Jalal Salam Bin Amer

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Jalal Salam Bin Amer is an Yemeni citizen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 564. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1973 in Al Muquala, Yemen.

[edit] Identity

The US Department of Defense was forced, by court order, to release the names of the captives taken in the "war on terror" who were held in Guantanamo. On April 20, 2006 they released a list of 558 names, nationalities and ID numbers, of all the captives whose status as "enemy combatants" had been reviewed by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[2] Twenty-five days later they released a list of 759 names, nationalities, ID numbers, dates of birth, and places of birth, of all captives who had been held in military custody in Guantanamo.^[1]

Bin Amer is one of the detainees whose name is spelled inconsistently in the various documents released by the Department of Defense. The Associated Press acquired a copy of a portable document format file containing all the unclassified documents prepared for hist Combatant Status Review Tribunal, where his name is spelled Jalal Salam Bin Amer.^[3] But the two official lists of names of Guantanamo detainees, released on April 20, 2006 and May 15, 2006, and his factors memo all used the name Jalal Salam Awad Awad.^[2][1][4]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[5][6] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[7]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Bin Amer chose not to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

Although the Department of Defense said that on March 3, 2006 they released all the transcripts for all the Guantanamo detainees who had participated in their Combatant Status Review Tribunals they did not release Bin Amer's. The Associated Press had, however acquired a copy through an earlier FOIA request, and made it available for download. His Tribunal did consider some unclassified evidence, a letter from his brother.^[8]

[edit] Allegations

The unclassified allegations that Bin Amer faced during his Tribunal were:^[9]

1. The detainee is a Yemeni National who traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee trained at a Jihad Para-military training camp called "The Libyan Base," near Kabul, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee received training on the AK-47 assault rifle, rocket propelled grenade launcher, PK-machine gun, and other weapons.
4. The detainee fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, using an escape network that helped fleeing Arabs and Afghans evade arrest by Pakistani Authoriites.
5. The detainee was arrest at a safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[10]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jalal Salam Awad Awad's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 7 February 2005. It was one of 121 memos released by the DoD on March 3, 2006.^[4] All 464 of the Summary of Evidence memos prepared for the first annual Administrative Review Board hearings were released in early September of 2007.^[11] The memos listed factors for and against the captives continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was found to be properly classified as an enemy combatant.^[sic]
2. The detainee is a Yemeni National who traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the Libyan Camp Annex in the vicinity of Kabul, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee received training on the AK-47 assault rifle, rocket-propelled grenade lanncher, PK machine gun, and other weapons.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, using an escape network that helped fleeing Arabs and Afghans evade arrest by Pakistani Authorities.
2. The detainee was arrested at a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
3. The detainee was caught in the house of Aziz (aka Riyadh the Facilitator).
4. "Riyadh the Facilitator" has been identified as an al Qaida operative.

d, Other Relevant data

1. Libyan training camp annex, outside of Kabul: A Libyan military training camp, known only as "the Libyan camp", is located in Kabul, Afghanistan. There is an annex to the camp also used for military training. It is an unknown distance from the main camp. The annex has an average of 10 to 12 students at a time and one trainer. (FN9)
2. Behavior while incarcerated:

   3/08/03 Tried to incite a disturbance at GTMO

   3/17/03 Verbally abusive to interpreter

   3/19/03 Spat on interpreter

   3/27/03 Threw toilet water on guards

   3/07/03 Practices martial arts (one of approx. 10 times he was caught over the duration of his incarceration)

   6/24/03 Verbally abusive to guards

   1/23/04 Took part in block riot

   10/10/04 Failure to comply with MP instructions (a common occurrence with this detainee)

   12/17/04 Speaking what appeared to be fluent Russian with other detainees

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

• In an affidavit from the detainee's brother, the detainee's brother stated, "My brother used to practice religion, but he was far from a religious fanatic - he just used to perform the basic requirements of our faith."
• In an affidavit from the detainee's brother, the detainee's brother stated, "My brother, because he liked to travel, was probably as interested in seeing new place and meeting people from different cultures as he was in the ministry."
• In an affidavit from the detainee's brother, the detainee's brother stated, "After September 11, 2001, and after the attack on Afghanistan, my brother called and told us that he would be home and would see us soon."
• Detainee admitted he went to train because Muslims have a religious duty to do so. However, he still maintains that he originally came to Afghanistan to immigrate and not for training.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jalal Salam Awad Awad's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 7 February 2006.^[12] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee admitted he went to train because Muslims have a religious duty to do so.
2. The detainee traveled from Hadramaut, Yemen to Sanaa Yemen. The detainee then proceeded to Karachi, Pakistan and on to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee continued on to Kandahar, Afghanistan and then to Kabul Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. While traveling to Kabul, Afghanistan, and individual attempted to convince the detainee to train at the Libyan camp and then go fight the jihad in Chechnya. However, the detainee did not agree.
2. The detainee trained at the Libyan Camp Annex in the vicinity of Kabul, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee received training for the Kalishnikov ^[sic] rifle, the rocket-propelled grenade launcher, the PK machine gun and other weapons.
4. The detainee stated that he was not trained at the Libyan camp, but he was trained by a Libyan man.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as one of the individuals who stayed in a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. The detainee reported that he spoke with an individual who was a recruiter and travel facilitator for military training in Afghanistan. The detainee met the individual in Hadramaut, Yemen.
3. The detainee stated that he was told by the recruiter how nice Afghanistan was and the recruiter pushed the idea of going for military training. The detainee was told that if he trained in Afghanistan he could go to Chechnya afterwards to fight in the jihad.
4. The detainee stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan at a guesthouse called al Ansar before deciding to go to the Libyan camp for training.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The al Ansar guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan is a two-story house with a basement. It accommodates Arabs immigrating to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee fled Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.
3. The detainee advised that there was an escape network that helped fleeing Arabs and Afghans evade arrest by Pakistani authorities.
4. The detainee stated that the border crossing route began at a safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan but is centered in the border town of Khowst, Afghanistan. The Kabul guest house was located in the Katib Birwan neighborhood of the city.
5. The detainee was arrested at a Karachi, Pakistan safe house.
6. The detainee said the lack of progress with his case is the reason for his uncooperativeness.
7. The detainee would not talk about details of his case file at this time as he has medical conditions that have not been attended to. The detainee would not discuss the specifics of his medical requirements stating that he has requested medical treatment many times in the past and has not received treatment.
8. The detainee stated that he has heard of al Qaida throughout the camp and since his detention, but he did not really understand what al Qaida was.
9. The detainee made mention of future unrest amongst the detainee population. The detainee was angry with the treatment of those in the camps. The detainee acted this way because he is frustrated with the four years already spent in Cuba. The detainee advised that detainee will soon show their dissatisfaction by hunger striking.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b c} list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ ^{a b} list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, April 20, 2006
3. ^ unclassified documents (.pdf) from Jalal Salam Bin Amer's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
4. ^ ^{a b} Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Jalal Salam Bin Amer Administrative Review Board - page 79
5. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
6. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
7. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
8. ^ unclassified documents (.pdf) from Jalal Salam Bin Amer's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, pages 14-17
9. ^ Summary of Evidence (.pdf) from Jalal Salam Bin Amer's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, September 23, 2004, page 13
10. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), Friday March 10, 2006, pp. 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-12. 
11. ^ OARDEC (7 February 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Awad, Jalal Salam Awad pages 79-81. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-09.
12. ^ OARDEC (7 February 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Awad, Jalal Salam Awad pages 54-56. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-09.