Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin

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The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is the larger of two factions of Afghanistan's Hezbi Islami Party, the other being headed by Mulavi Younas Khalis who split with Hekmatyar and established his own Hezbi Islami in 1979. It is known as the Khalis faction, and its powerbase is in Nangarhar.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is head of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, or HIG, which is considered a terrorist organization by Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

The original Hezb-e-Islami was founded in 1977 by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Contents

[edit] History

During the Soviet War in Afghanistan, Hekmatyar and his party operated near the Pakistani border against Soviet Communists. Areas such as Kunar, Laghman, Jalalabad, and Paktia were Hezb-e Islami's strongholds. The party is highly centralized under Hekmatyar's command and until 1994 had close relations with Pakistan, from which it received as much $600 million in U.S. aid money to fight the war with the Soviets. Despite its ample funding, it has been described as having

the dubious distinction of never winning a significant battle during the war, training a variety of militant Islamists from around the world, killing significant numbers of mujahideen from other parties, and taking a virulently anti-Western line. In addition to hundreds of millions of dollars of American aid, Hekmatyar also received the lion's share of aid from the Saudis. [1]

Frustrated by the enormously destructive warlord feuding in Afghanistan, including the Hebi Islami shelling of Kabul in April 1992, Pakistan abandoned HIG for the Taliban in 1994. HIG was expelled from Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996 and many of its local commanders joined the Taliban "both out of ideological sympathy and for reason of tribal solidarity." [2] In Pakistan Hezb-e-Islami training camps "were taken over by the Taliban and handed over" to Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). [3]

Hekmatyar opposed the 2001 American attack on the Taliban and continues to fight the American-supported Karzai government. Prior to Afghanistan's 2004 elections 150 members of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin party were reported to have defected to Hamid Karzai's administration.[4]

The HIG has previously had operations in Pakistan, and is now said to have allied with Mullah Omar and the remnant Taliban. One recent report estimated that HIG and the Taliban now command a comparable number of fighters.[citation needed] The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism reports that having lost Saudi support when it supported Saddam Hussein and Pakistani support after 1994, "the remainder of Hizb-i Islmi merged into al-Qaeda and the Taliban."[5] Radio Free Europe reports that "in 2006, Hekmatyar appeared in a video aired on the Arabic language Al-Jazeera television station and declared he wanted his forces to fight alongside Al-Qaeda." [6]

According to Le Monde newspaper it is currently active around Mazari Sharif and Jalalabad[7].

[edit] Selected explanations of the relation between Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Guantanamo captives

Originally the Bush Presidency asserted it was not obliged to let any captives apprehended in Afghanistan know why they were being held, or to provide a venue where they could challenge the allegations against them. However, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Rasul v. Bush required the institution of a review. The Supreme Court recommended the reviews be modeled after the Army Regulation 190-8 Tribunals that were ordinarily used to determine whether captives were innocent civilians who should be released, lawful combatants entitled to Prisoner of War status, or war criminals who could be tried, and who weren't protected by all the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

The Department of Defense set up the Office for the Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants (OARDEC). OARDEC administered an initial Combatant Status Review Tribunal for the 558 Guantanamo captives who were still in the detention camp as of August 2004. Unlike the AR 190-8 Tribunals, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were not authorized to determine whether captives were entitled to POW status, only whether they were "enemy combatants. OARDEC also administered annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Boards were only authorized to make a recommendation as to whether captives might represent an ongoing threat, or might continue to hold intelligence value, and therefore should continue to be held in US custody.

Close to 10,000 pages of documents from the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Board hearings were released after contested Freedom of Information Act requests.

Dozens of captives faced allegations that they had been associated with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. Some of the documents just alleged that a captive was associated with Hezb-e-Islami, without explaining why this implied they were an "enemy combatant". Other documents did provide brief explanations as how an association with Hezb-e-Islami implied a captive was an "enemy combatant". Neither Hezb-e-Islami nor Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin are on the U.S. State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and they never have been;[8] neither are they on the additional list called "Groups of Concern."[9]

  • Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded HIG as a faction of the Hizb-Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahadin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan government, and establish a fundamentalist state.[14]
  • Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Bin Laden. Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Admininstration (Afghan Transitional Administration) [sic] , and establish a fundamentalist state.[15]
  • The Secretary of State has identified the HIG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar [sic] founded HIG as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977 and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama bin Ladin. HIG has stages small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghanistan government, and establish a fundamentalist state.[16]
  • Gulbuddin Hekmatyar founded Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin [sic] as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin [sic] [sic] party in 1977, and that it was one of the major Mujadhedin [sic] groups in the war against the Soviets; that the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama Bin Ladin; that Hexb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attmpt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghanistan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.[17]
  • The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin [sic] (HIG) is a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party and was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Bin Laden. In [sic] early 1990s, the HIG ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. The HIG offered to shelter Bin Laden after he hfled Sudan in 1996.[18]
  • Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.[19][20][21]
  • HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

