Talk:Joseph Stilwell

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[edit] Stillwell or Stilwell?

First, it's Stilwell. Second, I found this article to be a little disjointed and hard to read in some places (notwithstanding the misspellings). The narrative is not chronological in some areas, as well. I agree that the overall tone of the article is negative, and seems based more on opinion than fact - unless the statements can be substantiated with citations as to their source. There are a couple of sentences that can be removed without changing the article. I expect an encylcopedia to present me with facts and be neutral in its position. I think that this article can stand a rewrite.

Is he Stillwell or Stilwell? Google has both. SGBailey 21:54 9 Jul 2003 (UTC)

I think it is worth noting that when he was serving as an officer in the American battalian at Tientsen, the commander of that battalian was George Marshall.

It appears that the editor did not read Tuchman except to handpick a few mean spirited quotes and failed completely to understand Stillwell's position and importance. US aide to China was throwing money into a black hole. China and Chiang remained currupt and entirely useless to the West in the struggle against Japan -- excepting that they did tie up Japanese resources. The project badly needs to get a new editor for this portion of the study.

Incredibly biased view of Stilwell with many inaccuracies. This entry should be rewritten with sources added or deleted completely.

Like several articles, I'll happily put this on my list to revise, but it won't be for a month or two before I'll have such time to do so. Anyone else coming along with a desire to work on it, please be my guest. RebelAt 18:21, 6 February 2006 (UTC)

For openers, the chronology is confusing. We have Stilwell distributing aid to China before he even arrived! I'll try to switch those sections, since nobody else seems to be working on it. --Cubdriver 11:04, 13 March 2006 (UTC)

Okay, did that and removed some of the more contentious undocumented stuff. In consequence some of the Wiki-links are probably in the wrong place. I'll try to get back to it in time if nobody else is moved to mend them. --Cubdriver 11:27, 13 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] recent reversion

I just wanted to clarify my decision to revert the article back from the editing done by 84.65.188.121. It seems that their revision was an attempt to minimalize and reduce POV in the former version. I recently wrote a thesis on a topic in China in this period and despite going through numerous works and archival material, never saw any evidence that anyone considered the CBI a "sideshow." Roosevelt even sent the Vice-President in 1944, and actively sought to ensure China's place among the Big Four. The other change concerned the change of reflection that the Chinese Nationalist and the British did not engage in many military operations against the Japaneses by choice to being unable due to poor equipping. I believe it is rather well known how reluctant Chiang was to throw his men into combat against the Japanese (or waste any resources that'd benefit him in the stalled Civil War). I cannot comment on the British, except that from the American perspective, they were seen as actively seeking to keep China divided and suitably under the heel of the pre-war international system. RebelAt 13:30, 27 May 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Current Article

It seems that there's a problem of POV in the current version of the article, but also prior versions as well. While much blame is attributed to Stilwell, the only scholar referenced is Barbara Tuchman and only as a foil for having too positive an opinion of the general. It'll go a long way to support negative (and positive) statements of Stilwell with references to works about him, or at least to place them in a See Also category below. RebelAt 14:04, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Wikification

While doing dab fixes tonight, I came upon this article and tried to give it a thorough copyedit and wikification. There were dozens of redundant wikilinks (someone linked to Chiang about 25 times), I removed some but not all of the glowing POV statements, and I tried to push it closer to the style guide of the WPMILHIST project. It's still a mess – there are gaping holes in the chronology of his life, and the book cite in the middle of the text has to be dealt with somehow. I graded it as a start-class because it's very disjointed.

I'll put it on my watchlist. I'm working to get another WWII biography to Good Article at the moment, but this is a good candidate as a future project for me. BaseballBaby 07:36, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Opinions other than US ones

Hey first of all what's with all the "citations needed." I've never seen an article this long with so many citations needed. Someone please site the sources. Second, what's with the overwhelmingly positive view of the person? What about views other than US. Like British, Chinese, Burmanese, Indian, etc. I read somewhere on wikipedia that he was removed because he contacted the CCP without Chiang's approval (don't know how reliable this claim is). However I know for a fact he was very unpopular with the Chinese, or at least the KMT. Stilwell accuse Chiang for hording the lend-lease for a showdown with the communist. However Chiang accuse Stilwell for hording the lend-lease for fighting in Burma. IMO both are true (though which one horded more I can't say) and so is the claim the the CCP also horded their stuff. And British views, mind giving some? Obviously they were arguing so they wouldn't have such a good view as stated here. (Though I agree with the British general. If the troops are exhausted they should be withdrawn). ParallelPain 09:02, 2 April 2007 (UTC)ParallelPain

