Kansas v. Hendricks

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Kansas v. Hendricks
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 10, 1996
Decided June 23, 1997
Full case name: Kansas v. Leroy Hendricks
Citations: 521 U.S. 346
Prior history: Certiorari to the Kansas State Supreme Court
Holding
Reverses Kansas State Supreme Court and agrees with the state's procedures for the indefinite civil commitment procedures for sex offenders meeting the definition of a "mental abnormality" upon release from prison
Court membership
Chief Justice: William Rehnquist
Associate Justices: John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
Majority by: Thomas
Joined by: Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Dissent by: Breyer
Joined by: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
Laws applied
Due Process, Miscellaneous; Criminal Procedure, Ex Post Facto


Kansas v. Hendricks 521 U.S. 346 (1997) is a case in which U.S. Supreme Court set forth procedures for the indefinite civil commitment of prisoners convicted of a sex offense whom the state deems dangerous due to a mental abnormality.

Contents

[edit] Fact of case

Under Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act (Act), any person who, due to "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder", is likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence" can be indefinitely confined.[1][2] Leroy Hendricks had an extensive history of sexually molesting children. When he was due to be released from prison, Kansas filed a petition under the Act in state court to involuntarily commit Hendricks. Hendricks challenged the constitutionality of the Act and requested a trial by jury which the court granted. Hendricks testified during the trial that he agreed with the diagnosis by the state psychiatrist that Hendricks suffers from pedophilia and admitted that he continues to experience uncontrollable sexual desires for children when he is under extreme stress. The jury decided that he qualified as a sexually violent predator. Since pedophilia is defined as a mental abnormality under the Act, the court ordered that Hendricks be civilly committed.[3]

Hendricks appealed the validity of his commitment as well as claiming that the state was unconstitutional using ex post facto and double jeopardy law, to the State Supreme Court. The court ruled that the Act was invalid on the grounds that the condition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy the "substantive" due process requirement that involuntary civil commitment must be based on the finding of the presence of a "mental illness". It did not address the claims of ex post-facto and double jeopardy.[3]

The Supreme Court granted Kansas certiorari.

[edit] Decision

The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision. It agreed with the Act's procedures and the definition of a "mental abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree that such person is a menace to the health and safety of others."[4] It agreed with Kansas that the Act limits persons eligible for confinement to persons who are not able to control their dangerousness. Further, the court decided the Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy prohibition nor the ban on ex post-facto law because the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and therefore involuntary confinement under it is not punishment. Because the Act is civil, Hendricks' confinement under the Act is not a second prosecution nor is it double jeopardy. And finally, the court said the Act is not considered punitive if it fails to offer treatment for an untreatable condition.[3][5]

[edit] Significance

The court's finding that preventative long term confinement of mentally disordered persons has previously been justified on the grounds that some people's behavior cannot be prevented, and it does not violate their rights to confine them to deter antisocial behavior. However, upholding the Act expanses involuntary civil commitment to people with personality disorders which could justify the commitment of large numbers of criminals if the proof of the likihood of reoffending required is sufficiently inclusive, which could happen if the requirement of dangerousness is not limited to those with a mental illness. Further, if mental abnormality (rather than mental illness) can be the basis for sex offender commitment, there is a danger that it may expand the basis for traditional civil commitment to personality disorders as well. [4]

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