Talk:Hyman G. Rickover

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Contents

[edit] Call for Rickover Interviewees

Greetings,

I am AustinKnight, and as of November 2005 am the primary author of the Rickover article. I am interested in compiling Rickover interview stories for the purpose of creating a respectful and honest book about these. With the lack of any other substantial form of compilation, I believe that these engaging stories will otherwise be completely lost over time.

I am a former mid-grade naval officer (LCDR) who served as an engineer officer and weapons officer aboard Atlantic & Pacific 688s from 1979-1988, and offer my personal word and committment that the treatment of these stories will be such that reputations will be well-served...very much including the Admiral's.

Stories may be sent to: rickoverinterview @ hotmail.com (remove spaces)

Other Rickover stories are welcome as well, but just from those who have direct, first-hand knowledge, please.

For confirmation purposes, please include your name and the name & timeframe of all boats you served on. The default position and appropriate expectation is that your name will not be used publicly, and in any case not without your expressed, written consent.

Regards,

--AustinKnight 18:11, 5 November 2005 (UTC)

[edit] The Rickover Incident

A high ranking Admiral drives up to the gate of a naval base. This base has a policy of 100% check of ID cards and there is a new Marine on guard duty at the gate.
Marine: I need to see your ID.
Admiral: I don't have time for this nonsense. (to the driver) Go ahead.
Marine: Don't do that.
Admiral to driver: You heard me, Drive on.
Marine draws his sidearm and says: Sir, this is my first time on post. Do I shoot you or your driver?

Apparently this incident is Rickover, as mentioned in a book about NR-1. Is it true? If so, I think we should include it because it gives us insight into Rickover's personality. -Joseph 15:22, 2004 Aug 20 (UTC)

[edit] Nuclear Navy

During the 1940's or 1950's, one of America's Diesel submarines got herself trapped underwater by the Soviet Union, and was subsequently forced to surface and run for Japan. This incedent played a major role in the decision to activly pursue nuclear power at sea, and I think it needs to be mentioned in the article. TomStar81 22:35, 16 Oct 2004 (UTC)

The sub incident occured in 1958, 4 years after the USS NAUTILUS was launched. This incident helped Rickover gain momentum in having nuclear subs built.
Anyone who has access to a source please go ahead and add a summary for the article. Be bold. Cheers, -Will Beback 00:19, 2 March 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Controversy and NR

Two things should be added. ADM Rickover became a rather controversial figure later in life(because of his influance), and something should be added about it. Also, it should be added that NR interviews EVERY nuclear power candidate officer in the Navy. This is mentioned, offhandldidly, about Pres. Carter.

[edit] Forcing Conformance to Approved Submarine Construction Drawings

The Admiral requested and got an emergency meeting of Key Executives/Managers of General Dynamicvs/Electrtic Boat Div. in a hotel in NY City Friday July 2, 1965. Purpose was not announced ahead of the meeting but it became evident it was to rub managements nose in allowing Engineering to request Naval Reactors Code 08 (his operations) for approval to deviate from approved designs when construction mistakes yielded non-compliance. His "scream session" reminded management this kind of performance detracts his time needed to sell submarines to Congress. Therefore, from that point on, all approved nuclear drawings were to be stamped in two inch high letters "ND" meaning non-deviational, period. I remember it clearly because it was my birthday and a party in my honor had to be canceled while the company limosine took us to NY. There is more to this story. The way the hotel suite seating was re-arranged, cold sweet grapes were obtained for the admiral, copies of the latesty newspapers and magazines obtained for his use, and how the meeting content developed as the admiral went around the room asking each person "what do you have to say for yourself?" Marv Curland

[edit] Carter, Rickover and TMI

If anyone has a good, referenceable source for this info/section, please provide same. Past searches regarding this claim did not find anything authoritative that could be used. --AustinKnight 23:27, 11 December 2005 (UTC)

The only source that I found is the relative's affadavit. -Willmcw 23:51, 11 December 2005 (UTC)
That looks sufficient. Robert Rickover, the Admiral's son, is a rare name, and does appear on other sites to support his wife, Jane, in her recollections. --AustinKnight 00:13, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
It appears that Carter did not commission a general nuclear power study, but rather one focused on TMI. Jane Rickover's affidavit appears valid, but it is a small extrapolation to assume that she was talking about this study. It is also reasonably questionable as to whether a presidential commission focused on TMI would go outside of its commission to make general recommendations to shutdown the entire industry, but her affidavit is her affidavit. --AustinKnight 00:58, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
If I read the affadavit correctly it appears that Rickover thought that the commision's evaluation of safety hazards was so negative that publishing it would have had the effect of ending public support for nuclear power. I don't get that they explicitly recommended anything like that. -Willmcw 01:11, 12 December 2005 (UTC)
Yes, I agree. We were still working through the original draft/language of this section, which was fairly rough in terms of accuracy. --AustinKnight 01:53, 12 December 2005 (UTC)

[edit] Rickover's childhood/Annapolis experience

I think the section over-emphasizes Rickover's European Jewish roots, his connections back to Ryki and his discovery late in life that all the Jews in Ryki had been killed. This material would be interesting as a sort of sidebar in a full length book about Rickover but I don't think any of this played a major part part in making Rickover the man he became. I'm sure it must have influenced him a little bit (if nothing else, it shaped his parents), but not enough to commit space to here. Rickover never seemed very interested in his Jewish roots and even became an Episcopalian at some point. I propose removing most of this stuff.

