User:John Kenney/Causes of World War I

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Following the assassination, the Austro-Hungarian government, supported by their German allies, determined to punish the Serbians for the assassination, and on July 23 sent an ultimatum to the Serbs with terms so insulting it was sure to be rejected. The Serbians, relying on the hope of support from Russia, gave an equivocal response which led to Austrian rejection, and to a declaration of war on July 28. The Russians mobilized in support of their Serbian allies, first partially, against only the Austrian frontier, and then, on July 31, after this was explained to be militarily impossible, a general mobilization was ordered. The German war plan, which relied on a quick strike against the Russian's French allies while the Russian army slowly mobilized, could not afford to allow the Russians to begin mobilization without launching their attack on the west. As such, the Germans declared war on Russia on August 1 and against France two days later, immediately launching an invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium to get around the fortifications along the Franco-German border. The violation of Belgium's neutrality led to a British declaration of war on Germany on August 4, leaving five of the six great powers involved in the first European general war since 1815.

Although World War I was triggered by this chain of events unleashed by the assassination, the war's origins go deeper, involving national politics, cultures, economics, and a complex web of alliances and counterbalances that developed between the various European powers over the course of the nineteenth century, following the final 1815 defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and the ensuing Congress of Vienna.

The reasons for the outbreak of World War I are a complicated issue; there are many factors which intertwine. Some examples are:

  • Fervent and uncompromising nationalism
  • Unresolved previous disputes
  • The intricate system of alliances
  • Convoluted and fragmented governance
  • Delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications
  • The arms races of the previous decades.
  • Rigidity in military planning

The various categories of explanation for World War I correspond to different historians' overall methodologies. Most historians and popular commentators include causes from more than one category of explanation to provide a rounded account of the causal circumstances behind the war. The deepest distinction among these accounts is that between stories which find it to have been the inevitable and predictable outcome of certain factors, and those which describe it as an arbitrary and unfortunate mistake.

Contents

[edit] Ideological causes

Some of the roots of the conflict arise out of specific ideologies which influenced the behaviour of politicians and other figures during the years leading up to the war.

[edit] The Rise of Nationalist Sentiment

The system of sovereign nation states, sometimes referred to as the Westphalian system, was developed in Europe from the mid-seventeenth century. Nationalism or patriotism may be seen, in part, as the popular ideological expressions of this system. To understand why European populations were eager for war in 1914, some historians find it necessary to examine the roots of such ideology.

Following the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte rose to power in France. Napoleon's armies marched all over Europe, bringing not only French control, but French ideas. The rise of ideas of nationalism, devotion and love for one's common people and ethnicity, increased in popularity during the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon encouraged the spread of nationalism, which he saw in his troops, to better the French war machine. The French people began to feel pride in their culture and ethnicity. The world watched nationalism for the first time and saw the power the French gained from it.

Napoleon was certainly not solely responsible for the spread of nationalistic ideas. Although the Napoleonic wars did spread the nationalistic sentiment, nationalism is a fundamental result of economic and technological factors. With increasing rates of literacy in industralising areas language became an increasingly important unifying factor for populations. At the same time language, being standardized like never before, became increasingly exclusionary. For an in-depth discussion of the rise of nationalism please see the article on nationalism.

Care needs to be taken when discussing the term nationalism. Nationalism meant many different things to many different groups. In many areas nationalism was confined almost entirely to a tiny elite, while in other areas it had broader populist support. Nationalism was also frequently incorporated into other diverse political ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, or even socialism. However, nationalism, in all its guises, did represent a break from the feudal traditions of much of Europe. It is in this light that it can be seen as a disruptive influence on the old states of Europe, where aristocracrats desperately tried to maintain their traditional beliefs and ways of life.

