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The Churchill White Paper of 3 June 1922 (Checkdate - UNISPAL jun 3 (typo?) sachar july 1 fromkin jun 30) was a Britsh statement of policy, mainly drafted by Sir Herbert Samuel and promulgated over Winston Churchill's signature. It clarified how Britain viewed the Balfour Declaration, 1917. A draft was presented to the Arab Delegation and the ZIonists on June 3. After a minor factual modification prompted by the Arab delegation, it was presented to Parliament on July 1, and was accepted by the House of Commons on July 6. // Check mideastweb / unispal draft against final wp //

[edit] Background

ans After the 1920 Palestine riots, which the British Palin Commission[1]found to have been caused by Arab hostility "connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy" Samuel urged Churchill to clarify to both communities the meaning of the Balfour Declaration and to reassure the Palestinians. ans

On June 14, 1921 Churchill reported to the House of Commons on the Cairo Conference (1921), where many of the official decisions later embodied in the White Paper and the Mandate were actually made. In February of 1922, Churchill set before both parties, Jewish and Arab, official proposals for a legislative council. The White paper was preceded by correspondence and meetings with both sides.[2] In particular, the Arabs objected to embedding the Balfour Declaration in the proposed Mandate. On 21 June 1922 a non-binding vote in the House of Lords rejected the Palestine Mandate, the Balfour Declaration and the government's Palestine policy by a vote of 60-29. This naturally troubled Weizmann, but Balfour advised him "What does it matter if a few foolish lords passed such a motion?" After the issuance of the White Paper and speeches by Balfour and Churchill on July 4 in the House of Commons, the government's Palestine policy and the Mandate was accepted by a vote of 292 to 35 on July 6th. [3](Sykes 70)

[edit] The White Paper

Klieman identifies 9 points in the Paper:

  1. reaffirmation of the Balfour Declaration
  2. Founding a JNH, "as of right and not on sufferance"
  3. No disappearance of Arab population, language, or culture
  4. All citizens would have the status of Palestinians
  5. Gradual fostering of full self-government
  6. Zionist Executive would not share in government
  7. Immigration not to exceed economic capacity
  8. Immigration regulated by legislative assembly together with the administration
  9. Religious communities or considerable populations can appeal to the League of Nations[4]


Some sections were seen by some Zionists as a retreat or abandonment from the promises of the Balfour Declaration:

  • "The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned are partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the [Balfour] Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on 2 November 1917."
  • 'Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded "in Palestine."

However, Conor Cruise O'Brien disagrees, feeling that while the idea of a Jewish state was certainly in the background of the Balfour Declaration and British policy, no such commitment was made, and interpretations were indeed "exaggerated" and thus British policy did not essentially change.[5]

[edit] Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (shrink)

It also addressed the conflicting claims related to the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, Sykes-Picot Agreement and subsequent Balfour Declaration:

'It is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24 October 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge'.

This is controversial, for it both abrogates what Arabs believe to be an undertaking from the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence that the Arab state would include Palestine and sets the Jordan river as the eastern border for Palestine, consistent with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which conflicts with some modern claims that the Jewish home was intended to include Transjordan, .

[edit] Transjordan

The White paper confirmed British policy which had actually been decided earlier at the Cairo Conference, e.g. the disposition of Transjordan as a part of the British mandate under the rule of Abdullah, but exempted from the provisions of the Mandate regarding Jewish settlement and the National Home.

[edit] Outcome Reception Acceptance ?

[edit] Arab

ans The Palestinians rejected the paper because it reaffirmed the Balfour policy. They were convinced that continued Jewish immigration would lead to a Jewish majority that would eventually dominate or dispossess them. ans

On June 17, the Arab delegation rejected the White Paper because of its continued committment to the Balfour Declaration.(mwebnote) Kleiman 203

[edit] Jewish

ans The Zionist leaders regarded the memorandum as a whittling down of the Balfour Declaration but acquiesced, partly because of a veiled threat from the British government and partly because, off the record, the Zionists knew that there was nothing in the paper to preclude a Jewish state. (Churchill himself testified to the Peel Commission in 1936 that no such prohibition had been intended in his 1922 memorandum.) ans


The British Government informed the Zionist Executive that its acceptance of the White Paper was necessary for the Mandate to be awarded, so the Zionists felt they had no choice but to accept. Weizmann was reluctant, worrying about the Balfour Declaration being whittled down, and the clear separation of Transjordan from the area of operation of the full Mandate. However, Jabotinsky, when shown the paper raised no serious objection, remarking that it would still afford a framework for building up a Jewish majority and for the emergence of a Jewish state, and signed it together with rest of the Zionist Executive, which sent their acceptance letter on June 18.(Sykes 69, midweb) Weizman later commented that "subsequent events showed his view to be right." [6]

After Jabotinsky left the Executive, he denounced the White Paper, and his earlier support was forgotten.[7]

[edit] analysis

ans Both Zionist and Palestinian interpretations of the memorandum were largely valid: The British did pare down their support for the Zionist program, but the Balfour policy remained intact long enough to allow extensive Jewish immigration and the establishment of semiautonomous Jewish governmental and military institutions. ans

