Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said

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Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said
Born:	February 5, 1976(1976-02-05) Oum el Bouaghi, Algeria
Detained at:	Guantanamo
Alias(s):	Ghallab Bashir, Ghalaab Bashir
ID number:	175
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Ghallab Bashir is a citizen of Algeria, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.^[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 175. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts report he was born on February 5, 1976(1976-02-05), in Oum el Bouaghi, Algeria.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts report he admitted hiding his real name from interrogators for until June 2004.

He is accused of being a bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden.

[edit] Identity

Captive 175 was identified inconsistently on official Department of Defense documents:

• Captive 175 was identified as Ghalaab Bashir on the Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 20 September 2004, and on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board, on 5 April 2005.^[2][3]
• Captive 175 was identified as Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said on the Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 19 March 2006, and on the two official lists of captives names published in 2006.^[4][1][5]
• Captive 175 was identified as Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said (Ghalaab Bashir) on four official lists of captives' names published in September 2007.^[6][7][8][9]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ghalaab Bashir's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 20 September 2004.^[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is an al-Qaida operative:

1. Detainee traveled from Syria, through Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan respectively, finally arriving at Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
2. Detainee was smuggled from Iran into Afghanistan and then on to Quetta, Pakistan with assistance from the Tablighi (JT: Jama'at al Tablighi) office in Zahedan, Iran.
3. Detainee attended the Al Farouq training camp in early 2001.
4. Detainee was a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.
5. The detainee's name was on a list of captured hard drives associated with a senior al Qaeda member.
6. Detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan around November 2001 with other Arabs and Pakistanis, stayed in the mountains for one month, continued to Pakistan with approximately 20 ^[sic] other other Arabs, and was captured on 16 December 2001.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.

1. Detainee was in charge of weapons inventory at Tora Bora, with duties consisting of handing out ammunition and taking inventory.
2. Detainee worked in one of the supply caves, loading and unloading supplies for other mujahideen.
3. Detainee was in Tora Bora after 11 September 2001 making sure fighting groups had enough supplies.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that captive 175 participated in his Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

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Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[10]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings.^[11] The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ghalaab Bashir's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 5 April 2005.^[3] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Bashir were among 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.^[12]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Syria, through Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan respectively, finally arriving at Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was smuggled from Iran into Afghanistan and then on to Quetta, Pakistan with assistance from the Tablighi (JT: Jama’at Tablighi) office in Zahedan, Iran.
3. Jama’at Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp in early 2001.

c. Connections

1. The detainee waa a bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden.
2. The detainee’s name was on a list of captured hard drives associated with a senior al Qaida member.
3. The detainee’s name also appears in a list of “trust” accounts found on files recovered from various computer media seized during raids against al Qaida.

d. Intent

1. The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan around November 2001, with other Arabs and Pakistanis, stayed in the mountains for one month, continued to Pakistan with approximately 20 other Arabs, and was captured on 16 December 2001.
2. In September 2004, the detainee admitted to using a false name since his arrival in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
3. The detainee was in charge of weapons inventory at Tora Bora, with duties consisting of handing out ammunition and taking inventory.
4. The detainee was in Tora Bora after 11 September 2001, making sure fighting groups had enough supplies.
5. The detainee worked in one of the supply caves, loading and unloading supplies for other mujahideen.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee stated he had “a middle of the road” approach with faith and religion and that he was not an extremist.
b.	The detainee claims to have not participated in jihad activities.
c.	The detainee denied attending the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan and that he was chosen to be a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden. He denied meeting Usama Bin Laden.
d.	The detainee denied receiving any military or weapons training.

[edit] Transcript

The Department of Defense released a two page transcript from captive 175's first annual Review Board.^[13] His Assisting Military Officer confirmed he had met with captive 175, and that an interpreter had read the Summary of Evidence memo to him.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hassan Mujamma Rabai Said's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 19 March 2006.^[4] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee departed Algeria on 19 Agust 2000 and stopped in Damascus, Syria.
2. After ten months, the detainee left Damascus for Zahedan, Iran via Tehran, Qam, and Mashad, Iran.
3. The detainee indicates he was helped into Pakistan by a group of smugglers he met through the Jamaat al Tablighi office in Zahedan. The detainee was then taken to Quetta, Pakistan.
4. The detainee departed Quetta for Jalalabad, Afghanistan, stopping in Kandahar and Kabull along the way.
5. The detainee left Jalalabad in November 2001 when the city fell and stayed in the mountains for approximately one month. An Afghan guide led the detainee and about twenty other Arabs to Pakistan where the detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities.
6. The detainee was identified as a member of a group that moved to Tora Bora on Usama bin Laden's orders. The detainee was in charge of weapons inventory at Tora Bora. The detainee's duties also included handing out ammunition.
7. The detainee was identified as working in one of the supply caves in Tora Bora, loading and unloading supplies for other Mujahedin.
8. In September 2004 the detainee admitted to using a false name since his arrival to ^[sic] Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b. Training

The detainee was identified as training at al Farouq.

c. Connections/Associations

1. Jamaat al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
2. The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida members found on a hard drive recovered during the arrest of a senior al Qaida operative.
3. The detainee's name was found on various computers listing suspected al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts during raids against al Qaida-associated safe houses in Rawalpindi and Karachi.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as having been chosen to be a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
2. The detainee claims he did not participate in jihad activities. However, the detainee feels political motivation and a properly declared fatwa are legitimate reasons for participating in jihad.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and the detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee stated that the attacks were not condoned by Islam and that they were a crime.

[edit] References

1. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
2. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (20 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Bashir Ghalaab pages 80-81. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-14.
3. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Administrative Review Board Proceedings (ISN 175) pages 103-104. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-14.
4. ^ ^{a b} OARDEC (19 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Said, Hassan Mujamma Rabai pages 55-56. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-14.
5. ^ OARDEC (April 20, 2006). List of detainee who went through complete CSRT process. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
6. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index for Combatant Status Review Board unclassified summaries of evidence. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
7. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index to Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
8. ^ OARDEC (August 9, 2007). Index of Transcripts and Certain Documents from ARB Round One. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
9. ^ OARDEC (July 17, 2007). Index of Summaries of Detention-Release Factors for ARB Round Two. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
10. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
11. ^ Army Sgt. Sarah Stannard. "OARDEC provides recommendations to Deputy Secretary of Defense", JTF Guantanamo Public Affairs, October 29, 2007. Retrieved on 2008-03-26. 
12. ^ "US releases Guantanamo files", The Age, April 4, 2006. Retrieved on 2008-03-15. 
13. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summarized Administrative Review Board Proceedings (ISN 175) pages 30-31. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-04-14.