Hindu-German Conspiracy

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The Hindu-German Conspiracy(name) refers to a series of plans formulated between 1914 and 1917 to initiate a Pan-Indian rebellion against the British Raj during World War I. The conspirators included Indian Nationalists in India, the United States and Germany, with the help of the Irish Republicans and the German Foreign Office.[1][2][3] The conspiracy was formulated at the beginning of the War, between the Ghadar Party in the United States, the Berlin Committee in Germany, the Indian revolutionary underground in India, Sinn Féin, and the German Foreign Office through the consulate in San Francisco. The most prominent plan attempted to foment unrest and trigger a Pan-Indian mutiny in the British Indian Army from Punjab to Singapore. This plot was planned to be executed in February 1915 with the aim of overthrowing the Raj from the Indian subcontinent. The February mutiny was ultimately thwarted when British intelligence infiltrated the Ghadarite movement, arresting key figures. Mutinies in smaller units and garrisons within India were also crushed.

Other related events include the 1915 Singapore Mutiny, the Annie Larsen arms plot, the Jugantar-German plot, the German mission to Kabul, the mutiny of the Connaught Rangers in India, as well as, by some accounts, the Black Tom explosion in 1916. The Indo-Irish-German alliance and the conspiracy were the target of a worldwide British intelligence effort, which was successful in preventing further attempts. American intelligence agencies arrested key figures in the aftermath of the Annie Larsen affair in 1917. The conspiracy resulted in the Lahore conspiracy case trials in India as well as the Hindu German Conspiracy Trial—at the time the longest and most expensive trial ever held in the United States.[1]

This series of events was consequential to the Indian independence movement. Though largely subdued by the end of World War I, it came to be a major factor in reforming the Raj's Indian policy.[4] Similar efforts were made during World War II in Germany, Italy, and in Southeast Asia which saw the formations of Indische legion, Battaglione Azad Hindoustan and Indian National Army respectively.

Contents

[edit] Background

An immigrant Punjabi family in America. c. 1900s
An immigrant Punjabi family in America. c. 1900s

With nationalism in India growing steadily in the late 1800s and the early 1900s, a number of Indians led by Shyamji Krishna Varma formed the India House in England in 1905. This organisation, with the support of Indian nationalists such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Lala Lajpat Rai, and Madame Bhikaji Cama, offered scholarships to Indian students, promoted nationalistic work, and was a major platform for anti-colonial opinions and views. The Indian Sociologist published by Krishna Varma was a notable anti-colonial publication. A number of other prominent Indian nationalists were also associated with the India House, including Madan Lal Dhingra, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, and Har Dayal.[5][6] The India House soon came under British scrutiny for the nature of its work and the increasingly inflammatory tone of The Indian Sociologist. In 1909, Madan Lal Dhingra fatally shot William Hutt Curzon Wyllie, the political aide-de-camp to the Secretary of State for India. In the aftermath of the assassination, the India House was rapidly suppressed. While some of its leaders, like Krishna Varma, fled to Europe, others like Chattopadhyaya, moved to Germany and many others moved to Paris.[5][6]

The economic scenario in India in the early 1900s was depressing and this led to large scale immigration of Punjabis to Australia, the United States and Canada. The Canadian government decided to curtail this influx with a series of legislations, which were aimed at limiting the entry of South Asians into the country and restricting the political rights of those already in the country. Though the Punjabi community had been an important loyal force for the British Empire, legislations like these led to discontent and protests within the community. Faced with increasingly difficult situations, the community began organising itself into political groups. A large number of Punjabis also moved to the United States, but they encountered similar political and social problems.[7]

[edit] Ghadar Party

Main article: Ghadar Party
See also: Har Dayal, Sohan Singh Bhakna, and Taraknath Das
Ghadar di Gunj, an early Ghadarite compilation of nationalist and socialist literature, was banned in India in 1913.
Ghadar di Gunj, an early Ghadarite compilation of nationalist and socialist literature, was banned in India in 1913.

The Ghadar Party, initially the Pacific Coast Hindustan Association, was formed in 1913 in the United States under the leadership of Har Dayal, with Sohan Singh Bhakna as its president. The members of the party were Indian immigrants, largely from Punjab.[7] Many of its members were from the University of California at Berkeley including Dayal, Tarak Nath Das, Maulavi Barkatullah, Kartar Singh Sarabha and V.G. Pingle. The party quickly gained support from Indian expatriates, especially in the United States, Canada and Asia.

The ultimate goal of Ghadar was to overthrow British colonial authority in India by means of an armed revolution. Although the Indian National Congress led a mainstream movement for dominion status, its constitutional methods and modest aims were viewed by Ghadar as soft. Ghadar's foremost strategy was to entice Indian soldiers to revolt.[7] To that end, in November 1913 Ghadar established the Yugantar Ashram press in San Francisco. The press produced the Hindustan Ghadar newspaper and other nationalist literature. Ghadar meetings were held in Los Angeles, Oxford, Vienna, Washington, and Shanghai.[8]

Towards the end of 1913, the party established contact with prominent revolutionaries in India, including Rash Behari Bose. An Indian edition of the Hindustan Ghadar essentially espoused the philosophies of anarchism and revolutionary terrorism against British interests in India. Political discontent and violence mounted in Punjab, and Ghadarite publications that reached Bombay from California were deemed seditious and banned by the Raj. These events, compounded by evidence of prior Ghadarite incitement in the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy of 1912, led the British government to pressure the American State Department to suppress Indian revolutionary activities and Ghadarite literature, which emanated mostly from San Francisco.[9][10]

[edit] Indian revolutionary underground

See also: Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy, Rash Behari Bose, and Jugantar
Rash Behari Bose, key leader of the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy and, later, of the February plot
Rash Behari Bose, key leader of the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy and, later, of the February plot

The Indian revolutionary underground gathered momentum during the first decade of the 1900s, with groups arising in Maharashtra, Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Madras Presidency. More groups were scattered around India. The Partition of Bengal in 1905 resulted in a major movement being organised in Bengal by the educated youth of the urban middle class Bhadralok community that epitomised the "classic" Indian revolutionary.[11] Another important movement organised in Punjab had immense support base in the rural and military society of the Punjab.[11] Revolutionary organisations like Jugantar and Anushilan Samiti emerged in the 1900s. A number of events of political terrorism were witnessed, prominent among which was the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy, led by erstwhile Jugantar member Rash Behari Bose, to assassinate the then Viceroy of India, Charles Hardinge. In the aftermath of this event, the British Indian police made concentrated police and intelligence efforts to destroy the Bengali and Punjabi revolutionary underground. Though the movement came under intense pressure for some time, Rash Behari successfully evaded capture for nearly three years. By the time the World War I had begun in Europe, the revolutionary movement had revived in Punjab and Bengal. In Bengal, the movement which was revived mainly in the French base of Chandernagore, was strong enough to nearly paralyse the local administration in Bengal.[12][13][7] The earliest mention of a conspiracy for armed revolution in India is found in Nixon's Report on Revolutionary Organisation which reported that Jatin Mukherjee (Bagha Jatin) and Naren Bhattacharya had met the Crown Prince of Germany during the latter's visit to Calcutta in 1912, and obtained an assurance that arms and ammunition would be supplied to them.[14] During the same time, an increasingly strong Pan-Islamic movement started developing, mainly in the north and north-west regions of India. With the onset of the war, the members of this movement formed an important component of the conspiracy.[15]