I think much more relevant was his position as an unpopular outsider at the Naval Academy and the role anti-Semitism played in this. Rickover probably went from a neighborhood (Jewish immigrants in Chicago) where he fit in culturally to a place where he was a total misfit. Rickover's value system (brains and learning), background (Jewish immigrant) and personality (prickly, almost anti-social) were at such odds with those of the Academy, where "manly virtue", genteel values, Protestantism, sociability and military bearing were more esteemed. Rickover never seemed to forget this; years later when he finally wielded real power, Rickover took shots at these traditional aspects of Navy culture whenever he could. Rickover was hard on all Navy officers, but especially those that seem to come from the traditional Annapolis mold of the early 20th century. Rickover appeared to despise the Naval Academy in particular and sometimes publicly called for its abolition.

--A. B. 02:04, 7 July 2006 (UTC)

Feel free to edit, but I'd not be too quick to judge relative weights, and would suggest keeping encyclopedic facts -- particularly those that are foundational to Rickover's psychology since he was clearly a bit of an odd duck. In fact, you yourself refer twice to the fact that Rickover was raised Jewish and the effects that this had on his life. Having been interviewed by the man, and later stood next to him supervising reactor operations as we took one of the 688 class fast attacks to sea for the first time, I can personally vouch that the man was quite Jewish in his mannerisms, behavior and style of speech. Yes, his first wife was an Episcopalian and apparently practiced himself, but there's no question that his psychological formative years (0-5 yrs-old) and in Chicago were as a European/immigrant Jew. I'd also remark that the Naval Academy stuff on the web is largely overblown, and likely only to be of interest to boat schoolers (of which I have a good number of good friends). Yes, Rickover may have called for the closing of the Naval Academy...but as have any number of others. *All* of the academies have come under scrutiny for closure from time to time. It's not like he bore a grudge toward Annapolis...he just didn't much care for it; particularly -- since he was a technologist -- the liberal arts aspects/weighting of the Academy (which he was successful in substantially curbing). And, to my experience, the guys that got the hardest, wildest Rickover interviews were college grads, not the Academy guys...at least, not unless they were non-nuke Captain-Admiral types who were carrier bound, as they did get put through the wringer (e.g., Annapolis-grad Zumwalt). Last but not least, if you're just going by web accounts, or non-nuclear naval experience, and do not have direct personal knowledge of Rickover or nuclear propulsion, consider deferring your comments for a while. The article isn't going anywhere. There are many, *many* other officers that served under Rickover and who are still alive who can provide an authentic take on the guy in an encyclopedic way. If by any chance you're getting most of your info from Dr. Schratz' "hit piece" that was written in 1983, I'd definitely postpone any editing; that was a grossly one-sided, highly pejorative, near-irrational rant that does not jive with the predominant literature on Rickover. *Anyone's* life would look pretty disgusting if the negatives were strictly one's focus. Biographies on Wikipedia serve best when they take the high road and focus on accomplishments. In any case, if you do choose to edit, please be sure to cite your sources. Cheers, --66.69.219.9 05:34, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Holocaust museum link and Paul R. Schratz

I could find no mention of Rickover on the Holocaust museum's web site. If there's something substantive about Rickover himself, then I suggest linking directly to that citation. If I'm missing something here, let me know.--A. B. 14:57, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

Actually, you literally read my mind: I was going to replace the Holocaust Memorial link with that of the U.S. Naval Institute's oral history re. Rickover...but saw that you'd already done so. A fine edit. While I don't agree with adding the Schratz link as, in my humble opinion, its clear bias renders it beneath that of an encyclopedic reference, I'm not in any way compelled to remove it. It speaks for itself: as a bitter tirade from a WWII diesel boat commander and Academy grad whose era had passed him by. Battles between the disestablished diesel boaters and the nuclear navy are the stuff of legend; at least this captures that in full force. Since all combatant U.S. submarines today are nuclear-powered, it's pretty clear whose arguments carried the day. --66.69.219.9 23:18, 12 July 2006 (UTC)
Thanks for reformatting the links I added. For what it's worth, I think you're too harsh on Schratz and his article. Lots of sharp people thought many of the same things about Rickover and his methods. Also, I think the older diesel boat generation was not necessarily anti-nuke and they were impressive in their own right, as any study of the U.S. submarine war in the Pacific will show. Visionaries in the submarine community were pushing for nuclear subs even before the Manhattan Project; the first U.S. enrichment effort was part of a low-key, long-term project to develop nuclear propulsion for submarines before it was taken over for The Bomb's development. When the bombs went off in Japan, submarine force leaders immediately put two and two together and pushed hard for a nuclear submarine. That's when Rickover hit the scene.
It's true, however, that many WW2 submariners were bitter, however, since Rickover pointedly made a show of taking as few of these people as he could he could get away with. He also tried to systematically destroy the rejectees' careers if he could. A family friend of my parents fell into this category; he was brilliant. I think Schratz' insights are good, regardless of his personal background--A. B. 01:47, 13 July 2006 (UTC)
To clarify, I have nothing but respect for WWII submariners, who in many people's opinion -- including mine -- were the only substantial maritime thing that was between us (or the Australians) and the Japanese after Pearl Harbor's destruction of the surface fleet. They led a hard life, and far too many experienced hard deaths, God rest their souls.
However, with the development of nuclear power it ultimately was Rickover who was put in the position of leading a wholesale changeout in the mindset of the submarine force. Rigorous discipline in the operation of the propulsion plant was essential, as entirely new risks and sciences were involved. Rickover knew U.S. politics, and was keenly sensitive to the possibility of the program being shut down if there were ever a single, serious nuclear incident.
Old dogs tend to think they know all they need to, and do not handily learn new tricks. Creation always comes with a near equal amount of destruction, especially when it is accompanied by revolutionary change, not incremental. Far too many diesel boaters insisted on building diesel boats, and Rickover was politically savvy enough to know that the two could not co-habitate in the U.S., as some politician, somewhere, would argue that the diesel boats were cheaper and thus "better." In the Cold War era, such thinking could have been lethal to U.S. national security and simply had to be done away with, regardless of the personal costs.
It's ironic, but Schratz' major error in his opinion piece was the same core fault of Rickover: he lacked the heart to be balanced in his judgments.
My respects and best wishes to your parents' friend. We all owe him and others our deepest gratitude. --66.69.219.9 03:19, 13 July 2006 (UTC)
Diesel boats can be just as lethal as nuclear boats and some other fleet operators continue to build and use both. The issue is more one of range, endurance and speed. Even today, if we had a major mission for submarines to just lurk in one area near their base, a conventional submarine would be a much cheaper choice. The Swedes, for instance, will never miss not having nukes. The U.S. Navy, however, had to go to an all nuclear submarine fleet becuase of the distances to its missions.--A. B. 03:38, 13 July 2006 (UTC)
Ah, c'mon...a snorkeling diesel boat is a chip shot target-wise, and today's nukes are as quiet as a diesel running on its battery. From payload, to speed, to survivability, to endurance, to livability there's no comparision between the two platforms today. Other fleet operators do not have the U.S.'s scope of responsibilities or politics to deal with. Building diesels in the U.S. is a non-starter. --66.69.219.9 03:46, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

