Hines Hill train collision

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Hines Hill is a crossing loop on the Eastern Goldfields Railway, at the location of Hines Hill, Western Australia.

On January 14, 1996, two trains entered the crossing loop simultaneously in opposing directions, although signals at the exit from the crossing loop were correctly showing red for stop.

The trains involved were National Rail Corporation's 5SP5 intermodal Sydney to Perth freighter, and Westrail's 7025 Perth to Kalgoorlie freighter.

The National Rail train in one direction misjudged the stop, and went past the red signal, hitting the last wagons of the Westrail train. Unfortunately, these wagons were tankers containing diesel which burst into flame, destroying the "black boxes" that might have explained what speed the train was travelling at. The driver and a teenage guest passenger were killed. National Rail locomotives AN10 and DL37 were written off due to being damaged beyond repair.

The accident happened at night, and there were no distance boards which might have helped the driver of the NR train judge the distance to the stop signal showing red.

Contents

[edit] Aftermath

The signalling was later altered to prevent trains entering the crossing loop simultaneously.

The accident illustrates the hazard of having crossing loops only just long enough to hold the two trains. If the loop had been longer, the safety distance from the red departure signal to the fouling point with the arriving train would have been larger and the other train would have cleared the single line section so avoiding the collision by some vital seconds.

[edit] Loop lengthening

Since the accident, the crossing loop at Hines Hill has been lengthened for longer 1800m trains. The loop is now 2304m long, which is considerably longer than the normal longest train. The extra distance provides both a safety margin and faster crosses, since a train entering the loop can clear the single line at a highish speed rather than very slowly.

The extra distance is to accommodate longer trains & has nothing to do with faster crossings as have other crossing loops on the Eastern Goldfields Railway.

Drivers still have to drive according to signals.

[edit] Automatic Train Protection

This accident would have been prevented if the station had been fitted with Automatic Train Protection (ATP), such as the Eurobalise system.

Beacons at the signals together with other intermediate beacons approaching signals would have regulated the speed of the trains to a safer level.

[edit] See also


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