[edit] Irish involvement

See also: Clan na Gael, Sinn Féin, Roger Casement, and John Devoy

Irish collaboration with the Ghadarite plans and efforts pre-dated World War I by at least six years. The conspiracy, during its planning stages, garnered major support from a network formed by the Ghadarites, the Irish and the Irish-American reporters and newspapers.[9] Har Dayal had close links in the Bay Area of San Francisco with Irish people like John Barry at the San Francisco Bulletin and other people at the Gaelic American weekly.[1] Barkatullah, later the Ghadar Vice-President, became acquainted with George Freeman who was the editor of the Gaelic American. The two of them, got along with Taraknath Das and went on to produce the Free Hindustan newspaper, modelled after the Gaelic American.[1] Irish Americans were involved in the early but failed attempts to smuggle arms into India, including a failed attempt on-board the SS Moraitis.[16] The community provided valuable intelligence, logistics, communication, media, and legal support to the German, Indian, and Irish conspirators. Those involved in this liaison with the Indian movement, and later involved in the plot, included major Irish republicans and Irish-American nationalists like John Devoy, Joseph McGarrity, Roger Casement, Eamon de Valéra, Father Peter Yorke and Larry de Lacey.[1] These pre-war collusions effectively set-up a network which, as war began in Europe, was tapped into by the German Foreign office.[1]

[edit] Germany and the Berlin Committee

Main article: Berlin Committee
See also: Imperial Germany, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Arthur Zimmerman, and Franz von Papen

With the onset of World War I, erstwhile members of the India House like Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, Abhinash Bhattacharya, Dr. Abdul Hafiz, Padmanabhan Pillai and Gopal Paranjape, joined hands with some Indian students in Germany to form to form a revolutionary group called the Berlin Committee (later called the Indian Independence Committee).[17][18] This had the active support of Arthur Zimmermann, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire. The German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg authorised German activity against India as World War I broke out in September 1914, and Germany decided to actively support the Ghadarite plans.[17] The German effort was headed by prominent archaeologist and historian Max von Oppenheim, who was also the head of the newly formed Intelligence Bureau for the east. Oppenheim helped arrange the Indian groups in Germany into a cohesive organisation, and using the links established between Indian and Irish residents in Germany (including Roger Casement) and the German Foreign Office, he tapped into the Indo-Irish network in the United States. Tasked to make contact with Ghadar leaders in California, the German consulate in San Francisco established links with Ram Chandra, a Ghadarite leader, through a naval lieutenant by the name of Wilhelm von Brincken, Tarak Nath Das and an intermediary by the name of Charles Lattendorf. Har Dayal had been arrested in the United States in 1914, but he had jumped bail and made his way to Switzerland, leaving the party and publications in the charge of Ram Chandra Bharadwaj. Contact was established with Har Dayal in Switzerland and he was convicned of the feasibility of the project.[2] The Berlin Committee also contacted Jatin Mukherjee in Bengal.[5][12][19][20]

[edit] Conspiracy

See also: Komagata Maru
Punjabi Sikhs aboard the Komagata Maru in Vancouver's English Bay, 1914. The passengers were not allowed to land in Canada and the ship was forced to return to India. The events surrounding the Komagata Maru incident served as a catalyst for the Ghadarite cause.
Punjabi Sikhs aboard the Komagata Maru in Vancouver's English Bay, 1914. The passengers were not allowed to land in Canada and the ship was forced to return to India. The events surrounding the Komagata Maru incident served as a catalyst for the Ghadarite cause.

During World War I, the British Indian Army contributed significantly to the British war effort. Consequently, a reduced force, estimated to have been as low as 15,000 troops in late 1914, was stationed in India.[21] It was in this scenario that concrete plans for organising uprisings in India were made.

In September 1913, Mathra Singh, a Ghadarite, visited Shanghai and promoted the Ghadarite cause within the Indian community there. In January 1914, Singh visited India and circulated Ghadar literature amongst Indian soldiers through clandestine sources before leaving for Hong Kong. Singh's reported that the situation in India was favourable for a revolution.[22][23]

In May 1914, the Canadian government refused to allow the 400 Indian passengers of the ship Komagata Maru to disembark at Vancouver. The voyage had been planned as an attempt to circumvent Canadian exclusion laws that effectively prevented Indian immigration. Before the ship reached Vancouver, its approach was announced on German radio, and British Columbian authorities were prepared to prevent the passengers from entering Canada. The incident became a focal point for the Indian community in Canada which rallied in support of the passengers and against the government's policies. After a 2 month legal battle, 24 of the them were allowed to immigrate. The ship was escorted out of Vancouver by the battleship HMCS Rainbow and returned to India. On reaching Calcutta, the passengers were detained under the Defence of India Act at Budge Budge by the British Indian government, which made efforts to forcibly transport them to Punjab. This caused rioting at Budge Budge and resulted in fatalities on both sides.[24] A number of Ghadar leaders, like Barkatullah and Taraknath Das, used the inflammatory passions surrounding the Komagata Maru event as a rallying point and successfully brought many disaffected Indians in North America into the party's fold.[23]

By October 1914, a large number of Ghadarites had returned to India and were assigned tasks like contacting Indian revolutionaries and organisations, spreading propaganda and literature, and arranging to get arms into the country.[25] The first group of 60 Ghadarites led by Jawala Singh, left San Francisco for Canton aboard the steamship Korea on 29 August. They were to sail on to India, where they would be provided with arms to organise a revolt. At Canton, more Indians joined, and the group, now numbering about 150, sailed for Calcutta on a Japanese vessel. They were to be joined by more Indians arriving in smaller groups. During the September - October time period, about 300 Indians left for India in various ships like SS Siberia, Chinyo Maru, China, Manchuria, SS Tenyo Maru, SS Mongolia and SS Shinyo Maru.[17][22][25]The Korea’s party was uncovered and arrested on arrival at Calcutta. In spite of this, a successful underground network was established between the United States and India, through Shanghai, Swatow, and Siam. Tehl Singh, the Ghadar operative in Shanghai, is believed to have spent $30,000 for helping the revolutionaries to get into India.[26] The Ghadarites in India were able to establish contact with sympathisers within the British Indian Army as well as build networks with underground revolutionary groups.

[edit] East Asia

Efforts had begun as early as 1911 to procure arms and smuggle them into India.[27] When a clear idea of the conspiracy emerged, more earnest and elaborate plans were made to obtain arms and to enlist international support. After the failure of the SS Korea mission, Herambalal Gupta took over the leadership of American wing of the conspiracy and began efforts to obtain men and arms. While the former resource was in plentiful supply with more and more Indians coming forward to join the Ghadarite cause, obtaining arms for the uprising proved to be more difficult.[28]

The revolutionaries started negotiations with the Chinese government through James Dietrich, who held Sun Yat Sen's power of attorney, to buy a million rifles. However, the deal fell through when it was realised that the weapons offered were obsolete flintlocks and muzzle loaders. From China, Gupta went to Japan to try to procure arms and to enlist Japanese support for the Indian independence movement. However, he was forced into hiding within 48 hours when he came to know that the Japanese had planned to hand him over to the British.[29] Later reports indicated he was protected at this time by Toyama Mitsuru.[30]

The Indian Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore, a strong supporter of Pan-Asianism, met Japanese premier Count Terauchi and Count Okuma, a former premier, in an attempt to enlist support for the Ghadarite movement.[31] Tarak Nath Das urged Japanese to align with Germany, on the grounds that American war preparation could actually be directed against Japan.[31] Later, in 1915, Abani Mukherjee is also known to have tried unsuccessfully to arrange for arms from Japan. The Ascendancy of Li Yuanhong to Chinese Presidency in 1916, led to the negotiations reopening through his former private secretary who resided in the United States at the time. In exchange for allowing arms shipments to India via China's borders, China was offered German military assistance and the rights to 10% of any material shipped to India via China. The negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful due to Sun Yat Sen's opposition to an alliance with Germany.[32]

[edit] United States

Main article: Annie Larsen affair
See also: Black Tom explosion
Franz von Papen, later the Chancellor of Germany briefly before Hitler's rise to power. Papen was key in organising the arms shipments.
Franz von Papen, later the Chancellor of Germany briefly before Hitler's rise to power. Papen was key in organising the arms shipments.