[edit] References

I deleted the reference to the novel "Blow Negative" from the references.

Here's what the Wikipedia Guide to Layout says about references:

Put under this header, again in a bulleted list, any books, articles, web pages, et cetera that you used in constructing the article and have referenced (cited) in the article.

--A. B. 04:14, 20 September 2006 (UTC)

I just read an amazon reviewer's synopsis of "Blow Negative"; while it sounds like an interesting book, it also sounds as if there are many differences between that events in the novel and in real life. --A. B. 04:34, 20 September 2006 (UTC)
That's because it's a work of fiction, not a biography -- it was inspired by Rickover and his work with the nuclear sub. Hayford Peirce 00:17, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Further reading

The Wiki guide to layout says "Further reading" can contain other info that might be of interest to the article reader.

Let me ask the people who keep deleting this reference: why does the article of Thomas More contain a reference to A Man for All Seasons? Why does the article on Huey Long contain a reference to All the King's Men? Why does the article on Reinhard Heydrich contain a reference to The Man in the High Castle as well as many other works of fiction? Why is it not possible to reference an article on Rickover with a novel clearly about him? If you can't answer any of these questions, I suggest you leave the reference to "Blow Negative" alone. Hayford Peirce 00:17, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

Hayford, interesting point. As I read your back and forth with 66.69.219.9 last night, I immediately thought of Warren's book. I'm not sure why you put this book in the references to begin with since none of the three works of fiction you cited above were listed in the references section:
Reinhard Heydrich#Heydrich in popular culture
Thomas More#Influence and reputation
Huey Long#In culture
Well, I just stuck it in there because it was the only place that existed that was about books. I hadn't looked at the other three references at that time. Remember, a lot of Wiki is still improvised to one degree or another, although standardization is coming along. Hayford Peirce 02:08, 21 September 2006 (UTC)
I suggest you briefly spell out how the fictional character differs from Rickover. From what I've just read about the book, it sounds like there were significant differences between actual events and those depicted in the book -- is this true?
You mean briefly in the article, where I have listed the book?
Honestly, I really don't know the best place since I don't know much about the book; there's not a lot about it on the usual submarine and Rickover web sites. One possibility is just a longer sentence than what you've already got (or a second sentence); I think much more than that is too long for an entry in a list like that. Another is to put longer comments in something like a new "Rickover in popular culture" or a "Rickover - Influence and reputation" section. That may be overkill, however. --A. B. 01:50, 21 September 2006 (UTC)
I think I'll expand the current reference by, say, a sentence, and link it to an article about the book itself. Then I'll start a [{stub}} about the book, putting in a couple of initial sentences of my own. I'll have to find my old copy and reread it -- then I can make a longer article about it. Hayford Peirce 02:08, 21 September 2006 (UTC)
Rickover is viewed so very differently by various biographers and former colleagues -- I wonder how Stephens viewed him. I look forward to reading the book if I can find a cheap used copy. --A. B. 00:51, 21 September 2006 (UTC)
It's an *excellent* book, with serious flaws (fiction-wise, that is), but the parts about the Rickover character are wonderful.... Hayford Peirce 00:55, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "WikiProject Biography" and "Military history WikiProject"

These project tags have been slapped on this article by the Looper5920 and Nobunaga24 "tag team" without consulting with the article's editors in any fashion.

