debate about the legal application of ethical concepts like Kavod HaBriyot and Mechabed HaBriyot. All agree that these terms have a specific meaning rooted in a Talmudic context, but significant differences exist on how narrowly defined their uses are in halakhic arguments. Most Orthodox rabbis, and some Conservative rabbis such as Joel Roth, hold that these terms do not equate with the term "human dignity" in its more modern useage. The use of kavod in original halakhic arguments is thus rather limited. Another school of thought holds that kavod historically had a wider range of uses in halakhic arguments. They hold that kavod equates with the term "human dignity" in its more modern useage. Those in this latter school of thought hold that kavod has a broader meaning which can change with social circumstances (in Daniel Sperber's argument) or evolving conceptions of morality (e.g. the discussions in Dorff's book A Living Tree and Louis Jacob's A Tree of Life). Many within the Conservative Jewish community hold that its use is valid for a liberal opinion vis-a-vis homosexuality, such as in the 2007 Dorff, Nievens, and Riesner, although this is a new view and still controversial. (See Conservative Halakha for details of this subject.)

[edit] Nishmat column

Putting this here (pending look at blog WP:RS policy. It's a Nishmat Yoatzot Q&A follow-up to a query (the original query is here) about whether the requirement that husbands and wives not pour wine for each other during Niddah applies to a Seder when others would readily find out about ones status. Nishmat answers by saying that the concept of Kavod HaBriyot might possibly apply. It says that this concept means that rabbinic prohibitions can sometimes be overridden in order to "avoid public embarassment." But it reasons that because the fact that married couples observe Niddah is common knowledge, there's nothing embarassing about it, so there is no need for Kavod HaBriyot to apply. This approach would seem to suggest the interesting idea that Kavod HaBriyot applies less today than it used to, on grounds that we moderns are a lot less embarassed by bodily functions than our ancestors were, so there's less need to do things to avoid it. A very interesting and different take on the whole subject. Best, --Shirahadasha 00:02, 19 January 2007 (UTC)

On reflection the material seems to meet WP:RS, Nishmat is a reliable source, and it answers the questions and peer-reviews/quality-controls the answers. I'll add it in over the weekend. --Shirahadasha 19:46, 19 January 2007 (UTC)
I agree that Nishmat would be a reliable source on this topic, and that this would be an interesting topic to add here. (I am not sure, however, that it means Kavod HaBriyot applies less today than it used. Rather, it means that it depends on the context.) Mark3 14:18, 22 January 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Removed unsourced sections

I've removed several unsourced sections that have been tagged as original research since January 2007. I've also rewritten the section on Conservative Judaism. Best, --Shirahadasha (talk) 03:43, 20 November 2007 (UTC)