User:Harlsbottom/Battle of Jutland

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Battle of Jutland Part of World War I Battle of Jutland, 1916 Date 31 May 1916–1 June 1916 Location North Sea, near Denmark Result Indecisive. Belligerents Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy High Sea Fleet of the Kaiserliche Marine Commanders Sir John Jellicoe Sir David Beatty Reinhard Scheer Franz von Hipper Strength 28 battleships 9 battle cruisers 8 armoured cruisers 26 light cruisers 78 destroyers 1 minelayer 1 seaplane carrier 16 battleships 5 battle cruisers 6 pre-dreadnoughts 11 light cruisers 61 torpedo-boats Casualties and losses 6,094 killed 510 wounded 177 captured 3 battle cruisers 3 armoured cruisers 8 destroyers (115,025 tons sunk) 2,551 killed 507 wounded 1 battle cruiser 1 pre-dreadnought 4 light cruisers 5 torpedo-boats (61,180 tons sunk)

v • d • e North Sea 1914-1918 1st Heligoland Bight – Live Bait Squadron – Dogger Bank – Jutland – 2nd Heligoland Bight – Zeebrugge – 1st Ostend – 2nd Ostend

The Battle of Jutland (German: Skagerrakschlacht (Battle of the Skagerrak); Danish: Søslaget ved Jylland / Søslaget om Skagerrak) was the largest naval battle of World War I and the only full-scale clash of battleships in that war. It was fought on 31 May–1 June 1916, in the North Sea near Jutland, the northward-pointing peninsular mainland of Denmark. The combatants were the Imperial German Navy's High Sea Fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer and the Royal Navy’s British Grand Fleet commanded by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. The intention of the German fleet was to lure out, trap and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the Germans were insufficient in number to engage the entire British fleet at one time. This formed part of their larger strategy of breaking the British naval blockade of the North Sea and allowing German mercantile shipping to operate freely again. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, was pursuing a strategy seeking to engage and cripple the High Sea Fleet and keep the German force bottled up and away from their own shipping lanes.

The Germans' plan was to use Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper’s fast scouting group of five modern battle cruisers to lure Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty’s battle cruiser squadrons through a submarine picket line and into the path of the main German fleet and so destroy them. But the British had learned from signal intercepts that a major fleet operation was likely, and on 30 May Jellicoe sailed with the Grand Fleet to rendezvous with Beatty.

On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty encountered Hipper long before the Germans had expected, with the submarine blockade having proved useless, but in a running battle to the south Hipper drew the British vangard successfully into the path of the High Sea Fleet. By the time Beatty turned and fled towards the main fleet he'd lost two battle cruisers and his numerical advantage in the class. From 18:30 hrs, when the sun was lowering on the western horizon backlighting the British forces, until nightfall at about 20:30 the two huge fleets — totaling 250 ships between them — were heavily engaged.

Fourteen British and eleven German ships were sunk with great loss of life. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe manœuvred to cut the Germans off from their base in hopes of continuing the battle in the morning, but under cover of darkness Scheer crossed the wake of the British fleet and returned to port.

Both sides claimed victory. The British had lost more ships and many more sailors, and the British press criticized the Grand Fleet's actions, but Scheer’s plan of destroying Beatty’s squadrons had also failed. The Germans continued to pose a threat that required the British to keep their battleships concentrated in the North Sea, but they never again contested control of the high seas. Instead, the German Navy turned its efforts and resources to unrestricted submarine warfare.

[edit] Background

[edit] Naval Situation

At the beginning of 1916 the naval situation in the First World War was at a stalemate. The British Royal Navy had effective command of the North Sea, and the German High Sea Fleet rarely left port. At the Battle of Heligoland Bight in 1914 and the Battle of Dogger Bank in 1915 the Germans had suffered heavier losses compared to the British. Both battles had been fought by scouting forces, and not by the main battleship battlefleets. These early losses contributed to a pessimistic mindset in German naval circles, with two successive Commanders-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Admirals Ingenohl and von Pohl, compelled not to use the fleet offensively. This policy had the support of Kaiser Wilhelm II, but brought unceasing complaints from Großadmiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the Imperial German Navy's pre-war expansion. The only offensive operation of note for the Imperial German Navy had been the raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby in December, 1914. The respective strengths of the High Sea Fleet and the Grand Fleet would never be so equal, as the British were suffering condenser difficulties with many of their newer battleships and had just suffered the loss of the super-dreadnought HMS Audacious. After Dogger Bank the Royal Navy would commission ten battleships and two battle cruisers, while Germany could only commission two battleships and two battle cruisers. Unfortunately for the Germans their primitive intelligence gathering capabilities left them unaware of this chance for a level fight with the British.^[1]

