Talk:Igor Smirnov

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[edit] Smirnov before the Soviet collapse

Hi William (or anyone with relevant information), I recently began to take an interest in this site and I wanted to ask why the claim that Smirnov "served on various local councils during the Soviet era" survived your recent edit of this page (incidentally, I completely agree with the decision to remove the "erstwhile Russian Communist" bit, but for different reasons. Indeed he was a CP member--it would have been difficult to get where he did without membership--he was, however, expelled in 1989).¹ Evidence that I have come across researching a related issue for my dissertation suggests that he never served in Soviet government organs (and certainly never served in the CPSU apparat).² Do you (or anyone else) have evidence to the contrary? If so, I would be interested to see it (if not, I will delete the claim from the article). Thanks for devoting so much time to this great resource! John ¹ See (among others): Viktor Diukarev, Pridnestrov’e'—-proshloe, nastoiashchee, budushchee, za kulisami politiki. (Tiraspol’: Uprpoligrafizdat PMR, 2000), 121. ² See (among others): Efim Bershin, Dikoe pole: Pridnestrovskii razlom (Moscow: Tekst, 2002), 21-22.

Hi Jamason! No, there is no evidence for the "served on various local councils" part, unless you count the trade union as a council and/or the OSTK (Obedenenie Sovietov Trudovyh Kolektivov); active in Transnistria at the very end of the Soviet era. The statement on the various local councils probably came from someone who saw the oft-repeated misinformation that Smirnov was mayor of Tiraspol (which he never was) and couldn't find evidence for it, but then decided to soften it. If you want to find more about Smirnov, the best resource is a book called "Leader". Olvia Press has a copy of it on its website, here: http://www.olvia.idknet.com/soderjanie.htm - note that it a puff-piece (nothing negative) but it has a lot of well-researched biographical information and all of it checks out. - Mauco 21:29, 17 June 2006 (UTC)
William: Thanks for the _Lider_ link! JM Jamason 22:45, 17 June 2006 (UTC)
You're welcome. It is actually a good book, despite its title which is straight out of North Korea. Also, some of the writing is very sugary, with no criticism at all. But it has a lot of info and none of it is false. It all stands up to research. The only "misrepresentation" is that the author left out any mention of Smirnov's negatives so if he has any, we are forced to learn about them from other sources. Apparently Smirnov is a coward (says Victor Barsan, Romanian author of a whitepaper on the Ilascu trial) and rude (says Edward Lucas, Eastern Europe correspondent for The Economist). It may be true, or they may have an axe to grind. I wouldn't know. - Mauco 01:15, 18 June 2006 (UTC)
Indeed. It is a great example (which I had previously overlooked, so thank you again) of the "internationalist" discourse endemic to the OSTK movement (and moreover very useful to me for the project I mentioned above--I am in the early stages of researching a dissertation on the crafting of this discourse by OSTK activists during the collapse of the Soviet Union). I would probably take the Barsan comment with a grain of salt--it sounds like a cheap shot, although I don't remember the context (I think I missed that comment when I was skimming the book!) One other thing I should have noted in my last comment: I was taking it for granted that we both considered 1990 "post-Soviet" in some significant sense in this context. In 1990, relatively free and open elections occurred across Moldova¹ and leaders emerged both republic-wide and locally in Pridnestrov'e that were "anti-communist" in significant ways. One of those elected in 1990 was Igor Smirnov--both to the MSSR Supreme Soviet and to the city soviet (gorsovet) of Tiraspol. Hence, although he did become the Tiraspol gorsovet chairman in 1990, I thought it misleading to say that he "served on various local councils during the Soviet era," which to me implies, first, that he was a career politician before his entry into politics during the Soviet collapse (which is untrue) and, second, therefore paints him as a communist functionary (an interpretational fallacy, I believe, though, of course, I do not mean to portray him too positively either). At any rate, sorry for the original lack of clarity. When I finish _Lider_, I will compile some of the information I have picked up on Smirnov during my readings and try to flesh out the 1989-1991 period in the article itself. Best wishes, as always. And, by the way, can I pick your brain for more source ideas some time in the near future? Thanks! Jamason 08:14, 18 June 2006 (UTC) ¹see William Crowther in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.
Yes, the Barsan comment about Smirnov being a coward should maybe be taken with a grain of salt. It is not in the "Leader"-book, but came from a white-paper which he wrote in the late 1990's to get the Ilascu group freed. But the paper has a lot of other unsubstantiated allegations, too, and is basically an advocacy screed with some of the facts that don't withstand further research. Likewise, the Edward Lucas comment is also not in the book. It was a personal comment. He got upset because the first time that he went to do an interview in PMR, Smirnov commented on Edward Lucas' bad haircut and Lucas thought that this was rude. In return, he (Lucas) called PMR a "tinpot dictatorship" which is, when you think about it, actually kind of rude, too. - Mauco 13:20, 18 June 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "Internationalist patriotism"

Jamason, for your dissertation you should check out the essays on this page: http://artofwar.ru/janr/index_janr_21-1.shtml It contains first-hand accounts for many of the fighters who participated in the 1992 war of Transnistria. In particular, the texts show the strength of feeling of community, and how this is an internationally-oriented patriotic sentiment which crosses the ethnic and national divides. It should be required reading for those who claim that the conflict is "economic" or "fuelled only by elites," something which completely misses the point. - Mauco 15:34, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

