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Warsaw Uprising
Part of Operation Tempest, World War II
A postwar sculpture of the Kotwica standing before the bullet-riddled Bank of Poland Redoubt (The "Anchor" is formed from the letters "P" and "W," for Polska walcząca — "Fighting Poland").
Date 1 August to 2 October 1944 Location Warsaw, Poland Result German victory, uprising crushed
Belligerents
Poland	Third Reich
Commanders
Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski #, Antoni Chruściel #, Tadeusz Pełczyński	Erich von dem Bach, Rainer Stahel, Heinz Reinefarth, Bronislav Kaminski
Strength
50,000 troops (15,000 armed)	25,000 troops
Casualties and losses
18,000 killed, 12,000 wounded, 15,000 taken prisoner 250,000 civilians killed	10,000 killed, 7,000 missing, 9,000 wounded

Operation Tempest Volhynia – Kowel – Łuck – Równe – Włodzimierz Wołyński – Lubartów – Kock – Operation Ostra Brama – Krawczuny – Miedniki – Rudniki Forest – Lwów Uprising – Jodła – Ceber – Warsaw Uprising

Warsaw Uprising

Prelude - The Battle Lack of outside support Capitulation - Aftermath Planned destruction Cultural representations Military units - Notable people Atrocities

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The Warsaw Uprising (Powstanie Warszawskie) was an armed struggle during the Second World War by the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule. It started on August 1, 1944, as part of a nationwide uprising, Operation Tempest. The Polish troops resisted the German-led forces until October 2 (63 days in total). Losses on the Polish side amounted to 18,000 soldiers killed, 25,000 wounded and over 250,000 civilians killed, mostly in mass executions conducted by advancing German troops. Casualties on the German side amounted to over 17,000 soldiers killed and 9,000 wounded. During the urban combat—and after the end of hostilities, when German forces acting on Hitler's orders burned the city systematically, block after block—an estimated 85% of the city was destroyed.

The Uprising started at a crucial point in the war as the Soviet army approached Warsaw. The Soviet army had reached a point within a few hundred meters across the Vistula River from the city on September 16, but failed to make further headway in the course of the Uprising, leading to accusations that Stalin did not want the Uprising to succeed.

There is no evidence that the Home Army coordinated its struggle with the Soviet Army. According to Russian memoirs (for example Konstantin Rokossovsky who led the Warsaw liberation) the Home Army tried to liberate the city before (and without) the Soviet army.

Contents 1 Eve of battle 1.1 Operation Tempest 1.2 Diplomacy with the Soviets and other Allies 1.3 The Soviet advance 1.4 German defensive preparations 2 Opposing forces 3 The battle 3.1 W-hour 3.2 First moves 3.3 German reinforcements 3.4 Wola Massacre 3.5 Ochota 3.6 Old Town 3.7 Loss of Żoliborz and Old Town 3.8 Sewers and barricades 3.9 Life behind the front lines 4 Lack of outside support 4.1 The airdrops 4.2 Soviet 'help': Berling landings on Powiśle 4.3 Closed or destroyed military archives 5 Capitulation 5.1 The signing of the Capitulation Agreement 6 Reasons for failure 7 Casualties 8 Aftermath 8.1 Expulsion of civilians 8.2 Destruction of the city 8.3 Political arena 8.4 The legacy 8.5 Armia Krajowa soldiers who remained in Poland 8.6 Armia Krajowa soldiers who were liberated by the Allies 8.7 Long term effect on Communist Poland 8.8 After the war 9 See also 10 Notes and references 11 External links

[edit] Eve of battle

[edit] Operation Tempest

From the very beginning of its existence the Home Army was planning a national uprising against the German forces. Initial plans created by the Polish government-in-exile in 1942 assumed that the allied invasion of Europe would lead to the withdrawal of considerable German forces from the Eastern Front for the defence of the Third Reich. The Home Army would act to prevent troop transfer to the west and to allow the British and American forces to seize Germany by breaking all communication links with the majority of German forces massed in the Soviet Union.

However, by 1943 it became apparent that the allied invasion of Europe would not come in time, and that in all probability the Red Army would reach the pre-war borders of Poland before the invasion had well begun. In February, 1943, general Stefan Rowecki amended the plan. The Uprising was to be started in three phases, the first being in the East (with main centres of resistance in Lwów and Wilno), before the advancing Red Army. The second part was to include armed struggle in the belt between the Curzon Line and the Vistula river, while the third part was to be a nationwide uprising in all of Poland.