Admiral Hugo von Pohl had been in command of the High Sea Fleet since 2 February 1915 and in the wake of Dogger Bank had sortied only five times with the fleet. On 8 January 1916 he fell seriously ill with liver cancer and was suceeded by Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer on 24 January, promoted from command of the fleet's most powerful battleship force, III Squadron. His task, as he recalled in his memoirs;

Upon assuming command of the fleet, Scheer prepared a memorandum outlining a more vigorous prosecution of the naval war, entitled Guiding Principles for Sea Warfare in the North Sea, which was approved by the Kaiser upon his visit to Scheer and the High Sea Fleet on 23 February 1916. In it he reiterated that "the High Sea Fleet seeking decisive battle with the Grand Fleet" ought to be avoided, and that efforts should be concentrated on submarine warfare, mine warfare, use of air power and seeking to draw out isolated British units which could then be destroyed by the Germans. In conclusion, Scheer called for the "active employment of the High Sea Fleet in sorties".^[3] The High Sea Fleet then started mounting offensive sweeps of the North Sea using torpedo boat destroyers, before Scheer ordered another raid mounted on the British coast. The bombardment of Lowestoft by German battle cruisers on 24 April 1916 caused both outrage and panic in Britain, but did not draw out the Grand Fleet as hoped for. The British in response dispatched the 3rd Battle Squadron, composed of King Edward VII class pre-dreadnoughts to the Medway on 29 April.^[4] The British also stepped up sweeps over the Horn Reef (off the Western coast of Denmark) to assert local dominance over the southern North Sea. This activity "suited our plans, and I decided to utilize it to the full by making a renewed advance with our whole fleet."^[5][a] However, the battle cruiser Seydlitz had been heavily damaged after striking a mine after the raid, and would not be available for action until mid-May. On 9 May a spate of condenser problems appeared in the battleships of III Squadron which would not be remedied until 23 May.

Scheer's decision to mount a new operation was motivated by developments governing Germany's other offensive naval weapon, the U-Boat. German submarines had gradually cast aside the accepted notion of allowing targeted merchant and passenger ships to be evacuated, and then sunk. The British use of Q-Ships to surprise and sink U-Boats led to the Germans sinking ships without warning.

On 18 May Scheer issued an order detailing an advance to the North-West on the coastal town of Sunderland "to compel the enemy to send forces out to attack us", much in the manner of previous raids on British coastal towns.^[6] The submarine warfare campaign had temporarily suspended therefore all available U-Boats could be available to blockade the British ports and sink British warships as they sortied to oppose the High Sea Fleet.^[7][b] The advance against the English coast however was dependent upon air reconnaissance from zeppelin naval airships, to make sure that battle would not be joined under conditions unfavourable to the High Sea Fleet. This was the preferred operation as the chance of luring British forces from the bases at Harwich, Rosyth and Cromarty was much greater.

At the same time an advance by the German fleet to the North, over the Horn Reef was planned. The advantages inherent in this plan were that air reconnaissance was not necessary and that it would be difficult for the British to out-manœuvre the Germans and cut them off. The distances involved would also favour the Germans; the British would have further to sail from their bases; U-Boat and airship support would be readily more available.

Preparations for the High Sea Fleet's planned sorties were extensive. At the start of May Scheer ordered the Squadron II of the High Sea Fleet, composed of pre-dreadnought battleships, to be ready to take part in a fleet battle. While these six ships did give Scheer extra firepower, they also hampered him tactically by forcing his fleet to maintain the same speed as these ships.^[8] On 15 May Scheer had two dozen U-Boats begin to reconnoitre the North Sea. From the 23 May to 1 June they were then ordered to take up positions off British ports in readiness for the coming operation. At the same time naval airships were ordered to be in a constant state of readiness.^[9] The decision upon which course of action to take, be it the North-West and Sunderland, or to the North and the Horn Reef, lay in the state of the weather and the ability of the all important scouting naval airships to traverse the North Sea. The weather remained unfavourable, and on 30 May Scheer resolved to cancel the attack on Sunderland and make the advance to the North. He instructed the Scouting Force and the Main Fleet of the High Sea Fleet to leave harbour on the following morning, 31 May 1916.