William. Thanks!--these are great. All of your tips have been very useful. I also very much agree with your assessment of the events--not "ethnic conflict" (William Crowther, Pal Kolsto, etc) nor "elite conspiracy" (the words are Stuart Kaufman's, but see also Charles King). I typically describe the OSTK as an "'internationalist' movement." Of course, to OSTK partisans, "internationalism" had a rather idiosyncratic meaning. But, as I have mentioned before, mapping out this "internationalism" is precisely what I find the most interesting. I am always happy to get more source tips if you run across them! Warm regards Jamason 00:42, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
See also http://www.transnistria.org/mas1.pdf which "gets it" much more than, say, Crowther (in fact, his chapter in Ian Bremmer's book "New States, New Politics" has typos, spelling and even factual mistakes. At one point, he even switches East and West of the Dniester). By the way - I agree with your description of the "'internationalist' movement". There are few instances in history where an independence movement has been fuelled on principles and ideals which others, from abroad, can rally behind just as well as the titular nationalities. The "great melting pot", the United States of America, comes to mind. And then of course Transnistria. - Mauco 05:47, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
There is also this one: "The Legacy of Lenin" by Michael Garner, published in The Tiraspol Times, online edition here: http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/features/the_legacy_of_lenin.html (which gives a historical background to a lot of what you have researched already, Jamason.) - Mauco 17:07, 16 July 2006 (UTC)

The "internationalism" of the PMR existed and exists more in theory than in practice. Officially there are three official languges, but in reality Russian is the only language heard in cities and in an official context. The movement has had the the goal of secession from Moldova, but not true independence. Rather it sought to pave the way to a "return" to Russia, to which the majority of the people can connect. In my view the ideals that formed the foundation of the movement can resonate abroad, but only in Russia, Abkhazia, and S. Ossetia. I would not say that the conflict was an ethnic one in the classical sense, as there were people of multiple nationalities on both sides, but it centered around a cultural dispute. On the Moldovan side, after the liberalisation of society and political life in the USSR, local leaders emphasized the need of fostering a cultural (meaning Romanian) revival in the state. They passed the language laws that made Romanian the only official state language, similarly to almost all other western republics. Some local minorities viewed these changes as a peril to their traditional way of life and felt marginalized by the new system. In Transnistria where Romanians did not form the majority of the population, people rallied around local leaders who greatly exaggerated the true state of affairs and alluded to the fascist occupation during WWII. The leaders were mostly Russian and virtually all minorities united under the banner of the language of interethnic communaction, even many ethnic Moldovans from Transnistria. Some of the leaders used the conflict as an opportunity to benefit politically and economically (though modern repots may indeed be exaggerated), even Lebed' called them a group of profiteering bandits. They were certainly not interested in reaching reconciliation and the situation continues to this day. TSO1D 20:23, 18 July 2006 (UTC)

Certainly, and many of the participants at the time probably weren't even conscious of what Jamason pointed out; the "internationalism" aspect. Without a doubt we all know that there was a good deal of opportunism involved, too, but it is complex. To paint them with one brush ("smuggling company masquerading as a state") focuses on a subgroup of opportunists and misses the wider point. There is also ostalgie. Take a gander at this: http://www.tiras.ru/52.html Look at all the grey hairs in the audience, then look at Viktor Kostyrko emcee'ing the event. He's high up in the pecking order, he knows the score, but he's still putting on the show. It is straight out of Good bye, Lenin! - Mauco 00:19, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
In my opinion the so-called "Internationalist patriotism" is just a renewed version of the old Marxist-Leninist-Soviet concept of Proletarian internationalism--MaGioZal 03:20, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
I beg to differ. I think Jamason would, too (this is, after all, what he is writing his thesis about). Proletarian internationalism wanted world revolution, but no one in Transnistria is expansionist at all, not in the least, or present a threat to the established world order. As one of the referenced sources point out it is a lot closer (not in values, but in concept) to U.S.-American patriotism. Being an American is not based on a common ancestry, or a common religion, but on accepting a set of ideas which are often also shared by new immigrants as well. - Mauco 12:20, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
In the United States, though, the set of values was more universal in character, cultural assimilation was seen as necessary for the welfare of the state, but not an ideal in itself. Transnistira, on the other hand as the Tiraspol article pointed out, has a "российский" character which is more cultural than ethnical. Still, defining this as internationalism is a bit problematic. After all, although technically one can say that no ethnic group was dominant as people were not discriminated by ethnicity, in reality Russians were favored as it was their culture that emerged as the binding force. It is hard not to view this as the effect of Russification conducted in the area during the Russian Empire and USSR (of course excluding the MASSR period) whether direct or indirect. After all, there are few instances in the present, where a person is discriminated based on his ethnicity, which is an extremely subjective and relative descriptor, yet one's cultural association continues to be an important factor. During the Moldo-Transnistiran war, the PMR side often contrasted the Moldovan Romanians' chauvinism, even neo-fascism to their "internationalism". In reality this meant that one side envisioned a future under a Romanian/Moldovan society, whereas the other side wished to continuation of the Russian ("российское") society, which in Transnistria was well-established. At the breakup of the USSR when the new language laws were introduced in Moldova, the society was changing from a nominally bilingual, but in reality a Russian-dominated society (linguistically and culturally) to a Moldo-Romanian model. Many who were already deeply integrated in the Russian society resented this change and resisted. However, nobody believed that Transnistria would be more culturally pluralistic in public life than Moldova, not the Transnistrians and not the Moldovans. To some extent, Transnistria is even more mono-cultural at the state level than Moldova. In urban areas of Moldova, Russian is still spoken widely (perhaps even more often than Romanian), beside Romanian which is now being embraced by many minorities living in the state along with the autochtonous population. In Transnistria, on the other hand, one cannot survive if he does not speak Russian. Despite of the existence of three official language, virtually nothing but Russian is heard (except in rural areas where Moldovan is still spoken by the locals). TSO1D 13:13, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
This is turning into an interesting discussion! But: We are going off on a tangent here which is not really appropriate for Igor Smirnov's talk page. Is there a better place to take this, either in wiki or perhaps a non-Wikipedia forum? I agree with you, and I have some questions... - Mauco 15:11, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
(plus, I still can't get that bittersweet image of Viktor Kostyrko out of my mind, MC'ing to the geriatrics with the best of motives.) - Mauco 15:11, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
I was thinking of the same thing. We can copy this part of the discussion to Talk:Transnistira/gen disc or something of the sort, or if you prefer an external forum, something like Politics Forum might work. TSO1D 17:42, 19 July 2006 (UTC)

