HMS Aboukir (1900)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 HMS Aboukir |
|
| Career |  |
|---|---|
| Class and type: | Cressy-class armoured cruiser |
| Name: | HMS Aboukir |
| Builder: | Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co Ltd, Govan |
| Launched: | May 16, 1900 |
| Fate: | Sunk by U-9 on September 22, 1914 |
| General characteristics | |
| Tons burthen: | 12,000 tons |
| Length: | 472 ft (144 m) |
| Beam: | 69.5 ft (21.2 m) |
| Propulsion: | triple expansion engines twin screws |
| Speed: | 21 knots (39 km/h) |
| Armament: | 2 × 9.2inch guns 12 × 6in guns |
HMS Aboukir was a Cressy-class armoured cruiser of 12,000 tons. Her triple expansion engines and twin screws gave her a top speed of 21 knots (39 km/h). She carried 2 × 9.2in and 12 × 6in guns. She was built by Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co Ltd, Govan, Scotland, in 1902.
The Cressy-class vessels had rapidly become obsolete due to the great advances in naval architecture in the years leading up to the First World War. At the outbreak of the war, these ships were mostly staffed by reserve sailors. The Aboukir was one of four units that made up Rear Admiral Henry H Campbell's Seventh Cruiser Squadron. Owing to the obsolescence of these ships, the squadron was nicknamed the "Live Bait Squadron".[1] [2]
[edit] The Live Bait Squadron
Shortly after the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, Aboukir and her sister ships Bacchante, Euryalus, Hogue and Cressy were assigned to patrol the Broad Fourteens of the North Sea, in support of a force of destroyers and submarines based at Harwich which blocked the Eastern end of the English Channel from German warships attempting to attack the supply route between England and France. Since the smaller vessels were unable to operate in rough seas, the cruisers often formed the front line.[3]
The British Admiralty was planning to withdraw them, when the Aboukir and two of her sisters, Cressy and Hogue were lost to submarine attack. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty (the government minister responsible for the Navy) had minuted the First Sea Lord (the officer with overall responsibility for naval operations), Prince Louis Battenberg on 18 September 1914 that "The Bacchantes should ought not to continue on this beat. The risk to such ships is not justified by any services they can render. The narrow seas, being the nearest point to the enemy, should be kept by a small number of good modern ships",[4] following a representation from Roger Keyes, the commander of the Harwich submarine force the previous day. However, Battenburg, concerned about the threat to cross-channel traffic from surface ships, was persuaded to retain the cruisers in this role until they could be replaced by Arethusa class light cruisers, of which only one had been completed and the remaining seven were under construction. In rough weather in which destroyers could not operate and in the absence of replacement ships, the old cruisers were all that were available to give an early warning of a German sortie into the channel.[3]
When this was written the squadron was on patrol in its assigned area. The patrol originally included a fourth Cressey-class cruiser and flagship of the squadron, Euryalus, and a destroyer screen. However deteriorating weather had led to the destroyers being withdrawn back to Harwich on the night of 17 September. At 6 am on 20 September, Euryalus had also returned to port because of low coal stocks. Rear Admiral Arthur Christian, in operational command of the squadron, had been unable to transfer to another ship because of the rough sea, and consequently command was passed to John Drummond, captain of Aboukir, as the senior officer remaining with the squadron.
The three cruisers continued their patrol uneventfully for another two days. By the evening of 22 September the rough sea had died down. However the weather was still poor off Harwich and the destroyer screen was held back in port, several hours steaming from the cruisers, until 5 am.[3]
At around 6 am on 22 September the three cruisers were steaming at 10 knots (19 km/h) in line ahead and they were spotted by the U-9, commanded by Lt. Otto Weddigen. Although they were not zigzagging, all of the ships had lookouts posted to search for periscopes and one gun on each side of each ship was manned.
Weddigen ordered his submarine to submerge and closed the range to the unsuspecting British ships. At close range, he fired a single torpedo at the Aboukir. The torpedo broke the back of the Aboukir and she sank within 20 minutes with the loss of 527 men.
The captains of the Cressy and Hogue thought the Aboukir had struck a floating mine and came forward to assist her. They stood by and began to pick up survivors. At this point, Weddigen fired two torpedoes into the Hogue, mortally wounding that ship. As the Hogue sank, the captain of the Cressy realised that the squadron was being attacked by a submarine, and tried to flee. However, Weddigen fired two more torpedoes into the Cressy, and sank her as well.
The entire battle had lasted less than two hours, and cost the British three warships, 62 officers and 1,397 ratings. Coming on the heels of the loss of the light cruiser HMS Pathfinder earlier to another submarine attack, this incident established the U-boat as a major weapon in the conduct of naval warfare.
[edit] References
- ^ Channel4.
- ^ www.divernet.com, July 2002.
- ^ a b c Robert K. Massie (2004). Castles of Steel. Jonathan Cape, 128-131. ISBN 0-224-04092-8.
- ^ Churchill's Minute Regarding The Cressys. World War 1 Naval Combat. Retrieved on 2007-05-04.
- Colledge, J. J. and Warlow, Ben (2006). Ships of the Royal Navy: the complete record of all fighting ships of the Royal Navy, Rev. ed., London: Chatham. ISBN 9781861762818. OCLC 67375475.
[edit] See also
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