Hassan bin 'Attash

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Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash
Born: circa 1985 (age 22–23)
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Detained at: Guantanamo
Alias(s): Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash,
Hassan Mohammed Salih Bin Attash
ID number: 1456
Conviction(s): no charge, held in extrajudicial detention, previously held in "the dark prison"

Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 1456. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate that Bin Attash was born in 1985, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Clive Stafford Smith said bin Attash was just seventeen when he was captured.[2] Hassin is the brother of Waleed Mohammed bin Attash, who has also been described as an inmate in the CIA's network of secret prisons.[3] Hassin too claims he spent time in the other prisons, including "the dark prison", prior to being detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[4]

Main article: Minors detained in the global war on terror

Contents

[edit] Human Rights Concern

The circumstances of Hassan Bin Attash have triggered the attention of several human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, Reprieve and Human Rights Watch.[5][6][3][7] According to their accounts Hassan Bin Attash was captured on September 10, 2002, spent time in the dark prison, spent four months in Jordan, where he was hung upside down, and beaten on the soles of his feet, which were then immersed in salt water. They assert that he underwent this kind of questioning until he was willing to sign anything. They claim that he wasn't interrogated about anything he himself had done, but rather about the activity of his older brother. They assert that his 70 year-old father underwent similar questioning. Bin Attash was flown to Guantanamo in March 2003.

The Boston Globe quoted Guantanamo spokesmen Lieutenant Commander Chito Peppler, who insisted, "US policy requires all detainees to be treated humanely,"[7]

Peppler repeated the assertion that none of the captive's assertions of abuse were credible because al Qaeda trained operatives to lie about abuse.[7]

[edit] Identity

Captive 1456 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

[edit] Diego Garcia

Diego Garcia is an isolated Island in the Indian Ocean. It is a British Protectorate, that was controversially depopulated several decades ago, to make room for a large American military base. Human Rights critics have speculated that the American base at Diego Garcia, or American ships moored at Diego Garcia, was the site of an American secret interrogation center.[10] Human Rights group Reprieve reports that flight records show that two captives named Al-Sharqawi and Hassan bin Attash were flown from Diego Garcia in September 2002. The man and the teenage boy were flown aboard N379P, a plane known to be part of the CIA's ghost fleet. Flight records showed that the plane stopped in Morocco, Portugal, then Kabul.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush Presidency asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush Presidency's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 9 November 2004.[11][8] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is a member of the Taliban of al Qaida.
  1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan for Jihad, one to two months prior to Ramadan in 1997.
  2. The detainee stayed at a Jihadist guesthouse during his travel to Afghanistan.
  3. In Afghanistan, the detainee received weapons training on the Kalishnikov, Beeka, and Deshooka, as well as on explosive devices such as mines, grenades and mortars.
  4. The detainee also attended an explosives class.
  5. The detainee took bomb making classes in Khowst, Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee was a foot soldier in Jalalabad.
  7. The detainee took an al Qaida operative from Afghanistan to Pakistan to establish a safehuuse and organize an operation to plan al Qaida attacks against U.S. Naval Vessels and U.S. Oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.
  8. The detainee forwarded money that allowed al Qaida operatives to travel to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in support of the operation to attack U.S. interests.
  9. The detainee used the aliases Umayr and Al-Mughayrah[12]
  10. The detainee's brother[12] is a prominent member of al Qaida.
  11. The detainee's father[12] who is currently in jail in Saudi Arabia, is a close contact of Usama Bin Laden.