Unfortunately for the German planning, the British had gained possession of the main German code books (the British had been given a German code book from the light cruiser SMS Magdeburg, boarded by Russian naval officers after the ship ran aground in Russian territorial waters), therefore intercepted German naval radio communications could usually be deciphered; hence the British Admiralty was therefore usually aware of German deployments and activity levels, giving them a glimpse into the German plans and the ability to formulate better responses from this extra military intelligence.

[edit] British response

The British intercepted and decrypted a German signal on 28 May ordering all ships to be ready for sea on the 30th. Further signals were intercepted and although they were not decrypted it was clear that a major operation was likely. In accordance with Admiralty instructions, Jellicoe decided to put to sea with the entire Grand Fleet on a sweep on the 30th. The main dreadnought battlefleet at Scapa, the 2nd Battle Squadron at Invergordon, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth all got under way in the evening, with the former two arranged to rendezvous in the North Sea at 14:00 the next day.

The British did not leave port unnoticed however. At 07:37 on the morning of the 31st the submarine U.32 reported two heavy ships, two cruisers and a number of destroyers seventy miles east of the Firth of Forth, heading South-East. At 08:30 wireless transmissions from the Grand Fleet were picked up and decoded by the Germans indicating that two squadrons of ships had left Scapa Flow.

Not knowing the Germans' objective, Jellicoe's intention was to rendezvous 90 miles (145 kilometers) west of the mouth of Skagerrak off the coast of Jutland and wait for the Germans or for their intentions to become clear. The planned position gave him the widest range of responses to likely German intentions.

[edit] The Admirals

See the respective article of each admiral:

John Jellicoe

David Beatty

Reinhard Scheer

Franz Hipper

John Jellicoe: John Rushworth Jellicoe entered the Royal Navy in 1872. He had entered the training ship HMS Britannia second in the entry exams and graduated two years later top of his term. His thorough grounding in mathematics served him well in the large number of examinations junior officers had to take for further promotion.

[edit] Orders of battle

Main article: Order of battle at Jutland

Jellicoe's battle force was twenty-eight dreadnoughts and nine battle cruisers, while Scheer had sixteen dreadnoughts, five battle cruisers and six obsolete pre-dreadnoughts. The British were superior in light vessels as well. Due to a preference of protection over firepower in the German ship designs the German ships had thicker armour against shellfire attack, but carried fewer or smaller guns than their British counterparts. No German ship participating in the battle was equipped with guns larger than 12-inch (305 mm) while most British capital ships had 13.5-inch (343 mm) or 15-inch (381 mm) guns. Combined with their larger number this gave the British an advantage of 332,400 lb (151 tonnes) against 134,000 lb (61 tonnes) in terms of weight of broadside.

[edit] Naval tactics in 1916

Concentration of force at one point and communications dictated the tactics used in fleet actions when the large rifled naval guns now in use could literally shoot beyond the horizon. Thus tactics called for a fleet approaching battle to be in parallel columns moving in-line ahead, allowing both relatively easy manœuvring and shortened sight lines for command and control communications. Also, several short columns could change their heading faster than a single long column while maintaining formation, and if a column were too long, trailing units may never reach an effective range to fire at an enemy unit. Since co-ordinating command and control signals in the era were limited to visible means - made with flags or shuttered searchlights between ships - the flagship was usually placed at the head of the centre column so orders could be seen by the many ships of the formations.

Also, since coal-fired boilers of the era generated a lot of smoke from the funnels, the trailing clouds of smoke often made it impossible to identify signals on ships beyond the one directly ahead or behind, so every ship had to repeat the signal for the following one to understand. The time required for this was often doubled as most signals had to be confirmed by every ship before they could be executed and passed on. In a large single-column formation a signal could take ten minutes or more to be passed from the flagship at the front of the column to the last ship at the end, whereas in a columns formation moving line-ahead, visibility across the diagonals was often better (and always shorter) than a single long column, and the diagonals gave signal redundancy increasing the chance that a signal would been seen and correctly interpreted sooner.