Ever heard of building a consensus? Who TF are you guys, and why are you cluttering this article's Talk page with your self-promoting activity? And why do you think you're the ones who are qualified to speak to the quality of the article? Do you have some specific qualifications in that regard (and don't quote us as to just how many other articles you've glued your project tags to)? Lastly, do you have any direct familiarity with the topic...at all? --66.69.219.9 04:40, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Assessments are based on many factors other than the rater's specific knowledge of the subject, such as amount of content, format, references, quality of prose, etc. --Nobunaga24 06:12, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

P.S. A re-assessment has been made. Per your "FAQ": "Who can assess articles? In general, anyone can add or change an article's rating." --66.69.219.9 04:44, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Yes, within the guidlines. It's not FA. Please read this: Wikipedia:Featured articles--Nobunaga24 06:12, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

And another thing: "This article is supported by the Maritime warfare task force. This article is supported by the United States military history task force." -- Make that, "This is Bullshit." NO ONE from either of these "task forces" has done ANYTHING to edit this article, except perhaps to clutter its talk page with self-important crap. --66.69.219.9 04:56, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

Inclusion is based on subject matter, not how many people from it have edited the article. As this project is one of the largest on wikipedia, with over 19,000 articles as part of the project, I hardly think it is just "self-important crap."--Nobunaga24 06:12, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
What, precisely, does "this project" accomplish? It certainly hasn't added anything to this article yet. --24.153.209.20 14:50, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
I'll take the bait just this once. After this, you are talking and crying to yourself. Judging by the edit history and the tone, I think this is still the same editor as 66.69.219.9. If you want to know what it has accomplished, stop complaining for a minute, click the link on the tag and take a look. It's accomplished quite a bit. Why this is such an issue to you, beats me. Instead of screaming about it, you could add something positive to the project, and work to better the articles included in the maritime section. Or you can continue to shout into the wind here. Keep in mind, this is NOT your article. It's everyone's --Nobunaga24 15:29, 6 October 2006 (UTC)
See Wikipedia:Ownership of articles. --A. B. 16:22, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "WikiProject Biography" and "Military history WikiProject" -- another perspective

As someone with an interest in Rickover, I look at these outside editors' evaluation of this article as a positive thing. These featured article reviews have done much to improve other articles. Their specific feedback (we will get specific feedbak, right?) can only help make this the best article positive.

24.153.209.20/66.69.219.9, if it helps, just think of it as another ORSE ([1], [2], [3]). Cheer up -- it's perhaps an unwelcome intrusion, but one that will make us better for it somehow (or so someone says).

You know in your heart Rickover would enjoy this (as well as make a much harder and more sadistic examiner than any Wikipedia editor). --A. B. 16:20, 6 October 2006 (UTC)

I'm not an expert on Rickover by any means, so most of my suggestions will be fairly general; but here are some of the more obvious points where this article could be improved:
  • Inline citations should be added in larger numbers. Any judgements, controversial points, or direct quotes need to be cited, obviously; but, beyond that, a thorough citation of all significant points in the article would not be inappropriate. I would suggest using thecite.php footnote method.
  • An infobox template ({{Infobox Military Person}}) should be added.
  • The references (the sources used for material in the article) need to be listed separately from the works written by Rickover if those works were not actually used.
  • The "Jimmy Carter and Three Mile Island" seems pretty stubby; it might be better to either expand it or merge it into one of the surrounding sections.
If you'd like additional input (and input from a somewhat wider audience), you might want to take advantage of the military history peer review process. Kirill Lokshin

[edit] Trivia

I've deleted the recent "Trivia" category. Aside from the fact that its two-statement contents were unencyclopedic and only served to clutter the article, the first comment was uncited, and the second was flat out false. One example of Rickover appearing in full uniform includes this photo taken with Presidents Carter, Ford and Nixon. --72.183.125.111 22:42, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] CONFORM and 688

According to Patrick Tyler (Running Critical), and later quoted and expanded by Norman Polmar in his 2004 book "Cold War Submarines", back when the 688 program started, there was this alternative called CONFORM. To make a long story short, the CONFORM program held promise of a substantially superior and smaller submarine at a lower cost. Rickover not only forced his own idea (688) through, but he destroyed all the records of the competing CONFORM program. I must say I'm curious as to why this incident is not discussed in the main article at all. Even if another source mitigated or rebutted this story (I'd admit not being familiar with any rebuttals, so if I add this part myself it'd be up to someone else to write the other POV), I would think it is worthy of at least a mention. Certainly it does seem to portray a darker side of Rickover. Comments? Kazuaki Shimazaki 14:04, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