  12. The detainee stated that since he joined al Qaida he was treated well by the organization due to "his father's and brother's close relationship[12] with Usama Bin Laden.
  13. The detainee was arrested in a raid on al Qaida safehouses, Pakistan on 11 September 2002.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 1456 participated in his Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[13]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hassan Mohammed Salih Bin Attash's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 31 October 2005.[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee's entire family, with the exception of his mother, two sisters, and his youngest brother, had participated in jihad.
  2. One of the detainee's family members stated the detainee was always eager to join the jihad and was very involved in
  3. The detainee first traveled to Afghanistan for jihad one to two months prior to Ramadan, 1997. The detainee traveled at the urging of a family member.
  4. The detainee was raised with Takfiri jihad radical beliefs.
  5. The detainee traveled from Jiddah [sic] , Saudi Arabia to Peshawar, where he stayed at Abu Zubaida's guesthouse while waiting to travel on to the Khalden Camp [sic] , outside of Jalalabad.
  6. The detainee visited the Y'aqub al-Balushi guesthouse while transporting remote controls and timers for explosives for an al Qaida operative.
  7. The detainee transported an al Qaida member from Qandahar [sic] , Afghanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, via Quetta Pakistan, where they were to establish a safe house for organizaing operations.
  8. The detainee worked with al Qaida members who provided timers, remote control devices, and explosives to groups in Khowst and Qandahar; the equipment was to be used in operations against United States personnel. The detainee said he transported the explosives to Afghans in Quetta.
  9. The detainee established a number of e-mail accounts to communicate and coordinate with other al Qaida members. The detainee admitted he sent letters confirming plans to carry out major operations in Yemen including targeting oil tankers in Yemeni ports, which would have completed a plan to attack ships in the Straits of Hormuz.
  10. The detainee posted letters to a former mujahid living in Saudi Arabia, who was attempting to acquire guns and silencers to conduct assassinations in Saudi Arabia.
  11. The detainee worked directly with a senior al Qaida lieutenant, who was in charge of Usama Bin Laden's cadre inside Pakistan. He was responsible for coordinating and facilitating travel for al Qaida and Mujahidin fighters, raising money through charitable organizations, and providing al Qaida operatives and Mujahidin with false documents, including passports, stamps, and visas.
b. Training
  1. In 1997, the detainee went to Afghanistan where he received basic military-type training in the Khalden [sic] Camp.
  2. The detainee stayed at the Khalden [sic] Camp where he received training on weapons such as the Kalashnikov [sic] , Beeka, and Deshooka, as well as explosive devices such as mines, grenades, and mortars.
  3. The detainee took bomb-making classes in Khowst, Afghanistan, at the Khalden [sic] and Jihad Wahl camps. The detainee was trained to make a bomb using TNT and C-4. The detainee was shown how to make remote detonators out of game cartridges in Sega games.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee's family had been close to Usama Bin Laden since the early 1980's [sic] . It was not uncommon for Usama Bin Laden to be at the detainee's father's house, and the detainee had often been to the Usama Bin Laden family home in Jeddah.
  2. The detainee worked with a senior al Qaida member involved in the operation against United States naval vessels and United States oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.
  3. The detainee assisted a senior al Qaida member with providing timing devices needed for an operation involving hotels in Karachi.
d. Detainee Actions and Statements
The detainee traveled back and forth from Karachi to Qandahar every two months, bringing money to support al Qaida operations.
e. Other Relevant Data
The detainee was arrested on 11 September 2002, in a safe house, referred to as the "Tariq Road House." The detainee was arrested with a senior al Qaida operative.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated even though he was involved in correspondence with the attack on ships in the Straits of Hormuz, he claimed to have no further details about these operations.
b.

