Talk:Instrumentalism
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[edit] Philosophic hairsplitting?
Not being a professionally trained philosopher, I am having a difficult time finding more than a paper thickness of difference betweeen instrumentalism, pragmatism, and utilitarianism, other than the deployment of the terms by thinkers in different fields. I would appreciate a clearer differentiation, or alternatively, is there an extraordinary amount of effort being expended to build academic reputations by attempts to stake out their own positions (referring to the scholars, not the Wiki editors, of course!). This is not to say that the concepts are not complex, just that there seems to be more overlap among, than separation between them. --Blainster 18:12, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Functions, Not Black boxes
"Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable, and that they should be treated like a black box into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions." I could be wrong, but black boxes involve unknown transformations by definition, whereas theories themselves are explicit & thus given data, we know why it predicts what it does. As further proof, we can manually change a theory at any time. : Waxwings 23:07, 24 July 2005 (UTC)
[edit] Ambiguous sentence
The sentence quoted above may not say what is intended. Does instrumentalism deny that theories should be treated like a black box? I think this sentence should read "Instrumentalism denies that theories are truth-evaluable; rather, it suggests they should be treated like a black box into which you feed observed data, and through which you produce observable predictions."
[edit] Popper is not an instrumentalist
...and anyone who's read his Conjectures and Refutations should know this, since he directly attacks instrumentalism in more than one place. He is quite explicit on this point, so I have no idea why he's included in this article.
- Then you should edit the article to reflect that. Providing citations would also be helpful.--droptone 22:00, 17 November 2005 (UTC)
Dear editors, please refer to Popper's Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge included in Conjectures and Refutations (Chapter 3). In this paper he presents 3 different positions: and it is quite clear that his position is neither instrumentalism nor essentialism. Jackbars 20:31, 21 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] O and T terms
Whom among the instrumentalitst makes this distinction between O and T? What is problematic is that what is meant by 'meaning' is unclear. I am a gene but my meaning (not any meaning?) cannot be derived from observation so I am a theoretical entity, likewise I am Simon (the one writing this remark) but yet my meaning cannot be derived from observation, so am I likewise a theoretical construct? I can directly experience acidity though I might use a more precise theory to define it, the same with the quality red...
Re: O & T terms
The analysis given in the article is flawed. Where it states:
"... Observation statements (O-statements) have their meaning fixed by observable truth conditions, e.g. "the litmus paper is "red", whilst observation terms (O-terms) have their meaning fixed by their referring to observable things or properties, e.g. "red". Theoretical statements (T-statements) have their meaning fixed by their function within a theory and aren't truth evaluable, e.g. "the solution is acidic", whilst theoretical terms (T-terms) have their meaning fixed by their systematic function within a theory and don't refer to any observable thing or property, e.g. "acidic". Though you may think that "acidic" refers to a real property in an object, the meaning of the term can only be explained by reference to a theory about acidity, in contrast to "red", which is a property you can observe. ..."
Both "red" and "acidic" are matters of perception and, therefore, equally subjective. To someone who is color blind or otherwise impaired, the litmus paper is not red. Contrarily, we can taste for acidity; and our taste-sense is as valid for determining properties as is sight. They are just different senses with which to "observe". From sensory organ to brain to interpretation a number of things happen, making each of these properties subject to what we "know" or have learned of our environment. Every individual having normal eye-sight and brain function sees an object of color red, and learns through rote that others consistently identify and register the same object as "red" as he does. But, we have no means of knowing perfectly that they see the color red as the same precise hue. How are we to know that the person with whom we agree it is red is not seeing a color that to us might by a little more cyan or magenta? Through long experience, each person registers his "red" as uniquely red, just as you register yours; the only consistency being that you register and label the same objects as having the same color - whatever its true color may be. Logically we know that however we interpret the color it must be have the same "true" color to everyone, regardless of personal interpretation. We analyze and determine no further than this because it is sufficient that we all recognize color consistently.
While the example given is flawed, the underlying idea still has some merit. Accepting both of these forms of "observation" as equally valid, what other property might constitute an un-observable statement or term (i.e., "theoretical"). An unobservable term is one we cannot observe directly or indirectly because we either lack the necessary sensory apparatus or for which there is no phenomenon capable of being sensed. Heat is detectible by humans but not temperature, which is only a measure of heat. Yet, humans can and do estimate temperature over a very limited range. This is a learned skill obtained from frequent reference to thermometers and "remembering" the relative sensation of heat correspondsing to a given temperature. Until the concept of temperature was first postulated and a measurement devised, the best people could say of heat was an object was either hot, cold or indifferent. Thus, temperature is extrinsic rather than intrinsic, and is unobservable only by indirect detection. There are other properties that are still less observable (e.g., entropy) and are normally detected as estimates made by long or painstaking observation. However, do these constitute "theoretical" properties or real ones. Using the same measuring apparatus, we get consistent results which are "observable", moving many extrinsic properties from the realm of theoretical to observable; with our senses extended through inventive means.
Self, good, cognition, and temperment, are a few more likely properties with which to illustrate this idea regarding the 'evaluability of truth', or, so called, 'subjective truth'. We all accept these terms as having some kind of validity, yet are hard pressed to verify them as measureable properties. I can only prove self and cognition to myself; all others having to take my word for it I have such properties. Similarly, all things we deem good are not invariably or universally so, but may only be good in some context of consensus or personal gratification. For example, an impulse to charity is generally considered a positive good, but not if it creates a permanent and burdensome condition of dependence. Sexual desire may feel "good" to the person having it, yet may feel threatening to others or disruptive to the society in which he resides when expressed.
When all means of detection and proof are exhausted, we fall back on faith. Faith is an acceptance that allows us to operate as though a truth were determined that is, otherwise, indeterminable. Faith is not the same as subjective truth, because the one enables us to operate in a consistent manner, where the other denies consistency is possible. There are many things we do and accomplish without ever taking stock of the reality underlying our decisions to act. We get into cars and airplanes having faith the brakes won't fail or airframe fracture; yet these are real possibilities. We investigate the universe in which we live and hypothesize possible explanations for everything we can see or conceive relying on base assumptions we know can never be proved or disproved. Ultimately, we have faith either in our theories or in something beyond our limited abilities of observation and conception. Either way, we are convinced of their truth.
John Dewey was wrong to see politics as "just" a means to an end. Moreover, if it was just a means, then which means should not have mattered so much to Dewey as results. Yet, Dewey strongly advocated a particular political philosophy over all others, one that was at odds with the prevailing political philosophy in which he operated. This means he had to start his program by supplanting the prevailing philosophy to reach his ends. It takes far more work to achieve an objective when you first have to replace an entire system and culture before you can make an inroad. Yet that is exactly what Dewey did.
Dewey was a socialist with a decidedly socialist agenda. The United States in which he operated was predominently geared toward the individual and recognized the ability and right of individuals to fend for ourselves. Dewey felt the individual was over emphasized, and his activism helped promote the movement that ultimately stigmatized individualism while codifying cultural conformity (regardless of his intent). The resulting culture is less resilient and robust than the one preceding it, as demonstrated by its vulnerability and inability to operate outside of collectivized norms wherever the norms breakdown. Ends over means tend to be myoptic, often with forseeable results. Emphasizing ends deemphasizes any system of values that serve as a guage for those ends or of the means to accomplish them. Dewey, himself, was a moral man, yet the consequence of his philosophy was to disconnect ends from means in the minds of those who followed after. For all Dewey's intellect (and it was considerable), he did not have sufficient forsight or willingness to determine wither he would take us.