This debate does touch on a few interpretive questions that I think have great importance for the article. To the extent that I would like to clarify the framework within which the article was written, I would like to make a few brief points.

First, it seems that the debate above is all about the implicit legitimacy—or lack thereof—of the PMR. This is unfortunate. This article was never about right/wrong or good/bad. It is intended as a step toward finding an interpretive framework that best explains the actions and political language of Igor Smirnov and his colleagues. For leaders in Chisinau, political language revolved around national reawakening. For OSTK leaders, political language revolved around what they called “internationalism.” Mapping out this “internationalism,” even if it is offensive—and I would agree much of it is—is a project that helps advance our understanding of the motivations at the heart of the OSTK movement and therefore the broader conflict.

Second, with respect to “internationalism,” there is a tendency to treat “it” as a thing rather than a discourse. It has been said that “defining this as internationalism is a bit problematic.” I completely agree. That is why I think it is important to use quotation marks when describing the OSTK as such. This is the word that OSTK leaders used and in practice, “internationalism” assumed an entire host of meanings and implications that you or I as westerners might not predict. Moreover, I would point out that while it was mentioned above that Moldovans participated in some number in the OSTK, I believe that it is most important that Moldovan voices were explicitly given room to help craft “internationalist” discourse. Whatever the actual number of Moldovan participants, those that did participate were welcomed and, moreover, were given the rhetorical tools to justify participation.

Finally, is OSTK “internationalism” just a “continuation of the Russian ("российское") society”? I believe that this is not a powerful analytical tool for explaining the OSTK. It is in the first place vague, but more importantly, does not explain much of the actions and the political language of the participants. It is an important contextual concept, but there are others as well. Why for example emphasize the protection of the interests of discrete nations and not wish to foster assimilation? Why privilege the working class in the discourse of identity? Why specifically Soviet nostalgia and not nostalgia for the Russian Empire (which is more prevalent in Russia proper)? These questions necessitate a closer look at the ideology of “internationalism.”

As a final note, I would argue that it is important to remember that both people and ideologies are dynamic. Indeed, in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev was a committed believer in the Soviet path to socialism. Clearly, today—over fifteen years after the creation of the OSTK—the leaders of the PMR have evolved considerably in their beliefs. Leaders in Chisinau have too. The PMR is a failed, authoritarian society. However, I would argue that as a movement the OSTK began inspired by an (albeit idiosyncratic!) vision of national equality and economic renewal. Jamason 18:05, 19 July 2006 (UTC)