This article is another in a series of whitewashes of historical articles related to the individuals who actively worked in favor of the Communist forces in China. This article ignores the criticisms of those that witnessed Stilwell's hatred of the Nationalist forces and efforts to bring about victory for the Communist Chinese. Jtpaladin 19:25, 9 June 2007 (UTC)
You have a good request, and if I feel motivated, I'll dig out my copy of Barbara Tuchman's work, considered one of the best treatments on the man. Off the top of my head, I do believe Stilwell had a good reputation in Burma, but certainly butted heads with Chiang Kai-shek. The hatred was mutual, Patrick Hurley was sent specifically to China to act as an intermediary between FDR and Chiang, as Chiang wanted to stop going through Stilwell (in fact, this was part of a trade to let American officers go visit and speak with Communists in the northern part of the country). I do think its a bit too far to say that Stilwell wanted the Communist to win, he was more engaged with simply beating the Japanese, and had reached wit's end with the Nationalists, whom he believed were not doing enough. The Communists, mean while, had a reputation for fighting the Japanese, that actually, was more reputation and not so much fact. But that's better reserved for another article. :) So I'll break out my book, and see what I can do to knock out those citation requests. ~ (The Rebel At) ~ 22:29, 9 June 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Comments

About a year ago I noted that this article did not give a balanced treatment of the man and was filled with derogatory, inaccurate, unsupported, and downright nasty comments. I tried to edit the worst parts of the article, but 24 hours later it was right back the way it had been. Someone really had an axe to grind and clearly was not going to consider facts. I therefore gave up. I have recently found this discussion tab and find at least some of the comments more balanced and accurate, especially those of The Rebel At. The article itself now is better than it was, but still suffers from inaccuracies, unnecessary entries, duplicative entries, and disjointed flow. It badly needs to be cut down and all entries that do not bear directly on Stilwell and his career removed.

First, I would point out that Barbara Tuchman did far more research on the man than anyone else has done, before or since. This research, and detailed knowledge, allowed her to put her analysis of the man in context with all events and factors in the CBI. Her credentials as an unbiased historian and author are impeccable. It therefore would be far better to accept her analysis and comments, positive and negative, on the man than to accept those from casual readers of the article.

Stilwell suffers from treatments at the hands of “armchair” historians who typically read his diaries, and conclude that his daily behavior mirrored the language therein. This is not true as pointed out by Eric Larrabee in his book “Commander In Chief” (page 517). Stilwell never intended his diaries be seen by anyone else and were his way of venting the frustrations of his daily life….as he put it “to keep from biting the radiator.” In the references for the article, the British edition of Barbara Tuchman’s book is listed. Stilwell was an American and Tuchman’s USA edition should be listed as the reference: Stilwell and the American Experience in China.

I have the following comments on items in the article:

Stilwell’s nickname. Stilwell acquired his nickname of “Vinegar Joe” at Fort Benning where he was in charge of tactics instruction (not a “commander”). He had a habit of observing as many field problems as he could. One day he was observing a reconnaissance problem where young officers were supposed to go out in front of the lines and observe “enemy” dispositions. This day it was obvious one young officer was trying to bluff his way through his report…something that in combat could cost lives. In order to ensure that the officer, and all the other officers in the class, realized that not reporting accurate information could cost lives and should never happen, he imparted a “significant emotional event.” The next morning a drawing of a vinegar jug, with a caricature of Stilwell superimposed on its front appeared on the bulletin board (Stilwell Collection at the Hoover Archives). Stilwell liked it so much he obtained permission from the artist, had it duplicated, and sent it to all his friends. From then on he was “Vinegar Joe.” It was thus essentially a nickname he gave himself. Later in his career, the soldiers under his command gave him another nickname: “Uncle Joe,” in recognition of his leadership style that emphasized taking care of the individual soldier.

I find no reference to the nickname of “Old Two Shirts” that is listed in the article. At best it was not in common use and thus need not be listed. Stilwell’s two primary nicknames were “Vinegar Joe” and “Uncle Joe.”

