Jaralla Saleh Mohammed Kahla Al Marri

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Jarallah al-Marri
Born: August 12, 1973(1973-08-12)
Doha, Qatar
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 334
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Jarallah al-Marri is a citizen of Qatar currently held in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba.[1] Al Marri's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 334.[2] The Department of Defense reports that he was born on August 12, 1973, in Doha, Qatar.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 334 was identified inconsistently on official documents:

[edit] Combat Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[13][14] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[15]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the [[Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jaralla Saleh Mohammed Kahla Al Marri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 14 October 2004.[9] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee was associated with the Taliban and al Qaida forces.
  1. The detainee is a Qatar citizen who traveled to Afghanistan, through Pakistan, to participate in the Jihad.
  2. The detainee arrived in Pakistan in the fall of 2001 and later traveled to a guesthouse in Afghanistan.
  3. Prior to 11 September 2001, the detaines went to the al Farouq camp[16] camp even after learning it was owned by Usama Bin Laden.
  4. The detainee fled the al Farouq [16] camp after 11 September 2001, and was issued an AK-47.
  5. The detainee had interaction with the Taliban and they directed him through checkpoints throughout Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee and others fled Afghanistan, but were arrested at the Pakistan border by the Pakistani police.

[edit] Transcript

Al Marri chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[1]

[edit] Al-Marri's position

Al-Marri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal was held on October 30, 2004.[1] Al-Marri requested a lawyer. He was told that the tribunal was not a court of law, so he didn't need a lawyer. Al-Marri then started responding to all questions by saying "No comment".

Al Marri's personal representative told the tribunal that he had expected Al-Marri to speak on his own behalf, so he only had rough notes.[1] Al-Marri and his personal representative had discussed the unclassified portion of the summary of why the DoD considered Al-Marri an unlawful combatant. Al-Marri agreed with the summary that he had "traveled to Afghanistan, in the fall of 2001, prior to the attacks of 9-11. But he said he didn't know that the camp was owned by Bin Laden. He denied being issued an AK-47. He said he traveled alone, not with others. He acknowledged interacting with the Taliban, at roadblocks. At the time he traveled Taliban manned all the roadblocks.

[edit] Result of hearing

The tribunal confirmed the determination that Al-Marri was properly classified as an unlawful combatant based on the classified portion of his file.

[edit] Jarallah Al Marri v. George W. Bush

A writ of habeas corpus was submitted on Jarallah Al Marri'ss behalf.[11] In response, on 22 November 2004 the Department of Defense released 21 pages of unclassified documents related to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[17]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jaralla Saleh Mohammed Kahla Al Marri's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 17 November 2005.[10] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee went to Mecca and attended a course at the Al Harum Mosque where met a Saudi individual who described jihad and persuaded him to join.
  2. The Saudi individual introduced the detainee to another individual who was to be his point of contact regarding the jihad in Afghanistan.
  3. On 6 September 2001 the detainee flew from Doha, Qatar to Karachi, Pakistan on Qatar Airlines, checked into the Mustafa Hotel, and called his point of contact for jihad. The detainee paid his own way to Afghanistan.
  4. On 10 September 2001 the detainee departed the Mustafa Hotel and traveled to the al Farouq training camp where he arrived on 11 September 2001.
  5. The detainee related he resided in the mountains for approximately thirty days while waiting to cross the border, which was closed. The detainee saw this as a barrier to his ability to return home.
  6. The detainee claimed he needed to return home because he was ill. He reported that he traveled to Kabul, the to the town of Buldak and on to a checkpoint where he boarded a bus that drove to Quetta, Pakistan, where it was stopped by the Pakistani police or military. The detainee was captured and taken to jail, where he remained until he was turned over to U.S. Forces.
b. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee reported that upon his arrival at al Farouq he learned that Usama bin Laden owned the camp.
  2. The detainee reported that while residing in the mountains of Kabul in September 2001 he realized the jihad was a battle of Muslim against Muslim.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied transferring $10,000 U.S. Dollars to his brother and claimed the transfer receipt was a forgery.
b.

