User:Ipankonin/Duelfer Chemical Weapons quotes

• ISG has obtained no evidence that contradicts our assessment that the Iraqis destroyed most of their hidden stockpile, although we recovered a small number of pre-1991 chemical munitions in early to mid 2004.

• These remaining pre-1991 weapons either escaped destruction in 1991 or suffered only partial damage. More may be found in the months and years ahead.

The destruction years ago of the bulk of Iraq’s CW munitions not withstanding, ISG remains concerned about the status and whereabouts of hundreds of CW artillery rounds. Previous assertions that the munitions were all destroyed have been undermined by reporting that the munitions remain intact in an unknown location.

'In the 5 January 1999 Compendium, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq had not adequately accounted for 550 mustard-filled artillery rounds it claimed to have lost.' This issue first surfaced in 1996 because of discrepancies in Iraq’s accounting of weapons holdings, and was investigated but not resolved by UNSCOM (see the January 1999 UN compendium for details). ISG conducted extensive interviews with high- and mid-level Iraqi officials to determine the final disposition of the 550 mustard-filled rounds—which would be highly toxic, even now—cited by the UN as an unresolved disarmament issue, and found inconsistencies in the story among witting high-level officials. Most officials recounted the story of accidental destruction in a fire in Karbala, reporting provided to the UN after Iraq’s investigation of this issue prior to 1998, while the former MIC director, Huwaysh, claims the rounds were retained for future use.

• In a 7 August 2003 debriefing, Huwaysh said that as of early 2003, all 550 mustard rounds were kept by the SRG at Suwayrah, probably the former location of the II RG Corps Headquarters, just north of the Shaykh-Mazar ammunition depot.

• According to Huwaysh, the matter was discussed by the Higher Committee on Monitoring Inspections and a decision was made to declare the shells, which was done just prior to OIF.

• Amir Rashid admitted that the Higher Committee discussed the shells in February or March 2003. Rashid said the discussion focused on the connection between the burned mustard shells at the Fallujah proving ground and other shells that reportedly burned on a trailer near Karbala after the 1991 Gulf War.

• General Hussam Amin did not remember any discussions of Suwayrah and mustard shells. According to Amin, in early 2003, General ‘Amir Al Sa’adi explained to him that the mustard shells were destroyed on the trailer near Karbala.

• The enormous number of munitions dispersed throughout the country may include some older, CW-filled munitions, and ISG cannot discount the possibility that a few large caches of munitions remain to be discovered within Iraq.

Beginning in May 2004, ISG recovered a series of chemical weapons from Coalition military units and other sources. A total of 53 munitions have been recovered, all of which appear to have been part of pre-1991 Gulf war stocks based on their physical condition and residual components.

The most interesting discovery has been a 152mm binary Sarin artillery projectile—containing a 40 percent concentration of Sarin—which insurgents attempted to use as an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). The existence of this binary weapon not only raises questions about the number of viable chemical weapons remaining in Iraq and raises the possibility that a larger number of binary, long-lasting chemical weapons still exist.

• ISG has no information to indicate that Iraq produced more binary Sarin rounds than it declared, however, former Iraqi scientists involved with the program admitted that the program was considered extremely successful and shelved for future use. According to the source, General Amer al-Saadi sought to downplay its findings to the UN to avoid heightened attention toward the program.

Under UN Security Resolution 687, Iraq should have destroyed or rendered harmless all CW munitions, but we cannot determine without additional information whether the rounds we have recovered were declared or if their destruction was attempted.

• An Iraqi source indicated that when weapons were forward-deployed in anticipation of a conflict, the CW weapons often became mixed in with the regular munitions, and were never accounted for again. Another source stated that several hundred munitions moved forward for the Gulf war, and never used, were never recovered by retreating Iraqi troops. A thorough post-OIF search of forward depots turned up nothing—if the weapons were indeed left behind, they were looted over the 12 years between the wars.

• Iraq’s unilateral destruction of weapons in 1991 was far from perfect—a February 2003 UNMOVIC inspection at the Al Azziziyah Firing Range to attempt to account for 157 R-400 bombs by inspecting the debris turned up 8 bombs that had survived the 1991 explosions. So it is possible that Iraqi—or even UN—explosion pits could have been looted of a few surviving munitions.