An elaborate plan and arrangement was made to ship arms from the United States and the Far East through Shanghai, Batavia, Bangkok and Burma.[28] Even while Herambalal Gupta was on his mission in China and Japan, other plans where explored to ship arms from the United States and East Asia. The German high command decided early on that assistance to the Indian groups would be pointless unless given on a substantial scale.[33] In October 1914, German Vice Consul E.H von Schack in San Francisco approved the arrangements for funds and armaments. $200,000 worth of small arms and ammunition were acquired by the German military attache Captain Franz von Papen through Krupp agents, and arranged for its shipment to India through San Diego, Java, and Burma. The arsenal included 8,080 Springfield rifles of Spanish-American War vintage, 2,400 Springfield carbines, 410 Hotchkiss repeating rifles, 4,000,000 cartridges, 500 Colt revolvers with 100,000 cartridges, and 250 Mauser pistols along with ammunition.[33] The schooner Annie Larsen and the sailing ship SS Henry S were hired to ship the arms out of the United States and transfer it to the SS Maverick. The ownership of ships were hidden under a massive smokescreen involving fake companies and oil business in south-east Asia. For the arms shipment itself, a successful cover was set up to lead British agents to believe that the arms were for the warring factions of the Mexican Civil War.[2][34][35][26][36][37][38] This ruse was successful enough that the rival Villa faction offered $15,000 to divert the shipment to a Villa controlled port.[2]

Although the shipment was meant to supply the mutiny planned for February 1915, it was not dispatched until June of that year, by which time the plot had been uncovered and major leaders in India had been arrested or gone into hiding. The plot for the shipment itself failed when disastrous coordination prevented a successful rendezvous off Socorro Island with the Maverick. The plot had already been infiltrated by British intelligence through Indian and Irish agents linked closely with the conspiracy. Upon returning to Hoquiam, Washington after a number of failed attempts, the Annie Larsen's cargo was promptly seized by US customs.[37][38] The cargo was sold at an auction despite the German Ambassador Count Johann von Bernstoff's attempts to take possession, insisting they were meant for German East Africa.[39] The Hindu German Conspiracy Trial opened in 1917 in the United States on charges of gun running and at the time was one of the lengthiest and most expensive trials in American legal history.

Among other events in the United States that have been linked to the conspiracy is the Black Tom explosion when, on the night of July 30, 1916, saboteurs blew up nearly 2 million tons of arms and ammunition at the Black Tom terminal at New York harbour awaiting shipment in support of the British war effort. Although blamed solely on German agents at the time , later investigations by the Directorate of Naval Intelligence in the aftermath of the Annie Larsen incident unearthed links between the Black Tom explosion and Franz von Papen, the Irish movement, the Indian movement as well as Communist elements active in the United States.[40][41]

[edit] Pan-Indian mutiny

Main article: Ghadar Conspiracy
See also: 1915 Singapore mutiny

By the start of 1915, a large number of Ghadarites (nearly 8,000 in the Punjab province alone by some estimates) had returned to India.[12][42] However, they were not assigned a central leadership and begun their work on an ad hoc basis. Although some were rounded up by the police on suspicion, many remained at large and began establishing contacts with garrisons in major cities like Lahore, Ferozepur and Rawalpindi. Various plans had been made to attack the military arsenal at Mian Meer, near Lahore and initiate a general uprising on 15 November 1914. In another plan, a group of Sikh soldiers, the manjha jatha, planned to start a mutiny in the 23rd Cavalry at the Lahore cantonment on 26 November. A further plan called for a mutiny to start on 30 November from Ferozepur under Nidham Singh.[43] In Bengal, the Jugantar, through Jatin Mukherjee, established contacts with the garrison at Fort William in Calcutta.[12][19] In August 1914, Mukherjee's group had seized a large consignment of guns and ammunition from the Rodda company, a major gun manufacturing firm in India. In December, a number of politically motivated armed robberies to obtain funds were carried out in Calcutta. Mukherjee kept in touch with Rash Behari Bose through Kartar Singh and V.G. Pingle. These rebellious acts, which were until then organised separately by different groups, were brought into a common umbrella under the leadership of Rash Behari Bose in North India, V. G. Pingle in Maharashtra, and Sachindranath Sanyal in Benares.[12][19][44] A plan was made for a unified general uprising, with the date set for 21 February 1915.[12][19]

[edit] February 1915

The public executions of convicted mutineers at Outram Road, Singapore, c. March 1915
The public executions of convicted mutineers at Outram Road, Singapore, c. March 1915

In India, unaware of the delayed shipment and confident of being able to rally the Indian sepoy, the plot for the mutiny took its final shape. Under the plans, the 23rd Cavalry in Punjab was to seize weapons and kill their officers while on roll call on 21 February.[45] This was to be followed by mutiny in the 26th Punjab, which was to be the signal for the uprising to begin, resulting in an advance on Delhi and Lahore. The Bengal cell was to look for the Punjab Mail entering the Howrah Station the next day (which would have been cancelled if Punjab was seized) and was to strike immediately. However, Punjab CID successfully infiltrated the conspiracy at the last moment through one Kirpal Singh.[23] Sensing that their plans had been compromised, D-day was brought forward to 19 February, but even these plans found their way to the intelligence.[45] Plans for revolt by the 130th Baluchi Regiment at Rangoon on 21 January were thwarted. Attempted revolts in the 26th Punjab, 7th Rajput, 130th Baluch, 24th Jat Artillery and other regiments were suppressed. Mutinies in Firozpur, Lahore, and Agra were also suppressed and many key leaders of the conspiracy were arrested, although some managed to escape or evade arrest. A last ditch attempt was made by Kartar Singh and V. G. Pingle to trigger a mutiny in the 12th Cavalry regiment at Meerut.[35] Kartar Singh escaped from Lahore, but was arrested in Varanasi, and V. G. Pingle was apprehended in Meerut. Mass arrests followed as the Ghadarites were rounded up in Punjab and the Central Provinces. Rash Behari Bose escaped from Lahore and in May 1915 fled to Japan. Other leaders, including Giani Pritam Singh, Swami Satyananda Puri and others fled to Thailand or other sympathetic nations.[23][35]

On February 15, the 5th Light Infantry stationed at Singapore was among the few units to mutiny successfully. Nearly eight hundred and fifty of its troops mutinied on the afternoon of the 15th, along with nearly a hundred men of the Malay States Guides. This mutiny lasted almost seven days, and resulted in the deaths of forty-seven British soldiers and local civilians. The mutineers also released the interned crew of the SMS Emden. The mutiny was only put down after French, Russian and Japanese ships arrived with reinforcements.[46][47] Of nearly two hundred tried at Singapore, forty seven were shot in a public execution,. Most of the rest were deported for life or given jail terms ranging between seven and twenty years.[46] Some historians, including Hew Strachan, argue that although Ghadar agents operated within the Singapore unit, the mutiny was isolated and not linked to the conspiracy.[48] Others deem this as instigated by the Silk Letter Movement which became intricately related to the Ghadarite conspiracy.[15]