There was no U.S. Embassy in China 1935-9. It was a Legation.

Stilwell did not “object” to his assignment to China in 1942. Privately he did not like it because he wanted to command U.S. troops in the war and knew the assignment to China would be to a backwater of the war. However, unlike General Drum, who was first considered for the China assignment, and promptly alienated General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson with his attitude of the assignment being beneath him, Stilwell knew the needs of the country at war were most important, and told General Marshall, “I’ll go where I’m sent.” Tuchman, p. 245.

It was Stimson and Marshall who selected Stilwell to go to China, not Roosevelt. Roosevelt concurred in the selection.

If it is desired that the article go to such depths, the discussion of the politics of the CBI Theater needs to be put in context. Stilwell was sent over to the CBI to keep China in the war and thus keep Japan from transferring her China-based forces to other theaters. Additionally, in the early years, it was envisioned that China would provide a base for assaults on Japan itself. To pursue these ends Stilwell knew he had to modernize and train the Chinese Army, and, after the first Burma campaign, as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to open a land supply route to China. Stilwell was there to fight the Japanese. He did control U.S. Lend Lease supplies, and wanted to ensure they were used in the best manner to indeed fight the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to let the Americans defeat the Japanese while he hoarded U.S. Lend Lease supplies for the inevitable clash with the Communists. Thus Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek were at odds on basics. However, on top of this fact was the fact that Chiang micromanaged units that he ostensibly had put under Stilwell’s command and would not sanction aggressive action.

Chiang Kai-shek (and Roosevelt) favored the “cheap” strategy of relying on airpower alone to defeat the Japanese. Chennault played to this desire in October 1942, by stating that with 105 fighters, 30 medium bomber, and 12 heavy bombers he could “accomplish the downfall of Japan…probably within six month, within one year at the outside.” (Tuchman p.337). Stilwell’s position was that a reliable ground force was needed first because as soon as the airpower bothered the Japanese enough they would simply overrun the airfields. Stilwell’s views were not accepted, but his prediction came disastrously true 1944. In the meantime, more supplies being flown over the Hump were diverted to the 14th Air Force, at the expense of other uses. As Tuchman pointed out, Chennault thought he should have been the overall commander in the CBI, and throughout the years Stilwell was in command, there was a constant effort to have him replaced by Chennault. Stilwell knew this, and it made for strained (at best) relations with Chennault. One thing Stilwell never knew was that Chennault’s “air aide,” Joesph Alsop, a commissioned officer at the time, actually wrote the October 1944 aide memoire for Chiang Kai-shek that demanded Stilwell’s recall (p 242, “I’ve Seen the Best of It” by Joseph W. Alsop), an act that, at best was gross insubordination.

Marshall did not acknowledge Stilwell had been given the toughest assignment of any theater commander. It was Secretary of War Stimson who said Stilwell had been given the toughest job of any general (p. 541, “On Active Service In Peace and War, Henry L. Stimson). (Also in Tuchman, p. 506.)

By saying “Stilwell personally led the American forces out of Burma on foot” it implies that there were indeed American forces in Burma. There were not; only Stilwell’s staff. The allied forces in Burma in early 1942 were British and Chinese (the latter ostensibly commanded by Stilwell, but in reality taking orders from Chiang Kai-shek, over a thousand miles away, orders that frequently countermanded Stilwell’s orders). Stilwell led a party of 114 personnel (military and civilian) out of Burma on foot….Americans, Chinese, British, Burmese, mixed Asiatics, and Dr. Seagrave’s surgical unit. Stilwell’s party was the only one to reach India without loss of life.

When discussing the “Allies’ strategy” one must, in addition to “logistical and air support” include training of the Chinese Army.

The “opening of a land route to China” was from India and across northern Burma, not “from northern Burma and India.”

The use of the word “Peanut” to refer to Chiang Kai-shek, as Tuchman points out (p. 283), started as a code word for use in messages to refer to Chiang. Stilwell used the word in his diaries, in his letters to his wife, and orally around the headquarters (which undoubtedly got back to Chiang Kai-shek as he had planted spies in Stilwell’s residence and headquarters). To say he used it in “official reports” is unsubstantiated and, to my knowledge, untrue. In fact, Stilwell was known for being very correct in public.

