Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mar'i

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Born in Khochna, Yemen Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mar'i was detained following a raid on his home in Pakistan on 23 September 2001 and is currently being held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantánamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.

In the list of Guantanamo detainees the U.S. Department of Defense was forced to release on May 15, 2006 Mari'i's birthdate is unknown, but his place of birth is listed as Darmar, Yemen.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID nuumber is 577.

His 'capture' and subsequent labelling as a combatant are the area of some controversy since he claims I am not an enemy combatant, I am a sleeping combatant because I was sleeping in my home.

Jamal claims he went to Kandahar, Afghanistan in May 2001, to prepare for field work gathering medical supplies for the Al Wafa charity. He then moved to Karachi, Pakistan where he worked with (or alternately was) the regional director, and purchased supplies from local hospitals to distribute to Al Wafa.

When his house was raided, Jamal was found with $13,000 which was to be used to bring his family to live with him. Following his detainment at Guantánamo, Jamal kept in contact with him family by telephone until Nov. 2003 at which point contact was lost between them.

Contents

[edit] Identity

Captive 577 was named inconsistently on various official documents released by the United States Department of Defense:

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[11][12] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[13]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Captive 577 chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[14]

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jamal Muhammad 'Alawi Mari's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 22 September 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee has worked for various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) with al Qaida and Taliban connections:
  1. Detainee admitted he was the director of the Baku, Azerbaijan branch of the Al Haramayn.
  2. Al Haramayn is a [sic] NGO with known al Qaida connections.
  3. Detainee admitted traveling to Kandahar (AF) in May 2001 to work in the al Wafa office.
  4. Detainee admitted he was the director of the Karachi (PK) branch of al Wafa.
  5. Al Wafa is an NGO with known al Qaida connections.
  6. Detainee was apprehended during a raid on his residence on 23 September 2001 in Karachi (PK).
  7. Alawi was capture in a facility with other individuals now detained by DoD and information related to weapons, explosives and tactics were found in that facility at the time of capture.

[edit] Tribunal

Alawi denied some of the allegations, and claimed that they contained contradictions. He admitted to being an employee of Al Haramayn, but not its director. He said that Al Haramayn was not an NGO, and that he was unaware of it having any terrorist connections.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[15]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mari's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 October 2005.[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. In 1997 the detainee was hired to work at the al Haramayn office in Baku, Azerbaijan.
  2. In 1998 the detainee was placed in charge of the al Haramayn office in Baku.
  3. A foreign government agency identified the detainee as the al Haramayn director since August 1998. The agency stated the detainee also took part in high-level illegal activity. The agency reported that al Haramayn, in the guise of providing humanitarian assistance, disseminated propaganda of an extremist and separatist nature.
  4. The detainee stated that he left al Haramayn in Baku in January or February 1999 and attempted to obtain a position at the al Haramayn office in Sanaa, Yemen.
  5. An associated of the detainee from al Haramayn helped the detainee get a job with al Wafa. The detainee then moved to Karachi, Pakistan in May 2001.
  6. In May 2001 the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan through Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan and Spin Balduk, Afghanistan. In Kandahar, the detainee visited the director of al Wafa for about two weeks while learning about the organization and what was expected of him.
  7. At the beginning of June 2001, the detainee traveled from Kandahar to Karachi and opened the al Wafa office in Karachi. The detainee's office purchased medicine and supplies and sent them to Afghanistan. The detainee was given a cell phone and was in daily contact with the director of al Wafa.
  8. The detainee headed the al Wafa office in Karachi. This office was responsible for buying medical supplies and also facilitated travel of al Wafa personnel into Afghanistan.
  9. The detainee was the only person with access to the al Wafa account at the Bank of the Emirates in Karachi.
  10. The detainee rented a house in his name for the al Wafa organization in August 2001. The detainee used this rental as a base of operations.
  11. The detainee relied heavily on the local Taliban office for storage space and access to office equipment. The detainee would forward supplies to Afghanistan from the Taliban office to avoid the official authorization required by the Pakistan Government.
  12. The detainee stated that during the three months he worked for al Wafa in Pakistan, he handled shipments of medical supplies and worked with the Taliban for the storage and shipping of supplies.
  13. The detainee admitted the Taliban and al Wafa were connect to facilitate movement of supplies and food into Afghanistan.
  14. While in Karachi, the detainee received boxes of records from the director of the al Wafa office in Kandahar. The boxes contained information regarding explosives and attack plans.
  15. The detainee was arrested in his home by Pakistani officials on 23 September 2001. A suitcase with clothes and $11,300 U.S. Dollars [sic] were found.
  16. At the time of the detainee's arrest, several items were seized, including lists of chemicals and pharmaceuticals and handwritten notes regarding the characteristics of different military weapons, explosives and attack scenarios.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee disclosed that an al Qaida member contacted the al Wafa office in Karachi requesting assistance in purchasing medical equipment to set up a laboratory in Pakistan.
  2. The detainee admitted that he knew two al Qaida members. One member was from Kuwait and worked for al Wafa. The other member sent his family to Kuwait just prior to 11 September 2001 and knew people in Jordan who were with Usama bin Laden.
c. Detainee Actions and Statements
The detainee stated that he personally endorses the Chechnyan jihad.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee maintains that neither al Haramayn nor al Wafa was involved with funneling money to Mujahidin fighters or terrorist groups in either Chechnya or Afghanistan.
b.