[edit] Bagha Jatin

Main articles: German plot and Bagha Jatin
See also: Jugantar
Bagha Jatin, wounded after his final battle at the banks of Burha Balang, off Balasore. His enterprise was deemed one of the most significant threats to British India in autumn 1915
Bagha Jatin, wounded after his final battle at the banks of Burha Balang, off Balasore. His enterprise was deemed one of the most significant threats to British India in autumn 1915

In April 1915, unaware of the failure of the Annie Larsen plan, Papen arranged through Hans Tauscher a second shipment of arms, consisting of 7,300 Springfield rifles, 1,930 pistols, 10 Gatling guns and nearly 3,000,000 cartridges.[49][50] The arms were to be shipped in mid June to Surabaya in the East Indies on the Holland American steamship SS Djember. However, the intelligence network operated by Courtenay Bennett, the Consul General to New York, was able to trace the cargo to Tauscher in New York and passed the information on to the company, thwarting these plans as well.[49] In the meantime, even after the February plot had been scuttled, the plans for an uprising continued in Bengal through the Jugantar cohort under Jatin Mukherjee (Bagha Jatin). German agents in Thailand and Burma, most prominently Emil and Theodor Helferrich, brothers of the German Finance minister Karl Helfferich, established links with Jugantar through Jitendranath Lahiri in March that year. In April, Jatin's chief lieutenant Narendranath Bhattacharya met with the Helfferichs and was informed of the expected arrival of the Maverick with arms. Although these were originally intended for Ghadar use, the Berlin Committee modified the plans, to have arms shipped into India to the eastern coast of India, through Hatia on the Chittagong coast, Raimangal in the Sunderbans and Balasore in Orissa, instead of Karachi as originally decided.[50] From the coast of the Bay of Bengal, these would be collected by Jatin's group. Jatin estimated that he would be able to win over the 14th Rajput Regiment in Calcutta and cut the line to Madras at Balasore and thus take control of Bengal.[50] Jugantar also received funds (estimated to be Rs 33,000 between June and August 1915) from The Helfferich brothers through a fictitious firm in Calcutta.[51] However, it was at this time that the details of the Maverick and Jugantar plans were leaked to Beckett, the British Consul at Batavia, by a defecting Baltic-German agent under the alias "Oren". The Maverick was seized, while in India, police destroyed the underground movement in Calcutta as an unaware Jatin proceeded according to plan to the Bay of Bengal coast in Balasore. He was followed there by Indian police and on 9 September 1915, he and a group of five revolutionaries armed with Mauser pistols made a last stand on the banks of the river Burha Balang. Seriously wounded in a gun battle that lasted seventy five minutes, Jatin died the next day in the town of Balasore.[12][52]

[edit] Southeast Asia

One of the other plans considered was to initiate a rebellion in Burma (which was a part of British India at the time) from Thailand (Siam), which was another strong base for the Ghadarites, and then use Burma as a base for advancing into India.[53][52] This Siam-Burma plan originated early in October 1914 from the Ghadar Party and was finally concluded in January 1915. Ghadarites from branches in China and United States, including leaders like Atma Ram, Thakar Singh, and Banta Singh from Shanghai and Santokh Singh and Bhagwan Singh from San Francisco, attempted to infiltrate Burma Military Police in Thailand, which was composed mostly of Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims. Early in 1915, Atma Ram had also visited Calcutta and Punjab and linked up with the revolutionary underground there, including Jugantar.[22][54] Herambalal Gupta and the German consul at Chicago arranged to have German operatives George Paul Boehm, Henry Schult, and Albert Wehde sent to Siam through Manila with the express purpose of training the Indians. Santokh Singh returned to Shangai tasked to send two expeditions, one to reach the Indian border via Yunnan and the other to penetrate upper Burma and join with revolutionary elements there.[43] The Germans, while in Manila, also attempted to transfer the arms cargo of two German ships, the Sachsen and the Suevia, to Siam in a schooner. seeking refuge at Manila harbour. However, US customs stopped these attempts. In the meantime, with the help of the German Consul to Thailand Remy, the Ghadarite established a training headquarters in the jungles near the Thai-Burma border for Ghadarites arriving from China and Canada. German Consul General at Shanghai, Knipping, sent three officers of the Peking Embassy Guard for training and in addition arranged for a Norwegian agent in Swatow to smuggle arms through.[55] However, the Thai Police high command, which was largely British, discovered these plans and Indian police infiltrated the plot through an Indian secret agent who was revealed the details by the Austrian charge d’affaires. Thailand, although officially neutral, was allied closely with Britain and British India. On July 21, the newly arrived British Minister Herbert Dering presented Foreign Minister Prince Devawongse with the request for arrest and extradition of Ghadarites identified by the Indian agent, ultimately resulting in the arrest of leading Ghadarites in August. Only a single raid into Burma was launched by six Ghadarites, who were captured and later hanged.[55][56][52]

Another plan that was explored was to raid the penal colony in the Andaman islands with a German volunteer force raised from East Indies and release the political prisoners to raise an expeditionary Indian force that would threaten the Indian coast.[51] The plan was proposed by Vincent Kraft a German planter in Batavia who had been wounded fighting in France. It was approved by the foreign office on 14 May 1915, after consultation with the Indian committee, and raid was planned for Christmas Day 1915 by a force of nearly one hundred Germans led by a former naval officer von Müller was raised. Knipping made plans for shipping arms to the Andaman islands. However, Vincent Kraft was a double agent, and leaked details of Knippings plans to British intelligence. His own bogus plans for the raid were in the meantime revealed to Beckett by "Oren", but given the successive failures of the Indo-German plans, the plans for the operations were abandoned on the recommendations of both the Berlin Committee and Knipping.[57]

[edit] Afghanistan and the Middle East

See also: Oskar von Niedermayer and Niedermayer-Hentig Mission
Mahendra Pratap, centre, at the head of the Mission with the German and Turkish delegates in Kabul, 1915. Seated to his right is Werner Otto von Hentig.
Mahendra Pratap, centre, at the head of the Mission with the German and Turkish delegates in Kabul, 1915. Seated to his right is Werner Otto von Hentig.

The Berlin Committee, through Ottoman Turkey, also established contact with Mahmud al Hasan of Tehrek e Reshmi Rumal. This movement, led by the Deobandi Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi and Mahmud al Hasan (principle of the Darul Uloom Deoband), proposed a pan-Islamic insurrection in the tribal belt of India with support from the Aghan Amir, the Ottoman Empire and Imperial Germany. Ubaidullah proceeded to Kabul to establish contact with the Amir of Afghanistan while Mahmud al Hasan proceeded to Hijaz to establish contact with the Turkish Governor, Galib Pasha. At Kabul, Ubaid Ullah decided that the pan-Islamic cause would be best served by focussing on the Indian Freedom Movement.[58] Ubaidullah proposed that the Afghan Amir declare war against Britain. Members of the Tehrek e Reshmi Rumal are known to have been active amongst Muslim troops along with Ghadarite agents in South Asia.[15][59]