To say that Chiang “was concerned that his troops lacked training and supplies” could be true, but the more important point is that he did little to nothing to help them get trained and supplied. He hoarded U.S. Lend Lease supplies and balked at making units available for training by Americans (with the exception of the remnants of two Chinese divisions that walked out of Burma in 1942 and were trained by Americans at Ramgarh, India….and even there Stilwell had to constantly push Chiang for replacements).

Regarding the sentence that says Stilwell was “Infuriated by what he regarded as Chiang’s corruption, incompetence and timidity,” the use of the word “regarded” leads the reader to believe there was some debate over whether there was corruption, incompetence and timidity. In fact there is no debate that those characteristics were present in Chiang and his government (see Tuchman and The White Paper). The sentence should be changed to “Infuriated by Chiang’s corruption, incompetence and timidity.”

It is true that Stilwell recommended cutting off Lend Lease supplies to Chiang for he realized that was the only thing that would get Chiang to cooperate. It never was done, but it was a simply an effort to elicit a quid pro quo, and looking out for the interests of the U.S. Stilwell felt that the U.S. should get something in return for all the supplies and effort it was putting into China. At one point Stilwell noted that Chiang had never expressed any appreciation for what the U.S. was doing to help China.

The reference to Stilwell noting in his diary that “$380,584,000 in 1944 dollars” had been wasted on Chiang and his government might be an accurate figure, but it does not appear in Stilwell’s 1944 or 1945 diaries (see diaries on line at the Hoover Library and Archives web site). The number does appear in Larrabee’s “Commander in Chief,” p. 577, but is not cited as coming from Stilwell’s diary.

To say Stilwell “continually” clashed with Wavell is an exaggeration. Wavell was the Commander in Chief in India from July ’41 to sometime in ’43 when he became Viceroy of India and then had little contact with Stilwell. Stilwell had disagreements with him, as he did with other British senior officers, but it must be understood that these clashes were the result of British inaction, always wanting more materiel and time before doing anything, and, what were, in Stilwell’s eyes, bloated staff and procedures. After all, Stilwell was there to fight the Japanese, and Wavell and Auchinleck gave the appearance of dragging their feet in that area. There were senior British officers who Stilwell admired and appreciated such as Slim and Festing, and the difference was that these officers were given to action as contrasted to inaction.

The Southeast Asia Command did not split the CBI command. SEAC was established at the TRIDENT Conference in May 1943, and was established “for adequate logistical support of Allied Operations” (p. 5/6, “Stilwell’s Command Problems,” Romanus and Sunderland). Stilwell was appointed as Mountbatten’s deputy and this added yet another responsibility to Stilwell’s many. SEAC came directly under the British Chiefs of Staff. Stilwell continued to command the CBI Theater.

Stilwell’s offensive in northern Burma, commencing in December 1943, was to clear northern Burma of Japanese and construct a land supply route that would connect with the old Burma Road into China. This mission had been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Any discussion of Stilwell’s handling of the British Chindit forces and Merrill’s Marauders needs to be put in the context of coalition warfare, which was what Stilwell was waging. He had Chinese, American, and British forces under his command and he had to treat them all equally…he could not favor, or be seen as favoring, one nationality over another. An excellent discussion of this dilemma is contained in Gary Bjorge’s article “Merrill’s Marauders: Combined Operation in Northern Burma in 1944” starting at page 12 in “Army History,” Spring/Summer 1995.

Chennault did not advocate a “strictly limited air offensive against the Japanese.” As already mentioned he postulated in 1942 that with 147 aircraft he could bring about the defeat of Japan in 6-12 months, certainly an unrealistic prediction, and hardly a “limited air offensive.”

If the sentence “Ironically, however, Chiang manipulated the opportunity to blame Stilwell for the Japanese success….” remains in the article, it should read, “Illogically, however, Chiang….” There was absolutely no basis in fact to connect Stilwell with the Japanese successes. See Tuchman, p. 501.

Stilwell was “recalled” and not “relieved.” The use of the word “relief” implies that an officer’s career is finished. Stilwell’s was not. Further Roosevelt used the word “recall” in his message to Chiang (Tuchman, p. 502).

Stilwell was met at the Washington, DC airport by a colonel (General Marshall’s aide). The two generals met him later at his lodging at Fort Myer. Tuchman, p. 507.