[edit] Social Darwinism

By the late 19th century a new form of political and social thought emerged in the same context as nationalism, known as Social Darwinism. It emphasized the competition on a social scale between different national, ethnic, or racial groups. Inspired by what Charles Darwin considered a faulty understanding of his theory of evolution, expressed as 'survival of the fittest', this ideology was taken up by European political elites. The new ideology emphasised the violent struggle for existence between "races" or "nations" in which the weak would inevitably be destroyed by the stronger. These ideas were profoundly influential (see Weikart, below). Much of the German and Austro-Hungarian leadership feared what they saw as an inevitable battle between "Slavs" and "Germanic civilization." Social Darwinism as a political ideology also influenced competition amongst nation states for colonies. Colonial expansion was rationalized by the elite as important for assuring a nation's economic and military strength in the face of rivals. The British policy of 'strategic exclusion' of potential competitors was compatible with this adversarial perspective.

An aspect of late 19th century Social Darwinism was the sense of urgency it engendered. For a nation to be not growing compared to its neighbors and rivals was seen as very risky. The French looked in dismay at their birth rate, which was lower than Germany's.

[edit] German Domestic Politics

Left wing parties, especially the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) made large gains in the 1912 German election. German government at the time was still dominated by the Prussian Junkers who feared the rise of these left wing parties. Some authors feel that they deliberately sought an external war to distract the population and whip up patriotic support for the government. Other authors feel that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war, worrying that losing a war would have disastrous consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it were lengthy or difficult.

[edit] French Domestic Politics

The situation was quite the opposite in France, but with the same results. More than a century after the French Revolution, there was still a fierce struggle between the left wing French government and its right wing opponents, including monarchists, "bonapartistes" and the Catholic church. A "good old war" was seen by both sides (with the only and remarkable exception of Jean Jaures) as a way to solve this crisis thanks to a nationalistic reflex. Everyone thought the war would be short and would lead to an easy victory. The left side government thought it would be an opportunity to implement social reforms (income tax was created in July, 1914) and the right side politicians hoped that their connections with the army's leaders could give them the opportunity to regain power.

[edit] Structural or Systemic Causes

Some of the causes of the war lie in the structure of European society at the time, and the way it functioned.

[edit] Unifications of Germany and Italy

In the years that followed the Congress of Vienna, conflicts began springing up all over Europe between those who cried out for change, and those who resisted it. By the mid-1800s, nationalism had become an evident force. A wave of unrest was seen across the continent in the Revolution of 1848. The 1860s and early 1870s saw two great changes to the map: the unification of Italy and the unification of Germany. These two nations were formed on the basis of nationalism. German Unification was brought about by Prussia's "Iron Chancellor", Otto von Bismarck, through a series of wars from 1864–1871. Italy was finally unified in 1866 after a long struggle under leaders Cavour and Garibaldi. The addition of two great powers in Europe fundamentally altered the balance of power.

[edit] Changes in Austria

In 1867 the Habsburg Empire fundamentally changed its governmental structure, becoming the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. For hundreds of years the Empire had been run in an essentially feudal manner with a German-speaking aristocracy at its head. However, with the threat represented by an emergence of nationalism within the empire's many component ethnicities, some elements, including Emperor Franz Joseph, decided that a compromise would have to be made in order to preserve the power of the German aristocracy. In 1867 the Ausgleich was agreed upon which made the Magyar elite in Hungary almost equal partners in the government of the Empire.

This arrangement fostered a tremendous degree of dissatisfaction amongst many in the traditional German ruling classes. Some of them considered the policy to have been a calamity for their Empire because it often frustrated their intentions in the governance of the Empire. For example, it was extremely difficult for the empire to form a coherent foreign policy that suited the interests of both the German and Magyar elite.

Throughout the fifty years from 1867 to 1914 it proved difficult to reach adequate compromises in the governance of the empire, leading many to search for non-diplomatic solutions. At the same time a form of social darwinism became popular amongst many in the Austrian half of the government which emphasised the primacy of armed struggle between nations, and the need for nations to arm themselves for an ultimate struggle for survival.

As a result at least two distinct strains of thought advocated war with Serbia, often unified in the same people.