Attempts made by the Deobandis of Tehrek e Reshmi Rumal, to organise incursions from the western border of India from Persia, through Baluchistan, to Punjab. Indian prisoners of war from France, Turkey, Germany, and Mesopotamia—especially Basra, Bushehr, and from Kut al Amara—were recruited, raising the Indian Volunteer Corps that fought with Turkish forces in a number of fronts.[60] The Indians were led by Amba Prasad Sufi, who during the war was joined by Kedar Nath Sondhi, Rishikesh Letha and Amin Chaudhry. These Indian troops were involved in the capture of the frontier city of Karman and the detention of the British consul there, and also successfully harassed Percy Sykes' Persian campaign against the Baluchi and Persian tribal chiefs who were aided by the Germans.[61][62] The Aga Khan's brother was killed while fighting the rebels.[63] The rebels successfully harassed British Forces in Sistan in Afghanistan, confining British forces to Karamshir in Baluchistan, and later moving towards Karachi. Some reports indicate they took control of the coastal towns of Gawador and Dawar. The Baluchi chief of Bampur, having declared his independence from British rule, also joined the Ghadarites. It was not before the war in Europe turned for the worse for Turkey and Baghdad was captured by the British forces that the Ghadarite forces, their supply lines starved, were finally dislodged. They retreated to regroup at Shiraz, where they were finally defeated after a bitter fight during the siege of Shiraz. Amba Prasad Sufi was killed in this battle. The Ghadarites carried on guerrilla warfare along with Iranian partisans until 1919.[64][62]

Meanwhile, the Germans sent a diplomatic mission to attempt to rally the Afghan Amir to the Central war effort. The mission was headed by Oskar von Niedermayer and included Werner Otto von Hentig, the German diplomatic representative to Kabul, as well as Barkatullah and other prominent nationalists from the Berlin Committee. Officially headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap, the mission also had representatives the Ottoman Empire, including Kasim Bey (previously resident to Bucharest). The mission established contacts with the tribes of the Indo-Iranian border and encouraged them to strike against British interests.[65][66]

This mission was met by Ubaidullah Sindhi's group at Kabul in December 1915. Along with bringing members of the Indian movement right to India's border, it also brought messages from the Kaiser, Enver Pasha and the displaced Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi, expressing support for Pratap's mission and inviting the Amir to move against India.[67][68] The immediate aim was to rally the Amir against British India and to obtain from the Afghan government a right of free passage.[67][69]

Although the Amir refused to commit for or against the German proposals at the time, it found support amongst the Amir's immediate and close political and religious advisory group, including his brother Nasrullah Khan, his sons Inayatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan, as well as religious leaders and tribesmen.[67] It also found support in one of Afghanistan's most influential newspapers, the Siraj al-Akhbar, whose editor Mahmud Tarzi took Barkatullah as an officiating editor in early 1916. Tarzi published a series of inflammatory articles by Raja Mahendra Pratap, as well as increasingly anti-British and pro-Central articles and propaganda. By May 1916, the tone in the paper was deemed serious enough for the Raj to intercept the copies to India.[67]

By the end of 1916, hopes of the Amir's support were nearly non-existent. Nonetheless, the Provisional Government of India was formed in Kabul December 1916 to emphasise to the Amir the seriousness of intent and purpose of the Germans and the Indians. The government had Raja Mahendra Pratap as President, Barkatullah as Prime Minister, Ubaid al Sindhi as the Minister for India, Maulavi Bashir as War Minister, and Champakaran Pillai as Foreign Minister.[70][71] The provisional Government found support from Enver Pasha, proclaiming Jihad against Britain.[69] It also attempted to obtain support from Tsarist Russia, Republican China, and Japan and after the February Revolution in Russia in 1917, Pratap's government corresponded with the nascent Soviet government. In 1918, Mahendra Pratap met Trotsky in Petrograd before meeting the Kaiser in Berlin, urging both to mobilise against British India.[72] Under pressure from the British, Afghan cooperation was withdrawn and the mission closed down. However, the mission, and its offers and liaisons at the time, had profound impact on the political and social situation in the country, starting a process of political change that ended with the assassination of Habibullah in 1919 and the transfer of power to Nasrullah and subsequently Amanullah, precipitating the Third Anglo-Afghan War that led to Afghan Independence.[72]

[edit] Culmination

See also: Connaught Rangers
Mutiny India 1920. Jalandhar mutiny memorial at Glasnevin cemetery, Dublin.
Mutiny India 1920. Jalandhar mutiny memorial at Glasnevin cemetery, Dublin.

By the end of 1917, divisions had begun appearing between the Ghadar Party in America on the one hand, and the Berlin Committee and the German high command on the other. Reports from German agents working with Ghadarites in Southeast Asia and the United States clearly indicated to the European wing a significant element of disorganisation, as well as unrealism in gauging public mood and support within the Ghadarite organisation. The failure of the February plot, the lack of bases in Southeast Asia following China's participation in the war in 1917, and the problems of supporting a Southeast Asian operation through the sea stemmed the plans significantly. Infiltration by British agents, change in American attitude and stance, and the changing fortunes of the war meant the massive conspiracy for revolution within India never succeeded.[73]

One of the last events linked to the conspiracy derives from the Irish involvement when, on 28 June 1920, units of the Connaught Rangers mutinied at Jullundur in Punjab. The Anglo-Irish War had already begun in Ireland with German support, to which the British government responded with large scale troop deployments. The most infamous of these were the Black and Tans and the Auxiliary Division. The news of atrocities by these units, upon reaching India, was instrumental in triggering a mutiny in the 1st Battalion of the Connaught Rangers. Five men from C Company refused to take orders from their officers, declaring their intent not to serve the King until British forces left Ireland. The Union Flag at Jullundur was replaced by the flag of the Irish Republic.[74] This mutiny was suppressed within three days and the mutineers imprisoned at Dagshai. However, rumours of execution of the prisoners led to the spread of unrests. AtSolan, Private James Daly led about 70 Rangers in mutiny and tried to storm the armoury, which the loyal guard successfully defended. Two mutineers were shot dead while others were taken prisoner. In all, about 400 men joined the mutiny, of whom eighty-eight were court martialled. Fourteen were sentenced to death and the rest given up to 15 years in gaol. A few were acquitted. Thirteen of the men sentenced to die had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. 21-year-old Daly was shot by a firing squad in Dagshai prison on November 2, 1920; he was the last member of British Forces to be executed for mutiny. Daly and John Miranda (who died in prison) were buried at the Dagshai graveyard.[75]

[edit] Counter intelligence

Outlines and nascent ideas of the conspiracy began to be noted and tracked by British intelligence as early as 1911.[76] Incidents like the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy and the Komagata Maru incident had already alerted the CID of the existence of a large-scale network and plans for pan-Indian militant unrest. Measures were taken which focussed on Bengal—the seat of the most intense revolutionary terrorism at the time—and on Punjab, which was uncovered as a strong and militant base in the wake of Komagata Maru.[77][78] Har Dayal's extant group was found to have strong links with Rash Behari Bose, and were "cleaned up" in the wake of the Delhi bomb case.[78]

[edit] In Asia

See also: Charles Tegart, Oren, Vincent Kraft, and Kirpal Singh

At the outbreak of the war, Punjab CID sent teams to Hong Kong to intercept and infiltrate the returning Ghadarites, who often made little efforts to hide their plans and objectives.[77] These teams were successful in uncovering details of the full scale of the conspiracy, as well as discovering Har Dayal's whereabouts. Immigrants returning to India were double checked against a list of revolutionaries.[79]