I am not saying that the discourse focued on the “continuation of the Russian ("российское") society,” but rather that the actions of the leaders of the state and the wish of the majority did include this desire. As for assimilation, the population of the region, especially in urban areas was already rather homogenous to a great extent, thus the need for assimilation would have been marginal. As for the emphasis on the working class and Soviet nostalgia, this is due to the nature of the people who participated in the movement and the political circumstances of the time. When the idea of seperatism began to emerge in Transnistria, many of the leaders who came to the fore were members of the former elite, or still held on to some of the idealogy of the USSR, at least in public. When Transnistria broke away, the USSR still existed (although it was on the brink of collapse), and the Transnistrian leadership included reactionaries who even favored the putsch against Gorbachev. Thus some the particularities of the "internationalist" discourse can be seen as remnants of the old ideology. TSO1D 19:02, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
From this last paragraph, it sounds like we are close on many points. By why describe them as “reactionaries” when more value-neutral language can be substituted? Leaving aside the tone, it seems to me that where we really differ is in my belief that while OSTK activists clearly borrowed heavily from Soviet political institutions and symbology, and clearly wanted to remain within a Slavic Eurasian cultural space, at the same time OSTK “internationalism” is something unique, something endemic to its own time and place. Smirnov and friends were not “nationalists” as they understood that word, and they were not “communists” as they understood that word. They were “internationalists.” Indeed, it seems that many in left-bank Moldova were inspired by this peculiar ideology. Jamason 20:18, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Yes, you are right, this is were we differ. I don't really see the uniqueness of the new "internationalism". I have always viewed the discourse of the Transistrian leaders as a continuation of the traditional Communist rhetoric adapted to their circumstances. I agree that they did not see themselves as nationalists as they understood the word (as something akin to fascism) and after a certain point they also ceased seing themselves as Communists. Nevertheless, their main goal was to preserve their way of life as much as possible rather than to create something new. The changes that swept the USSR and the realization that they could end up in a Moldovan state (or even Romania) that was centered around another culture alien to them and were they might be forced to assimiliate was the driving force that mobilized the people. I doubt that too many people on both sides of the conflict paid great attention to the ideology of their leaders, most viewed their participation as performing a duty to their state and families. I doubt that many ordinary people absorbed the messages of "internationalism." For most this was mere rhetoric and old one at that, but the threat of their being forced to abandon their Russian language and culture was real and powerful. The romanain-phobic language utilized by some of the leaders and people actually is an argument agaisnt the theory that the people of the region were united by a tolerant ideal that envisioned a multi-cultural society. In many ways a significant proportio of the Transnistrians who fought in the conflict shared the same attitudes as their Cossack reinforcements, not internationalism but support for Russian culture and duty to the Russian state in whatever form it existed. TSO1D 21:58, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Excellent points, BUT let us not go off on the wrong tangent and focus on Romania-phobic language. That is a small aspect and not really representative of the bigger picture. It could easily be seen in light of some of the Russophobic heated language of the time ("Suitcase-Trainstation-Russia") and there is still enough of that to go around. I.e., see this recent map with Smirnov on a suitcase: http://www.imperial-vin.com/images/map1024.jpg - Mauco 22:30, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Lol funny picture and good point. TSO1D 22:52, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
So to get back to the main topic: They didn't all buy into the rhetoric or ideology overtly. But somehow, unconsciously, the current was strong enough to override identification by ethnicity and avoid a Bosnia-type situation. The Legacy of Lenin article made this point: "In Europe today, no other country comes closer to Pridnestrovie in its ethnic diversity than Bosnia, another small country with 3 main nationalities and no single dominant majority. But in Bosnia, with the presence of 3 nationalities and lack of majority, ethnic ambitions led to inter-ethnic war. In Pridnestrovie, this never happened. Here, in marked contrast to Bosnia, all 3 main nationalities are united behind a common goal (...)" - Mauco 22:30, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Nevertheless, the situation was not only restricted to Transnistria, but existed throughout Moldova. During the most fired up period from '89 to '92 some radicals on both sides got their fifteen minutes of fame, however overall there was not that much animosity across ethnic lines. To some extent the conflict was even geographical, just like there were Moldovans in Transnistria supporting the PMR, there were Russians in Moldova supporting the Moldovan forces. In fact that should have been expected, people of different nationalities frequently associated together and nationalistic tensions until '89 were probably quiter in the Moldovan SSR than in most other states. In my view what happened in Bosnia should be viewed as an abomination, not the norm. I hope it's not human nature to devise plans to suddenly kill your neighbors and friends when the opportunity presents itself because they speak a different language or have other beliefs. In my view the main reason that the fighting broke out rests with the political leaders on both sides who resorted to extreme actions rather than seek reconciliation. The Moldovan leaders made few concessions to ethnic minorities and the fact that they initially refused to make Russian co-official even in Transnistria shows their intractibility and how they wanted to benefit from a revival of ethnic sentiments. On the Transnistrian side, some also exacerbated the conflict by exagerating the ills of living in Moldova and making allusions to the fascist occupation of '40, in the sense that that could happen again. But among individuals hostilities were minimal. On numerous occasions soldiers of the two sides actually got together in the evening and ate, drank, and played cards. TSO1D 22:52, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Yes. In fact, there's some 2004 testimony from the ECHR case where it came out that the 14th Army didn't just fight for Transnistria. Some stayed loyal to the chain of command (Russia), others defected to Transnistria, and then there were some who defected to Moldova. One of the witnesses explains how he laid down some ground rules for the fighting with one of the enemy commanders and how he could do so because they both knew each other from having been companion-in-arms in Afghanistan. - Mauco 01:01, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

Three points in response to above:

First, while some have described OSTK activists as “communists,” or at the very least, manipulating communist symbols to mobilize supporters,(1) the evidence does not bear out this assertion. OSTK activists—almost none of whom had served in the CP apparat(2)—attacked the party throughout the conflict, both on grounds of poor leadership and for the communist ideology itself, which had largely lost its currency among OSTK activists by the end of the 1980s. They claimed to be creating their own "system of government," which consciously abandoned communist ideology, even while keeping many of the structures of the Soviet system. Retention of a great nostalgia for the former Soviet Union itself should not be conflated with a continued belief in its Marxist rationale. OSTK activists were interested in "pragmatic policy" and economic development. Inspiration for this policy came from governments both East and West, and the result was to be a "society without 'isms.'"(3) It is revealing that most were eager to accept the label “technocrat.”(4)

Second, there actually _was_ a high degree of discomfort with the nationalist Cossacks among OSTK activists. See for example Efim Bershin, who writes: “Those that came did not immediately figure out what was going on here.” Almost without exception, they “proclaimed that they were protecting Russians,” not, as Bershin would have liked to have seen, Transnistrians. While in the end, some Cossacks “understood they were not protecting some concrete nation, but simply a peaceful people,” others did not acclimatize. “Some had to be expelled, some left by themselves.”(5) Or, as Igor Smirnov tactfully put it to an Izvestiia reporter in 1992: “‘[W]e have thanked them for their assistance and have asked them to refrain from coming to the republic.’”(6)