[edit] Aftermath

After the British Parliament's acceptance of the White Paper, the stage was set for the ratification of the Mandate by the League Council, but as this needed to be unanimous, it "was by no means a foregone conclusion." The Zionists were concerned in particular with the votes of Brazil and Spain, without significant Jewish populations, but a unanimous vote was achieved. on Saturday, July 24, 1922. [8]

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Palin Commission Report (1920): Information from Answers.com. Retrieved on 2007-06-17.
  2. ^ CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE PALESTINE ARAB DELEGATION AND THE ZIONIST ORGANISATION. 1922. Retrieved on 2007-06-17.
  3. ^ *David Fromkin (1989). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. Clearwater, Fla: Owl Books, 425-426. ISBN 0-8050-6884-8. 
  4. ^ Aaron S. Klieman (1970). Foundations of British policy in the Arab world: The Cairo Conference of 1921. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 203. ISBN 0-8018-1125-2. 
  5. ^ Conor Cruise O'Brien, (1986). The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism. New York: Touchstone Books. ISBN 0-671-63310-4. 
  6. ^ *Chaim Weizmann (1949). Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. New York: Harper & Brothers, findpage. 
  7. ^ Bernard Wasserstein (2004). Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop?. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, findpage. ISBN 0-300-10597-5. 
  8. ^ *Chaim Weizmann (1949). Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. New York: Harper & Brothers, 291. 

[edit] See also

[edit] External links

[edit] Further Reading

  • David Fromkin (1989). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East. Clearwater, Fla: Owl Books. ISBN 0-8050-6884-8. 
  • Jacob C. Hurewitz (1987). The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Schocken Books. ISBN 0-8052-0524-1. 
  • Aaron S. Klieman (1970). Foundations of British Policy in the Arab world: The Cairo Conference of 1921. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. ISBN 0-8018-1125-2. 
  • Conor Cruise O'Brien, (1986). The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism. New York: Touchstone Books. ISBN 0-671-63310-4. 
  • Howard M. Sachar (1969). The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924. Knopf. 
  • Christopher Sykes (1973). Crossroads to Israel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-20165-9. 
  • Bernard Wasserstein (2004). Israelis and Palestinians: Why Do They Fight? Can They Stop?. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-10597-5. 
  • Bernard Wasserstein (1991). The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish conflict, 1917-1929 2nd edn. Oxford: B. Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-17574-1. 
  • Chaim Weizmann (1949). Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann. New York: Harper & Brothers. 

[edit] eliminate, redundant

  • 'it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status. So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, re-affirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.' Points 1 & 4
  • 'During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000… it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on the sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.' Point 2

Having clarified the understanding and intent of the British government, the White Paper continues, outlining a measure to assist in attaining the objectives: 'For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. ... The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.' Point 7

[edit] mideast encyc stuff

Note refs. AMzn?

http://www.answers.com/topic/churchill-white-paper-1922

Churchill White Paper (1922)

A 1922 British statement of policy regarding Palestine.

Drafted by the first high commissioner of Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, the white paper (also called the Churchill memorandum) was issued in the name of Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill in June 1922. A year earlier the Palestinians participated in political violence against the Jews, which a British commission found to have been caused by Arab hostility "connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy." Samuel therefore urged Churchill to clarify to both communities the meaning of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and to reassure the Palestinians.

The Churchill statement reaffirmed British commitment to the Jewish national home. It declared that the Jews were in Palestine "as a right and not on sufferance" and defined the Jewish national home as "the further development of the existing Jewish community [Yishuv], with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race [sic], an interest and a pride." In order to fulfill the Balfour policy, "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration."

At the same time, the memorandum rejected Zionist statements "to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine," which would become " 'as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectations as impracticable and have no such aim in view." It assured the indigenous Palestinians that the British never considered "the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic [sic] population, language, or culture in Palestine" or even "the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole." In addition, the allowable number of Jewish immigrants would be limited to the "economic capacity of the country."

The Zionist leaders regarded the memorandum as a whittling down of the Balfour Declaration but acquiesced, partly because of a veiled threat from the British government and partly because, off the record, the Zionists knew that there was nothing in the paper to preclude a Jewish state. (Churchill himself testified to the Peel Commission in 1936 that no such prohibition had been intended in his 1922 memorandum.) The Palestinians rejected the paper because it reaffirmed the Balfour policy. They were convinced that continued Jewish immigration would lead to a Jewish majority that would eventually dominate or dispossess them. Both Zionist and Palestinian interpretations of the memorandum were largely valid: The British did pare down their support for the Zionist program, but the Balfour policy remained intact long enough to allow extensive Jewish immigration and the establishment of semiautonomous Jewish governmental and military institutions.

Bibliography

Caplan, Neil. Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917 - 1925. London and Totowa, NJ: Cass, 1978.

Hurewitz, J. C. The Struggle for Palestine. New York: Green-wood, 1968.

Lesch, Ann M. Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917 - 1939: The Frustrations of a Nationalist Movement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979.