The detainee claimed he had second thoughts about fighting jihad once he discovered al Farouq was owned by Usama bin Laden.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jaralah Al Mari's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 2 November 2006.[12] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. COmmitment
  1. The detainee traveled to Saudi Arabia in late July or early August of 2001 and attended the al Harum Mosque. The detainee spent several hours a day over a period of a week with an individual he met at the mosque discussing Islam and jihad in Afghanistan. This individual gave the detainee a point of contact for jihad in Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee met with the point of contact at a restaurant in Saudi Arabia to discuss traveling to Afghanistan. The detainee was told not to discuss this travel with anyone because other governments did not approve of people entering Afghanistan.
  3. The detainee stated he understood that his activities in Afghanistan would include attending training camp [sic] , fighting and killing people who were killing Muslims.
  4. Approximately one month after returning to Qata, the detainee called his point of contact on two occasions to advise him of his decision to travel to Afghanistan. The point of contact instructed the detainee to purchase an airline ticket to Pakistan and to check into a hotel using a different name.
  5. The detainee was told not to speak to anyone of jihad. The detainee told his family he was traveleing to Pakistan to attend Tablique Dawa, an annual three day call to Islam. The detainee stated he did not tell his family about his true plans regarding his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan because he felt they would not support him.
  6. On 6 September 2001, the detainee flew from Qatar to Pakistan on Qatar Airlines. The detainee checked into a hotel and called his point of contact, who advised him that another individual would be contacting the detainee at the hotel.
  7. An individual arrived at the detainee's room and asked for 200 Riyals to pay for an airline ticket to Afghanistan, Pakistani clothing, shoes and a bag. On 7 September 2001, the individual returned to the hotel with a plane ticket, and the next day the detainee flew to Pakistan. The contact advised the detainee there would be three or four Arab males on the plane but not to acknowledge them or act like the detainee knew them.
  8. Upon arrival in Pakistan, the detainee was transported to a mudaffa. The detainee was told that other individuals staying in the mudaffa were Taliban.
  9. The detainee stated while at the mudaffa he heard about Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, which was described as a group of people who made it possible for others to go to jihad.
  10. On 9 September 2001 the detainee was driven to the vicinity of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The detainee wsa then driven around the border checkpoint on a motorcycle. On the other side of the border, the detainee met with original car and driver in Afghanistan and was driven to a mudaffa in Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. On 10 September 2001 the detainee arrived an an encampment for new arrivals at the al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan. ON the evening of 11 September 2001, the detainee was given a sleeping bag and moved away from al Farouq because it was believed the United States might start bombing the area.
  2. The detainee stated he learned that al Farouq was owned by Usama bin Laden before 11 September 2001, prior to arriving at the camp.
  3. The detainee stated there was discussion on 12 September 2001 regarding the attacks on the United States, specifically that the incidents occurred in New York City. ON 13 September 2001 the detainee returned to al Farouq to await transportation to Kandahr, Afghanistan. The detainee re-entered the camp and noticed a large mosque, approximately ten to fifteen white tents and a one story building with a sign indicating it was the Office.
  4. The detainee stated he spent approximately 30 days at an abandoned village where he was issued an AK-47 rifle without ammunition. The detainee stated it was during this time that he learned of the United States retaliation for the 11 September 2001 attacks.
c. Connection/Associations
  1. A source stated the detainee's brother was in Afghanistan for 15 to 19 months and trained in Usama bin Laden's camps.
  2. In May 2003, the detainee's brother was charged by a federal grand jury in Peoria, Illinois with making false statements to FBI agents during the investigation of 11 September 2001. The indictment alleges that the detainee's brother lied to agents about calling a named unindicted co-conspirator in the indictment charging Zacarias Moussauoui with crimes relating to the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  3. The detainee stated he met with his brothers approximately six to ten days prior to leaving for Afghanistan. The detainee could not remember the content of their conversations.
d. Other Relevant Data:
  1. The detainee was transported to another mudaffa in Afghanistan where he heard airplanes bombing in the distance.
  2. The detainee stated an individual in Afghanistan arranged for the detainee to be smuggled across the border into Pakistan. The detainee crossed the border on a motorcylce, using a gate at which the smuggler seemed to know the guard. While taking a bus from one town to another in Pakistan, the detainnee was apprehended after a guard boarded the bus and questioned the detainee on his nationality.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to perform jihad, but claims he was misled. The detainee learned after his arrival in Afghanistan that the Taliban were not as good as he was told.
b.

