Talk:Hans-Joachim Marseille

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

↓    Skip to table of contents    ↓

This is the talk page for discussing improvements to the Hans-Joachim Marseille article.
Article policies
Archives: 1, 2
This person is a Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross recipient
Good article Hans-Joachim Marseille has been listed as one of the History good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can delist it, or ask for a reassessment.
This article is within the scope of the following WikiProjects:
Maintained The following user(s) are actively contributing to this article and may be able to help with questions about verification and sources:
Dapi89 (talk) – Grant65 (talk) – MisterBee1966 (talk)
This in no way implies article ownership; all editors are encouraged to contribute.
This article is a frequent source of heated debate. Please try to keep a cool head when commenting here.
Archive
Archives
Archive 1
Archive 2


Contents

[edit] Defence of the Reich

I wonder if this should be included as one of Marseille's campaigns. He flew fighter protection over the Leuna plant in the summer of 1940. D.O.T.R operations lasted from the first day of the war to the last. (Having read Caldwell and Muller's The Luftwaffe over Germany: The Defence of the Reich). Dapi89 (talk) 11:14, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

BTW, I have added some more info on Marseille's victims. But I am unsure about the credibility of the website. Dapi89 (talk) 11:16, 26 April 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Strange quote?

"Bungay has pointed out the low military value of shooting down DAF fighters, rather than the bombers that, by mid-1942, were having a highly damaging effect on Axis ground units and convoy routes"

This sentence strikes me as nonsensical except Bungay proved that Marseille was ignoring bombers in favour of fighters. Blowing up bombers was nasty business for Luftwaffe fighters and the kill rate of Allied heavy bombers was comparatively low by any individual German pilot because you had to pour so much ammo into it until one went down. More importantly this sentence opens the question if Marseilles behaviour was different from any other pilot known who would rather go after easy kills like fighter bombers than slug it out with equally capable aircraft. More importantly I fail to see how that sentence is important for his biography, it sounds like an analysis of Luftwaffe combat tactics in North Africa. Even with his high amount of kills he wouldn't have affected how the German squadron prioritized targets and how easy/hard it was to go after the bombers. If it was not possible due to heavy escorts by the British one guy specialized in going after the escorts makes imo perfect sense and should have allowed others to go after the bombers. Altogether I fail to see the relevance of that sentence in regards of Marseilles. It would only fit into a bigger picture if backed by some argumentation why Luftwaffe failed at going after bombers.

Besides this being an Unsigned comment the sentence is relevant in the context of Marseille's claims; the Luftwaffe and JG 27 in particular, as the only Jagdgeshwader available, was the only protection the Afrika Korps had against constant attacks by Allied bombers and fighter bombers. Marseille and the rest of JG 27 were fully aware of this yet they persisted in going after the fighters - not one bomber was shot down on the day Marseille claimed 17 kills, ie; no-one took responsibility for attacking bombers while "one guy specialized in going after the escorts". In the meantime the German and Italian ground troops and supply lines were being pounded.
Which is why I didn't touch the entry or something. Anyway as you point out yourself the flaw somehow lay within the way the Luftwaffe operated over Africa. Again while it may be valid criticism of what the Luftwaffe did I fail to see its relevance in conjunction with one German pilot. If there was a mentality to go after fighters obviously none higher up in command did anything to correct it.
"Even with his high amount of kills he wouldn't have affected how the German squadron prioritized targets and how easy/hard it was to go after the bombers" Pure speculation. It could equally be argued that Marseille had such a high profile within JG 27 that he had every opportunity to influence what sort of targets should be attacked. There is always the possibility that had Marseille gone after bombers the rest of his Staffel would have followed his lead. With his abilities at using his 109 against fighters, who's to say he couldn't have found a way of attacking bombers with equal success?
"Blowing up bombers was nasty business for Luftwaffe fighters and the kill rate of Allied heavy bombers was comparatively low by any individual German pilot because you had to pour so much ammo into it until one went down." True against B-17s and B-24s, for example. The Bostons, Baltimores, Marylands and Blenheims which made up the bulk of the DAF bomber forces were not heavy bombers. Minorhistorian (talk) 00:17, 16 May 2008 (UTC)
Point taken. Which makes it kind of stranger that the Luftwaffe somehow consciously ignored easy kills in favour of risking a fight to the death with equally capable fighter aircraft. I mainly find the sentence out of place in criticizing one German pilot as you yourself state that it was a big problem not addressed by anyone of the Luftwaffe so either the Allied escorts did a marvelous job at keeping the Luftwaffe occupied with dealing with them so they got little opportunity to attack bombers or the whole Africa command of the Luftwaffe failed to appreciate targetting bombers. Even as commander of a Staffel it seems out of place to attribute this factor in the Luftwaffe's failure to him when obviously there should have been plenty of other pilots around less daring in attacking enemy fighters and rather out for an easy kill. Are there any quotes by Marseilles or his comrades that they only went up for fighters because they found it "unhonourable" to fight bombers. Such an attitude would imho be needed to make this sentence work as valid criticism of his shortcomings or attitude problem.

I don't mean to disrail the whole entry or start some pointless criticism. This point, while minor, simply stroke me as strange so I commented on it.