There are many, many, many stories about Rickover, the person, which is the subject of this article -- not "submarine development in the U.S." -- that are not included in the article. --72.183.125.111 12:39, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
Considering that Rickover's primary claim to fame is his hand in US nuclear submarine development, I'm not so sure. His contributions to US submarine safety (the positive) is known and listed, so why not potential negatives? --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
A quick look at the article's bibliography gives some sense of the prodigious amount of information written about Rickover. The CONFORM story pales in comparison to many other person-al stories about Rickover that cannot be included in order to make the article of reasonable size. --72.183.125.111 12:39, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
If this article is already huge, I might agree with you, but it is not. However, honestly I must say I find Rickover's heavy handed activity with CONFORM, thus depriving the US of a potential cheaper and superior alternative, to be MUCH more intriguing than say the presents he received from EB. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
CONFORM might be interesting to an E.B. engineer, but not so much to the general population. --72.183.125.111 12:39, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
How is it not of interest to the general populace that Rickover potentially slowed US submarine development for a generation? It is like saying Lysenko is not of interest to Russians for hindering their genetics and agricultural advances for a generation. Considering the decision was made during a time of fierce competition with the Soviet Union, this might just have threatened national security. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
Moreover, the premise that CONFORM was an acceptable design is a specious one: The most powerful reactor plant at the time was the S6G...the one used in the 688 design; a smaller submarine would have meant a smaller reactor and a slower submarine. A primary design criteria for the 688 was that it had to keep up with the nuclear-powered carrier battle group; this was something that the 688 was and is certainly capable of. --72.183.125.111 12:39, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
Smaller submarines are not necessarily slower. In fact, USS Skipjack had a speed of 33 knots, on 15000HP. Larger subs have more wetted area and require a lot more thrust just to regain the same speed. The CONFORM project seemed to have realized this and was going for efficiency improvements to increase speed rather than just cramming larger and larger plants (which kill off their advantage by requiring larger boats) onto the subs. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
If there was a serious study that found 688 superior, then there would be no problem. However, no such study was apparently made. Rickover apparently just ramroaded the thing through Congress. Once he got it, he quickly scrapped everything, so no analyst can go over them in retrospect and sidelined all those that supported CONFORM. That last part was the most petty and intriguing to me and I suspect more Americans than some think. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
Shimazaki-san, I'm really & truly not interested in a point-by-point debate. And I mean, literally, it's just not interesting to me. But...carrier protection and thus speed were the critical elements that drove the 688's success. My sense is that Rickover also didn't want to pay for a full-up new reactor design; S6G borrowed heavily from the surface ship D1G design, and thus dramatically lessened overall reactor design & development for the 688. Moreover, if CONFORM couldn't keep up with the carrier battle group, then...in that day and age...it was a non-starter of an idea. Rickover was nothing if not politically savvy, and he had to know that the carrier admirals would sink any new submarine design that didn't play to their interests, which had substantial merit as a result of growing Soviet submarine ASUW capabilities. Last, and least, NAVSEA didn't...and doesn't...have a talent pool waiting in hot-standby to create a full-up design for a new submarine. E.B. does...and did. If the CONFORM design had a "NAVSEA" branding label on it at the end of the day, it was just and only that. That's really all I have to say about all of this. Good luck with the re-write. --72.183.125.111 14:30, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
Moreover, CONFORM is highly akin or identical to "Fat Albert," an E.B. 688-alternative design that was shorter but wider than a 688. This design effectively exists in the fleet today as the Seawolf class, but its reactor development took decades to achieve. --72.183.125.111 12:39, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
Fat Albert as I understood it was much lighter, and it was NEVER meant to match the speed of the 688 (the proposal already said it would only do 27 knots), so I won't say it is the same as CONFORM. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
Notably, but not surprisingly, the Seawolf class was cancelled after only three were constructed due to excessive costs. You have to consider the source (especially when there is an inherent conflict of interest) when it comes to ostensibly "superior" submarine designs that in fact have an enormous cost tail in terms of overall system design, construction and maintenance. Not surprisingly, the military-industrial complex loves expensive programs that appear "low cost" to the run-of-the-mill U.S. Congressional 'consumer.'
Since the Seawolf was so much larger than the others, the cost increase is more likely related to that. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)
CONFORM was designed from the US Naval Systems Command, with some help from EB. That means NSC has a grudge against Rickover, but the "Rickoverists" also have an interest here too to defend their design. Building a smaller submarine is of dubious advantage to EB anyway, since smaller ships tend to be cheaper. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 03:34, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Status of the article and future development

(Relocated discussion from Will_Beback & 24.28.6.209 talk pages)

Thank you for your contributions this evening to the Rickover article. I think that the retirement section is getting a little heavy as compared to his substantial contributions, but then I guess elephant fights are always dramatic & amusing. --24.28.6.209 05:43, 15 August 2007 (UTC)

If the section seems too long we might trim some of the Veliotis material. There's some coverage of the retirement and related circumstances in newspaper archives if we need more sources. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 05:50, 15 August 2007 (UTC)
Rickover's public & private combat with General Dynamics/Veliotis was substantially the reason that he was successfully forced to retire, so I wouldn't short change related comments in that dimension. Since Lehman has publicly bragged that he deliberately set out to "solve the Rickover problem," (i.e., that he premeditated Rickover's retirement) prior to becoming Secretary of the Navy, this point needs to be mentioned.
To me, it's not that the retirement section is too long, rather that the NR/AEC section -- Rickover's salad days, if you will -- should be the most profound...and right now it isn't. Part of the problem is that Rickover's service was so long, and his irascibility so world-class, that there are any number of stories that could be added to convey just how he accomplished what he did. Tough to pick one or two stories out of a hundred or so.
My overall take is that the article is fine for now...though Lehman's premeditation bears mentioning. --24.28.6.209 02:26, 16 August 2007 (UTC)
I'm sure you're right about what you say. It'd be better to discuss the article on its talk page though. Overall, I think the article looks great. It may be the best online biography in existence. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 05:36, 16 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Lehman

  • How much of Lehman's intention was well-founded toward removing a clinging senescent tyrant, and how much was motivated by malevolent intra-service rivalry or a desire to sweep fraudulent contractor claims under the rug, can be argued but not quantified by historians.

