Talk:James Graham, 1st Marquess of Montrose

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article incorporates text from the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition, now in the public domain.
This article is within the scope of the following WikiProjects:

[edit] Misc

Should this guy be in the category "british poets"? -R. fiend 22:02, 3 Jul 2004 (UTC)

I've added a link to the Scottish Civil War article and a link to Alasdair MacColla and Confederate Ireland, where most of Montrose's troops came from. Jdorney

[edit] Montrose at Dundee.

I am pleased to say that I have finally come across a Wikipedia piece on a Scottish subject worthy of commendation, well-argued and well-written, unlike so many others. There are, however, points at which the author's obvious admiration for his subject comes close to an almost total loss of objectivity. I personally do not believe that Montrose was the 'greatest soldier of the war', Cromwell excepted. There are others equally deserving of recognition, my personal favourite being General John Lambert; but even Black Tom Fairfax and Henry Ireton are worthy of mention. My wording is better and more neutral.

The real matter here concerns Montrose's alleged ability, which I have always believed-and argued-has been considerably overestimated. His victories, remarkable as they were, owed more to the incapacity of his enemies than to his own innate abilities as a soldier. In particular his neglect of military intelligence was notorious, taking him close to the threshold of disaster at Dundee, Fyvie and Auldearn, and over the threshold at Philiphaugh and Carbisdale. I've edited out the highly subjective statement about his conduct at Dundee because it strays so far from the facts. Let me try and explain the true position as briefly as I can.

Dundee far from being a great success was a self-induced fiasco. Believing his main opponents, General William Baillie and Sir John Hurry, were still south of the Tay, Montrose sent the bulk of his army north to Brechin in April 1645, while he advanced to Dundee with the Irish infantry and some of the Gordon cavalry, for no better reason than to make a 'showing' in the Lowlands. Even with Baillie and Hurry to the south, this operation involved a high degree of risk, because the army would not be able to make a quick retreat to the cover of the hills. As so often in Montrose's campaigns no scouts were sent out; and Baillie's army, was not far to the south: it was at Perth. As soon as he learned of the rebels whereabouts, he marched off in pursuit. In the late afternoon of 5 April, with a high proportion of his Irish infantry incapacitated by drink, Montrose was shocked to see Baillie making a rapid approach from the west. With some difficulty the army was reassembled, only just in time, and a fighting retreat was made to the east, the royalists suffering a number of losses in the process. Montrose's pointless raid on Dundee had brought is army close to destruction. This was a feat that no general in Europe would wish to emulate! Rcpaterson 03:53, 26 May 2006 (UTC)