Stilwell was “sacrificed as a political expedient,” but it had nothing to do with getting along with his allies in the theater. It was simply Roosevelt caving in to Chiang. See Larrabee, p 575.

Stilwell did not make “diplomatic inroads with the Chinese Communist Red Army….” As first proposed by John Service, Stilwell’s State Department advisor, Stilwell championed the idea of sending a small observer mission to Yenan, seat of the Communists. Stilwell had reports the Communists were fighting the Japanese and he wanted to exploit all possible sources that were willing to fight. Chiang refused permission to send a mission to Yenan. It was only after two specific requests from Roosevelt directly to Chiang to allow a mission that approval was finally obtained and the Dixie Mission went to Yenan. Stilwell wanted to provide military supplies to the Communists because they were fighting the Japanese, but he never was successful in doing so….he did not receive approval to do so. Stilwell never “had gotten” the Communists to follow an American commander….they volunteered to do so (see Tuchman, p. 485 and p.503). Further he did not contact “the CCP without Chiang’s approval.” (2 April 2007 comments in this discussion tab) In addition, the unsupported 9 June 2007 comments in this discussion tab are false….Stilwell did not work to bring about victory for the Communist Chinese. He predicted it because of the corruption of the Chiang regime and the lack of support it had from the Chinese people, but to say he worked to bring it about is simply untrue and unsupportable. I know of no generally accepted quality publication that makes these charges. Tuchman alludes to such wild statements when commenting on Chennault’s testimony to Congress in which Chennault alleged that in July 1945, Stilwell proposed to take, on his own initiative and volition, the Tenth Army (which was scheduled for the invasion of Japan) and invade China. As Tuchman wrote, “Only the unlimited accusations of the McCarthy era, combining with the relentless animus of Alsop and Chennault could have produced this remarkable fiction.” (page 528)

The year “1945” should be inserted after “November” in the sentence, “In November, he was appointed to lead a ‘War Department Equipment Board’….”

It should be noted that the Ledo Road was renamed the Stilwell Road by Chiang Kai-shek.

With reference to the 2 April 2007 comments in this tab, two statements need to be corrected. Stilwell was not popular with Chiang and his upper echelon (the KMT); however, he was quite popular with the Chinese people and especially the soldiers under his command. When Stilwell was recalled, he received a number of letters from KMT generals citing how much he had contributed to China and the Chinese people, and that he would be missed (Stilwell Collection, Hoover Archives). Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ching Ling) was very distressed at his recall and “cried & was generally broken up.” (Stilwell diaries October 20, 1944).

The second statement is that Chiang accused Stilwell of hoarding supplies. There is no indication of what supplies. Supplies were sent from the U.S. to India for further transport over the Hump to China. Supplies getting to China were designated for specific entities such as the 14th Air Force or the Chinese. It needs to be understood that until the supplies for Chiang got to China, they remained U.S. property. And far more supplies arrived at the depots in Assam, India that could be flown over the Hump….there were not enough aircraft to satisfy the insatiable desires for more and more supplies in China. It also must be appreciated that supplies were needed for the Chinese divisions under Stilwell’s command attacking into northern Burma (to reopen the Burma Road so more supplies could get to China!). Whether Chiang said it or not, it is completely fallacious that Stilwell “hoarded” supplies.

Finally, I would quote from Larrabee (p.578) when speaking of Roosevelt: “His other theater commanders he left largely alone, but with Stilwell he continually meddled, undermining Stilwell’s efforts and compromising his authority by sending a stream of ‘presidential representatives’ – Lauchlin Currie, Wendell Willkie, Henry Wallace, Patrick Hurley, Donald Nelson – whose chief qualifications were their ignorance of China or, in some cases, Roosevelt’s desire to get them out of the country. An Eisenhower or a MacArthur would have blow his stack; Stilwell patiently put up with it. ‘More than any other American theater commander in the war,’ in Secretary Stimson’s view, ‘Stilwell required the constant and vigorous political support of his own government, and less than any other commander did he get it.’ The President, thought Stimson, ‘never gave to Stilwell the freedom of action and automatic backing which he so courageously accorded to his commanders in other theaters.’” Elktonave 17:49, 2 September 2007 (UTC)