I think we should leave this debate to historians. This text appears polemical. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 17:10, 17 August 2007 (UTC)

Agreed. I don't think that it is in any way inaccurate, but at the same time these words do come across as having a bone to pick. I don't have the words or interest right now to convey this matter. Maybe later. --24.28.6.209 22:28, 17 August 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Engineering excellence vs. tactical focus

As per the point that Tom Clancy made when he wrote Submarine, what do the ex USN officers here think of the contention that Rickover's overwhelming focus on nuclear safety diminished the relative importance, for US submarine officers, of tactical skill and training in anti-submarine operations, compared to the Royal Navy's selection programme for submarine captains? Buckshot06 16:49, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

The only opinions of ex USN officers that matter are those published in relaible sources, not those offered on Wikipedia talk pages. If this is a controversy then we should cover it. While Clancy isn't a submariner, he is a well-known author on the topic and his viewpoint on the subject should be mentioned in the article, along with any noteworthy disagreeing or concurring opinions. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 19:49, 27 October 2007 (UTC)
Will is correct. Moreover, for several reasons, it will also likely be difficult to find USN officer opinions on the matter in print. Security, for certain, is one of the reasons, but not least of which is how to actually measure the degree of tactical vs. engineering focus.
As operators of the world's finest nuclear submarines (certainly in their opinion), internally the US submariners don't compare themselves much to other navies in regard to tactical vs. engineer skills. That's not to say they don't know who internationally has skills and who doesn't -- the Brits, in particular, are admired for their aggressiveness in tactical situations...likely attributable to the Perisher approach in screening officers for command. The actual career path for U.S. submariners includes quite a bit of tactical proficiency requirements; you don't hear much in the press about this, as the nuclear end of things captures the imagination fairly quickly...but there is definitely a balance.
Some navies split the career options for officers between bridge-skills and engineering paths, including U.S. submariners (Rickover himself was an EDO), but the hard-core engineering types by and large do not have command-at-sea tours. If someone is an over-the-top "nuke", they'll almost certainly go EDO, and no one disrespects this choice...you need people like that.
Having said all this, the extreme focus on nuclear propulsion plant operation & maintenance was well known during Rickover's era, and one way by which this was addressed after he left was that only very strong former at-sea submarine commanders have held Rickover's now uniquely 8-year position as NAVSEA-08. From Rickover's first replacement, Kinnaird R. McKee, to today's head of NR, Kirkland Donald, all have been exceptional operators; not one has been an EDO. --24.28.6.209 15:02, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
P.S. I spent some time this evening looking through Google books to see if this topic is addressed there, but no joy – as expected, it's not something you'd find in the open press. But there was a good comment from William Lowell Putnam in Arctic Superstars that is apropos: "...but no amount of strategic, or even tactical skill is of much value without the means to implement either." In my opinion, that, in a very short statement, is the sum legacy of Rickover: he delivered the means. Last but not least, as Rickover himself points out, and with great accuracy in terms of results during the Cold War: "A fast noisy submarine is of no tactical value." [4] --24.28.6.209 02:22, 29 October 2007 (UTC)
Perisher is referred to in this online article by the first active-duty U.S. naval officer who actually attended it as "one of the premier training programs for submariners in the world." The high degree of U.S. respect for British tactical training is definitely real. --71.42.142.238 17:46, 30 October 2007 (UTC)
Adding to that from the British perspective: here an exchange officer at the U.S. Submarine Development Squadron Twelve states without dispute that "...“Perisher”...has produced submarine CO’s revered across the world." --71.42.142.238 17:55, 30 October 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Thresher

(Relocated the following off-topic comment to further the tangential discussion.)

On the other hand, when Thresher went down, he's also known to say to the committee that the Thresher's not his business because it is a "follow-on" ship and the only difference is that a bit of silencing was tacked on (find quote tonight). So, by his statement, silencing in US subs have little to do with him. --Kazuaki Shimazaki 04:06, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

This is likely a more profound comment under this heading than the last one, where it originated. I think that the Thresher disaster deserves more treatment in the article, as it led to so many changes, and appears to have been exacerbated by blind adherence to strict (and over-conservative) procedures. Let's discuss this here first, then edit as appropriate.
As noted here, in a book by the often hostile-to-Rickover Norman Polmar, "Significantly, the day after the disaster, Rickover called the first of several meetings to determine means of a faster reactor startup, as it became evident that the initial "minor difficulty" was an emergency reactor scram, or shutdown." The literature on the Thresher disaster by and large converges on the theory that a silver-brazed joint let to a reactor scram which led to a loss of propulsion, and also points toward the freezing up of high-pressure air lines as the boat attempted to blow ballast tanks and surface.
I'll look to see if there's more in the public domain that can be brought to this, as I have no doubt that Thresher was a ::traumatic and very humbling event in Rickover's life, and may have led to more pragmatic yet safe approaches to reactor operations. --71.42.142.238 16:14, 29 October 2007 (UTC)
Response to "Follow-on" ship comment Perhaps Shimazaki was unable to find the quote he referred to. I checked Rickover's entire testimony before the Joint Committee. It was in response to a question by Representative Bates about who had authority for which parts of the Thresher construction. Rickover explained that because the reactor plant on Thresher was the S5W plant, which is the same as the reactor plants of the Skipjack class, Thresher was considered as a "follow-on" ship; therefore the agreement within the Bureau of Ships was that his responsibility was limited to the reactor plant and not to the rest of the propulsion plant. I could not find use of the "not my business" expression in this testimony. To the contrary, elsewhere in that same testimony, he pointed out his continual delema of being blamed for medling in Bureau of Ships activities outside the reactor plant, but that when he saw an activity (or in-activity) that might have adverse impact to the reactor plant, he considered it to be his responsibility to do something about it.
I agree that the loss of Thresher deserves more treatment in the article. I'll try to draft a couple of paragraphs for review here.Tvbanfield (talk) 15:18, 22 May 2008 (UTC)


