Talk:Henry L. Stimson

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Contents

[edit] the quote

Stimpson's oft-quoted "gentlemen" line may have been driven by budgetary constraints; as well, the Army was then establishing Signals Intelligence Service (noted in Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups, 1999 & 2004) under Friedman, who was unquestionably the most brilliant cryptanalyst of his generation, & the perceived need for MI-8 may have diminished. Or we may conclude Stimpson was less scrupulous than he pretended. Trekphiler 00:15, 12 December 2005 (UTC)


FURTHER TO THE ABOVE:

From reading multiple sources, long ago, my understanding is as follows. Sec. Stimpson made a walking tour of the Cryptology section, overseen by Herbert O. Yardley. Yardley was anxious to please and impress his sour-pussed visitor. He mentioned proudly the names of various nations whose code had been cracked, but this got no reaction from Stimson, verbal or nonverbal. Finally Yardley said: "Of course, we can read all VATICAN traffic." It was at this point that Stimson spun on his heel and walked out. The quote was not, I believe, spoken to Yardley and his staff but included in the written document that dissolved MI-8 one or two days later.

What history overlooks here is this. Cryptology is like a game with offense and defense. Each nation engages Both Ways in a contest with each other nation. If the Vatican had coders and decoders for their own traffic, it is a fair guess that some effort went into decoding traffic of Others, particularly codes of the Italian government. It is hardly imaginable to me that if Herbert O. Yardley had sailed for Rome in 1930 and asked if there might be a job for him in the Vatican, that he would have been turned down because Pope Pius XI felt that gentlemen did not read other gentlemen's mail. A companion quote is "spying is the world's second oldest profession". Cryptology serves motivations and needs of those deliberately engaged in world power contests. It is not necessary to encode data such as genuflections per month or soap consumption to launder cassocks.

Trylon 13:41, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

Where is the source of this famous quote? According to some sources, it wasn't written or said in 1929, but was a justification written in 1948 of closing down MI-8. Hexmaster, 213.66.100.72 21:32, 12 July 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Vetoing of Kyoto for atomic bomb

I'm slightly surprised by the following statement:

"They honeymooned in the Japanese city of Kyoto, which such made an impression on him that in 1945 it led him to veto the dropping of an atomic bomb on the city, which was one of the four shortlisted targets."

Is this really how such major decisions are made? This same assertion was made in the Notes & Queries section of The Guardian yesterday (by one Tomo Katagiri of Edinburgh) and I came here to check it out.

In the external links section is a link to a selection of Stimson's diary and papers relating to the bomb selected and annotated by Doug Long. Section 8 includes the following, referring to a discussion with President Truman (notes by Doug Long in square brackets):

"We had a few words more about the S-1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets [Kyoto]. He again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act [a-bombing Kyoto, Japan's cultural center] might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria [which Russia was about to invade, as part of the Yalta Conference agreement with the U.S. and Great Britain]."

Could we perhaps have some source for the honeymoon theory. If there is any basis for thinking it was a factor in Stimson's decision then it should be included. --Spondoolicks 14:54, 19 January 2006 (UTC)

Stimson had been in Kyoto three times in the 1920s on official visits to Japan. (They still take VIP's there), and he never mentioned the honeymoon story. Stimson had very solid reasons for removing Kyoto -- and as a former Secreatry of State he knew all about diplomacy. Rjensen 17:27, 19 January 2006 (UTC)
The "Honeymoon" theory is supported by a quote in the Edwin O. Reischauer article. studerby 14:02, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Morgenthau-Plan

And his protest against the Morgenthau Plan ??? --172.178.219.147 08:52, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

what's your suggestion? Rjensen 09:00, 25 February 2006 (UTC)


First:Please excuse my bad English. My suggestion is :In 1944 Stimson called the Morgenthau plan "a crime against civilization". (As Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden did.) [1]

--172.178.219.147 14:32, 25 February 2006 (UTC)

[edit] "Getting Japan to fire the first shot"

Pearl harbor conspiracy theorists are fond of making much of Stimson's diary entries in the months prior to December 7th.

  • October 16 entry:
""We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move - overt move."
  • November 25, 1941 diary entry:
"The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot...."
  • Source:Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries [microfilm edition] (New Haven: Yale University Library,

1973), entry for October 16, 1941. as cited in [2]


UNlike the conspiracy theorists, the author of the Princeton book honestly points out, the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. You look at a particular straw in the wind and it proves nothing, but as you gather evidence, each brushstroke is added and gradually a larger picture takes shape. Personally I have no conclusion about what the American leadership were thinking. They clearly were aware of Japanese intentions and their past propensity for "surprize attacks". There were some random orders that suggest there were attempts to engineer incidents- though much smaller in scale than the Pearl Harbor attack.


WP does not have the space to list such voluminous "brushstrokes". Nonetheless, the particular facts need to be reported, and my inclination is to include them without interpretation or conclusions drawn.