For the actual battle the fleet would deploy into a single column by the leading ships of the columns turning 90 degrees to port or starboard, the remaining ships following their leaders in succession, the column being formed at right angles to the original line of advance. To form the column into the right direction the fleet had to know from which direction the enemy was approaching before he could be seen by the enemy battleships, as this manœuvre took longer to achieve than two fleets heading towards each other at high speed needed to come within fighting range. It was the task of the scouting forces, consisting of battle cruisers and cruisers, to find the enemy and report his position, course and speed with sufficient time and, if possible, deny the enemy's scouting force the opportunity of obtaining the same information.

Ideally the line of battleships would cross the path of the enemy column so that the maximum number of guns could be brought to bear, while the enemy could only fire with the front turrets of the leading ships. Carrying out this classic manœuvre of "crossing the T" was largely a matter of luck; more common were heavy exchanges between two fleets on roughly parallel courses.

[edit] Battle cruiser action

(1) 15:30 hrs, Abrupt manœuvre separates the British fleet.
(2) 15:45 hrs, First Shots fired by Hipper's squadron.
(3) 16:00 hrs-16:05 hrs, Indefatigable explodes leaving two survivors.
(4) 16:25 hrs, Queen Mary disintegrates, nine survive.
(5) 16:45 hrs, Beatty's Battle cruisers escape the action.
(6) 16:55 hrs, Evan-Thomas' Battleships run the gauntlet

[edit] Prelude to big guns

The German U-boats were ineffective, sinking no ships as they came out of the British ports. Some reconnaissance reports sent to Scheer, but nothing which changed his plans. Jellicoe's ships proceeded to his rendezvous undamaged but misled by Admiralty intelligence that the Germans were nine hours later than they actually were.

At 14:20 on 31 May, despite heavy haze and scuds of fog giving poor visibility, scouts from Beatty's force reported enemy ships to the south-east; the British light units, investigating the neutral Danish steamer N. J. Fjord which was sailing between the two fleets, had also found German scouts engaged in the same mission. Beatty moved eastwards to cut the German ships off from their base. The first shots of the battle were fired when Galatea of the British 1st Light Cruiser Squadron mistook two German destroyers for cruisers and engaged them. Galatea was subsequently hit at extreme range by her German counterpart, Elbing, of Rear-Admiral Bödicker's Scouting Group II.

At 15:30, Beatty's forces sighted Hipper's cruisers moving south-east (position 1 on map). Hipper promptly turned away to lead Beatty towards Scheer. Beatty, some three miles (5 km) from Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas's column (5th Battle Squadron), turned towards the enemy and signalled by flag for the 5th Battle Squadron to follow.

[edit] The Run to the South

Given the distance and visibility, the 5th could not read the flag signals; and as Beatty made no effort to communicate via searchlight or radio telegraph, the 5th continued on its original course for several minutes. During the next quarter hour, Beatty's actions received a lot of criticism as his ships out-ranged and outnumbered the German squadron, yet he held his fire. At 15:45, after having the German ships within range for over ten minutes, and with both fleets roughly parallel at 15,000 nautical-yards (14 km (9 mi)), Hipper opened fire followed by Beatty (position 2). Thus began the opening phase of the fleet action, known as the "Run to the South". During the first long minutes of the ensuing action, all the British ships fired well over the German fleet, before finally getting the range.

Beatty had ordered his ships to engage in a line, one British ship engaging with one German and his flagship Lion doubling on the German flagship Lützow. However, due to another mistake on the part of the British, Derfflinger was left unengaged and free to fire without disruption, while Moltke drew fire from two battle cruisers. The Germans drew first blood. Hipper's five battle cruisers promptly registered hits on three of the six British battle cruisers. Nearly ten minutes passed before the British managed to score their first hit. Naval forensic historians estimate the Germans scored thirty-five to eleven hits in the next interval.