  1. In order to deal with political deadlock, some reasoned that more Slavs needed to be brought into the empire in order to dilute the power of the Magyar elite. With more Slavs, the South Slavs of the Empire could force a new political compromise in which the Germans would be able to play the Magyars against the South Slavs. Other variations on this theme existed, but the essential idea was to cure internal stagnation through external conquest.
  2. Another fear was that the South Slavs, primarily under the leadership of Serbia, were organizing for a war against Austria-Hungary, and even all of Germanic civilization. Some leaders, such as Conrad von Hötzendorf, argued that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.

A powerful contingent within the Austro-Hungarian government was motivated by these thoughts and advocated war with Serbia long before the war began. Prominent members of this group included among them Leopold von Berchtold, Alexander Hoyos, and Janós Forgách Graf von Ghymes und Gács. Although many other members of the government, notably Franz Ferdinand, Franz Joseph, and many Hungarian politicans did not believe that a violent struggle with Serbia would necessarily solve any of the multinational empire's problems, the hawkish elements did exert a strong influence on government policy, holding key positions.

[edit] Material causes

In Marxist theory and related strands of historical theory, the cause of the war is largely attributed to an alleged material dependency of advanced European nations on imperialism. By this group of theories, nations such as Great Britain and France could only maintain healthy domestic economies in the late 19th century through their control and exploitation of foreign resources, markets and territories. As a late arrival on the world stage, the German Empire would have been locked out of such advantageous positions. Intense rivalry between this emerging economic power and the incumbent Great powers would be the inevitable outcome.

[edit] Colonial Expansion

Rivalry among the powers was exacerbated from the 1880s by the scramble for colonies which brought much of Africa and Asia under European rule in the following quarter-century. Under pressure from certain groups, even Bismarck agreed to the chase for overseas Empire, adding to Anglo-German tension as German acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific threatened to impinge upon British strategic and commercial interests. Wilhelm's support for Moroccan independence from France, Britain's new strategic partner, provoked the Tangier Crisis of 1905. During the Second Moroccan or Agadir Crisis (1911), a German naval presence in Morocco tested the Anglo-French coalition once again. These two crises led to negotiations, which Germany arguably 'lost'. This was a major factor to the development of a more aggressive policy in Germany.

[edit] Web of alliances

The complex set of treaties binding various players in Europe together prior to the war is sometimes thought to have been misunderstood by contemporary political leaders. Mobilization by a relatively minor player would have a 'cascading' effect that could rapidly run out of control, involving every country. Yet leaders discussed the crisis between Austria Hungary and Serbia as if it were a localised issue. This is how Austria-Hungary's threat of 'police action' against Serbia eventuated in Britain's entry into the war:

  • Austria Hungary threatens Serbia
  • Russian treaties with Serbia commit it to mobilize in Serbia's defense
  • Germany mobilizes against Russia due to the Schlieffen Plan (they had 6 weeks to defeat France)
  • France mobilizes after German Attack (right hook through Belgium)
  • Britain's 1839 treaty with Belgium commits it to defend Belgium from all aggressors although how far Britain needed to adhere to this treaty is questionable; it is more likely that the decision was based more on the age-old concern to prevent a single power dominating the channel ports of the continent and also Asquith's need to hold his government together in the face of a largely pro-war House of Commons.
  • With Britain's entry, the remainder of the British Imperial colonies and dominions are drawn in offering financial and military assistance. These were Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa
  • Japan, honouring its military agreement with Britain, declares war on Germany

[edit] Arms Race

As David Stevenson has put it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparedness ... was an essential element in the conjuncture that led to disaster ... The armaments race ... was a necessary precondition for the outbreak of hostilities." David Herrmann goes further, arguing that the fear that "windows of opportunity for victorious wars" were closing, "the arms race did precipitate the First World War." If the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war; it was "the armaments race ... and the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" which made his death in 1914 the trigger for war. (Ferguson 1999 p 82)

The naval strength of the powers in 1914
Country Personnel Large naval vessels Tonnage
Russia 54,000 4 328,000
France 68,000 10 731,000
Britain 209,000 29 2,205,000
TOTAL 331,000 43 3,264,000
Germany 79,000 17 1,019,000
Austria 16,000 3 249,000
TOTAL 95,000 20 1,268,000
Source: Ferguson 1999 p 85


The German naval buildup is seen by some historians as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations. The overwhelming British response, however, proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely to equal the Royal Navy. In 1900 the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910 the ratio was 2.3:1 and in 1914, 2.1:1. Germany was hopelessly outgunned. Ferguson (1999 p 83-85) argues that "so decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War."