[edit] Loss of the Thresher

(Proposed new article)

On April 10, 1963 the USS Thresher (SSN-593) was lost at sea with 112 naval personnel and 17 technical civilians. This was the first major setback for the naval reactors program, and although there were no indications that the loss was attributed to reactor problems, it presented serious concerns for Admiral Rickover. Thresher was first in a class of a new submarine design that would be much quieter and go faster and deeper than previous submarines. To achieve quietness, all machinery would be placed on resilient mountings and piping would be connected to machinery with flexible couplings. To achieve greater depths, a new type of steel, called HY-80 (high yield, 80,000 pounds per square inch), would be required for the hull. Thresher's reactor plant, however, was to be the S5W reactor, the same plant that had been installed and fully tested on the Skipjack class submarine. Therefore the innovations in the engine room and in hull construction were outside of the area of Rickover's responsibility.[1]

Rickover's concerns included:

  • The scheduling of several subs of the new class to be built before the first would be tested at sea
  • Problems with quality control of the welding of HY-80 steel
  • The assignment of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to build a first of a class submarine
  • The integrity of seawater piping, specifically the widespread Navy practice of brazing seawater pipe joints rather than welding because it is faster and less expensive.

Rickover was often criticised for medling in Navy issues that were outside of his areas of responsibility. It was his view however, that if he saw actions or in-actions in the Navy that would have serious negative impact on the effectiveness of nuclear submarines, it would be his responsibility to bring these problems to light. He did so as a witness before the Navy court of inquiry and in his testamony to the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The Joint Committee held its hearings in June of 1963 after the Navy court of inquiry made its report. At these hearings Admiral Rickover informed Congress of his views of what may have led to the loss of Thresher. While the findings of the Navy court of inquiry were of a very specific and technical nature, Rickover pointed more to generic and wide-spread management practices that set the stage for loose adherence to existing specifications and poor quality control. He pointed to the frequent reassignment of technical managers in the Navy and in the shipyards, and to the lack of individual responsibility as the key management shortcomings.

During testimony before the Joint Committee on June 15, 1961 concerning the pinpointing of responsibility in the event of nuclear accidents, Rickover said:[2]

Responsibility is a unique concept: it can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you cannot escape it. If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible.

Also Rickover emphasized to Congress that he did not create newer and tougher standards in the Reactor Program, he simply insisted that already existing standards be adhered to strictly. In his efforts to enforce these standards, he found that manufacturers and shipyards too often waived descrepencies, especially if it would be difficult or expensive to remedy the problem.

With regard to the use of silver-brazed joints in sea-water piping, he pointed out that, since there were no reliable procedures at that time to determine if a brazed joint was properly brazed, and because there had been numerous failures of brazed joints during full-ship shock tests of submarines, he ordered all silver-brazed joints in Thresher piping that passed through the reactor compartment, i.e., through his area of responsibility, to be replaced with welded joints. None of the brazed joints elsewhere in Thresher were replaced, of which approximately 3000 joints are subject to submerged sea pressure.

Rickover's testimony to Congress and his recommendations contributed significantly to the establishment of the Navy SUBSAFE program, which has been very successful in preventing flooding casualties in its deep diving submarines.Tvbanfield (talk) 21:12, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Non-punitive letter of censure

I've reverted a one-time editor's change to the related JAGMAN .pdf in-line link from the incredibly irrelevant Wikipedia censure article as it was distinctly dis-informing the article. Editors are encouraged to add information, not remove it. --24.28.6.209 (talk) 15:37, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

Restored yet again. See above comments. The Wikipedia 'censure' article adds nothing to this article, nor does it do anything to explain to the encyclopedic audience what a "non-punitive letter of censure" is. The JAGMAN is the authoritative document. --24.28.6.209 (talk) 21:48, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

How about citing page, chapter ect. and actualy put in the effort to explain what a "non-punitive letter of censure", instead of slapping a link to a 6.53 mb, 381 page manual.??--Hu12 (talk) 21:51, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
Glad to honor a constructive criticism. I'll do that when I get "a round tuit". It's certainly vastly preferable to destroying information while pretending to add value via a completely irrelevant link. --24.28.6.209 (talk) 21:54, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
Until you do get "a round tuit", We'll omit the link per consensus. A 6.53 mb, 381 page manual, without citing the specifics is excessively inappropriate, and inaccessable to most.--Hu12 (talk) 22:03, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
No. We won't. Please dilettante elsewhere. --24.28.6.209 (talk) 22:13, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
Why don't we just copy the relevant text from the PDF into the citation, and then keep the link in the citation for those who want the entire context? ·:· Will Beback ·:· 22:24, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

Even easier: I've reformatted it to a referenced citation. See how easy that was? And it didn't even require referencing a completely irrelevant article such as censure.--24.28.6.209 (talk) 22:32, 15 December 2007 (UTC)