Beatty's flagship Lion burning after being hit by a salvo from Lützow

[edit] Sudden death

The first near-disaster of the battle occurred when a 12-inch (305 mm) salvo from Lützow wrecked "Q" turret of Beatty's flagship Lion. Dozens of crewmen were instantly killed, but a far larger catastrophe was averted when the mortally wounded turret commander, Major Francis Harvey of the Royal Marines, promptly ordered the magazine doors shut and the magazine flooded, thereby preventing the fickle propellant from setting off a massive magazine explosion. Lion was saved. Indefatigable was not so lucky; at 16:00, just fifteen minutes into the slugging match, she was smashed aft by three 11-inch (280 mm) shells from Von der Tann, causing damage sufficient to knock her out of line and drop her speed significantly. Soon after, despite the near-maximum range, Von der Tann put another 11-inch (280 mm) salvo on one of her 12-inch (305 mm) turrets. The plunging shells easily pierced the thin upper armour and Indefatigable was ripped apart by a magazine explosion, sinking immediately with her crew of 1,019 officers and men, leaving only two survivors (position 3).

That tipped the odds to Hipper's benefit, for a brief while as Admiral Evan-Thomas, essentially chasing from oblique (astern) finally manœuvred his squadron of four fast "super-dreadnoughts" into long range. He commanded a squadron of the Queen Elizabeth class armed with 15-inch (381 mm) guns. With occasional 15-inch (381 mm) shells landing on his ships at long ranges, Hipper was in a tight spot and unable to respond at all against Evan-Thomas's squadron with his smaller shorter-ranged guns, but had his hands full with Beatty's units. He also knew his baiting mission was close to completion and his force was rapidly closing with Scheer's main body and had little choice as there was little speed difference between the sides engaged. At 16:25 the battle cruiser action intensified again when Queen Mary was hit by what may have been a combined salvo from Derfflinger and Seydlitz, and she disintegrated in a magazine explosion with all but nine of her 1,275 man crew lost.

[edit] Off to the side

Shortly after, a salvo struck on or about Princess Royal, which was obscured by spray and smoke. A signalman leapt to the bridge of Lion, "Princess Royal's blown up, Sir." Beatty famously turned to his flag captain, "Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today. Turn two-points to port", i.e. two points nearer the enemy (position 4). However, the signalman's report was incorrect, as Princess Royal survived the battle.

At about 16:30, Southampton of Beatty's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron led by Commodore William Goodenough sighted the main body of Scheer's High Sea Fleet, dodging numerous heavy-calibre salvos to report the detailed strength of the Germans: sixteen dreadnoughts with six older battleships. Simultaneously a destroyer action raged between the battle cruiser fleets, as British destroyers scrapped with their German counterparts and managed to put a torpedo into Seydlitz. The destroyer Nestor, under the command of Captain Bingham, sank two German torpedo boats, V 27 and V 29, before she and another destroyer, Nomad, were immobilized by hits and later sunk by Scheer's dreadnoughts.

[edit] The Run to the North

Beatty headed north to draw the Germans towards Jellicoe and managed to break contact with the Germans at about 16:45 (position 5). Beatty's move towards Jellicoe is called the "Run to the North". Because Beatty once again failed to signal his intentions adequately, the super-dreadnoughts of the 5th Battle Squadron found themselves lagging behind the battle cruisers and heading directly into the main body of the High Sea Fleet.

Their difficulty was compounded by Beatty, who gave the order to Evan-Thomas to "turn in succession" rather than "turn together". There is poorly-referenced speculation that the exact wording of the order originated with Lieutenant-Commander Ralph Seymour, Beatty's flag lieutenant, rather than Beatty himself. This should have resulted in all four ships turning, in succession to transit through the same patch of sea, which gave the High Sea Fleet repeated opportunity with ample time to find the proper range. Consequently, the trailing ships experienced a period wherein they had to fend off the lead German dreadnoughts and Hipper's battle cruisers on their own. Fortunately, the dreadnoughts were far better suited to take this sort of pounding than the battle cruisers, and none were lost, as in the event, one captain turned early mitigating the adverse results. Nonetheless, Malaya sustained heavy casualties in the process, likely lessened by the initiative of her Captain in turning early. At the same time, the 15-inch (381 mm) fire of the four British ships remained effective, causing severe damage to the German battle cruisers (position 6).

[edit] Still fighting blind

Jellicoe was now aware that full fleet engagement was nearing, but had insufficient information on the position and course of the Germans. Rear-Admiral Horace Hood's 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was ordered to speed ahead to assist Beatty, while Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's 1st Cruiser Squadron patrolled the van of the main body for eventual deployment of Jellicoe's dreadnought columns.