Finally, I would point out, in Bosnia there were only nationalist movements. All involved were trying to create nation-states. Many have suggested that there is a “logic” to the nation-state that often leads to policies of assimilation, border revision, expulsion, or, sadly, “ethnic cleansing.”(7)

1)Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 147. 2)This is often assumed as well, but is also not supportable. An obvious indication of this lack of involvement is that almost without exception there were no former party functionaries, city committee (gorkom) secretaries, or even local government (gorsovet) deputies within the leadership of the Dniester state created in 1990; most of the latter were voted out of office in the same elections with brought the OSTK to power in Transnistria. See these scholars for accusations of communist involvement: Crowther, “The Politics of Democratization,” 294-296; Crowther, "Moldova After Independence," 343; King, The Moldovans, 187; Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 147. 3) Igor Smirnov, in 1993. Quoted in A. K. Frolov , “Samospasenie,” in Nepriznannaia respublika, Vol. III, Gryzlov, ed., 37. 4) Diukarev, Pridnestrov’e, 256. 5) Bershin, 145, 146. 6) Izvestiia, June 17, 1992, trans. in FBIS, June 19, 1992, 64-5. 7) See: Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers.” Jamason 15:41, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

I agree that few if any of the OSTK activits or the general population of Transnistria still held on to the basic tennets of Communism. Nevertheless, as you pointed out, there was a great degree of nostalgia throughout the region. As a result some leaders did manipulate Communist symbols, I don't understand how that can be denied. I mean starting with the flag of the republic to virtually all remaining aspects of the state, Soviet relics are present to a greater degree than in any other region. I agree though that this is mostly due to nostalgia and not faith in Communism. As for the "pragmatic approach," despite of how those leaders might have wanted to appear, the fact is that up until the present the pace of privatization and the transition to a market economy has progressed incredibly slowly and less transparently than in other parts of the USSR, leading to the acquisition of valuable assets by powerful individuals.
About the tensions between the Cossacks and the other Transnistrian forces and leaders, in my view these were more public than private. Some leaders might have regretted the fact that the Cossacks did not acquiesce to their public discourse, however I doubt that too many of them were not glad at the aid of the Cossacks. Public disourse was one thing, and reality was another. Despite of the fact that Cossacks were perceived as radical even by many of the Transnistrians, the two groups did nevertheless share some beliefs, such as the fact that Transnistria is Russian soil, etc.
By the way, while I was looking at the "art of war" link provided by William, I read this interesting comment here: "Кстати, об 'интернационализме' и 'национализме'. Смешно, когда человек, который знает лишь свой родной язык (ведь его все понимают!) обвиняет другого человека, который знает несколько языков, в национализме, называя себя интернационалистом! Какой же это 'интернационализм' приднестровцев, если многие из них, прожив в Молдавской ССР полжизни, работая здесь, родив и вырастив детей, не удосужились выучить язык нации, которая дала название республики! Тогда как любой молдаванин либо иной представитель не 'титульной' нации, закончив школу и институт неплохо знал кроме своего родного еще и 'общепонятный' язык, ибо был вынужден его учить? Так кто же интернационалист?" TSO1D 17:10, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
Oh and take a look at this link, I think it is relevant to the discussion here and presents a good analysis of the mentality of the Transnistrian people and the political class of the region. TSO1D 17:55, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
But your point is? I read Galinskii's presentation and he is giving the fairly basis rundown of PMR's claim to not be united with Moldova, historical and cultural differences. He is laying it on a bit more heavy than usual with the emphasis on everything Russian, but that should probably be understood in the context of where he gave the presentation. Other than that, I don't see anything particularly offputting (and mind you, my mentality is Western. I am not Slav, also not part of the Transnistrian people, much less of the political class of the region). - Mauco 23:56, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
Oh, I did not present this link as something off-putting as you said. I was under the impression that Jamason doesn't agree with the fact that Transnistria has a pro-Russian character culturally and politically, and this article just emphasizes that point. TSO1D 00:02, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Thanks for the clarification. I re-read it and your comment fully makes sense now. And yes, it is indeed a fairly accurate presentation and there is no denying that they love Mother Russia. Is this only for cultural reasons? Are they set in the mold? Or is it not also, in part, a natural cause-and-effect which is easily predictable and can be expected because they haven't been treated with love and kindness by Moldova, Romania, even Ukraine lately, not to mention US, EU, etc. Some positive moves from the West could do wonders, I think. Just a personal opinion. It wouldn't break that overly Russian culture but at least bring in more tolerance and plurality to Transnistria, and in the process make it less authoritarian. Compared to what we (I mean the West) spend elsewhere it would seem that it would be worth at least a try. There's a Moldovan who works in Brussels, Nicu Popescu, who has suggested some of the same things. I can put you in touch with him. He doesn't advocate recognition of PMR (quite the contrary, I think) but does suggest the need for more interaction, specifically suggesting classes for learning English in Tiraspol, etc. Basically a sort of Alliance française / British Council form of outreach and interchange. - Mauco 03:55, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

This was an insert. Here is Jamason's reply to what TSO1D wrote above:

First, you seem to be conflating Soviet and Communist symbols. This is understandable to the extent that PMR partisans often did too. However, given their well documented antipathy to communism and the communist party (after 1989), it should be assumed that they understood these symbols as Soviet and not communist. As you say, few still held on to the basic tenets of communism in 1989, but we all agree they did not want to see the Soviet Union collapse.