The detainee denied that al Wafa had any ties to al Qaida, Usama bin Laden or any other terrorist activities to his knowledge.
c.

The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks and had not heard any information concerning the attacks.
d.

The detainee stated he would not have been involved with al Wafa if he had known that it was connected to al Qaida.
e.

The detainee denied having any military training or attending any training camps.
f.

The detainee stated he was unaware if senior al Wafa members ever dealt directly with Taliban or al Qaida entities.
g.

The detainee stated he had no knowledge of the transfer of money, weapons or commodities other than medical supplies to the Taliban or al Qaida.
h.

The detainee did not believe that al Wafa would be associated with explosives and attack plans. The detainee believes the information seized from his office on explosives and attack plans was planted by Pakistani intelligence.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 577 chose to participate in his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jamal Muhammed Alwai's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 25 November 2006.[5] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee began working at al Haramayn, a humanitarian organization, in 1997. After one year, the detainee became an executive of the organization, and although not formally promoted, the detainee took over as director.
  2. The detainee denied al Haramayn had anything to do with funding the Chechnyan jihad or Mujahedin fighters. The detainee endorsed the Chechnyan jihad, but did not use al Haramayn to assist the fight.
  3. In May 2001 the detainee took a job working for an [sic] al Wafa Islamic relief organization in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  4. In July 2001, the detainee returned to Karachi, Pakistan to establish an al Wafa organization and received 110,000 United States Dollars. Part of the detainee's mission was to establish an al Wafa office in Karachi, Pakistan.
  5. The detainee stayed at a special, Taliban guest house while in Pakistan.
  6. The detainee relied heavily on the local Taliban office for storage space and access to office equipment because his Karachi, Pakistan, al Wafa organization was not yet established. Medical supplies the detainee purchased were sent directly from the vendor to the Taliban office for storage. The detainee would then go to the Taliban office and forward the supplies to Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee's al Wafa office had boxes which contained notebooks with handwritten notes of weapons capabilities, explosives, chemical and pharmaceutical lists and attack scenarios.
  8. The detainee had 11,300 United States Dollars in his possession when he was arrested.
b. Connections/Associations
  1. Al Haramayn was founded in 1992 to disseminate the Saudi Arabian version of the Sunni Islamic religion with Wahaistic influences/teachings. In addition to providing legitimate humanitarian aid to promote Islamic teachings, this organization has provided support to families of Islamic suicided attackers, freed activists from prisons, procured fraudulent travel documents, provided medical care for wounded Mujahedin, smuggled weapons into Algeria and transferred radical fundamentalists into Bosnia.
  2. The detaiene assisted at al Haramayn in as early as 1995.
  3. Al Haramayn has provided logistical support to the Mujahedin fighting in Afghanistan since the 1980's [sic] . Their annual budget was between 50 to 60 million United States Dollars. Al Haramayn provides support to Islamic extremist elements in seventeen countries or regions that includes freeing of activists from prisons, procurement of fraudulent travel documents and weapons smuggling to Algeria. Forty bank accounts connected to terrorist activities have been linked to offices and sub-departments of al Haramayn.
  4. A source stated al Haramayn worked closely with members of al Wafa. A former al Qaida member stated organizations such as al Haramayn and al Wafa allowed easier access to funds which financed al Qaida. These organizations provided a legitimate cover for al Qaida members to travel world-wide under the guise of humanitarian operations. These groups would build mosquest for the purpose of recruiting future al Qaida members.