[edit] Over by Christmas

The belief that a war in Europe would be swift, decisive and 'Over by Christmas' is often considered a tragic underestimation — the theory being, that had it been widely appreciated beforehand that the war would open such an abyss under European civilization, no-one would have prosecuted it. This account is less plausible on a review of the available military theory at the time, especially the work of Ivan Bloch, an early candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Bloch's predictions of industrial warfare leading to bloody stalemate, attrition, and even revolution, were widely known in both military and pacifist circles. Some authors such as Niall Ferguson argue that the belief in a swift war has been greatly exaggerated since the war. He argues that the military planners, especially in Germany, were aware of the potential for a long war, as shown by the famous Willy-Nicky telegraphic correspondence between the Emperors of Russia and Germany. He also argues that most informed people considered a swift war unlikely. Moreover, it was in the governments' interests to feature this message widely in their propaganda, for this encouraged men to join the offensive, made the war seem less serious, and promoted general high spirits.

[edit] Incompetence

By some historical accounts, the war was primarily the consequence of errors of judgment by European leaders, especially the monarchs of Russia and Germany. In this approach, leaders on all sides may be taken to have been too complacent about the real risk of war, or too in thrall to lobbies within their societies who favoured war. Other, specific oversights are sometimes offered as contributory to this general incompetence.

[edit] Primacy of the Offensive and War by Timetable

Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory encouraged all of belligerents to strike first in order to gain the advantage. The window for diplomacy was shortened by this attitude. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being caught on the defensive.

Some analysts have argued that mobilisation schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganisation. Thus, diplomatic overtures conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored..

[edit] The Schlieffen Plan

Germany's strategic vulnerability, sandwiched between its allied rivals, led to the development of the audacious Schlieffen Plan. Its aim was to knock France instantly out of contention, before Russia had time to mobilise its gigantic human reserves. Germany could then turn her full resources to meeting the Russian threat. Although Alfred Graf von Schlieffen initially conceived the plan well prior to his retirement in 1905, Japan's defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 exposed Russia's organisational weakness and added greatly to the plan's credibility.

The significance of the Schlieffen Plan is that it forced German military planners to prepare for a pre-emptive strike at the first sign of war; otherwise Russia would have time to mobilize, and Germany would be crushed by Russia's massive army. The plan included a strike at the Belgian city of Liège as soon as the German army mobilized. At the last minute, Kaiser Wilhelm II attempted to cancel the plan and avoid a war, he found that it was too late — to scrap the plan would require a re-organization of the German army that would leave Germany vulnerable for several months.

It appears that no war planners in any country had considered Germany's options, prepared for anything like the Schlieffen Plan, or advised politicians accordingly. Thus Europe's leaders debated calmly, without any sense of the requisite urgency, believing all parties would act patiently. But Germany could not afford patience.

[edit] Communication Issues

[edit] Telegraphy

In 1914, all nations still used telegraphy as the main form of communication. This often resulted in delays from hours up to even days.

[edit] Ambassadors

In 1914, the nations were very dependent on their ambassadors, partly due to delays in communications. This often led to subjective diplomatic decisions — and misunderstandings.

[edit] Specific Events

[edit] The Congress of Vienna

After Napoleon's final defeat at The Battle of Waterloo, the Congress of Vienna concluded in 1815. The congress was organized by the main victors of the Napoleonic Wars: Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria. The key figure of the congress was Austria's representative, Klemens von Metternich. Metternich advocated restoring Europe to the way it was before the French Revolution. He urged Europe to create a balance of power, where no European nation was stronger than another. This became known as the concert of Europe, a system where great powers would help each other to keep the old aristocracies in power. By preventing a single monarchy in a state from falling to nationalism or liberalism it would prevent the entire continent from going up in flames under social revolution. If that were to ever happen, according to Metternich, Europe would be thrown into another continental war, as Napoleon and French Nationalism had shown. Metternich feared nationalism as a force that could tear apart multi-ethnic nations like Russia and the Austrian Empire.