In Punjab, the CID, although aware of possible plans for unrest, was not successful in infiltrating the conspiracy for the mutiny until February 1915. A dedicated force was formed, headed by the Chief of Punjab CID, and including amongst its members Liaqat Hayat Khan (later head of Punjab CID himself). In February that year, the CID was successful in recruiting the services of one Kirpal Singh to infiltrate the plan. Singh, who had a Ghadarite cousin serving in the 23rd Cavalry, was able to infiltrate the leadership, being assigned to work in his cousin's regiment. Singh was soon under suspicion of being a spy, but was able to pass on the information regarding the date and scale of the uprising to British Indian intelligence.[80] As the date for the mutiny approached, a desperate Rash Behari Bose brought forward the D-day to the evening of 19 February, which was discovered by Kirpal Singh on the very day. No attempts were made by the Ghadarites to restrain him, and he rushed to inform Liaqat Khan of the change of plans. Ordered back to his station to signal when the revolutionaries had assembled, Singh was detained by the would-be mutineers, but managed to make good his escape under the cover of answering the call of nature.[80]

The role of German or Baltic-German double-agents, especially the agent named Oren, was also important in infiltrating and preempting the plans for Autumn rebellions in Bengal in 1915 as well as scuttling Bagha Jatin's plans in winter that year. Another source was the German double agent Vincent Kraft, a planter from Batavia, who passed information about arms shipments from Shanghai to British agents after being captured. Kraft later fled through Mexico to Japan where he was last known to be at the end of the war.[52] Later efforts by Mahendra Pratap's Provisional Government in Kabul were also compromised by Herambalal Gupta after he defected in 1918 and passed on information to Indian intelligence.[66]

[edit] In Europe and the Middle East

See also: John Wallinger and Indian Political Intelligence Office

By the time the war broke out the Indian Political Intelligence Office, headed by John Wallinger, had expanded into Europe. In scale this office was larger than those operated by the British War Office, approaching the European intelligence network of the Secret Service Bureau. This network already had agents in Switzerland against possible German intrigues. After the outbreak of the war Wallinger, under the cover of an officer of the British General Head Quarters, proceeded to France where he operated out of Paris, working with the French Political Police, the Sûreté.[81] Among Wallinger's recruits in the network was Somerset Maugham, who was recruited in 1915 and used his cover as author to visit Geneva while avoiding Swiss interference.[82][83] Among other enterprises, the European intelligence network attempted to eliminate some of the Indian leaders in Europe. A British agent called Donald Gullick was dispatched to assassinate Virendranath Chattopadhaya while the latter was on his way to Geneva to meet Mahendra Pratap to offer Kaiser Wilhelm II's invitation. It is said that Somerset Maugham based a number of his stories on his first-hand experiences, modelling the character of John Ashenden after himself and Chandra Lal after Virendranath. The short story of Giulia Lazzari is a blend of Gullick's attempts to assassinate Virendranath and Mata Hari's story. Winston Churchill reportedly advised Maugham to burn 14 other stories.[84][85]

The Czech revolutionary network in Europe also had a role in the uncovering of Bagha Jatin's plans. The network was in touch with the members in the United States, and may have also been aware of and involved in the uncovering of the earlier plots.[86][87][88] The American network, headed by E.V. Voska, was a counter-espionage network of nearly 80 members who, as Habsburg subjects, were presumed to be German supporters but were involved in spying on German and Austrian diplomats. Voska had began working with Guy Gaunt, who headed Courtenay Bennett's intelligence network, at the outbreak of the war and on learning of the plot from the Czech European network, passed on the information to Gaunt and to Tomáš Masaryk who further passed on the information the American authorities.[89][87]

In the Middle East, British counter-intelligence was directed at preserving the loyalty of the Indian sepoy in the face of Turkish propaganda and the concept of The Caliph's Jihad, while a particularly significant effort was directed at intercepting the Kabul Mission.[90][91]

[edit] In the United States

See also: W.C. Hopkinson

In the United States, the conspiracy was successfully infiltrated by British intelligence through both Irish as well as Indian channels. The activities of Ghadar on the Pacific coast were noted by W. C. Hopkinson, who had grown up in India and spoke fluent Hindi. Initially W.C.H. had been despatched from Calcutta to keep the Indian Police informed about the doings of Taraknath Das. [92] The Home department of the British Indian government had begun the task of actively tracking Indian seditionists on the East Coast as early as 1910. Francis Cunliffe Owen, the officer heading the Home Office agency in New York, had become thoroughly acquainted with George Freeman alias Fitzgerald and Myron Phelps, the famous New York advocate, as members of the Clan-na-Gael. Owens' efforts were successful in thwarting the SS Moraitis plan.[93] The Ghadar Party was incidentally established after Irish Republicans, sensing infiltration, encouraged formation of an exclusively Indian society.[94] Following this, a number of approaches were adopted, including infiltration through a "Native" Indian intelligence officer by the name of Bela Singh who successfully set up a network of agents passing on information to British intelligence, as well as the use of the famous American Pinkerton's detective agency.[95][94] W. C. Hopkinson himself was assassinated in a court in Victoria by a Ghadarite called Mewa Singh in October 1914.[96] An Irish double agent by the name of Charles Lamb is said to have passed on the majority of the information that compromised the Annie Larsen and ultimately helped the construction of the prosecution. An Indian operative, codenamed "C" and described most likely to have been the adventurous Chandra Kanta Chakravarty (later the chief prosecution witness in the trial), also passed on the details of the conspiracy to British and American intelligence.[97]

[edit] Trials

The conspiracy led to a number of trials in India, most famous among them being the Lahore Conspiracy trial, which opened in Lahore in April 1915 in the aftermath of the failed February mutiny. Other trials included the Benares, Simla, Delhi, and Ferozepur conspiracy cases, and the trials of those arrested at Budge Budge.[98] At Lahore, a special tribunal was constituted under the Defence of India Act 1915 and a total of 291 conspirators were put on trial. Of these 42 were awarded the death sentence, 114 transported for life, and 93 awarded varying terms of imprisonment. A number of these were sent to the Cellular Jail in the Andaman. Forty two defendants in the trial were acquitted. The Lahore trial directly linked the plans made in United States and the February mutiny plot. Following the conclusion of the trial, diplomatic effort to destroy the Indian revolutionary movement in the United States and to bring its members to trial increased considerably.[99][100][101]

In the United States, the Hindu German Conspiracy trial commenced in the District Court in San Francisco on November 12, 1917 following the uncovering of the Annie Larsen affair. One hundred and five people participated, including members of the Ghadar Party, the former German Consul-General and Vice-Consul, and other members of staff of the German consulate in San Francisco. The trial itself lasted from November 20, 1917 to April 24, 1918. The last day of the trial was notable for the sensational assassination of the chief accused, Ram Chandra, by a fellow defendant, Ram Singh, in a packed courtroom. Singh himself was immediately shot dead by a US Marshal. In May 1917, eight Indian Nationalists of the Ghadar Party were indicted by a federal grand jury on a charge of conspiracy to form a military enterprise against Britain. In later years the proceedings were criticised as being a largely show trial designed to preempt any suggestions that the United States was joining an Imperialist war.[11] The jury during the trial was carefully selected to exclude any Irish person with republican views or associations.[102] Strong public support in favour of the Indians, especially the revived Anglo-phobic sentiments following the colonial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, allowed the Ghadarite movement to revive despite British concerns.[103]

[edit] Impact

The conspiracy had a significant impact on Britain's policies, both within the empire and in international relations.[9][104][3][105][106][107] The outlines and plans for the nascent ideas of the conspiracy were noted and tracked by British intelligence as early as 1911.[76] Alarmed at the agile organisation, which repeatedly reformed in different parts of the country despite being subdued in others, the chief of Indian Intelligence Sir Charles Cleveland was forced to warn that the idea and attempts at pan-Indian revolutions were spreading through India "like some hidden fire".[76][108] A massive, concerted, and coordinated effort was required to subdue the movement. Attempts were made in 1914 to prevent the naturalisation of Tarak Nath Das as an American citizen, while successful pressure was applied to have Har Dayal interned.[109]

