Jabir Jubran Al Fayfi

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Jabir Jubran Al Fayfi
Born: 1975 (age 32–33)
Ta'if, Saudi Arabia
Detained at: Guantanamo
ID number: 188
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Jabir Jubran Al Fayfi (born 1975 in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia) is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] Al Fayfi's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 188. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1975, in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Identity

The official documents from the US Department of Defense, and from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC transliterate Al Subii's name differently:

  • His name was transliterated as Jabir Jubran Al Fayfi on the official lists of names released by the US Department of Defense.[1]
  • His name was transliterated as Jaber Jabran Ali Al-Fayfee on the press releases from Saudi officials, when he was repatriated on February 21, 2007.[2][3]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jabir Jubran Al Fayfi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 September 2004.[4] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and the Taliban.
  1. The detainee was recruited at a mosque in Saudi Arabia to participate in Jihad.
  2. Detainee received two weeks of weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle.
  3. In November and December 2001, detainee met with al Qaida members while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
  4. One of the detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. Detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle in Bagram, Afghanistan to fight on the lines.
  2. Detainee fought the Northern Alliance from September through December 2001.
  3. Detainee was instructed to flee Afghanistan and go to Pakistan via the mountains.

[edit] Transcript

Al Fayfi didn't choose to attend his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[5] But his Personal Representative read a statement on his behalf.

[edit] Statement

Al Jayfi did not attend his CSRT. But he had dictated responses to each allegation for his Personal Representative to present on his behalf.

  • Al Jayfi denied having any relations with al Qaida. He acknowledged going to the Taliban's front lines, to see if they were abiding by the terms of a Fatwa, by a Saudi scholar, published in a Pakistani newspaper. If he thought the Taliban was complying with the Fatwa's conditions he would have joined their fight against the Northern Alliance.
  1. Al Jayfi denied being recruited in Saudi Arabia. He acknowledged taking a contact address of a man in Kashmir.
  2. Al Jayfi acknowledged receiving two weeks of training on the AK47.
  3. Al Jayfi acknowledged passing through Tora Bora, on his way to Pakistan. He acknowledged meeting some other Arabs while he was fleeing to Pakistan. He had no idea if any of them were al Qaida.
  4. Al Jayfi said he knew nothing about his name being found on captured hard drives. He pointed out that there would be more than one person with the same nickname. His nicknames were Abu Grafar or Abu Ibrahim. He said that these nicknames were as common there as David was among the interrogators.
  • Al Jayfi acknowledged being briefly present on the front line. But he was not there to fight, only to observe whether the Taliban were applying the Fatwa's conditions.
  • Al Jayfi said that it was obligatory for everyone to have a gun on the front line. But he did not participate in any fighting.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jabri Jabran Al Fayfi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 3 December 2004.[6] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. One of detainee's known aliases was on a list of captured al Qaida members that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
  2. Detainee fought the Northern Alliance from September through December 2001.
b. Training
  1. Detainee received two weeks of weapons training on the Kalishnikov rifle.
  2. Detainee trained at the Al Farouq training camp near Kandahar.
c. Connection/Associations
  1. The detainee stayed at the Arab Center in Bagram, Afghanistan, where Taliban fighters stayed while waiting to go to the line to fight.
  2. The detainee spent time in a Jaesh e Mohammed [sic] (JEM) building in Karachi, Pakistan
  3. JEM is an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan. The JEM had close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama Bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to the JEM.
  4. In November and December 2001, detainee met with al Qaida members while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
  5. Detainee was instructed to flee Afghanistan and go to Pakistan via the mountains.
d. Intent
  1. Detainee was recruited at a mosque in Saudi Arabia to participate in Jihad.
  2. Detainee was issued a Kalishnikov [sic] rifle in Bagram, Afghanistan to fight on the lines.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was never trained at a terrorist training camp.
b. The detainee stated he now thinks what he did was a mistake (Apr 2003).
c. The detainee stated that he learned a lesson from his experience in Afghanistan and at Camp Delta and would not participate in another jihad.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Jabri Jabran Al Fayfi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 18 February 2006.[7] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] Board recommendations

In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[8][9]

The Board's recommendation was unanimous.[8][9] The Board's recommendation memos were heavily redacted -- their actual recommendation was redacted.

The Board based its recommendation on assessments from the FBI, the CIA, the United States Department of State and an agency identified by the acronym DASD-DA.[8]

The Board's recommendation memo indicated that it convened twice, on 3 March 2006 and 28 April 2006.[8]

The Board concluded that Jabri Jabran Al Fayfi continued to pose a threat to the United States.[9]

In the memo where they explained the basis for their recommendation the Board reported[9]:

(U) The ARB has complied with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. In making a determination of status or disposition of this detainee, the ARB has assessed, to the extent practicable, whether any statement derived from or relating to this detainee was obtained as a result of coercion; and the probative value, if any, of any such statement. In addition, the ARB considered any new evidence that became available relating to the enemy combatant status of this detainee.

[edit] Repatriation

Al Fayfi was repatriated on February 21, 2007, along with six other Saudis.[2][3][10] The seven men were detained, without charge, in Hayer Prison, while Saudi justice officials determined whether they had violated any Saudi laws.[11]

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ a b Seven Saudi Guantanamo detainees return to the Kingdom. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington DC (February 21, 2007). Retrieved on March 3, 2007.
  3. ^ a b "Saudi terror suspects go home", United Press International, February 22, 2007. Retrieved on March 3. 
  4. ^ OARDEC (21 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Fayfi, Jabir Jubran page 97. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-07.
  5. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Jabir Jubran Al Fayfi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 10-13
  6. ^ OARDEC (March 10, 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Fayfi, Jabri Jabran pages 26-27. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-16.
  7. ^ OARDEC (18 February 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Fayfi, Jabri Jabran pages 79-81. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
  8. ^ a b c d OARDEC (June 26, 2006). Administrative Review Board assessment and recommendation ICO ISN page 54. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
  9. ^ a b c d OARDEC (28 April 2006). Classified Record of Proceedings and basis of Administrative Review Board recommendation for ISN pages 55-60. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
  10. ^ Anant Raut, Jill M. Friedman (March 19, 2007). The Saudi Repatriates Report. Retrieved on April 21, 2007.
  11. ^ P.K. Abdul Ghafour. "Families Meet With Gitmo Returnees", Arab News, Saturday, February 24, 2007. Retrieved on March 3.