Hani Saiid Mohammad Al Khalif

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Hani Saiid Mohammad Al Khalif is a citizen of Saudi Arabia held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 438. American intelligence analysts estimate that Al Khalif was born in 1972, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.
Combatant Status Review Tribunal notice read to a Guantanamo captive. During the period July 2004 through March 2005 a Combatant Status Review Tribunal was convened to make a determination whether they had been correctly classified as an "enemy combatant". Participation was optional. The Department of Defense reports that 317 of the 558 captives who remained in Guantanamo, in military custody, attended their Tribunals.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hani Saiid Mohammad Al Khalif's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 27 September 2004.[2] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is associated with the Taliban:
  1. The detainee is a citizen of Saudi Arabia who left Saudi Arabia in November of 2000 for Afghanistan in order to fight in the jihad.
  2. The detainee told the Taliban that he was there to fight in the jihad.
  3. Upon arriving in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse in the winter of 2000.
  4. The detainee attended the Al Farouq training camp just outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan, for 45 to 50 days and was trained to use the Kalishnikov rifle, the PK machine gun, the 9mm pistol and rocket-propelled grenades.
  5. The detainee was captured in late 2001 by General Dostum's Northern Alliance Forces near Mazir-E-Sharif, after the US bombing campaign of the Konduz region had started.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States or its coalition partners:
  1. After finishing training in early 2001, the detainee was sent to the front lines at Kabul, Afghanistan, and fought there for five or six months.
  2. The detainee was then sent north to the front lines near Konduz, Afghanistan, and fought there for about five months until his capture in late 2001.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Hani Saiid Mohammad Al Khalif participated in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[3]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Hani Saiid Mohammad Al Khalif's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 18 April 2005.[4] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee, a Saudi Arabian citizen, traveled to Afghanistan in November of 2000 to fight in the jihad. He paid for his own travel with savings from his job at the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.
  2. The detainee told the Taliban that he was there to fight in the jihad.
  3. The detainee decided on his own that it was his duty as a Muslim to join the jihad in defense of other Muslims.
  4. The detainee traveled from Riyadh through Jordan to Damascus, Syria. He then took an Iranian Air Flight from Damascus to Tehran, Iran and then onto Mashed [sic] , Iran. He then crossed into Afghanistan from Mashed.
  5. This is a travel route for the movement of jihad volunteers from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. While in the Saudi Army, the detainee learned to use a 9mm pistol and a Hechler & Koch G-3 assault rifle.
  2. The detainee was trained to use the Kalishnikov rifle, the PK machine gun, the 9mm pistol, and rocket-propelled grenades while at the Farouq camp. He also had physical training, learned to read maps, dig trenches, and use camouflage techniques.
  3. The detainee trained at al Farouq in the detection, avoidance, disarming, and displacement of various antitank and antipersonnel mines.
  4. The detainee trained in the use and maintenance of the 82mm mortar near Konduz, Afghanistan.
c. Associations
  1. Detainee seems to know another detainee well.
  2. That detainee was the acting Taliban Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif [sic] .
  3. Upon arrival in Afghanistan, detainee stayed at a guesthouse.
  4. The guesthouse was managed by a close personal friend of Mullah Omar.
  5. The guesthouse manager sent the detainee to an Arab guesthouse in Kandahar.
  6. An al Qaida facilitator knew the detainee as Haydarah Salim Al-Libi.
  7. Haydarah Al-Libi was in charge of logistics for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in Karachi, Pakistan.
  8. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group as a foreign terrorist organization.
d. Intent
  1. After finishing training in early 2001, the detainee was sent to the frontlines at Kabul, Afghanistan, and fought there for five or six months.
  2. The detainee was then sent north to the frontlines near Konduz, Afghanistan, and fought there for about five months until his capture in late 2001.
  3. The detainee was captured in late 2001 by General Dostum's Northern Alliance Forces near Mazir-e-Sharif, after the U.S. bombing campaign of the Konduz region had started.
  4. The detainee stated he would only wage jihad against the United States if the United States was involved in killing Muslims.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

During the Gulf war, the detainee fought side by side with the United States Marines in Saudi Arabia.
b.

