Invitation to treat

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Contract Law
Part of the common law series
Contract
Contract formation
Offer and acceptance  · Mailbox rule
Mirror image rule  · Invitation to treat
Firm offer  · Consideration
Defenses against formation
Lack of capacity to contract
Duress  · Undue influence
Illusory promise  · Statute of frauds
Non est factum
Contract interpretation
Parol evidence rule
Contract of adhesion
Integration clause
Contra proferentem
Excuses for non-performance
Mistake  · Misrepresentation
Frustration of purpose  · Impossibility
Impracticability  · Illegality
Unclean hands  · Unconscionability
Accord and satisfaction
Rights of third parties
Privity of contract
Assignment  · Delegation
Novation  · Third party beneficiary
Breach of contract
Anticipatory repudiation  · Cover
Exclusion clause  · Efficient breach
Fundamental breach
Remedies
Specific performance
Liquidated damages
Penal damages  · Rescission
Quasi-contractual obligations
Promissory estoppel
Quantum meruit
Subsets: Conflict of law
Commercial law
Other areas of the common law
Tort law  · Property law
Wills and trusts
Criminal law  · Evidence

In the contract law of common law jurisdictions, an invitation to treat (invitation to bargain in the U.S.) is an action by one party which may appear to be a contractual offer but which is actually inviting others to make an offer of their own. The distinction is important because if a legitimate contractual offer is accepted by another, a binding contract is immediately formed and the terms of the original offer cannot be further negotiated without both parties' consent. An invitation to treat may be seen as a request for expressions of interest.

The clearest example of an invitation to treat is a tender (or bidding in the U.S.) process. This was illustrated in the case of Spencer v Harding (1870) LR 5 CP 561, where the defendants offered to sell by tender their stock and the court held that they had not undertaken to sell to the person who made the highest tender, but were inviting offers which they could then accept or reject as they saw appropriate. In certain circumstances though, an invitation for tenders may be an offer. The clearest example of this was seen in Harvela Investments Ltd v Royal Trust of Canada (CI) Ltd [1986] AC 207, where the defendants had made it clear that they were going to accept the highest tender; the court held that this was an offer which was accepted by the person who made the highest tender and that the defendants were in breach of contract by not doing so.

An auction may be more ambiguous. Generally an auction may be seen as an invitation to treat, with the property owner asking for offers of a certain amount and then selecting which to accept as illustrated in Payne v Cave (1789) 3 TR 148. However, if it is stated by the owner that there is no reserve price or that there is a reserve price beyond which offers will be accepted then the auction is most likely a contractual offer which is accepted by the highest bidder; this was affirmed in the Court of Appeal in Barry v Davies [2000] 1 WLR 1962.

A shop owner displaying their goods for sale is generally making an invitation to treat (Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists [1953] 1 QB 401). They are not obliged to sell the good to anyone who is willing to pay for them, even if additional signage such as "special offer" accompanies the display of the good. (But see bait and switch.) This distinction was legally relevant in Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394, where it was held that displaying a flicknife for sale in a shop did not contravene legislation which prohibited offering for sale such a weapon. The distinction also means that if a shop mistakenly displays a good for sale at a very low price it is not obliged to sell it for that amount [1].

Generally, advertisements are invitations to treat, so the person advertising is not compelled to sell to every customer. In Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204, it was held that where the appellant advertised to sell wild birds, was not offering to sell them. Lord Parker CJ commented that it did not make "business sense" for advertisements to be offers, as the person making the advertisement may find himself in a situation where he would be contractually obliged to sell more goods than he actually owned. In certain circumstances however, an advertisement can be an offer, a well known example being the case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256, where it was held that the defendants, who advertised that they would pay anyone who used their product in the prescribed manner and caught the flu £100 and said that they had deposited £1,000 in the bank to show their good faith, has made an offer to the whole world and were contractually obliged to pay £100 to whoever accepted it by performing the requested acts.

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