Around 17:30 the armoured cruiser Black Prince of Arbuthnot's squadron, bearing southeast, came within view of Beatty's leading 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, establishing the first visual link between the converging bodies of the Grand Fleet. Simultaneously the signals cruiser Chester, steaming behind Hood's battle cruisers, was intercepted by the van of the German scouting forces under Rear-Admiral Bodicker.

Heavily outnumbered by Bodicker's four light cruisers, Chester was pounded before being relieved by Hood's heavy units which swung back westward for that purpose. Hood's flagship Invincible disabled the light cruiser Wiesbaden as Bodicker's other ships fled toward Hipper and Scheer, in the mistaken belief that Hood was leading a larger force of British capital ships from the north and east. Another destroyer action ensued as German torpedo boats attempted to blunt the arrival of this new formation.

[edit] The fleet action

In the meantime Beatty and Evan-Thomas had resumed their engagement of Hipper's battle cruisers, this time with the visual conditions to their advantage. With several of his ships damaged, Hipper turned back to Scheer around 18.00, just as Beatty's flagship Lion was finally spotted by Jellicoe on Iron Duke. Jellicoe promptly demanded the latest position of the German forces from Beatty, who failed to respond to the question for almost ten minutes.

Jellicoe, having overestimated the enemy forces, was in a worrying position, needing to know the position of the Germans in order to judge when and how to deploy his battleships from their cruising formation in six columns corresponding to the division into a single battle line. The deployment could be onto either the western or the eastern column and had to be carried out before the Germans arrived; but early deployment could mean losing any chance of a decisive encounter. Deploying to the west would bring his fleet closer to Scheer, gaining valuable time as dusk approached, but the Germans might arrive before the manœuvre was complete. Deploying to the east would take the force away from Scheer, but Jellicoe's ships might be able to cross the "T" and would have the advantage of silhouetting Scheer's forces against the setting sun to the west. Deployment would take twenty irreplaceable minutes, and the fleets were closing at speed. Jellicoe ordered deployment to the east at 18:10 ❷.

Meanwhile Hipper had rejoined Scheer, and the combined High Sea Fleet was heading north, directly toward Jellicoe. Scheer had no indication that Jellicoe was at sea, let alone that he was bearing down from the northwest, and was distracted by the intervention of Hood's ships to his north and east. Beatty's four surviving battle cruisers were now crossing the van of the British dreadnoughts to join Hood's three battle cruisers; in doing so, Beatty nearly rammed Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's flagship Defence.

Arbuthnot had been ordered upon the deployment of the fleet to take up station to the rear. In order to do so, the 1st Cruiser Squadron would have to pass along the length of the Grand Fleet either on the disengaged side or the engaged side. Arbuthnot chose the latter, despite the hail of fire he knew his ships would receive from the Germans and the possibility the smoke from his ships might blind the British capital ships' shooting.^[10] Arbuthnot's obsolete armoured cruisers had no real place in the coming clash between modern dreadnoughts, but he was attracted by the drifting hull of the crippled Wiesbaden. With Warrior, Defence closed in for the kill, only to blunder right into the gunsights of Hipper's and Scheer's oncoming capital ships. Defence was destroyed in a spectacular explosion viewed by most of the deploying Grand Fleet, sinking with all hands (903 officers and men). Warrior was hit badly but spared destruction by the mishap to the nearby superdreadnought Warspite. Warspite had been steaming near 25 knots (46 km/h) to keep pace with the 5th Battle Squadron as it tailed Beatty's battle cruisers in the run north, creating enough strain to jam her rudder. Drifting in a wide circle, she appeared as a juicy target to the German dreadnoughts and took thirteen hits, inadvertently drawing fire from the hapless Warrior. This maneouvre from Warspite was known as "Windy Corner". Despite surviving the onslaught, Warspite was soon ordered back to port by Evan-Thomas.

As Defence sank, Hipper moved within range of Hood's 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. Invincible inflicted two below-waterline hits on Lützow that would ultimately doom Hipper's flagship, but at about 18:30 abruptly appeared as a clear target before Lützow and Derfflinger. A series of 12-inch (305 mm) shells struck Invincible, which blew up and split in two, killing all but six of her crew of 1,032 officers and men, including Rear-Admiral Hood.