The detainee said he has never been an enemy of the United States, nor has he supported any efforts against them.
c.

The detainee said he left Saudi Arabia to fight the jihad long before Americans were in Afghanistan. If he were released, the detainee would like to get a job, start a family and have a normal life.
d.

Detainee denies any affiliation with al Qaida and denies knowing anyone from al Qaida.

[edit] Transcript

Although he did not attend this hearing, the DoD released a two page summarized transcript of the unclassified portion of his hearing.[5] The transcript recorded that his Assisting Military Officer had prepared a summary of the pre-hearing interviews with Al Khalif. This summary was not attached to the transcript.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Ald Mohammad Al Hala's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 11 July 2006.[6] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] Transcript

Ald Mohammad Al Hala attended his second hearing.[5] The Department of Defense released a 17 page summarized transcript in September 2007.

[edit] Enemy Combatant election form

His Asssisting Military Officer reported that they met for an pre-hearing interview on

17 July 2006, and read from the Enemy Combatant Election Form that

"The detainee was attentive and polite throughout the interview."

[edit] Response to the factors

  • Hani said he came to his conclusions on his obligations to engage in jihad through his own reading.
  • Hani said he decided to join the Taliban because he thought the Taliban was the legitimate government of Afghanistan.
  • Hani confirmed he and his cousin had traveled to Afghanistan, and had attended an Afghan training camp. He said he didn't learn the camp's name, so he could not confirm or dispute whether it was the Al Farouq camp.
  • Hani confirmed he spent half a year on the front lines, then took another course on how to use a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.
  • Hani confirmed he had enlisted in the Saudi Army during the 1991 Gulf War.
  • Hani said he had never received explosives training.
  • Hani disputed that he had been a member of Abu Layth al Libi's group. He stated:

    I have never been a member of Layth al Libi's group. This is the first time I have heard of it.

  • Hani disputed that he was in charge of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. He stated he had never heard of it in Afghanistan, hearing of it for the first time during his interrogation.
  • Hani confirmed he had never engaged in hostilies against the USA, including never firing on American planes during the American aerial bombardment of Afghanistan. He confirmed that he was injured during a friendly fire incident by a Taliban fighter, during a retreat from the Northern Alliance.
  • Hani confirmed his Taliban superiors told him to surrender to General Dostum at Mazari Sharif. He confirmed he was told that foreigners who surrendered peacefully to Dostum would be allowed to return to their home countries.
  • Hani confirmed he had no knowledge of any attacks on the USA.
  • Hani confirmed that he had no knowledge of planned uprisings within Guantanamo.
  • Hani confirmed that he had no affiliation with al Qaida, and that he didn't know anyone affiliated with al Qaida.
  • Hani confirmed that when he heard about al Qaeda's attacks on the USA he disapproved because the Koran forbids that kind of killing.
  • Hani confirmed that he does not consider the USA an enemy.

[edit] Response to Board questioning

Most of the Board's questioning addressed Hani's knowledge of and response to the three recent suicides. Additional time was devoted to inquiries about Guantanamo medical care.

At the end of the hearing, after a brief discussion about what his plans would be if he were sent home, his Presiding Officer encouraged Hani to regard his treatment during the hearing as respectful. His Presiding Officer encouraged him to encourage other captives to attend their hearings.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ OARDEC (27 September 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Khalif, Hani Saiid Mohammad pages 102-103. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-19.
  3. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  4. ^ OARDEC (18 April 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Khalif, Hani Saiid Mohammad pages 87-89. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-31.
  5. ^ a b OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 438 pages 1-2. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-31.
  6. ^ OARDEC (11 July 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Hala, Ald Mohammad pages 58-61. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-31.