That is a very comprehensive analysis of Stilwell. From reading materials written by the historians here in Taiwan who studied the Second Sino-Japanese War, it is fair to say that Stilwell was a tragic figure that was doomed to fail at his assignment because =
  • His personality: He spent (and wasted) way too much time and energy accusing the KMT leadership and fighting Chiang and Chennault, instead of accepting the tremedous shortcomings of his Chinese Ally and try to work out a less than perfect solution to fight the Japanese. His despise and hatred toward Chiang got to a point when Roosevelt gave Chiang an ultimatum to hand over command of all Chinese armed forces to Stilwell (with explicit instruction to keep this confidential), he rushed to have the letter read out loud in front of all the Chinese and American generals attending a meeting, for the sole purpose of embarrass and discredit Chiang in public. This event led directly to his recall as Chiang replied to Roosevelt that the KMT would rather fight alone than cave in to this ultimatum.
  • Roosevelt and Churchill: The CBIT had the lowest priority on the Allied agenda, evident by the fact that no US army or UK army reinforcement was sent to India to implement the offensive to re-open land supply routes to China. Stilwell has to train and use the Chinese soldiers that escaped into India from north Burma in 1942, and Indian infantry troops to launch the belated Burma Campaign. So his plan had forsight and strategically correct, but he could not win support from the Chinese, British, or American to implement it.DCTT 09:27, 8 October 2007 (UTC)

CAUTION DCTT’s comments are likely biased since their source is the KMT (Taiwan) version of history of the period, and clearly supporters of Chiang Kai-shek had, and have, a vested interest in trying to make Chiang look good and Stilwell look bad. It is clear from Tuchman that Stilwell went to China believing he could work with Chiang and the Chinese. It was only after Stilwell experienced Chiang’s duplicity, failure to keep promises, corruption, inaction, and failure to take care of his soldiers and people that he realized that Chiang was the source of many of his problems. DCTT appears to not know all the facts surrounding Stilwell presenting Roosevelt’s message to Chiang. Because of past failures on the part of Chinese officials to deliver messages from Roosevelt to Chiang (in whole or in part), Roosevelt ordered the senior American officer in Chungking to personally deliver his messages; Stilwell was that officer. DCTT also fails to realize that Merrill’s Marauders was sent to the CBI for the campaign in northern Burma and later both replacements for the Marauders (formed into the 475th Infantry Regiment) and the 124th Regiment were sent. I would assess that DCTT has selectively chosen comments without fully understanding or presenting all the facts simply in order to reflect badly on Stilwell…..and fails to cite creditable references.Elktonave 16:53, 7 November 2007 (UTC)

CAUTION Elktonave’s comments are likely biased since their source is the US (American) version of history of the period, and clearly supporters of Stilwell had, and have, a vested interest in trying to make Stilwell look good and Chiang look bad. It is clear from Tuchman that Chiang agreed to let Stilwell come to China believing he could work with Stilwell and the US. It was only after Chiang experienced Stilwell's bad temper, nasty personality, lack of respect for others, poor leadership, and wasted crack Chinese troops in the Burmese jungle that he realized that Stilwell was the source of many of his problems. Elktonave appears to not know all the facts surrounding Stilwell presenting Roosevelt’s message to Chiang. Because of past failures on the part of American officials to properly deliver messages from Roosevelt to Chiang (in whole or in part), Roosevelt ordered the senior American officer in Chungking to personally deliver his messages in private and in full confidence; but Stilwell did exactly the opposite. Elktonave also fails to realize that Merrill’s Marauders numbered less than 3,000 and made very limited impact to the CBI for the campaign in northern Burma. I would assess that Elktoave has selectively chosen comments without fully understanding or presenting all the facts simply in order to reflect badly on Chiang…..and fails to cite creditable references other than ones supporting Stilwell DCTT 14:54, 12 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] relatives?