Second, powerful individuals have acquired valuable state assets throughout the post-Soviet republics despite hopes that transition to a market economy would proceed smoothly. I am sure that the PMR's transition might be slower or less transparent, but I do not know what indicators you are using and I do not know where you got this information.

Third, I was unclear why you cited the quote above. It is indeed interesting, but again, the point you are making needs to be elaborated. No one has said that everyone participating in the conflict was monolithic in their thoughts and opinions. I personally do not believe that everyone fighting was fighting for the same reason. The claims I am making concern Igor Smirnov and leaders of the OSTK. Jamason 19:29, 20 July 2006 (UTC)

I agree with what you are saying, the opposition to Moldovan rule was extremely diverse. Nevertheless, it is the theory of people like Smirnov sincerely acting in the name of internationalism that I doubt. I provided that passage to show how the term "internationalism" employed by various Transnistrian leaders was in reality simply the defence of the interest of the Russophone population. The Olvia article I cited gives an analysis of the theory how the particularity of the Transnistrian people was formed and how the region remains integrated and oriented towards the Russian cultural and political spheres. Smirnov's case is even less convincing of a desire to create a new cosmopolitan and multicultural Transnistrian society. He was not even Transnistrian by birth, so he was actually less connected to the particularity of the region than others, he was born in Russia and thus felt a much greater loyalty to the Center than the Moldovan SSR. Nevertheless, he was a staunch supporter of the rights of Russophones and the Russian state, and it was these characteristics that allowed him to rally the population. His discourses on internationism were simply meant to legitimize the movement and differentiate the tolerant and "internationalist" Transnistrians from the nationalist, quasi-fascist Moldovan forces. TSO1D 21:26, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
So, if I understand you correctly, you are saying that we have a case of a new politician turning his liabilities (in this case: his non-native birth) into an asset by crafting an ideology to fit? And precisely an ideology which appeals to a multi-ethnic people which agree, transpassing ethnic lines, that they are willing to rally behind the banner of sovereign statehood... That's a pretty unique situation. Not many other places in world history where we have seen this. De Gaulle comes to mind, but with different parameters. If so, I personally think you are giving Smirnov way too much credit, or maybe I am completely misreading your point (it is late here, sorry). - Mauco 00:09, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
I refered to his non-native birth only to show that his views on Transnistria would have been shaped less by a potential super-national particular identity of Transnistria, and more by his Russian background and that he was more loyal to the USSR as a whole than to the MSSR. I don't believe that he created a truly new ideology, but rather that he was able to tap into the fear of the Russophone population of being marginalized and emphasized the need to retain closer relations to or if possible remain in Russia (the Soviet Union). His discourse as a result at different stages included various elements, parts of the old Soviet rhetoric, "internationalism", fear of Romanian nationalsim/fascism, the particular identity of the region, pride in Russia and its culture, etc. His main asset was his ability to identify the concerns and desires of the population and combine it into a fluid package that the people could connect to. TSO1D 01:44, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Spot on analysis. Smirnov is no De Gaulle. But what do you think of those (also within his own country) that call him a peasant? I personally think that he sees himself more than anything else as a khozyain but this is something which is hard to translate into a Western political context because we rarely have politicians who see their role as comprehensively. So the nuances of Smirnov gets lost in the translation and he is often just described as an autocrat, period. - Mauco 03:55, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
I just realized that not everyone will understand my reference to khozyain so I just wrote a small stub, see Khozyain and please edit or change it to make it better because I just did it quickly. Might be helpful to add more politicians to the list, too. - Mauco 04:45, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Jamason, where can we read your dissertation? Is it published anywhere yet? Or will it be? - Mauco 00:15, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