  5. A senior al Qaida operative traveled to Azerbaijan in 1997 at the invitation of al Haramayn.
  6. Al Haramayn established an officer in Azerbaijan to provide a legitimate organization, which was also providing money and materials to Mujahedin, military leaders throughout Chechnya. Authorities accused al Haramayn of supporting activities not in alignment with the humanitarian aims of the organization in January 2000 and the office was subsequently closed.
  7. The detainee admitted the Taliban and al Wafa were connected in some ways, but he denied any connection between al Wafa and al Qaida.
  8. The detainee claims to have never met any al Qaida members with al Haramayn, although he admitted to knowing two al Qaida members.
  9. An al Wafa associate of the detainee had past contacts with Usama bin Laden and Usama bin Laden's senior operative.
  10. An al Wafa associate of the detainee was in contact with a microbiologist involved in al Qaida's anthrax program.
  11. The detainee received a telephone call stating the Kandahar, Afghanistan office was closing for fear of United States air attacks. The detainee was informed that documents and paperwork from the Kandahar office was being sent to him for safekeeping.
c. Other Relevant Data
  1. All employees of al Haramayn worked for the detainee by 1998. The detainee oversaw the finances that were used for payroll, food, medical supplies, Islamic publications and general aid.
  2. The detainee was responsible for the supply and care of five camps of displaced people located in Azerbaijan. Financial support for the organization came from Saudi Arabia. The organization did not have bank accounts and operated solely on cash.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated the head office in Saudi Arabia wanted to close the Baku, Azerbaijan office of the al Haramayn because it was getting fewer donations and, there was a conflict because it was a Sunni establishment providing aid to Shiites. A new director was sent to relieve the detainee despite operations being closed.
b.

A source stated there is no relation between al Qaida and al Wafa disliked each other and were in a disagreement.
c.

The detainee maintained that he had no contact with members of the Taliban government or the al Qaida terrorist organization.
d.

The detainee stated the al Wafa charity in Karachi, Pakistan was strictly a charitable organization.
e.

The detainee claims his business in Karachi, Pakistan was not a part of al Wafa.
f.

A source stated the detainee has no connection to al Qaida or the Taliban.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 577 chose to participate in his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ a b OARDEC (22 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Mari, Jamal Muhammad 'Alawi page 102. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-12.
  3. ^ a b OARDEC (26 October 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Mari, Jamal Muhammad Alawi pages 33-35. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-12.
  4. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  5. ^ a b OARDEC (25 November 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Alwai, Jamal Muhammed pages 77-80. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-12.
  6. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  7. ^ OARDEC (September 4, 2007). Index for testimony. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  8. ^ OARDEC (August 8, 2007). Index for CSRT Records Publicly Files in Guantanamo Detainee Cases. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  9. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  10. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  11. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  12. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  13. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  14. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Jamal Muhammad Alawi Mar'i's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 130-144
  15. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 

[edit] External links