[edit] The Franco–Prussian War (1870–1871)

Many of the direct origins of World War I can clearly be seen in the results and consequences of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. This conflict brought the establishment of a powerful and dynamic German Empire, causing what was seen as a displacement or unbalancing of power: this new and prosperous nation had the industrial and military potential to threaten Europe, and particularly the already established European powers. Germany’s nationalism, its natural resources, its economic strengths and its ambitions to "find a place in the sun" sparked colonial and military rivalries with other nations, particularly the Anglo-German naval arms race.

A legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany following the German annexation of parts of the formerly French territory of Alsace-Lorraine. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France, giving rise to the desire for revenge, known as revanchism. French sentiments wanted to avenge not only military and territorial losses, but also the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power. French defeat in the war had sparked political instability, culminating in a revolution and the formation of the French Third Republic. Bismarck was wary of this during his later years, and tried to placate the French by encouraging their overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained. A Franco–German colonial entente that was made in 1884 in protest of an Anglo–Portuguese agreement in West Africa proved short-lived after a pro-imperialist government under Jules Ferry in France fell in 1885.

[edit] The 'War in Sight' crisis

France quickly recovered from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. France paid its war renumerations and began to build its military strength again. Bismarck leaked that Germay was planning a preventative war against France so that this recovery could not be realised. However the Dreikaiserbund sided with France rather than Germany humiliatingly forcing Bismarck to back down.

[edit] The Rise of Kaiser Wilhelm II

Under the political direction of its first Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, Germany secured its new position in Europe by an alliance with Austria-Hungary and a diplomatic understanding with Russia. Bismarck began pursuing alliances and peace treaties. He made peace with almost every nation in Europe except France. He feared greatly that a war might destroy the newborn nation he had created in the 1860s. By the time of Wilhelm I's death, a system of alliances kept a tight peace in Europe.

The ascension (1888) of Kaiser Wilhelm II brought to the German throne a young ruler determined to direct policy himself, despite his rash diplomatic judgement. After the 1890 elections, in which the centre and left parties made major gains, and due in part to his disaffection at inheriting the Chancellor who had guided his grandfather for most of his career, Wilhelm engineered Bismarck's resignation.

Much of the fallen Chancellor's work was undone in the following decades, as Wilhelm failed to renew the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, presenting republican France with the opportunity to conclude (1891–94) a full alliance with the Russian Empire. Worse was to follow, as Wilhelm undertook (1898–1900) the creation of a German navy capable of threatening Britain's century-old naval mastery, prompting the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 and its expansion (1907) to include Russia in the Triple Entente.

[edit] Anglo–German Naval Race

As mentioned above, Wilhelm II nurtured a desire to construct a German navy capable of challenging the maritime dominance of the Royal Navy. Such a navy would tie in with German ambitions in the colonial and commercial spheres, threatening British pre-eminence in these areas. The Kaiser entrusted the establishment of this German navy to his Naval Minister and close advisor, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz.

Motivated by Wilhelm's backing and his own enthusiasm for an expanded navy, Tirpitz championed four Fleet Acts from 1898 to 1912 that set Germany on constructing a fleet capable of matching the strength of British naval forces. The German program was enough to alarm the British and drive them into the above-mentioned alliances with France and Russia.

Under the direction of Admiral Jackie Fisher, the First Sea Lord from 1905 to 1910, the Royal Navy embarked on its own massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. The cornerstone of British naval rearmament was to be the massive Dreadnought battleship, which had been introduced in 1906. From then on until 1914, the British and Germans vied with each other to construct superior numbers of battleships, submarines, and other naval vessels and weaponry, constituting the main (but by no means only) bone of contention between Great Britain and Germany. Ironically, Germany's shipbuilding is one of the reasons why Germany lost the war. Shipbuilding took immense amounts of resources, which could have been used for the land army.