[22]
  • Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin [sic] (HIG) has been designated by the United States as a terrorist organization.[23]
  • "Hezb-E-Islam/Gulbuddin (HIG) members recruited young and impressionable radical men from the Shamshatoo Refugee camp to train at camps focusing on advanced training including remote controlled Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and electronics.[28]"
  • "Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long established ties with Usama Bin Ladin. (HIG) founder Gulbuddin Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) and establish a fundamentalist state.[29]
  • "The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin [sic] are designated terrorist organizations. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin ran terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. They have staged attacks in an attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.[30]"
  • "In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflcts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.[13][31]"
  • Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG was known to have several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was the pioneer in sending mercenary fighter [sic] to other Islamic conflicts. The founder of HIG was known to have shelteed Usama Bin Laden after he fled the Sudan. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.[32][33]
  • Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long established ties with Usama bin Laden. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded HIG. Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fightters to other Islamic fighting conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after he later fled Sudan in 1996.[34]
  • The Hezb-E-Islami [sic] organization is a terrorist organization with long-established ties to Bin Laden.[35]
  • The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin [sic] (HIG) has been identified as an organization which sponsor terrorism.[38]
  • HIG has been designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. [22]
  • Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin is a known terrorist organization that has long established ties to al Qaida.[43]
  • The HIG is an active terrorist organization in Afghanistan with long established ties to Usama Bin Laden.[44]
  • The Taliban military commander is associated with Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin [sic] (HIG). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, [[Terrorist Organization Reference Guide, states that HIG has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden [sic] and has staged attacks in attempts to force United States troop withdrawal from Afghanistan..[46]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ Bergen, Peter L., Holy war, Inc. : inside the secret world of Osama bin Laden, New York : Free Press, c2001., p.69
  2. ^ The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism, Olivier Roy, Antoine Sfeir, editors, (2007), p.133
  3. ^ Rashid, Taliban, (2000), p.92
  4. ^ Commanders Line Up Behind Karzai. Institute for War & Peace Reporting (September 14, 2004). Retrieved on January 15, 2007.
  5. ^ The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism, Olivier Roy, Antoine Sfeir, editors, (2007), p.133
  6. ^ Afghanistan: Skeptics Urge Caution Over Purported Hekmatyar Cease-Fire July 19, 2007
  7. ^ Le Monde.fr : Les zones d'influence talibanes en Afghanistan
  8. ^ "2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations", "Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations List" October 23, 2002, "Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organizations List" January 30, 2003, "Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations Table" December 30, 2004, "Fact Sheet:Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)" October 11, 2005, "Country Reports on Terrorism: Chapter 8 -- Foreign Terrorist Organizations" April 28, 2006
  9. ^ "U.S. Designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations: List includes 42 groups, 43 others deemed “of concern”" April 30, 2007
  10. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdullah Mujahid's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 206
  11. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Haji Hamidullah's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 242
  12. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Alif Mohammed's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 113-122
  13. ^ a b Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Adel Hassan Hamad's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 244
  14. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mahbub Rahman's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 90
  15. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Juma Din's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 261
  16. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Taj Mohammed's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 142
  17. ^ a b Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Quasam's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 23-29
  18. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Akhtar Mohammed's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 46-53
  19. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Nasrullah's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 1
  20. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdul Zahor's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 322-335
  21. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdul Ghaffar's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 13-25 - August 2005
  22. ^ a b Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Jumma Jan Administrative Review Board - page 105-107 - April 4, 2005
  23. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Jumma Jan's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 41-52
  24. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf) from Sharbat's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 36-40
  25. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Taj Mohammed's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - November 12, 2004 - page 64
  26. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdul Zahor's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 1-6
  27. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammad Gul's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - - mirror - pages 1-12
  28. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from Sharifullah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 79-97
  29. ^ " Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdul Majid Muhammed's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 90-97
  30. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Lufti Bin Swei Lagha Administrative Review Board - page 45
  31. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Nazargul Chaman's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 51-63 - September 2005
  32. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Nasim's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 54
  33. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Sabar Lal Melma's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 248 - August 10, 2005
  34. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Haji Nasrat Khan's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 257-265
  35. ^ Summary of Evidence (.pdf), from Mohamed Jawad's Combatant Status Review Tribunal October 19, 2004 - page 149
  36. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Juma Din's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 38-44
  37. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Akhtiar Mohammad'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 43-52
  38. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Faiz Ullah's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 15, 2004 - page 89
  39. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Faiz Ullah's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 174
  40. ^ Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Rahmatullah Sangaryar's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 19, 2004 - page 60
  41. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Hamidullah'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 89-101
  42. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Mussa Yakubi's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 298-314
  43. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Mustafa Sohail's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 24-34
  44. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Haji Nasrat Khan'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 17-25
  45. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Abdul Razak's Administrative Review Board hearing - December 16, 2005 - page 64
  46. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Gholam Ruhani Administrative Review Board, May 2, 2005 - page 54
v • d • e
Alleged Afghan Training Camps
Kandahar
Kabul
Jalalabad
Khost
Jihad Wahl (1996-?) | Al Sadeeq | Khalden (198x-2000)
Takhar
Murad Beek
Unsorted locations