I also see your point. I don't have any such quotes I can cite; possibly someone else has.
It is interesting to note that Manfred von Richthofen has been at times criticised for shooting down so many "easy" two seat aircraft, eg: New Scientist. What such critics fail to mention is that "easy" victories against "poorly armed or less manoeuvrable aircraft" which were engaged in reconnaissance missions and bombing German military targets was militarily more effective than shooting down fighters.Minorhistorian (talk) 23:02, 16 May 2008 (UTC)

It should also be noted that some Luftwaffe units (as Galland said) focused on trying to defeat the escorting fighter screen first, then attacking the bombers. As the Luftwaffe was outnumbered from the time it stepped foot on African soil, it would seem this failure to deal with the bombers was down to numbers and doctrinal elements. Dapi89 (talk) 18:16, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

[edit] Tate's opinions

Major Robert Tate of the United States Air Force rejects Bungay's notion of internal rivalry in the German Jagdgeschwader:

This points out another very basic difference between German and Allied combat philosophy. While the Allies tended to hunt in packs and compete vigorously for kills, the Germans, at least in North Africa, tended to let the best pilots "have at it" while the novices would tend to sit back and enjoy the show. This is one reason the loss of an asset like Marseille was so devastating to the Luftwaffe in Africa. That kind of emotional destruction would not likely occur in Allied squadrons[1]

.


I don't see how it is possible to say that Tate is disputing Bungay's observations; Tate wrote his piece in 1996 while Bungay wrote Alamein in 2002. If anything Tate's column is more of a hackiography in which he views Marseille with evident adoration. What evidence does he have to back up his claim about the Allied pilots "hunting in packs and competing for kills"? What is his source material when he says the "Germans, at least in North Africa, tended to let the best pilots "have at it" while the novices would tend to sit back and enjoy the show."? This in itself backs up what Bungay describes as a primma-donna attitude. Few of the novices in JG 27 had any chance to learn anything in North Africa and many became victims because of this. Bungay also specifically cites and quotes Eduard Neumann as one of those who describes internal rivalry being a problem in JG 27, something which Tate ignores, even though he was reading one of the books in which Neumann is quoted. I'm not disputing Marseille's skill and valour, nor am I disputing his claims, but using an unsourced and uncritical assessment to counter critical analysis is pushing things somewhat. Minorhistorian (talk) 00:01, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

Perhaps it is not clear. It was not meant to say Tate was challenging Bungay's comments, merely that their assertions clash. The "opinions" described by Tate about the German combat philosophy are available in every decent text on the campaign. I have no reason to doubt the information he gives about the mentality of Allied pilots is accurate. If authors such as Donald Caldwell, who has written some of the best books about the Luftwaffe, graces this website I don't think it is suspect in any way. You are very much incorrect to say the German pilots were primma-donnas and elbowed the rookies out of the way. The cadets or raw recruits were shown what to do. Marseille tried to pass on his style this way, but few could pull it off. There are examples of German pilots, on all fronts, taking new pilots, attacking formations, then taking up the position of wingman and asking their charge to have a go. I thought I had all the filmed interviews with Eduard Neumann regarding JG 27, and he never mentioned rivalry being a problem, although it probably existed in all fighter squadrons (USAAF Fighter Groups were riddled with competition/rivals). Does Bungay footnote this quote? I see you have removed the bit you put in about German rivalry. Why? If Bungay said this was a problem and has a valid source it should go back in. Dapi89 (talk) 01:05, 28 April 2008 (UTC)

I agree, there are plenty of good sources about German combat philosophy and perhaps Tate should go back to his article and provide some sources; when I cited Kurfurst, you quite rightly asked what book sources were provided and the same question could be asked of Major Tate. The subject of inter-pilot rivalry in JG 27, and, more importantly, whether it crippled the unit's military capabilities is a matter of some debate, and I think that who said what needs more clarity. Although Bungay mentions Eduard Neumann as a source (Alamein, pp 140-141), in the same paragraph there's also mention of an unnamed pilot of I./JG 27 that Bungay quotes: "some squadron leaders had the attitude "There is only one man who has the right to shoot down enemy aircraft - me!"" - which could also be construed as being said by someone with a grudge and a case of sour grapes. On reflection the reference is not clear enough to warrant a debatable issue being added to the page. As far as I know the Osprey book on JG 27 by John Weal makes no reference to this issue.Minorhistorian (talk) 01:17, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

Yes, well, Weal is the better of the Osprey writers, although even he falls short in thoroughness in some areas. He doesn't discuss Marseille's tactics, just his kill count and it is the same with the others. Some aces are ignored altogether. Take Karl-Heinz Bendert for example. He is credited with 51 kills while a member of JG 27, of which 36 were claimed over Africa, which if correct, is better than Caldwell. He is not mentioned in the book at all!!!! I think this is a case of kill count snobery. Pertaining to style. Kurowski picks up on this point, and so does (I believe) Fritz Dettmann. They assert that without the protection given to Marseille by his comrades he would not have been as successful, and probably would have been killed in action. As it was Marseille came close to this early on. Numerous accounts exist of Marseille attacking formations of Allied aircraft alone. The rest of the German pilots would circle above and call out warnings, only interveening if Marseille called fot it. Dapi89 (talk) 15:08, 29 April 2008 (UTC)

BTW, fair enough with regard to Tate. Dapi89 (talk) 15:10, 29 April 2008 (UTC) Italic text

[edit] No. 1 Squadron SAAF on 1 September 1942

According to J.Scutts No. 1 Sqdn SAAF Hurricanes were called away from the morning combat to attack a formation of Stukas, implying they were not involved. Calls for help were ignored as they were "too busy" with the Ju 87s, is this right? Dapi89 (talk) 20:07, 23 May 2008 (UTC)