User talk:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-AirCampaign
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[edit] Written by the Air Force for the Air Force
There are a number of problems with the list below:
Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power[1]
1. Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface. - not true
2. Air Power is an inherently strategic force. - not true
3. Air Power is primarily an offensive weapon. - circumstantial
4. In essence, Air Power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air operations. - not true
5. Air Power produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension-time. - not true
6. Air Power can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously. - true, but also obvious by design
7. Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass. - true, but irrelevant as role of mass has also been redefined
8. Air Power’s unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen. - not true
9. Technology and air power are integrally and synergistically related. - not true
10. Air Power includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation. - obvious economic interdependencies
The first of these is that the Air Force is essentially a flying, very long range artillery. Not only is is prone to countermeasures, but it is also vastly uneconomical in certain types of conflicts and engagements. Particularly 4th Generation warfare and in theatres where the conflict is waged in increasingly urban environments precluding use of artillery, ground or flying.
This premise that warfare must be linked with defence economics is lost on the Air Force which never the less sees fewer air platforms being deployed with each successive technology generation. It is this that forced the development of guided munitions to offset reduction in platform assets to greater precision in targeting. However, with remotely piloted systems, munitions can now, or soon will be deliverable from far simpler and more economic ground-based platforms, and operational and operating expenses, particularly in terms of fuel and skilled personnel costs will probably reduce most Air Forces to very specialist roles outside of the ground targeting that require human decision-making in visual acquisition situations of near proximity. Even that can be accomplished from ground control stations now or near future.
The reality for the Air Forces is that they will be reduced significantly, and the next generation of manned aircraft is probably the last generation of manned combat aircraft to fly for some time.
Precision air weapons may have redefined the meaning of mass, but Mass has not been the defining Principle by which warfare has been conducted for at least half a century.
Air Power is targeting, but targeting is not always intelligence. In any case, it is rarely intelligence derived from air assets operated by Air (Power) Forces. Ground operated, remotely piloted systems have been providing 27-hour targeting intelligence for the ground and air assets in today's conflicts with far greater efficiency (conflicts after all have an economic cost-to-benefit rationale) then manned aircraft. The reality is that all Arms and Services can today deploy targeting intelligence systems independent of Air Power asset reliance. GPS and other guidance systems mean that automated munitions release can be achieved with greater precision and reliability then a human operator can achieve, except in a very restricted number of cases requiring visual, judgement-based decision-making process before release.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 21:53, 30 March 2008 (UTC)
[edit] I don't diagree
Those are direct quotes from the head of one of the Air Force's doctrinal centers, so I am not at all suprised to see disagreement with them. I disagree with some of them, but it is probably useful to point out what an apparently hard-core airpower partisan has to say. John Boyd, incidentally, was not guilty of assuming that airpower could solve anything; he worked closely with the Marine informal "maneuvrist" group along with Bill Lind.
Hey, if the Air Force really dominated the fourth dimension, they'd use their time machine and never make a mistake, right? :-)
Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 22:13, 30 March 2008 (UTC)
- Damn hard to transfer to the 135th Time Effects Squadron though ;o) In any case, it is not a part of the Air Force, but a part of the Library of Congress where most of its combat personnel spend time in research in case they "rub out" anyone important, line members of the Congress, during their missions ;o)...or that is the rumour.
- John Boyd had practical experience of large scale use of aircraft in combat. He also knew that claims to targets were several orders of magnitude greater then actual targets defeated by the said claims ;o)
- Precision targeting solution invented to circumvent this problem only arrived in time to see the nature of warfare change yet again; a timely reminder that human methods for conflict resolution are just as dynamic as its methods for delivering music and fast food.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 00:29, 31 March 2008 (UTC)
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- LOL...I used to work for the Library of Congress, where we had some very odd things. While the new Madison Building is really the center of activities, the original building still has an incredibly beautiful Great Hall, with elegant stairs up to it. Many of us cherished a New Yorker cartoon with crowds pointing, Superman-style, to a figure on the steps: "Look! A Congressman!" Yes, there were literate ones.
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- If you ever saw the movie "Three Days of the Condor", the building in which the research organization was housed was about where the Federal Research Division, which did DoD research, was located. Howard C. Berkowitz (talk) 00:41, 31 March 2008 (UTC)