[edit] Political impact

See also: Defence of India act 1915

The conspiracy, judged by the British Indian Government's own evaluation at the time, and those of a number of contemporary and modern historians, was an important event in the Indian independence movement and was one of the significant threats faced by the Raj in the second decade of the 20th century.[110][111]

In the scenario of the British war effort and the threat from the militant movement in India, it was a major factor for the passage of the Defence of India Act of 1915. Among the strongest proponents of the act was Michael O'Dwyer, then the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, and this was largely due to the Ghadarite movement.[112] It was also a factor that guided British political concessions as well as Whitehall's India Policy during and after World War I, including the passage of Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms which initiated the first round of political reform in the Indian subcontinent in 1917.[107][106][105] The events of the conspiracy during World War I, the presence of Pratap's Kabul mission in Afghanistan and its possible links to Bolshevik Russia, as well as a still active revolutionary movement especially in Punjab and Bengal (as well as worsening civil unrest throughout India) led to the appointment of a Sedition committee in 1918 chaired by Sydney Rowlatt, an English judge. It was tasked to evaluate German and Bolshevik links to the militant movement in India, especially in Punjab and Bengal. On the recommendations of the committee, the Rowlatt Act, an extension of the Defence of India act of 1915, was enforced in India.[113][114][115][112].

The events that followed the passage of the Rowlatt Act in 1919 were also influenced by the conspiracy. At the time, British Indian Army troops were returning from the battlefields of Europe and Mesopotamia to an economic depression in India.[116][117] The attempts of mutiny in 1915 and the Lahore conspiracy trials were still in public attention. News of young Mohajirs who fought on behalf of the Turkish Caliphate and later fought in the ranks of the Red Army during the Russian Civil War was also beginning to reach India. The Russian Revolution had also cast its long shadow into India.[118] It was at this time that Gandhi, until then relatively unknown in the Indian political scene, began emerging as a mass leader.

Ominously, in 1919, the third Anglo-Afghan war began in the wake of Amir Habibullah's assassination and institution of Amanullah in a system blatantly influenced by the Kabul mission. In addition, in India, Gandhi's call for protest against the Rowlatt act achieved an unprecedented response of furious unrest and protests. The situation especially in Punjab was deteriorating rapidly, with disruptions of rail, telegraph and communication systems. The movement was at its peak before the end of the first week of April, with some recording that "practically the whole of Lahore was on the streets, the immense crowd that passed through Anarkali was estimated to be around 20,000."[117] In Amritsar, over 5,000 people gathered at Jallianwala Bagh. This situation deteriorated perceptibly over the next few days. Michael O'Dwyer is said to have been of the firm belief that these were the early and ill-concealed signs of a conspiracy for a coordinated uprising around May, on the lines of the 1857 revolt, at a time when British troops would have withdrawn to the hills for the summer. The Amritsar massacre, as well as responses preceding and succeeding it, contrary to being an isolated incident, was the end result of a concerted plan of response from the Punjab administration to suppress such a conspiracy.[119] James Houssemayne Du Boulay is said to have ascribed a direct relationship between the fear of a Ghadarite uprising in the midst of an increasingly tensed situation in Punjab, and the British response that ended in the massacre.[120]

Lastly, British efforts to downplay and disguise the nature and impact of the revolutionary movement at this time also resulted in a policy designed to strengthen the moderatist movement in India, which ultimately saw Gandhi's rise in the Indian movement.[4]

[edit] International relations

See also: Anglo-American relations and Anglo-Japanese relations

The conspiracy influenced a number of aspects of Great Britain's international relations, most of all Anglo-American relations during the war, as well as, to some extent, Anglo-Chinese relations. After the war, it was one of the issues that influenced Anglo-Japanese relations.

At the start of the war, the American government's refusal to check the Indian seditionist movement was a major concern for the British government. By 1916, a majority of the resources of the American department of the British Foreign Office were related to the Indian seditionist movement. Before the outbreak of the war, the political commitments of the Wilson Government, (especially of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan who had eight years previously had authored a highly critical pamphlet called the "British rule in India" classified as seditionist by the Indian and Imperial governments), and the political fallouts of the perception of persecution of oppressed people by Britain prevented the then ambassador Cecil-Spring Rice from pressing the issue diplomatically.[50][121][122] After Robert Lansing replaced Bryan as Secretary of State in 1916, Secretary of State for India Marquess of Crewe and Foreign Secretary Edward Grey forced Spring-Rice to raise the issue and the evidences obtained in Lahore Conspiracy trial were presented to the American Government in February. The first investigations were opened in America at this time with the raid of the Wall Street office of Wolf von Igel, resulting in seizures of papers that were later presented as evidence in the Hindu German conspiracy trial.[122] However, a perceptibly slow and reluctant American investigation triggered an intense neutrality dispute through 1916, aggravated by belligerent preventive measures of the British far-eastern fleet on the high seas that threatened the sovereignty of American vessels. Seizure of German and Turkish passengers from the American vessel China by the 'HMS Laurentic at the mouth of the Yangtze River, followed by a number of incidents including the SS Henry S, which were defended by the British government on grounds that the seized ship planned to foment an armed uprising in India, drew strong responses from the US government, prompting the U. S. Atlantic Fleet to dispatch Destroyers to the Pacific to protect the sovereignty of American vessels. Authorities in the Philippines were more cooperative, which assured Britain of knowledge of any plans against Hong Kong. The strained relations were relaxed in May 1916 when the Britain released the China prisoners and released relaxed its aggressive policy seeking cooperation with the United States. However, diplomatic exchanges and relations did not improve before November that year.[123][121][122]

The conspiracy issue was ultimately addressed by William G. E. Wiseman, head of British intelligence in the United States, when he passed details of a bomb plot directly to the New York Police bypassing diplomatic channels. This led to the arrest of Chandra Kanta Chuckrevarty. As the links between Chuckervarty's papers and the Igel papers became apparent, investigations by federal authorities expanded to cover the entire conspiracy. Ultimately, the United States agreed to forward evidence so long as Britain did not seek admission of liability for breaches of neutrality. At a time that diplomatic relations with Germany were deteriorating, the British Foreign Office directed its Embassy to cooperate with the investigations resolving the Anglo-American diplomatic disputes just as the United States entered the war.[124][122][125][122]

Through 1915-16, China (along with Indonesia) formed one of the major bases for the conspirators, and significant efforts were made by the British government to coax China into the war to attempt to control the German and Ghadar intrigues. This would also allow free purchase of arms from China for the Entente powers.[52] However, Yuan's proposals for bringing China into the war were against Japanese interests and gains from the war. This along with Japanese support for Sun Yat Sen and rebels in southern China laid the foundations for deterioration of Anglo-Japanese relations as early as 1916.[126] After the end of the Great War, Japan increasingly became a haven for radical Indian nationalists in exile, who were protected by patriotic Japanese societies. Notable among these were Rash Behari Bose, Tarak Nath Das, and A M Sahay. The protections offered to these nationalists, most notably by Toyama Mitsuru's Black Dragon Society,[127][128] effectively prevented British efforts to repatriate them and became a major policy concern.[129][130]