William, I will be working on something I will try to publish this summer. Please email me at jamason@umail.ucsb.edu if you would be interested in reading a rather longer version I wrote for my master's thesis. Regards, Jamason 04:25, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
When you are ready to publish, but if you don't have the outlet for it, then maybe the website www.conflict.md is an option. It is dedicated exclusively to Transnistria and financed by OSCE. I have good friends in OSCE so I can send them your text and ask them to publish it. However, the site has a bit of a negative policy towards Transnistria. They will love it when you call it a "failed authoritarian" state but they won't like anything nice that you then might have to say about Igor Smirnov, Grigorii Marakutsa or the other founding fathers... - Mauco 04:45, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Thanks! Although, I am myself unconfortable with the thought that I am saying anything nice about OSTK leaders. Also, regarding something said above, I really don't accept the characterization of my arguments that I "do[n't] agree with the fact that Transnistria has a pro-Russian character culturally and politically." Please see my comments dated 18:05, 19 July 2006 and 20:18, 19 July 2006. Jamason 22:41, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
I wouldn't worry about it, and if I were to write something, I'd probably say nice things about them overall. Here's my motivation: You go to a place like (the misleadingly named) www.peacebuilding.md and start browsing through their library. It is 99% anti-PMR. To a casual reader, it all sounds plausible. But then, when you dig into the thick of things and really start doing your research (which I know you've done), and when you go back to the sources quoted in the footnotes, you find that what sounded plausible at first is actually a dishonest montage through and through. Half-truths, exaggerations, a lot of weasel-wording everywhere, and - my pet peeve - , quotes from other works which are taken out of context. One of the worst recent offenders of this genre is the New York City Bar Report .... Jeesh, with friends like that, the West doesn't need enemies. Personally, I know that I would be harder on Transnistria if it wasn't for the dishonesty and excesses of the other side. I don't have a horse in this race, but if I were forced to choose, I would probably side with PMR because I don't want to be part of a team that feels it has to lie so blatantly in order to win. - Mauco 23:58, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
It's interesting that you said that. Although I agree that some of the Moldovan links are rather one sided and present some exaggerations, half-truths, and weasle-wording, I would still have to say that Transnistrian sources are by far more biased and even dishonest. Have you checked Olvia Press lately? That is supposed to be the official news source of the PMR, but it's nothing but pure propaganda, from their huge banner that reads: "SOS blockade" to articles like: "Why are Voronin's knees shaking". By the way, take a look at this article that discusses the disiniformation used by the other side. Pridnestrovie.net which I would say is a Transnistrian equivalent to the peacebuilding site has "information" of this type: "Recently, the European Union even used the words independent, open and democratic to describe Pridnestrovie's achievements, recognizing the country's democratic reforms and open, market-oriented economy." The very same words that you used about the Moldovan press I would use about its Transnistrian counterpart and to a much greater extent. TSO1D 02:35, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
Yes, TSO1D, I know that we are on different sides of the fence on this one, but I still value and respect your input. So, Olvia Press and Pridnestrovie.net are dishing it out just as well as they take it. Not defending it, just trying to understand where they are coming from - what would you do, if you were an unrecognized country? Now, I hadn't seen that article on disinformation. Thanks for the link. But, I nearly split a gut when I saw the byline. That Vladimir Socor, of all people, has the nerve to write about distorting information. LOL, the irony of that just made my day! - Mauco 04:50, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
I understand that it's difficult to find some solid criterea by which to assess the general level of credibility of news sources and think tanks, especially in this conflict, and I admit that I'm not fully objective (or actually anywhere close to, though I try) on this issue. Nevertheless, if you read mainstream Moldovan sources they are usually relatively tame and often rely on foreign sources, such as OSCE statements given in context. Some stories do stretch the truth or aim to cloud the evidence to push one viewpoint, however you will find that everywhere to some extent, and you will find such instances much more rarely in the stories of organizations like Basa than Flux for example. Still, if you look at Western articles, from the BBC, for instance, written by Westerners, they resemble the Moldovan articles to a much greater extent than the Transnistrian ones in content and style. The Transnistrian sources, on the other hand, don't even appear to try to be objective and they contain a high degree of truthiness. I understand what you are saying about this being their only recourse as they represent an unrecgonized country seeking acceptance, however I believe that this just shows that they would be more willing to use disinformation than the other side. So I still have to say that although I recognize sporadic flaws in Moldovan sources, I am still firmly convinced that Transnistrian sources on average. As for Socor, yea I had some doubts about that myself, but at least some of the information in the article is verfiable, such as the ip adresses. TSO1D 13:34, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
Also, I'm confused, when you said the "other side," I assumed you meant the Moldovan press, however I see you cited some Western sources as well. Would you group the New York Bar Association's report in this category as well? But in that case, this would be a general indictment of Western Press as arguments presented in the report are repeated habitually in reputable Western papers and journals. TSO1D 13:59, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
Clarifying: By "other side" I was referring to direct combattants in the Information War going on between Moldova and Transnistria. Olvia and friends on one side, Nantoi and friends on the other. I consider the NY Bar Association's report to fall into this category (due to lack of objectivity. I followed some of the footnotes, and the information it leaves out reveals its bias. The same thing that you point out with the quote from Pridnestrovie.net, who referred to a 2005 EU report which lauded its economy as being open and market-oriented but they did not quote any of the criticism and the report was largely critical). As for Infotag, Basa, etc I'd rule them out - they give the news straight - but that could change if the "war" heats up. There was a telling point at an OSCE press conference last month when William Hill refuted weapons smuggling accusations. Some of the local journalists started protesting the comments loudly, saying that if "the weapons" didn't get out through the land borders, then they were being smuggled out by air instead via the Tiraspol airfield. I wasn't there myself but someone who works for OSCE in Chisinau told me. - Mauco 14:24, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
Oh, ok, I understand, I thought you meant the entire press of the two republics. Under that assumption I said that the Moldovan press is more objective on the whole as there are organizations like the ones you cited above, whereas on Transnistria's side Olvia or Lenta PMR are clearly biased. If this is an information war, then Moldova has some mobilized divisions guarding the border, and as you said if the war escalates, they are ready to call up some reserves, whereas the PMR has already declared total war. As for the actual "combatants", they are all keen on manipulating the information in order to mislead users into acquiescing to their views. They are both convinced that they are right and thus acting correctly, as Pascal said: "When he ingroes the truth that sets him free, it is expedient that he be deceived." Now to find who is the greater deceiver in this arena is practically impossible, as both sides make great strides in creative spin in order to present semi-true, or even false information that still appears plausible. But as I said before, I believe it is the reduced incidence of such combatants in the Moldovan press as compared to its Transnitrian counterpart that makes the whole appear more honest. TSO1D 14:57, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
I wouldn't go as far as to say that they create outright false information, but the semi-true is just as bad in my book, and serves the same purpose. - Mauco 17:46, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
What do you think of New Region? I know too little about them, but my take is that they were set up to be a Russian voice in Ukraine a couple of years ago. Earlier this year they opened an office in Tiraspol. I thought it was suspicious that they came "on the air" with local PMR news the exact same week that RIA Dnestr closed, which was the agency of Alexey Martynov, the director of the (misleadingly named) Russian-Dniester Information-Analytical Center. Then again, they had a run-in with the PMR government less than a month ago, public letters back and forth, and strongly defended their right to free access to information, a free press, etc. So sign me: Confused. - Mauco 17:46, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