[edit] Berlin-Baghdad Railway

Soon after the Oriental Railway had transported its first passengers through the Balkans to Constantinople in 1888, German bankers received permission from Turkish leaders to construct a railway deeper into Turkey. By 1903, other nations in Europe had realized that Germans were planning to construct a railway which would provide a rail link from Germany to the Persian Gulf. This would have given Germany open access to African colonies, trade with India, and oil from Iraq. The new and huge impact of oil as fuel was recognised by the British, for its impact on German industrial and growing naval potential. The Suez Canal and the British control of shipping could be avoided by rail, and German power would threaten the British, French and Russian entente. They feared the Baghdad Railway would permit Germans to dominate the political and economic arenas of Europe (see Jastrow, and Engdahl below).

[edit] Historiography

The exact causes of the war have been debated with some intensity since the time the war began.

Immediately after the war much academic work that blamed Germany entirely for the war was produced in Allied countries. However, academic work in the later 1920s and 30s blamed all participants more or less equally. Various factors such as the network of secret alliances, emphasis on speed of offence, rigid military planning, Darwinian ideas, and the lack of resolution mechanisms were blamed by many. These ideas have maintained some currency in the decades since then. Famous proponents include Joachim Remak and Paul Kennedy. At the same time, many one sided works were produced by politicans and other participants often trying to clear their own names. In Germany these tended to deflect blame, while in Allied countries they tended to blame Germany or Austria-Hungary. The debate over "German war guilt" was quite emotional and topical in the interwar years, and some lingering resentment within Germany may well have contributed to the rise of the Nazi party, which denied German war guilt.

In 1961 Fritz Fischer wrote the enormously influential Griff nach der Weltmacht in which he blamed Germany for the war. Fischer believed that many members of the German government had overtly expansionist plans, formulated in the aftermath of social democratic gains in the election of 1912. He alleged that they hoped to use external expansion and aggression to check internal dissent and democratization. Some of his work is based on Bethmann-Hollweg's "September Programme" which laid out Germany's war aims. Fischer's work created a whole school of analysis in a similar vein, emphasising domestic German political factors. Some prominent scholars in this school include Imanuel Geiss, Hans-Ulrich Wehler,Wolfgang Mommsen, and V.R. Berghahn.

The "Berlin War Party" thesis and variants of it, blaming domestic German political factors became something of an orthodoxy in the years after publication. However, many authors have attacked it.

At first the idea prompted a strong response especially from German conservative historians such as Gerhard Ritter who felt the thesis was dishonest and inaccurate. Writing in the 1960s Ritter believed that Germany displayed all the same traits as other countries and could not be singled out as particularly responsible.

Other authors such as Arno Mayer, in 1967, agreed with some aspects of the theory, but felt it isolated Germany from its historical context. Mayer believes that all states acted more or less as Germany did in the years before the war. Samuel R. Williamson lays most of the blame with the Austro-Hungarian elites rather than the German in his 1990 book, Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War. Another recent work is Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War which completely rejects the Fischer thesis, laying most of the blame on diplomatic bumbling from the British. Recently, American historian David Fromkin has allocated blame for the outbreak of war entirely to Germany and Austria-Hungary in his 2004 book Europe's Last Summer.

In the 1960s, two new rival theories emerged to explain the causes of World War One. The first one, championed by the West German historian Andreas Hillgruber argued that in 1914 a “calculated risk” on the part of Berlin had gone horribly awry. Hillgruber argued that what the Imperial German government had attempted to do in 1914 was to break the informal Triple Entente of Russia, France and Britain by encouraging Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia and thus provoke a crisis in an area that would concern only St. Petersburg. Hillgruber argued that the Germans hoped that both Paris and London would decide the crisis in Balkans did not concern them and that lack of Anglo-French support would lead the Russians to reach an understanding with Germany. In Hillgruber’s opinion, the German government had pursed a high-risk diplomatic strategy of provoking a war in the Balkans that had inadvertently caused a world war.