[edit] Ghadar Party and IIC

The IIC was formally disbanded in November 1918, with most of its members becoming closely associated with Communism and the Soviet Union.[131] Bhupendranath Dutta and Virendranath Chattopadhyay alias Chatto arrived in Moscow in 1920. Narendranath Bhattacharya, under a new identity of M.N. Roy, was among the first Indian communists and made a memorable speech in the second congress of the Communist International that rejected Leninist views and foreshadowed Maoist peasant movements.[115] Chatto himself was in Berlin until 1932 as the general secretary of the League Against Imperialism and was able to convince Nehru to affiliate the Indian National Congress with the league in 1927. He later fled Nazi Germany for Soviet Russia but disappeared in 1937 under Stalin's Great Purge.[132]

The Ghadar Party, suppressed during the war, revived itself in 1920 and openly declared its communist beliefs. Although sidelined in California, it remained relatively stronger in East Asia, where it allied itself with the Chinese Communist Party.[8][132]

[edit] World War II

Although the conspiracy failed during World War I and the movement was suppressed at the time with a number of its key leaders hanged or incarcerated, a number of prominent Ghadarites also managed to flee India to Japan and Thailand. The concept of a revolutionary movement for independence also found a revival amongst later generation Indian leaders, most notably Subhas Chandra Bose who, towards the mid-1930s, began calling for a more radical approach towards colonial domination. During World War II, a number of these leaders were instrumental in seeking Axis support to revive such a concept.[133][134] Bose himself, from the very beginning of World War II, actively evaluated the concept of revolutionary movement against the Raj, interacting with Japan and subsequently escaping to Germany to raise an Indian armed force, the Indische Legion, to fight in India against Britain.[135] He would later return to Southeast Asia to take charge of the Indian National Army which was formed following the labour of exiled nationalists, efforts from within Japan to revive a similar concept, and the direction and leadership of people like Mohan Singh, Giani Pritam Singh, and Rash Behari Bose. The most famous of these saw the formation of the Indian Independence League , the Indian National Army and ultimately the Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind in Southeast Asia.[136][137]

See also: Indische Legion

[edit] Commemoration

The 1915 Singapore Mutiny memorial tablet at the entrance of the Victoria Memorial Hall, Singapore
The 1915 Singapore Mutiny memorial tablet at the entrance of the Victoria Memorial Hall, Singapore

The Ghadar Memorial Hall in San Francisco honours members of the party who were hanged following the Lahore conspiracy trial,[138] and the Ghadar Party Memorial Hall in Jalandhar, Punjab commemorates the Ghadarites who were involved in the conspiracy. A number of those executed during the conspiracy are today honoured in India. Kartar Singh is honoured with a memorial at his birthplace of the Village of Sarabha. The Ayurvedic Medicine College in Ludhiana is also named in his honour.[139] The Indian government has produced stamps honouring a number of those involved in the conspiracy, including Har Dayal, Bhai Paramanand, and Rash Behari Bose.[140] A number of other revolutionaries are also honoured through India and the Indian American population. A memorial plaque commemorating the Komagata Maru was unveiled by Jawaharlal Nehru at Budge Budge in Calcutta in 1954, while a second plaque was unveiled in 1984 at Gateway Pacific, Vancouver by the Canadian government. The ship itself is today maintained by the Komagata Maru heritage foundation.[141] In Singapore, two memorial tablets at the entrance of the Victoria Memorial Hall and four plaques in St Andrew's Cathedral commemorate the British soldiers and civilians killed during the Singapore Mutiny.[142] In Ireland, a memorial at the Glasnevin Cemetery in Dublin commemorates the dead from the Jalandhar mutiny of the Connaught Rangers.[143] The Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University today runs the Taraknath Das foundation to support work relating to India.[144] Famous awardees include R K Narayan, Robert Goheen, Philip Talbot, Anita Desai and SAKHI and Joseph Elder.

[edit] Note on the name

The conspiracy is known under a number of different names, including the Hindu Conspiracy, the Indo-German Conspiracy, the Ghadar conspiracy (or Ghadr conspiracy), or the German plot.[145][146][147][148][149] The term Hindu-German Conspiracy is closely associated with the uncovering of the Annie Larsen plot in the United States, and the ensuing trial of Indian Nationalists and the staff of the German Consulate of San Francisco for violating American neutrality. The trial itself was called the Hindu-German Conspiracy trial, and the Conspiracy was reported in the media (and later studied by a number of historians) as Hindu-German Conspiracy.[102] However, the Conspiracy involved not only Hindus and Germans, but also substantial numbers of Muslims and Punjabi Sikhs as well, along with strong Irish support that pre-dated German and Turkish involvement. The term Hindu was used commonly in opprobrium in America to identify Indians regardless of religion. Likewise, conspiracy was also a negative term. The term Hindu Conspiracy was used by the government to actively discredit the Indian revolutionaries.[102][150][151]

The term Ghadar Conspiracy may refer more specifically to the mutiny planned for February 1915 in India, while the term German plot may refer more specifically to the plans for shipping arms to Jatin Mukherjee in Autumn 1915. The term Indo-German conspiracy is also commonly used to refer to later plans in Southeast Asia and to the mission to Kabul which remained the remnant of the conspiracy at the end of the war. All of these were parts of the larger conspiracy. Most scholars reviewing the American aspect use the name Hindu-German Conspiracy, the Hindu-Conspiracy or the Ghadar Conspiracy, while most reviewing the conspiracy over its entire span from Southeast Asia through Europe to the United States more often use the term Indo-German conspiracy.[149][152]


[edit] Notes and references

Notes
  1. ^ a b c d e f Plowman 2003, p. 84
  2. ^ a b c d Hoover 1985, p. 252
  3. ^ a b Brown 1948, p. 300
  4. ^ a b Popplewell 1995, p. 4
  5. ^ a b c Champak-Chatto" And the Berlin Committee. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. Retrieved on 2007-11-04.
  6. ^ a b Strachan 2001, p. 794
  7. ^ a b c d Strachan 2001, p. 795
  8. ^ a b Deepak 1999, p. 441
  9. ^ a b c Sarkar 1983, p. 146
  10. ^ Deepak 1999, p. 439
  11. ^ a b c Fraser 1977, p. 257
  12. ^ a b c d e f g Gupta 1997, p. 12
  13. ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 201
  14. ^ Terrorism in Bengal, Compiled and Edited by A.K. Samanta, Government of West Bengal, 1995, Vol. II, p625.
  15. ^ a b c Qureshi 1999, p. 78
  16. ^ Plowman 2003, p. 82
  17. ^ a b c Hoover 1985, p. 251
  18. ^ Strachan 2001, p. 798
  19. ^ a b c d Gupta 1997, p. 11
  20. ^ Puri 1980, p. 60
  21. ^ Strachan 2001, p. 793
  22. ^ a b c Deepak 1999, p. 442
  23. ^ a b c d Strachan 2001, p. 796
  24. ^ Ward 2002, p. 79-96
  25. ^ a b Sarkar 1983, p. 148
  26. ^ a b Brown 1948, p. 303
  27. ^ Plowman 2003, p. 87
  28. ^ a b Brown 1948, p. 301
  29. ^ Brown 1948, p. 301
  30. ^ Popplewell 1995, p. 276
  31. ^ a b Brown 1948, p. 306
  32. ^ Brown 1948, p. 307
  33. ^ a b Fraser 1977, p. 261
  34. ^ Plowman 2003, p. 90
  35. ^ a b c Gupta 1997, p. 3
  36. ^ Hoover 1985, p. 255
  37. ^ a b Hoover 1985, p. 256
  38. ^ Brown 1948, p. 304
  39. ^ Stafford, D. Men of Secrets. Roosevelt and Churchill.. New York Times. Retrieved on 2007-10-24.
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