Polish-Soviet relations were broken off on April 25, 1943 due to the Katyn massacre, and it became obvious that the advancing Red Army might not come to Poland as a liberator but rather, as General Rowecki put it, "Our Allies' Ally". On November 26, 1943 the Polish government in exile issued an instruction to the effect that if diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were not resumed before their entry to Poland, the Home Army forces were to remain underground until further decisions were made. However, the Home Army commander took a different approach, and on November 30, 1943 the final version of the plan was created. It became known as Operation Tempest.

[edit] Diplomacy with the Soviets and other Allies

The Warsaw Uprising, or at least some form of insurrection in Poland, had been planned long in advance. Warsaw was chosen, partially, because of its status as a pre-war capital. The allies foresaw that the Germans would wish to hold onto Warsaw for as long as possible, as a tool of morale, communications and supply and troop movement, The Polish government-in-exile strongly wanted support from the other allies. For this reason they carried out frantic diplomatic efforts to gain support from their allies prior to the start of battle. Although there were supply drops by American, British and Polish forces prior to, and during the Uprising most fell uselessly into German hands. This left the Polish Home Army forces seriously under supplied.

Please help improve this section by expanding it. Further information might be found on the talk page or at requests for expansion.

[edit] The Soviet advance

The plan was intended both as a political manifestation of the influence of Polish Government in Exile and as a direct operation against German occupiers. The fear was that in the aftermath of the war the allies would ignore the legal London-based government. It was clear that Poland would be 'liberated' by the Red Army, and that the Soviet Union did not recognise the Government-in-Exile.

Initially, after the Red Army forces crossed the pre-war Polish borders, the local Home Army units were engaged in successful cooperation with the Soviets in liberating several towns and cities. However, in most cases after the struggle ended the Polish officers and members of local administration were caught by the NKVD and either shot or sent to Gulags and prisons in Russia. At the same time most of the Polish soldiers caught by the Soviets were given the choice of either joining the Soviet-backed Polish People's Army or sharing the fate of their officers.

Nevertheless, the Soviet advance was fast, and the Polish authorities saw no other choice but to continue the struggle against the German forces and aid the Soviets. At the same time the government in London asked the SOE and the Foreign Office several times for an allied mission to Poland to be sent; such missions had already been dispatched to all resistance movements in Europe, including Albania, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Yugoslavia. However, the pleas were not fulfilled until December 1944.

The official line of Soviet propaganda was that the Polish underground was "waiting with their arms at ease" and was not fighting the common enemy. As the Soviet forces were nearing Warsaw in June and July 1944, the Soviet radio stations demanded a full national uprising in Warsaw to cut the communication lines of the German units still on the right bank of the Vistula. On July 29, 1944 the first Soviet armoured units reached the outskirts of Warsaw.

With the recent flood of reports from the eastern territories about forced demilitarisation, trials and execution of Home Army soldiers by the Soviets, on 21 July 1944 the High Command of the Home Army decided to expand the scope of the Operation Tempest to include Warsaw itself. The date for the Warsaw Uprising was set to 1 August.

[edit] German defensive preparations

By the end of July the town had been declared "Festung Warschau" (Fortress Warsaw) by the Germans. It was to be defended at all cost against the Soviet offensive. However, the July 20 Plot and the failed attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler made many German units withdraw westward through Warsaw. The Home Army saw it as a sign of defeat of the Germans. The number of German soldiers in the area was lowered significantly.

On July 27, the governor of the General Government, Hans Frank called for 100,000 Polish men between the ages of 17–65 to arrive at several concentration places in Warsaw the following day. They were to be employed at construction of fortifications for the Wehrmacht in and around the city. This move was viewed by the Home Army as an attempt to neutralise the underground forces and the underground urged Warsaw inhabitants to ignore it. Fearing German reprisal actions, general Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski ordered full mobilisation of Home Army forces in Warsaw area.

[edit] Opposing forces

Main article: List of military units in the Warsaw Uprising

The Home Army forces of the Warsaw District numbered about 50,000 soldiers, 23,000 of them equipped and combat-ready. Most of them had trained for several years in partisan warfare and urban guerrilla warfare, but lacked experience in prolonged daylight fighting. The forces lacked equipment, especially since the Home Army had shuttled weapons and men to the east of Warsaw before making the decision on 21 July to include Warsaw in Operation Tempest. Besides the Home Army itself, a number of other partisan groups subordinated themselves to Home Army command for the uprising. Finally, many volunteers, including some Jews freed from the concentration camp in the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto, joined as the fighting continued.