By 18:30 the main fleet action was joined for the first time, with Jellicoe effectively "crossing Scheer's T" ❸. Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke quickly scored a series of hits on the lead German dreadnought, König, but in this brief exchange, which lasted only minutes, as few as ten of the Grand Fleet's twenty-four dreadnoughts actually opened fire. The Germans were hampered by poor visibility in addition to being in an unfavourable tactical position. Realizing he was heading into a trap, Scheer ordered his fleet to turn and flee at 18:33. Under a pall of smoke and mist Scheer's forces succeeded in disengaging.

Conscious of the risks to his capital ships posed by torpedoes, Jellicoe did not chase directly but headed south, determined to keep the High Sea Fleet west of him. Scheer knew that it was not yet dark enough to escape and his fleet would suffer terribly in a stern chase, so at 18:55 he doubled back to the east ❹. In his memoirs he wrote, "the manœuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would facilitate the breaking loose at night." But the turn to the east took his ships towards Jellicoe's.

Commodore Goodenough's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron dodged the fire of German battleships for a second time to re-establish contact with the High Sea Fleet shortly after 19:00. By 19:15, Jellicoe had crossed the "T" yet again ❺. This time his arc of fire was tighter and deadlier, causing severe damage to the Germans, particularly Rear-Admiral Behncke's leading 3rd Battle Squadron. At 19:17, for the second time in less than an hour, Scheer turned to the west, ordering a major torpedo attack by his destroyers and a "death ride" by Scouting Group I's four remaining battle cruisers — Lützow being out of action and abandoned by Hipper — to deter a British chase. In this portion of the engagement the Germans sustained thirty-seven heavy hits while inflicting only two, Derfflinger alone receiving fourteen. Nonetheless Scheer slipped away as sunset (at 20:24) approached. The last major engagement between capital ships took place as the surviving British battle cruisers caught up with their German counterparts, which were briefly relieved by Rear-Admiral Mauve's obsolete pre-dreadnoughts ❻. As King George V and Westfalen exchanged a few final shots, neither side could have imagined that the only encounter between British and German dreadnoughts in the entire war was already concluded.

At 21:00, Jellicoe, knowing of the Grand Fleet's deficiencies in night-fighting, decided to try to avoid a major engagement until early dawn. He placed a screen of cruisers and destroyers behind his battle fleet to patrol the rear as he headed south to guard against Scheer's expected escape. In reality Scheer opted to cross Jellicoe's wake and escape via Horns Reef. Luckily for Scheer, Jellicoe's scouts failed to report his true course while Jellicoe himself was too cautious to judge from extensive circumstantial evidence that the Germans were breaking through his rear.^{[citation needed]}

While the nature of Scheer's escape and Jellicoe's inaction indicate the overall superiority of German night-fighting proficiency, the night's results were no more clear-cut than the battle as a whole. Southampton, Commodore Goodenough's flagship which had scouted so proficiently, was heavily damaged but managed to sink the German light cruiser Frauenlob which went down at 22:23 with all hands (320 officers and men). But at 02:00 on 1 June, Black Prince of the ill-fated 1st Cruiser Squadron met a grim fate at the hands of the battleship Thüringen, blowing up with all hands (857 officers and men) as her squadron leader Defence had done hours earlier. At 02:10, several British destroyer flotillas launched a torpedo attack on the German battlefleet. At the cost of five destroyers sunk and some others damaged, they managed to sink the predreadnought Pommern with all hands (844 officers and men), as well as to torpedo the light cruiser Rostock and causing another, Elbing, to be rammed by the dreadnought Posen and abandoned. The battle cruiser Lützow was torpedoed at 01:45 on orders of her captain (von Harder) by the destroyer G38 after the surviving crew of 1,150 transferred to destroyers that came alongside.

The Germans were helped in their escape by the failure of British naval intelligence in London to relay a critical radio intercept giving the true position of the High Sea Fleet.^{[citation needed]} By the time Jellicoe finally learned of Scheer's whereabouts at 04:15 it was clear the battle could no longer be resumed. There would be no "Glorious First of June" in 1916.