At the Khalden [sic] Camp, the detainee received training on weapons. The detainee did not attend all the training, estimating that he attended less than 50 percent of the classes. The detainee speculated that he was given great leniency due to his young age.
c.

The detainee indicated he did not know what the remote detonators he was asked to transport would be used for.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 1456 participated in this Board hearing.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hassan Mohammed Ali Bin Attash's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 15 September 2006.[14] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee's family had been close to Usama bin Laden since the early 1980's {{sic}. It was not uncommon for Usama bin Laden to be at the detainee's father's house and the detainee had often been to Usama bin Laden [sic] family home in Jeddah. The detainee's entire family, with the exception of his mother, two sisters, and his youngest brother, has participated in jihad.
  2. The detainee was always eager to join the jihad. The detainee was very involved in al Qaida and first traveled to Afghanistan in 1997.
  3. The detainee stated he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Yemen and then to Pakistan where he stayed at a guest house. The detainee then traveled to the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee, along with another al Qaida operative, produced the film of the USS Cole attack with the money and at the personal direction of Usama bin Laden.[15]
  5. The detainee assisted in providing time devices needed for an operation involving the hotels in Karachi, Pakistan.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was raised with Takfiri jihad radical beliefs. In 1997, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan where he received basic military-type training in the Khaldan camp. The detainee stated he joined al Qaida and was treated well with the organization and became a trusted member of al Qaida and was close to senior al Qaida members.
  2. The detainee took bomb-making classes in Khowst, Afghanistan, at the Khalden [sic] and Jihad Wahl camps. The detainee was trained to make a bomb unsing TNTand C-4. The detainee was shown how to make remote detonators out of game cartridges in Sega games.
  3. The detainee received training on weapons at the Khalden [sic] camp. The detainee did not attaend all the training, estimating that he attended less than fifty percent of the classes.
  4. According to a source, the Khaldan camp was used to train Taliban and al Qaida fighters.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee said he saw Usama bin Laden about three times in the year 2000. The detainee related he had seen Usama bin Laden in the mosque, but did not talk to him.
  2. The detainee worked directly with a senior al Qaida operative, who was in charge of Usama Bin Laden's cadre inside Pakistan. The senior al Qaida operative was responsible for coordinating and facilitating travel for al Qaida and Mujahedin fighters, raising money through charitable organizations and providing al Qaida operatives and Mujahedin with false documents including passports, stamps and visas.
  3. In August 2001, a senior al Qaida operative ordered the detainee to travel back and forth to Kandahar, Afghanistan every two months and bring money to support his operation. Usama bin Laden approved the request, but asked the detainee to tell the al Qaida operative not to spend a lot of money.
  4. The detainee stated that in April 2001, al Qaida had begun planning a terrorist operation against shipping in the Straits of Hormuz. In April 2001, a senior al Qaida operative, at the suggestion and with the financial backing of Usama bin Laden, began implementing a terrorist operation against United States naval vessels and United States oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.
  5. The detainee established a number of e-mail accounts to communicate and coordinate with other al Qaida members. The detainee also admitted he sent letters confirming plans to carry out major operations in Yemen including targeting oil tankers in Yemeni ports, which would have completed the plan to attack ships in the Straits of Hormuz.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee was arrested on 11 September 2002 in a safe house. The detainee was arrested with a senior al Qaida operative.
  2. The detainee's family had made significant financial contributions to al Qaida and their jihad activities.
  3. According to an individual, the detainee's older brother was a senior lieutenant and a big supporter of Usama bin Laden and ordered his subordinates to follow the guidance of Usama bin Laden. All the brothers of the detainee worked for Usama bin Laden.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee indicated he did not know what the remote detonators he was asked to transport would be used for.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 1456 participated in this Board hearing.

[edit] References

  1. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
  2. ^ Kids of Guantanamo, cageprisoners.com, June 15, 2005
  3. ^ a b List of “Ghost Prisoners” Possibly in CIA Custody, Human Rights Watch, December 1, 2005
  4. ^ U.S. Operated Secret 'Dark Prison' in Kabul, Reuters, December 19, 2005
  5. ^ Guantánamo: pain and distress for thousands of children, Amnesty International
  6. ^ Reprieve uncovers evidence indicating German territory may have been used in rendition and abuse, Reprieve, October 10, 2006
  7. ^ a b c 7 detainees report transfer to nations that use torture, Boston Globe, April 26, 2006
  8. ^ a b OARDEC (9 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Bin Attash, Hassan Mohammed Ali (released September 2007) pages 64-65. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-21.
  9. ^ a b OARDEC (31 October 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Bin Attash, Hassan Mohammed Salih pages 1-3. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-19.
  10. ^ Richard Norton-Taylor, Duncan Campbell. "Fresh questions on torture flights spark demands for inquiry", The Guardian, Monday March 10, 2008. Retrieved on 2008-03-17. "Flight plan records show that one of the aircraft, registered N379P, flew in September 2002 from Diego Garcia to Morocco. From there it flew to Portugal and then to Kabul. Passenger names have been blacked out. However, Reprieve, which represents prisoners faced with the death penalty and torture, said that in Kabul the aircraft picked up Al-Sharqawi and Hassan bin Attash, two suspects who were tortured in Jordan before being rendered to Afghanistan and flown to Guantánamo Bay. Those rendered through Diego Garcia remain unidentified. In a letter to Miliband, Clive Stafford Smith, Reprieve's legal director, said: 'It is certainly not going to rebuild public confidence if we say that two people were illegally taken through British territory but then refuse to reveal the fates of these men.'" 
  11. ^ OARDEC (9 November 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- name redacted (released March 2005) pages 174-175. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-21.
  12. ^ a b c d The aliases "Umayr" and "Al-Mughayrah", and the phrases "The detainee's brother", "The detainee's father" and "his father's and brother's close relationship" were all redacted when this memo was first released in March 2005.
  13. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  14. ^ OARDEC (15 September 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ali Bin Attash, Hassan Mohammed pages 73-75. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-12-21.
  15. ^ Captive 1456's older brother, Tawfiq Bin Attash, is also accused of producing the USS Cole bombing video.