That's better than before. We should never include external links in the text that way, especially when they go to huge PDFs that take (in my case) well over half an hour to download. If we actually want readers to know what we're talking about, we should still include the text we're referencing. Since it's PD, fair use isn't an issue. The problem with the way it's set up now is that it appears to tbe a source for the censure, not a description of what a censure is. When the PDF finishes downloading I'll copy the relevant text into the reference. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 23:04, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
Good effort, and thank you. It's always nice to see an administrator adding value. --24.28.6.209 (talk) 23:16, 15 December 2007 (UTC)
Will, thoughts on this?
<ref>{{PDFlink|[http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/JAGMAN2004.pdf Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN)] |6.53 [[Megabyte|MB]]<!-- application/pdf, 6,855,029 bytes --> part A(0105), page 1-10}} Nonpunitive [[censure]] is provided for in R.C.M. 306(c)(2), MCM.</ref>[3]

--simulated refence section--
  1. ^ .Rockwell, Theodore, The Rickover Effect: The Inside Story of How Adm. Hyman Rickover Built the Nuclear Navy (John Wiley & Sons, 1995)
  2. ^ Loss of the U.S.S. "Thresher," Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, eighty-eight Congress, First and Second Sessions, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965, pp87
  3. ^ Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN) PDF (6.53 MB part A(0105), page 1-10) Nonpunitive censure is provided for in R.C.M. 306(c)(2), MCM.


--Hu12 (talk) 00:30, 16 December 2007 (UTC)
That looks good. BTW, two hours later and I still have only half of the PDF downloaded. My conneciton is fairly speedy, so the site itself must have a very slow connection. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 00:40, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] NONPUNITIVE CENSURE

This is from http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/JAGMAN2004.pdf. Warning, it is a large file on a slow server. As a product of the U.S. Government it is in the public domain. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 09:13, 16 December 2007 (UTC)

MANUAL
OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
(JAGMAN)
Office of the Judge Advocate General
Department of the Navy
1322 Patterson Avenue, Southeast
Suite 3000
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC
CHAPTER I
REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING AND
SUPPLEMENTING THE MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
PART A -- NONPUNITIVE MEASURES
0105 NONPUNITIVE CENSURE
a. General. "Censure" is a statement of adverse
opinion or criticism of an individual's conduct or
performance of duty expressed by a superior in the
member's chain of command. Censure may be
punitive or nonpunitive. See section 0114 regarding
punitive censure. Censure does not include adverse
comments in reports of fitness or performance
evaluations, letters of instruction, or administrative
remarks entries documenting factual matters such as
counseling. Proper use of adverse matter that is not
censure is governed by Department of the Navy
regulations and applicable service directives, such as
the Naval Military Personnel Command Manual and
the Marine Corps Individual Records Administration
Manual.
b. Nonpunitive censure. Nonpunitive censure is
provided for in R.C.M. 306(c)(2), MCM. Nonpunitive
censure may be issued by any superior in the member's
chain of command, and may be either oral or in
writing. A sample nonpunitive letter is at Appendix
A-1-a.
(1) A nonpunitive letter is not considered
punishment; rather, the letter is issued to remedy a
noted deficiency in conduct or performance of duty.
The contents of a nonpunitive letter are not limited to,
but may include the following: identification of
conduct or performance of duty deficiencies, direction
for improvement, language of admonishment, identification
of sources of assistance, outline of corrective
action, and the consequences of failing to correct the
deficiencies.
(2) A nonpunitive letter will be kept a
personal matter between the member and the superior
issuing the nonpunitive letter. Other than Secretarial
letters of censure (see section 0114b), the letter may
not be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel or
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, quoted in or
appended to fitness reports, included as enclosures to
investigations pursuant to the Manual of the Judge
Advocate General or to other investigations, or
otherwise included in official departmental records of
the recipient.
(3) The commanding officer of a member may
use the underlying facts to support a detachment for
cause proceeding, for relief of command, or to support
a negative endorsement. If the member submits a
rebuttal to those facts alleging inadequate counseling
or a failure to warn of deficiencies, a copy of the
nonpunitiveletter may be included in the
correspondence forwarding the member's rebuttal.
Under such circumstances, a nonpunitive letter may
properly be included in the official service record of
the member upon filing of the complete
correspondence under the provisions of applicable
service regulations. The fact of issuance of a
nonpunitive letter may not be mentioned in a fitness
report but the underlying facts may be included.
I think all of this may have been futile. I was able to get a 1.65 mb Congressional brief [5] that is verifying quite a bit of the Forced retirement section including the censure. Ive added a change[6]. --Hu12 (talk) 10:56, 16 December 2007 (UTC)
Not only does that load faster (48 seconds versus 4 hours) but, even better, it's a much more relevant reference. Thanks for finding it. ·:· Will Beback ·:· 11:35, 16 December 2007 (UTC)
  • Well, as the "one-time editor" (with 8000+ edits to WP, over 50% in the Main article space, but who is WP:COUNTing?) I am glad to see that my original edit to remove that totally useless, gigantic PDF link has been converted into a well sourced, informative citation. And so the content of WP was improved and all rejoiced. Which is the point of having multiple editors, after all. Even trolling, disruptive, IP editors can help out in their own way. — MrDolomite • Talk 20:20, 17 December 2007 (UTC)


[edit] Thresher & Scorpion

There should be mention of the 2 nuke subs lost. Thresher and Scorpion. If there is anything public about the HR's invovement with these losses, it should be included. I would assume that HR had a lot to do with looking into to fixes. 32.175.91.218 (talk) 16:27, 14 April 2008 (UTC)