The detainee stated he had second thoughts and wanted to return to Qatar after learning that the al Farouq camp was owned by Usama bin Laden.
c.

While at al Farouq, the detainee became sick and wanted to leave this Camp and return home. The detainee stated he wanted to leave before the bombing began and that he missed his wife and children.
d.

The detainee stated he knows of no one who was or may have been members of al Qaid and did not hear of a group by the name of al Qaida until after his capture. The detainee stated al Qaida along with all of the fighters and trainees, were called Mujahedin.

[edit] Jail conditions

[edit] Al-Marri's position

Al-Marri participated in the hunger strikes held during the summer of 2005. According to the Center for Constitutional Rights:

As Jarallah Al-Marri, a prisoner from Qatar, stated, “I participated in a hunger strike for 17 days to protest the inhumane conditions and religious persecution I and hundreds of other prisoners have been subject to at Guantánamo.[18]”
Further details of the seriousness of the prisoners’ claims are also emerging. Al-Marri, for example, was hospitalized as a result of his hunger strike and a deteriorating heart condition, and placed on an IV. He told his attorney, Jonathan Hafetz of Gibbons Del Deo Dolan Griffinger & Vecchione, that the government had a nurse make sexual advances towards him while he was lying in his hospital bed in a vain attempt to convince him to give up his hunger strike. Al-Marri has been in solitary confinement for over 16 months and today often goes as long as 3 weeks without being allowed outside his cell for recreation. The lights in Al-Marri's cell remain on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and he has been denied adequate bedding and clothing. Al-Marri is able to sleep only 2 hours a night, and his physical and mental health have deteriorated significantly.[18]

According to an article in The Columbia Journalist, from December 12, 2005, al-Marri had only had two visits from his lawyers.[19]


[edit] Detention of Al-Marri's Brother

Ali Al-Marri On Sept. 10, 2001, al-Marri came to Peoria with his family to become a graduate student at his undergraduate alma mater, Bradley University.

al-Marri was indicted and arrested on credit card fraud and lying to the FBI. He is being detained as a supposed al-Qaeda operative who came to the US to assist in a second wave of terrorist attacks. Al-Marri denies this.[20]

Al-Marri's brother Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, formerly a graduate student at Bradley University, is currently held in a South Carolina naval prison.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c d documents (.pdf) from Jaralla al-Marri's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
  2. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  3. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  4. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  5. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  6. ^ OARDEC (August 8, 2007). Index for CSRT Records Publicly Files in Guantanamo Detainee Cases. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  7. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  8. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  9. ^ a b OARDEC (14 October 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Marri, Jaralla Saleh Mohammed Kahla page. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-09.
  10. ^ a b OARDEC (17 November 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Marri, Jaralla Saleh Mohammed Kahla pages 1-2. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-09.
  11. ^ a b Jarallah Al Marri v. George W. Bush pages 1-21. United States Department of Defense (22 November 2004). Retrieved on 2007-12-13.
  12. ^ a b OARDEC (2 November 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Mari, Jaralah pages 13-16. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-09.
  13. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  14. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  15. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  16. ^ a b When originally released in 2005 "al Farouq camp" was redacted.
  17. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  18. ^ a b Guantanamo Legal Update 8.25.05, Center for Constitutional Rights, August 25, 2005
  19. ^ New Congressional Bill May Alter Legal Limbo for Guantanamo Bay Prisoners, The Columbia Journalist, December 12, 2005
  20. ^ The Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri case, CollegeFreedom.org