Another theory was A.J.P. Taylor's “Railroad Thesis”. In Taylor’s opinion, none of the great powers wanted a war, but all of the great powers wished to increase their power relative to the others. Taylor argued that by engaging in an arms race and having the general staffs develop elaborate railroad timetables for mobilization, the continental powers hoped to develop a deterrent that would lead the other powers to see the risk of war as being too dangerous. When the crisis began in the summer of 1914, Taylor argued, the need to mobilize faster than one's potential opponent made the leaders of 1914 prisoners of their own logistics – The railroad timetables forced invasion (of Belgium from Germany) as an unavoidable physical and logistical consequence of German mobilization. In this way, Taylor argued, the mobilization that was meant to serve as a threat and deterrent to war instead relentlessly caused a world war by forcing invasion. Many have argued that Taylor, who was one of the leaders of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, developed his Railroad Thesis to serve as a thinly veiled admonitory allegory for the nuclear arms race.

[edit] See also

[edit] Further reading

  • Evans, R. J. W., and Hartmut Pogge Von Strandman, eds. The Coming of the First World War (1990), essays by scholars from both sides
  • Ferguson, Niall The Pity of War Basic Books, 1999 ISBN 0465057128.
  • Fischer, Fritz From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German history, 1871-1945, Allen & Unwin, 1986 ISBN 0049430432.
  • Fischer, Fritz Germany's Aims In the First World War, W. W. Norton ; 1967 ISBN 0393053474.
  • Fischer, Fritz War of Illusions : German policies from 1911 to 1914 Norton, 1975 ISBN 0393054802.
  • Fromkin, David Europe's Last Summer: Who Started The Great War in 1914?, Knopf 2004 ISBN 0375411569.
  • Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics Cambridge University Press, New York: 1981.
  • Hamilton, Richard and Herwig, Holger. Decisions for War, 1914-1917 New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
  • Henig, Ruth The Origins of the First World War (2002)
  • Hillgruber, Andreas Germany and the Two World Wars, Harvard University Press, 1981 ISBN 0674353218.
  • Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War (1984)
  • Keiger, John F.V France and the Origins of the First World War, St. Martin's Press, 1983 ISBN 0312302924.
  • Kennedy, Paul The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, Allen & Unwin, 1980 ISBN 0049400606.
  • Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.). The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914. (1979)
  • Knutsen, Torbjørn L. The Rise and Fall of World Orders Manchester University Press, New York: 1999.
  • Lee, Dwight E. ed. The Outbreak of the First World War: Who Was Responsible? (1958), readings from, multiple points of view
  • Leslie, John (1993). “The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary’s War Aims,” Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (Eds.), 20: 307- 394.
  • Lieven, D.C.B Russia and the Origins of the First World War, St. Martin's Press, 1983 ISBN 0312696086.
  • Mayer, Arno The Persistence of the Old Regime : Europe to the Great War Croom Helm, 1981 ISBN 0394511417.
  • Ponting, Clive (2002). Thirteen Days. Chatto & Windus.
  • Remak, Joachim The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1967 ISBN 0030828392.
  • Ritter, Gerhard “Eine neue Kriegsschuldthese?” pages 657-668 from Historische Zeitschrift Volume 194, June 1962, translated into English as “Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis?” pages 135-142 from The Outbreak of World War One: : Causes and Responsibilities, edited by Holger Herwig, Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1997
  • Schroeder, Paul W. (2000), “Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War” in Unmaking the West: Counterfactual Thought Experiments in History, Philip Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and Geoffrey Parker (Eds.).
  • Steiner, Zara Britain and the Origins of the First World WarMacmillan Press, 1977 ISBN 0312098189
  • Stevenson, David. Cataclysm: The First World War As Political Tragedy (2004) major reinterpretation
  • Stevenson, David. The First World War and International Politics (2005)
  • Taylor, A.J.P. War by Time-Table : How The First World War Began, Macdonald & Co., 1969 ISBN 0356042065
  • Wehler, Hans-Ulrich The German Empire, 1871-1918, Berg Publishers, 1985 ISBN 0907582222.
  • Weikart, Richard, From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary ethics, Eugenics and Racism in Germany. 2004 ISBN 140396502
  • Williamson, Samuel Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, St. Martin's Press, 1991 ISBN 0312052391.

[edit] External link

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