• Because of poor Iraqi inventory accounting, simple pilferage before or after the 1991 Gulf war could have resulted in some lost munitions.

Origin of the Binary Sarin Round Used on BIAP

The binary chemical round detonated near the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) probably originated with a batch that was stored in a Al Muthanna CW complex basement during the late 1980s for the purpose of leakage testing. Iraq placed at least 12 filled binary Sarin munitions, either 152 or 155mm projectiles, in the basement of the Salah al-Din laboratory at the Al Muthanna CW complex, according to a report.

• The same report claims that only 20-30 binary 152mm rounds were produced, and the program switched to 155mm rounds after the 152mm rounds were expended in testing. The report stated that all of the binary munitions with aluminum canister inserts (such as the one used on BIAP) should have been used in field testing, but some may have been set aside for leak testing at Al Muthanna.

• A different report stated that as of 1988 no binary chemical rounds were stored at any other location besides the Salah al-Din laboratory, and that the rounds were kept in the basement to test for leakage and chemical degradation.

• A third report speculated that binary rounds may either have been buried or moved to one of two bunkers in the mid-1990s when the UN ordered the Al Muthanna complex to relocate a large number of chemicals and munitions. The same report said that Salah al-Din al-Nu’aymi, the manager of the binary Sarin munitions project, frequently stored munitions he was working on but had not tested in the basement of his laboratory at Al Muthanna.

• A fourth report said that 20-40 binary shells were kept in the “special stores” at Al Muthanna as of the late 80s, but the source believed that these had been destroyed by UNSCOM. ISG has been unable to verify from UNSCOM reports that any binary shells were destroyed at Al Muthanna.

The Technical Research Center (TRC) also worked on producing 152mm binary Sarin artillery shells, but we have no reason to believe that they possessed functional chemical munitions.

• According to the Iraqi FFCD, the TRC conducted lab experiments with 152mm binary munitions using a simulant to test the mixing of the binary components. No binary tests using chemical agent at the TRC were declared.

• According to one report, the Iraqi Intelligence service officer Ali Muklif ran the binary program, and the deputy director of the Military Industrialization Commission, Amir al-Sa’adi, ordered the work. The report claimed that al-Sa’adi provided the TRC with chemicals and possibly 152mm rounds, but the report did not elaborate on the work performed by the TRC.

The disposition of the 152mm and/or the 155mm artillery projectiles after the Gulf war is unknown, although it is possible that the rounds remained at the Al Muthanna complex and were looted after OIF.

• Even though Al Muthanna has been extensively investigated by UN and ISG teams, the complex covers 10 square miles, which makes it difficult to fully exploit. An ISG team that went to the site in January said that looters appeared to have been at several parts of the Al Muthanna complex.

• Several parts of the Al Muthanna complex were bombed or in poor condition throughout the 1990s. These areas pose a health risk to exploitation teams, but looters have shown themselves to be less risk-averse than ISG personnel. It is possible that the round was removed from an area in Al Muthanna that was deemed unsafe to exploit.

• An alternate explanation is that rounds were moved out of Al Muthanna and stored at a different location in the early 1990s, where it was later looted after OIF, although we have no reporting to substantiate this possibility.

The actual number of filled binary artillery shells produced by the Iraqi CW program during the 1980s is unknown, but we assess that only a handful of filled binary rounds would have existed after the Gulf war.

• According to a report, the National Monitoring Directorate only asked for the number of binary CW rounds Al Muthanna tested, not the number it actually produced. The Iraqi FFCD from June 1996 states that 10-12 152mm and 160 155mm binary Sarin artillery shells were field-tested.

• If the number of 152mm artillery shells produced by Al Muthanna was a few dozen, as was stated in the aforementioned sensitive report, then the shells which remained in the basement of the Salah al-Din Laboratory in the late 1980s may have been the only filled binary sarin rounds which existed at the time of the Gulf war.

• Reporting states that the only 152mm binary Sarin rounds produced by Al Muthanna that were not destroyed in field tests were in the basement of the Salah al-Din laboratory. The report stated that at least 12 binary munitions were placed there, although they may have been 152mm, 155mm, or a mixture of both.