What the leadership was thinking is enormously important historically, so something really should be said concerning some of the more notable Stimson diary entries.

How does that sound to folks? -Mak 16:50, 7 September 2006 (UTC)

we can report that Stimson was determined NOT to fire the first shot. Rjensen 17:05, 7 September 2006 (UTC)
The evidence is not at all conclusive on that score either. Perhaps we just report the controversy and include some of the quotes. In both these cases, Stimson was focused on how to get Japan to make a particular move, not on what actions the US should avoid taking. One does not necessarily imply the other. -Mak 02:04, 8 September 2006 (UTC)
Well no: to have Japan fire the first shot certainly means the US (and allies) does not fire the first shot. This was Stimson's warning to US Army & Air Force to not shoot first. Rjensen 23:28, 10 September 2006 (UTC)
You are making a different point, one that very well may be accurate, but one that is not especially surprizing or of much interest. If it is an important point to make about Stimson, relying on such indirection only invites questions. Surely if Stimson was so "determined" as you assert, the historian would be looking for the explicitly recorded instructions to the military leaders or some scribble of them in his diary.
Contrast Stimson's sentiments with those of Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. There is much more to be said than the fact that JFK didn't want the US firing the first shot. He also doesn't want the Kruschev to miscalculate and fire the first shot either. Is that where Stimson's mind is? Hardly. No such sentiment is expressed in the Stimson passages. It is easy to read these two passages and form the impression that the US was instead focussed on setting the most politically favorable conditions under which the war would begin. Certainly, I think it is not difficult to form the conclusion that it would have been foolish of the US leadership to expect that war with the Japanese could be avoided, and the only thing she really could hope to control was what Stimson was directing his attention to in these passages. -Mak 01:48, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

Did he do nothing of note between Pearl Harbour and Nagasaki?Andycjp 08:02, 19 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] The Morgenthau Plan

Mr Rjensen, the text you inserted some months back that Stimson halted the Morgenthau plan smells very much like unsubstantiated POV to me. And your refusal to include my sentence that makes it less misleading to the reader is certainly POV, i.e. that although the plan was not formaly implemented it did influence policy. Now, you obviously have much spare time, so I wonder if you would oblige me by reading maybe 30 pages from a book available online.

The sections:

  • 1 Section: by Richard Dominic Wiggers, The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II pp. 274 - 288

and

  • 2 Section by CHARLES M. BARBER, The Isolationist as Interventionist: Senator William Langer on the Subject of Ethnic Cleansing, March 29, l946 pp.244 -

This might also be beneficial to take a peek at. *The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, by Ray Salvatore Jennings May 2003, Peaceworks No. 49, United States Institute of Peace

Or you could bother to read the suggested reading in the Morgenthau plan article.

--Stor stark7 Talk 21:02, 17 September 2006 (UTC)

neither of your sources mentions Stimson, so I don't think they add to this bio of Stimson. Now you try some reading: say [3].—The preceding unsigned comment was added by Rjensen (talk • contribs) .

Mr Rjensen, please stop weasling! You know very well what my beef with you is about, so don’t try to sidestep the issue.

You had written “Stimson thus retained overall control of the U.S. occupation zone in Germany, and the Morgenthau plan never went into effect.”

The last part of that sentence misleads the reader to think that this is the end all of the subject!

My addition of the sentence “It did however end up influencing U.S. policy in the early occupation years.” was promptly deleted by you with some weak excuse relating to Eisenhower.

You then proceed to sidestep my suggestion that you read some literature that deals with the policies that were in fact effected in Germany (Such as JCS 1067 which had it‘s origin in the Morgenthau Plan) and their origins, by referring to the fact that that they don’t mention Stimpson. Mr Jensen, please don’t lie. Ray Salvatore Jennings report does indeed mention Stimson!

You then have the gall to suggest that I read a book that you obviously have not read yourself!

Let me quote from the book in question (paperback issue) to you:

Page 233. Refering to Truman’s signing of the governing directive to the U.S. occupation forces in Germany, the JCS 1067/8 on May 10, 1945: ..Morgenthau told his staff that Truman’s endorsement was a “big day for the treasury”. He just hoped that “somebody doesn’t recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan.” He wrote to his sons that the directive to Eisenhower was plenty tough, and if carried out at all in the spirit in which it is conceived, I don’t see how Germany can rise to make war again for at least another fifty years.”

Page 270. On August 9, 1945, at a meeting between Stimson and Eisenhower and Clay discussing the JCS 1067/8 “He [Stimson] warned that “no matter how vindictive” Americans felt now, unless Clay restored “an economic life” to the Germans, he would be “repudiated by the very people who gave you these instructions.” Stimson adviced Clay, “Sure, you’ve got to live with 1067.” But they mustn’t “let this country starve to death.”.