I am afraid that I know even less about this topic. I haven't really read New Region all that much and am oblivious about its history. As for RIA Dnestr, I don't remember seingn the dnestr.org page while it was still around. I also don't know the details of the dispute between Martynov and the government or why the name of his center is misleading. TSO1D 19:32, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

You can still access RIA Dnestr through the backdoor[1] and most of the content is still online. The dispute was between the PMR office of New Region Press and the PMR presidential press office; centered on freedom of press complaint (both sides published their letters and rebuttals and counter-rebuttals, which is how I know). The link to Alex Martynov is my own speculation. - Mauco 20:36, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
Thank you for the explanation and the link. I looked over some of the Dnestr stories and I had the impression that the agency resembled Olvia and Lenta PMR to a great extent in the ideologization and bias of the news stories. New Region, on the other hand appears to be a significantly more "professional" souce. The news stories have little commentary that is susceptible to bias but rather have the appearance of articles from reputable agencies, presenting multiple sides of an issue with relevant facts presented to put the issue in context rather than present the opinions of one group. TSO1D 15:47, 25 July 2006 (UTC)
My personal speculation that New Region = RIA Dnestr was just caused by the fact that the former came online the same week that the latter went offline. I think that it has a distinct Russian bias (not PMR, not Ukraine, not Moldova), and find it interesting to see that they are not 100% on the same page as PMR. They overlap a lot, but there are still some differences between the PMR viewpoint and the Russian viewpoint at times, and something else which stands out: if we take New Region as a proxy for Russia (just for the sake of argument) then it is telling that they try to see Moldova's side of the story, too, and give it some validity. As you have pointed out before, this is lacking from other PMR-based news coverage. - Mauco 16:25, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] ICDISS

By the way, I found this link which was published last week. Interview with ICDISS, International Council for Democratic Institutions and State Sovereignty. Deep in the article itself (scroll down) it comments on Socor's wildeyed claims and it turns out that the IP thing is quite a stretch of the truth. But what else would you expect from Vlad Socor, that just takes the prize, or the Jamestown Foundation. In fact there are more than 800 sites sharing the same IP and some of them deal with the work that is done in other countries in the region, apart from Transnistria, like support for Maidan square, the "Orange revolution", etc. - Mauco 16:20, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Socor's arguments do have some flaws, but the whole situation still appears very suspicious. None of the "authors" seem to have added this work to their list of publications, in fact they all denied working on it here though the source is in Romanian, it is a credible oneand I am convinced of the veracity of their investigations. Some of the supposed writers actually did accuse the forgers of plagiarism as some of the text was taken from a report on Karabakh, here Socor was right. Some of the arguments presented in the report appear to be too removed from common notions of international law to fit the style of the renowned experts linked with it. I am convinced to a high degree that the report was a farce. TSO1D 19:12, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
Yes, it appears suspicious because Socor and his hardline Romanian friends say so. That is their whole point. But who are the supposed writers, according to the NGO? I have the report[2], and there are no claims to that effect. If Olvia Press made some claims, and they were picked up by Regnum, then you can hardly blame the organization for that (which is what Socor does, even to the point of involving the Kremlin). And be careful when you say that "as some of the text was taken from a report on Karabakh, here Socor was right" because Vladimir Socor is NOT right on that count either. He has NOT shown this text, Ziua hasn't either, in fact no one has. In this is context it is so funny because Socor-the-pot is blaming the kettle for supposedly substandard scholarly research. There is only one report ever written by Williams and Scharf on NKR, available both on the website of New England Center for International Law and Policy[3] and also from the NKR ministry of foreign affairs, so it is fairly easy to compare the two. If you were to do it which I think you can do with software if you don't want to wade through the text of both of them then it would be impossible to afterwards come back to say precisely which portions of the text was taken from where. And if some of the conclusions are the same, then that only tells you that both reports are on track, or equally off track, as the case may be, but this is not what Socor is claiming either. He prefers to use some pretty slimy below the belt arguments instead. - Mauco 19:41, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
Well, it was Michael Scharf who stated that the new report seemed to have some parts derived from his and Williams's on NKR. As for their names, I agree that the report itself does not list those names, actually it doesn't list any authors, which is indeed odd. A Google search for the Euro-Atlantic Joint Forum brings up almost nothing which is certainly not proof of anything by itself, but is still pretty strange. ICDISS also appears very rarely for its existing history. Then this "center" also published other studies that seem to suggest that the new Ukr. customs regulations are de facto a blockade and implies that the OSCE and EU disapprove of the measure and that even Moldovans disapprove of them according to a poll. Some of these statements are misleading, others are pure lies. I don't see how any serious Western center would have published such non-sense. TSO1D 20:33, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
Maybe we should wait for the final version to come out. That one above is marked draft. I haven't done much scholarly work myself, but what little experience I have in the field tells me that usually non-sense and misleading statements tend to disappear as a result of peer review. If not, then you have my vote, TSO1D, and I second your conclusions. - Mauco 21:25, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Komsorg

Komsorg is not a trade-union organizer anyway. It is Komsomol Organizer. --Planemo 17:30, 5 December 2006 (UTC)

True. komsomol'skii organizator. I will change it in the article. jamason 22:35, 5 December 2006 (UTC)