Are Vinegar Joe and Richard G. Stilwell relatives? My father told of serving in Vietnam under "Acid Ass" Stilwell, whom he says was the son of Vinegar Joe, and the names have continuity; however the article doesn't reference the moniker and neither article mentions a kinship. Chris 10:05, 10 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] PROOF

After reading DCTT’s second submission of comments, it is clear he/she has simply reinforced my suspicion of KMT history bias. Barbara Tuchman’s book is and remains the authoritative work on Stilwell and refutes the bulk of DCTT’s allegations. DCTT comments also demonstrate there are still people who have an ax to grind when it comes to Stilwell, regardless of facts. Richard Stilwell was no relation to Joseph W. Stilwell, but Joseph W. Stilwell, Jr., son of Joseph Stilwell, was a brigadier general who served in Vietnam.Elktonave (talk) 04:05, 19 November 2007 (UTC)Elktonave

I am not even going to bother referencing Chinese sources, here is an American one: Time magazine Monday, Nov. 13, 1944 named 'Crisis'
"...In Minneapolis, Minnesota's Republican Congressman Walter H. Judd, who had been in China, gave his version of what had happened: one day General Stilwell received orders to deliver an ultimatum from the White House to Chiang Kaishek. The ultimatum demanded that General Stilwell be made commander of all China's armies or the U.S. would withdraw its military support from China. No self-respecting head of state could countenance such an ultimatum. The Generalissimo's patience snapped. Angrily he retorted: Then the U.S. will have to withdraw its support."
"...Instead of sending supplies, Washington proposed that General Stilwell be given command of all Chinese forces. The White House believed that the Nationalist Government could do a lot more in the fight against Japan by pressing domestic reforms and by coming to terms with the Chinese Communist Government at Yenan.
Nobody ever urged the Chinese Communists to come to terms with Chungking.
China's Patience. But, patiently, the Generalissimo continued to listen. He had learned patience in a stern school — 33 years of bloody civil and foreign wars, the pangs of a nation that had not yet forged its unity, won its independence or completed a revolution from feudalism.
He had swallowed his pride in dealings with the Americans before. He had agreed to let General Stilwell supervise the distribution of U.S. Lend-Lease in China.
Such a condition had been imposed on no other head of a foreign state. The implication was that Chiang Kai-shek could not be trusted with Lend-Lease.
But only once is he known to have complained bitterly to a colleague : "The Americans want me to be a slave. I don't mind being a slave for the sake of victory, but" — and his voice broke with anger and injury — "they treat me as if I were a thief!" DCTT (talk) 07:14, 23 November 2007 (UTC)
I think you need to actually read Tuchman's book. There is no denying that that the incidents you describe above occured, the issue is the context. Stilwell, who was fluent in Chinese, having first come to China in 1911 and having been posted there repeatedly thereafter, had conscientiously sought to work with KMT commanders and other warlords, to be for the most part met with half hearted promises and courteous evasions and obstructions. Thus, according to Tuchman, Chiang and his clique refused to reform the army which was riddled with patronage and corruption and place it on it a professional basis. Rather, supplies were hoarded and not used-either as preparation for a post-war campaign against the Reds-or as a result of graft and corruption. In Burma, where Stilwell showed his mettle as a grunt commander, corrupt KMT commanders allegedly repeatedly cut and ran betraying the stolid rank and file Chinese soldiers for whom Stilwell had the greatest respect, but whose own commanders treated like dirt. Stilwell wanted Chiang and his regime, which increasingly took on the character of a fascist police state, to commit to fielding at least thirty competent divisions, if not 100, and not just wait out the war in genteel opulence in Chungking (and then consolidate their power internally thereafter). For what its worth, this view was shared by Marshall and the British. The image is presented, quite frankly, of the KMT at that stage as an outfit akin to, or even more inept than, the supply loaded ARVN in Indochina a couple decades later with similar results emanating. Moreover, like it or not, China, unoccupied or not, was not at that time a great power. It was rather, like India to a great extent, an ancient and venerable land emerging from centuries of feudalism and colonial domination caught in an epochal maelstrom of war and revolution. Tom Cod (talk) 07:23, 16 December 2007 (UTC)
Tuchman's account represent the American POV of what happened during this part of history. I think other POV should be represented as well.
First of all, the KMT commanders were not mostly corrupt and incapable like Tuchman had described. A direct quote from TIME artile titled "The Army Nodbody Knows" in the June 16, 1941 issue:
"...Four years of war have hurt China a lot, but have also taught China a lot. The most spectacular discovery, for a nation in which military leadership has classically been an affair of coin and cunning rather than martial skill, has been that China could turn out first-class officer talent.
There is no younger officer class in the world than that of the Generalissimo's crack divisions. Generalissimo Chiang is 53, Chen Cheng is 41, Chen's Field Chief of Staff is 34. It would be hard to find a divisional or regimental commander in those divisions over 40. Regimental colonels are sometimes in their 20s.
These baby officers are tough babies. They are trim as well-kept guns, big fellows, by Chinese standards, hearty and jolly in rest and brutally energetic in action. They lead in person. With their divisions they clamber up mountainsides which would put most corpulent U.S. colonels hors de combat. In nearly four years of fighting, the young officers have mastered the arts of the field—silent de ployment, timely retreat, sudden concentration, plausible ambuscade, dependable supply of vegetable camouflage..."
But no doubt that Chiang's administration towards the end of the second Sino-Japanese war was becoming weak and corrupt, which eventually led to losing mainland China to the Communist, but this fact needs to be put into context as well. China fought alone for 4 years against a vastly more superior enemy. Therefore many of the best Nationalist Chinese generals were KIA or incapacitated early in the war of resistance against Japan. There were 73 KMT generals KIA during WWII (plus 1 Chinese Communist general), more than any other country Allied or Axis. It is reasonable to assume that some of the military commanders that managed to survive and rise in ranks to the end were more interested in self preservation and personal gain, rather than defeating the emeny. Chiang knew this all too well but could do very little to alleviate this problem, all he could do was execute one or two of them from time to time to warn others not to go too far. So Tuchman's analogy comparing KMT to AVRN is not only inappropriate, but also failed to take into account the context of China fighting a 8-year long war with marginal industrial capacity and grossly inadeqate military supplies. It is a miracle that Chiang did not surrender and broker some kind of peace agreement with the Japanese. DCTT (talk) 16:39, 19 December 2007