Lets turn to another source, one of which I listed above in my first post. Ray Salvatore Jennings report: A few snippets from what it has to say of the JCS 1067, (there is lots more) :

  • “The directive grew out of what came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan, named after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who advocated strict rules to punish and pacify the Germans under the premise of collective guilt and to ensure that the nation would never again remilitarize to threaten Europe or the United States.”
  • Michael Beschloss’s book The Conquerors describes how Clay was constrained in carrying out his mission by Washington’s micromanagement and by JCS 1067, the blueprint for U.S. occupation that limited the kinds of assistance available to postwar Germany. This directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was punitive and restrictive,
  • Clay was able to use his expertise to restore public utilities, clear roads, and move rations and supplies to prevent starvation and disease, but he was prohibited from providing economic or reconstruction assistance of any kind.2
  • During the winter of 1945–46, Clay grew increasingly concerned about the growing influence of the Soviets.“There is no choice,” Clay often repeated,“between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. ”Clay exploited a loophole in JCS 1067 to increase daily humanitarian rations to 1,500 calories per day.He warned Washington that without additional assistance, growing food shortages and economic misery would pave the way to a communist Germany. Clay’s appeal, economic stagnation in Europe, and sluggish recovery on the Continent prompted Washington to reevaluate the punitive style of the first months of occupation and to reconsider doubts over whether Germans were able to meaningfully participate in the management of their own affairs.9
  • By the summer of 1947, Marshall had successfully made the argument that JCS 1067 must be rescinded on “national security grounds” and replaced by JCS 1779. Drawing on earlier memos from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Marshall pushed aside concerns over denazification and punitive reminders of defeat. The Marshall Plan saw the reconstruction of Germany and Europe in geostrategic terms, a strong viable German economy and democracy being necessary not only for enhanced security againstthe Soviets but also for the eventual exit of occupation troops. The course correction had taken nearly two years to determine, but it was dramatic once it began.

Mr Rjensen, please stop misleading the readers by pushing your POV that there were no effects of the Morgenthau Plan.

--Stor stark7 Talk 20:08, 19 September 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Photographs of Henry L. Stimson

Sec'y Stimson & Gen. Grant, Lawn Party, Gov's Island http://memory.loc.gov/service/pnp/ggbain/09400/09435v.jpg (Library of Congress http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.09435) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bear1952 (talk • contribs) 01:31, 17 January 2008 (UTC)

[edit] The Committee of Three

I'm surprised his membership in "The Committee of Three" is left out. Along with Stimson, it included former Japanese Ambassador Joseph Grew and Admiral Forrester who all agreed it would've been wiser to take a softer more 'face-saving' line by war's end with the Japanese and despite Stimson's invaluable participation with Britain to create the atom bombs, the committee was, to my surprise, against our unconditional surrender terms, had written the Potsdam Delcaration differently than announced & against prolonging the war(in their opinion) to use the bombs, especially on civilians. None of which I learnt till recently. All of which is the opposite of my prior impression of Stimson.

Until I learnt about this, I did not know they wrote the original Potsdam Declaration, that they were against unconditional surrender, initially offered to let the Japanese keep their Emperor but that Byrnes and Truman had infuriated them by re-writing the declaration themselves to exclude that vital offer. In fact, I had a completely different picture of Stimson in my mind till recently.

From the bios I read on these men, they believed we could have ended the war earlier and on better terms for us and worse terms for Stalin and the communists if we'd kept with the original text and 'softer line'. We knew Stalin wasn't forwarding Japan's capitulation negotiation requests from decoding Japan's own diplomatic codes. Stimson, who took the original hard line on the Japanese over Manchuria, was crucial to the atomic bombs being realized, yet to his change in attitude by war's end seems important to me.

According to the Oxford encyclopedia on WWII, recent documents 'prised' out of archival shelters and secrecy acts indicate a very different picture of Stimson than commonly portrayed to date. They quote his released biography 'History might find that the United States, in its delay in stating its position on unconditional surrender terms, had prolonged the war.' This is a very different picture of Stimson than I learnt in history classes 20-30 years ago. I only learnt of this studying Ambassador Grew who was similarily quoted: Grew stated, "If surrender could have been brought about in May 1945 or even in June or July before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." I never heard of this 'Committee of Three' nor their protesting of unconditional surrender, the Potsdam Declaration, use of atom bomb and Stimson's concerns over the War Crime Trials too.

It seems a shame to leave out this very important change of attitude and participation by leaving out "The Committee of Three" altogether.

Sadly it might have saved all sides many lives and we might have been in a better position to prevent the spread of communism throughout East Asia settling with Japan before Stalin got his foot in the door.

Therefore, I just think it's an important aspect of his life and career if not legacy(total reversal of my perception personally) that is worthy of mention and expounding.(along with Grew and Forrestal).

Any supporters to this inclusion and expounding? TheBalderdasher (talk) 20:52, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

You have my vote. I'm all for the inclusion of this important information. I checked your sources and some of my own and see that you are right. For the sake of Stimson's remembrance I think this should definately be explained.AthabascaCree (talk) 06:06, 4 May 2008 (UTC)