Hard problem of consciousness

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The term hard problem of consciousness, coined by David Chalmers[1], refers to the "hard problem" of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. That is, their proposed solutions, regardless of how complex or poorly understood they may be, can be entirely consistent with the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomenon. Hard problems are distinct from this set because they "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".[2].

Various formulations of the "hard problem":

  • "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?"
  • "How is it that some organisms are subjects of experience?"
  • "Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?"
  • "Why do qualia exist?"
  • "Why is there a subjective component to experience?"
  • "Why aren't we philosophical zombies?"
  • "Phenomenal Natures are categorically different than behavior"

It has been argued that the Hard Problem has had other scholarly inquiries considerably earlier than Chalmers. For instance, Leibniz wrote:

“Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. [3]

And as Isaac Newton wrote in a letter to Henry Oldenburg: "to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour is not so easie".[4]

Some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett,[5] oppose the idea that there is a hard problem.

[edit] References

  1. ^ The Place of Mind, ed. Brian Cooney
  2. ^ "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", David Chalmers, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3), 1995, pp. 200-219, , Retrieved 2007-06-26.
  3. ^ Leibniz, Monadology, 17, quoted by Istvan Aranyosi
  4. ^ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Panpsychism
  5. ^ "Commentary on Chalmers: Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness" by Daniel Dennett

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