(UTC)

No, the ARVN analogy is not Tuchman's but that of commentator(s) here. If you're talking about World War II in a broad sense, from the attack on the Marco Polo bridge in 1937, then surely your statement about the deaths of KMT forces may be right. They put up some heroic fights around Shanghai and Nanking etc. Tuchman's point is that after settling into Chungking, Chaing and his milieu, based on their demographic character as embodying the more traditionally priviliged sections of society, became complacent and looked to riding out the war based on Allied intervention. Coupled with that, they increasingly backslid on social reforms and began reverting to old ways of abusing the peasants including their own troops who were often brutally press ganged into service. As the Dixie Mission to the Red zone confirmed, Mao, Chou and the Communists were taking a different approach, carefully cultivating support among the peasants, carrying out social reforms and building military strength. By the time of the civil war the KMT had reached such a sorry state that the ARVN analogy is not inappropriate. These problems were exascerbated by Chiang's isolating himself in a palace environment surrounded by yes-men with little direct contact with the realities of society and the field. Tom Cod (talk) 06:20, 9 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] No, but Controversy Material to Stilwell's Legacy

I appreciate the comments listed above, but believe, that while I personally agree with those who defend Stilwell, it is clear, as even Tuchman makes clear, that issues of his relationship with Chiang and the KMT were very a significant aspect of his China mission. Thus these issues and the controversy around them should be reflected more in the article, albeit in a NPOV fashion. Related issues regarding Chennault and recriminations against Stilwell's legacy during the McCarthy period by Joseph Alsop and others should also be touched on.Tom Cod (talk) 07:07, 16 December 2007 (UTC)


[edit] On Okinawa

A few years ago a had the honor to talk at length with one of the Marines who fought on Okinawa. I was surprised to learn that Stilwell commanded on Okinawa. The Marine said that Stilwell was liked betrer by the Marines than Buckner as he was more accessible and seamed to have a better sense of the complex operations. Saltysailor (talk) 18:07, 24 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Chinese Revisionism

Stilwell is amongst my favorite generals, but over the years I have found that those loyal to the KMT blame him for problems. This is consistant with the KMT's belief that the Communists were a bigger threat than the Japaness. Stilwell had the oposite view, which was consistant with US policy. Saltysailor (talk) 18:07, 24 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Tag & Assess 2008

Article reassessed and graded as B. --dashiellx (talk) 11:26, 8 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] A good general who failed at his assignment

Compared to Albert Wedemeyer, Stilwell had failed at his assignment as the commander of the China Burma India Theater. Maybe this failure has many causes that were beyond Stilwell's control, but in an American culture of only judging performance by end results, he clearly failed to bring together the Allies in CBIT to work together.DCTT (talk) 08:23, 21 May 2008 (UTC)