[edit] Damage to major ships during the battle

SMS Seydlitz

HMS Lion

SMS Lützow

See also: Damage to major ships at the Battle of Jutland

[edit] The outcome

SMS Seydlitz was heavily damaged in the battle, hit by twenty-one heavy shells and one torpedo. 98 men were killed and 55 injured

At Jutland, ninety-nine German ships sank 115,000 tons of British ships, while one hundred and fifty-one British ships sank 60,730 tons of the German fleet. The British lost 6,094 seamen, the Germans 2,551. Several other ships were badly damaged, such as HMS Lion and SMS Seydlitz. At the end of the battle the British had maintained their numerical superiority and had over twenty dreadnoughts and battle cruisers still able and ready to fight while the Germans had ten. Jellicoe was able to inform the Admiralty that the Grand Fleet was read to put to sea again on four hours notice at 21:45 on 2 June. Scheer was forced to inform the Kaiser that the High Sea Fleet would not be ready for combat before mid-August.

For the British, the outcome was a clear material defeat. But most importantly, the Grand Fleet still retained command of the seas and maintained a substantial numerical superiority over the High Sea Fleet. Tactically, the results were indecisive. The Germans had achieved a tactical victory over the Battle Cruiser Fleet, but then allowed itself to be crossed twice by the Grand Fleet crossing the T. The retreat by Scheer was a masterful extrication, but while saving the main body of the fleet he was quite prepared to sacrifice his battle cruisers which would have rendered the surviving High Sea Fleet even less ready to take on the British.

At a strategic level the outcome was not clear cut. The High Sea Fleet remained active and its presence as a fleet in being prevented a complete blockade of Germany. But Scheer himself was under no illusion about the future conduct of naval operations. In his report to the Kaiser, he wrote "there can be no doubt that that even the most favourable issue of a battle on the high seas WILL NOT COMPEL ENGLAND to make peace in THIS war." Instead, he stated that a "victorious termination of the war within measurable time can only be attained by destroying the economic existence of Great Britain, namely by the employment of submarines against British commerce". This after informing the Kaiser that "the LARGE WAR VESSEL, battleship and cruiser, is and remains, therefore, the foundation of Sea Power."^[11]

Defeat for either side would have proved catastrophic. A British loss would have undermined her ability to continue the war, dependent as she was upon the seas for the transport of goods and personnel. A German loss would have meant the imposition of a close blockade, probable economic defeat and the reopening of trade through the Baltic to assist a beleaguered Russian Empire.

[edit] Losses

[edit] British

• Battle cruisers Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible
• Armoured cruisers Black Prince, Warrior, Defence
• Flotilla Leaders Tipperary
• Destroyers Shark, Sparrowhawk, Turbulent, Ardent, Fortune, Nomad, Nestor

[edit] German

• Battle cruiser Lützow
• Pre-dreadnought Pommern
• Light cruisers Frauenlob, Elbing, Rostock, Wiesbaden
• (Heavy Torpedo Boats) Destroyers V48, S35, V27, V4, V29

[edit] British military honours from Jutland

[edit] Victoria Cross

• The Hon. Edward Barry Stewart Bingham (HMS Nestor)
• John Travers Cornwell (HMS Chester)
• Francis John William Harvey (HMS Lion)
• Loftus William Jones (HMS Shark)

[edit] Status of the survivors and wrecks

On the 90th anniversary of the battle, in 2006, the Ministry of Defence announced that the 14 British vessels lost in the battle were being designated as protected places under the Protection of Military Remains Act. The last living veteran of the battle is Henry Allingham, a British RAF (originally RNAS) airman, aged 111.^[12]

[edit] Notes

[edit] Citations

[edit] Reference list

[edit] External links

World War I Portal

Wikimedia Commons has media related to:

Category:Battle of Jutland

• Beatty's official report
• Jellicoe's official despatch
• Jellicoe, extract from The Grand Fleet, published 1919
• Jellicoe's report [1]
• Scheer, Germany's High Sea Fleet in the World War, published 1920
• Henry Allingham Last known survivor of the Battle of Jutland.
• Jutland Casualties Listed by Ship

[edit] Notable accounts

• by Rudyard Kipling
• by Alexander Grant, a gunner aboard HMS Lion
• by Moritz von Egidy, captain of SMS Seydlitz
• by Richard Foerster, gunnery officer on Seydlitz
• by Georg von Hase, gunnery officer on Derfflinger

(Note that due to the time zone difference, the times in some of the German accounts are two hours ahead of the times in this article.)