Hard incompatibilism

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Hard incompatibilism is the philosophical belief that we do not have the kind of free will necessary for moral responsibility. It claims that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. It differs from hard determinism in that it does not commit to the truth of determinism.[1] This avoids any commitment on to questions of indeterminism in quantum mechanics. Typically, supporters of hard incompatibilism accept both libertarian critiques of compatibilism and compatiblist critiques of libertarianism. Hard incompatibilism is also known as pessimistic incompatibilism.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Pereboom, Derk. 2001. Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-79198-7
  • Pereboom, Derk. 2005. 'Defending Hard Incompatibilism'. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Vol. 29, No. 1, September 2005, pp. 228-247.

[edit] See also

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