Talk:Hard problem of consciousness
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[edit] What about all the people who think this 'problem' is not a problem?
- "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
Depends on what the hell "rich inner life" means.
- "Why do qualia exist?"
Many of us believe that "qualia" certainly do not exist; it is a vague, quibbling, unhelpful and confusing notion.
- "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
What sort of "why" is that? What subjective component? What exactly does this mean?
- "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"
Many of us believe we are. And that 'philosophical zombie' is therefore a misleading term, as it implies the possibility of some other, ethereal force behind our consciousness, other than things we can observe. It also (literally) demonizes the perfectly sound theory that the apparent beauty and wonder of our minds are features that emerge from highly complex (but ultimately mechanical) cognitive functions.
This entire notion -- of there being a 'problem' with explaining consciousness -- seems to rely on us having a well-established explanation of what exactly people mean when they talk of 'subjectivity'. Which we don't. People always say, well, it's obvious what subjectivity is; we all experience it. In my opinion, if the nature of subjectivity was obvious, it would be easily explainable, without resorting to something like, "Well, you know what I mean, don't you? It's obvious." Clearly, ideas like subjectivity and qualia are far too vague and elusive to structure into arguments against other positions. This whole "problem of consciousness" thing is just a pain; it gets in the way of progress, just throwing in a bunch of confusing, ill-defined terms and saying, "See, nothing makes sense".
If people must get tied up with this idea and continue this article, please will someone write something acknowledging that a large number of people find this whole 'problem' non-existent. I would do it myself, but I don't really have any idea how philosophy encyclopaedia articles are supposed to be written, and I don't think I'd be very good at it, so I'd rather just give my opinion here on the talk page.
- Great post. Next time try to write something relevant to the article rather than its subject. Teflon Don (talk) 06:12, 19 November 2007 (UTC)
- It seems based upon the above post that the person who posted it, failed to grasp the issue of what the hard problem of consciousness is. I'm not sure anyone would believe themselves to possibly be a [philosophical zombie], if they understood the concept of what that is. Unless of course they were in fact a philosophical zombie. However I would like to know more about any possible arguments there are about there not being any problem. I can't see how one could argue that there isn't. Nhall0608 (talk) 22:24, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
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- He's not arguing that there isn't. He's stating that there isn't, but he isn't actually giving any reason (and isn't defeating any of the reasons that there IS a problem), so it's not an argument. It's just an unreasonable opinion. No more then spam, to be honest. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.53.37.218 (talk) 19:18, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
[edit] Need an explanation of the Opposing view
Reviewing the linked article "The Hard Problem is Dead", and Dennett's responses to Chalmers, I was unable to distill out a quote that captures the essense of their objection. It appears to be that they deny that consciousness exists in the same way as we experience it, challenge Chalmers to prove consciousness exists, and assert that if such a thing does not exist, then the "hard problem" set is empty. Possibly it is their assertion that consciousness is a biproduct when there exists all the mechanisms of sensation and cognition that can be explained functionally. In any case, the article would benefit if someone familiar with the opposing position can represent it succinctly so the nature of the opposing position may be more clearly understood. -Mak 18:08, 30 June 2007 (UTC)
There is a sort-of summary on Consciousness Explained. It is difficult to summarise DD's argument as he approaches the subject from several directions at once. 1Z 21:26, 30 June 2007 (UTC)
- I'm not sure Consciousness Explained is an appropriate opposing view. The book basically just redefines consciousness in order to ignore the problem instead of arguing that it is not a problem. It would be nice to see an opposing view that addresses why the hard problem is not really a problem instead of side stepping it. Nhall0608 (talk) 22:36, 12 December 2007 (UTC)
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- I agree that if it is the best counter-argument it should be put up. I was just hoping to hear of a counter argument with more merrit. It sounds like there are not any real counter arguments though, other than we don't have to think about the problem if we don't want to. 162.18.76.206 (talk) 16:47, 14 December 2007 (UTC)
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- Douglas Hofstadter (of Godel Escher Bach infamy) has recently published an incredible foray into the very idea that the "hard problem" does not exist - I Am A Strange Loop. I read Consciousness Explained a few years ago and didn't "get it" - I got a lot out of it, but I didn't really grasp the identity of what Dennett was trying to get across, and also felt frustrated that he had just redefined the problem out of existence. In contrast I think Hofstadter has succeeded immensely at communicating his message. I have just about finished it and I think now I do "get it". I don't know if he is right, or even if I fully believe it, but it is a solid, detailed, and utterly fascinating treatise on the nature of consciousness as the emergent high-level interactions of self-referencing symbols in the mind, analogous to the emergent high-level reality of self-referencing Godel statements in formal logic systems. Remy B (talk) 09:17, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
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- Excellent! I shall enjoy reading this book. Thank you! Nhall0608 (talk) 17:01, 28 February 2008 (UTC)
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[edit] Nagel "formulation"
"What is it like to be a bat?" is most certainly not a formulation of the hard problem. "Why is it like something to be a bat?" would be better, but we don't actually know that it is, and it doesn't add anything to what's already been expressed in previous formulations, which is why I just deleted that line instead of modifying it. This article is in my opinion pretty bad, but at this stage I don't know whether I'll manage to put much (or any) more time into improving it. Rebtech 11:11, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
[edit] Huh?
- "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
- "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
- "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
- "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
What the hell do any of these mean? If these are supposed to be specialized terms or jargon of some sort, I don't see them defined anywhere. -- Ultra Megatron (talk) 02:15, 20 November 2007 (UTC)
- Maybe it's just because I've been studying this area for a long time, but I see no specialised terms or jargon there. The only problem I have is with the last item: experience doesn't have a subjective component, it is the subjective component. Otherwise, I believe any decent English dictionary will tell you all you need to know to understand these questions. Rebtech (talk) 14:49, 2 January 2008 (UTC)
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- If it doesn't have a subjective component, wouldn't that imply that nothing lacks self-awareness? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.53.37.218 (talk) 19:23, 8 May 2008 (UTC)