General Antoni Chruściel, codename 'Monter', commanded the Polish forces in Warsaw. Initially he divided his forces into eight areas:

• Area I (Śródmieście, Old Town)
• Area II (Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany)
• Area III (Wola)
• Area IV (Ochota)
• Area V (Mokotów)
• Area VI (Praga)
• Area VII (Powiat Warszawski)
• Zgrupowanie Kedywu Komendy Głównej

On September 20 a re-organisation of this structure took place to fit the structure of Polish forces fighting among the Western Allies. The entire force, renamed the Warsaw Home Army Corps (Warszawski Korpus Armii Krajowej) and commanded by General Antoni Chruściel (Monter), formed into three infantry divisions.

As of August 1 their military supplies consisted of:

• 1,000 rifles
• 1,700 pistols
• 300 machine pistols
• 60 submachine guns
• 7 machine guns (medium or light, such as the MG 42)
• 35 anti-tank guns and carbines (including several PIATs)
• 25,000 hand grenades (mainly of the 'stick' variety).

In the course of the fighting the Poles obtained further gear through airdrops and by capture from the enemy (including several armoured vehicles). Also, the insurgents’ workshops worked busily throughout the uprising, producing 300 automatic pistols, 150 flame-throwers, 40,000 grenades, a number of mortars, and even an armoured car (Kubuś).

On August 1, 1944, the German garrison in Warsaw numbered some 10,000 troops under General Rainer Stahel. Together with various units on the left bank of the Vistula River, German forces comprised some 15,000 to 16,000 Wehrmacht soldiers as well as SS and police forces. Critically, these well-equipped German forces had been prepared for the defence of the city's key positions for many months. Several hundred concrete bunkers and barbed wire lines protected the buildings and areas occupied by the Germans. Also, at least 90,000 additional German troops were available from occupation forces in the surrounding area.

As of August 23, 1944, the German units directly involved with fighting in Warsaw included:

• Battle Group Rohr (commanded by Major General Rohr)
• Battle Group Reinefarth (commanded by SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth)
  • Attack Group Dirlewanger Brigade
  • Attack Group Reck (commanded by Major Reck)
  • Attack Group Schmidt (commanded by Colonel Schmidt)
  • Various support and backup units
• Warsaw Garrison (Group of Warsaw Commandant) commanded by Lieutenant General Stahel

[edit] The battle

[edit] W-hour

"W-hour" (from the Polish wybuch, "outbreak"[1]), the moment of the start of the uprising, had been rescheduled for 1 August at 1700 during a briefing on 31 July around 1730. The change of "W-hour" from 2400 (in earlier plans) to 1700 proved to be a costly strategic decision, reducing the chance of surprising the Germans, especially since many of the Polish partisans were not trained for prolonged day fighting. The order to start the uprising did not reach all of the units (around 23,000 personnel) due to organisational problems. The Warsaw Uprising began with simultaneous coordinated attacks at 17:00 hours on August 1, 1944.

The uprising was intended to last a few days until Soviet forces arrived; however, this never happened, and the Polish forces had to fight almost without any outside assistance. Initially the battle raged throughout most of Warsaw, but after a short time it became confined to districts in the West of the town. The key factor in the battle was the massive imbalance of weapons between the two sides. The German side was extremely well equipped whilst the Polish side had, initially, barely enough ammunition for a few days. The policy of one bullet, one German allowed the Polish fighters to sustain the uprising for many weeks at the cost of their own lives. Some areas fought for a full 63 days before an agreed capitulation took place. The losses on the Polish side amounted to 18,000 soldiers killed, 25,000 wounded and over 250,000 civilians killed; those on the German side amounted to over 17,000 soldiers killed and 9,000 wounded.

Although Stalingrad had already shown the level of danger which a city can pose to armies which fight within it and the importance of local support to armies, the Warsaw uprising was probably the first demonstration that in an urban terrain, a vastly under-equipped force supported by the civilian population can hold its own against far better equipped professional soldiers— though at the cost of vast sacrifices on the part of the city's residents.

[edit] First moves

Fighting broke out before the "W-hour" (scheduled for 1700) in several places where German units encountered organising Polish forces: around 1400 on Żoliborz, 1500 on Czerniaków, 1600 around Plac Napoleona, Hale Mirowskie, Plac Kercelego marketplace, Okopowa street and Mokotów.

Until "W-hour" those separate incidents were not generally perceived as part of a bigger plan. However, around 1600 SS-Standartenfuhrer Paul Otto Geibel, chief of police and SS in the Warsaw District, received a warning about the uprising from an anonymous 'lieutenant of Luftwaffe', who had in turn been warned about it by a Polish woman. He alerted the units under his command, which thus were prepared for the assault at 1700. This drastically reduced the element of surprise of the insurgents. On the other hand, while the Germans had been considering the possibility of an uprising, they had no operational plans prepared for such an occasion.

The results of the first two days of fighting in different parts of the city were as follows:

Area I (Śródmieście, Stare Miasto): Units in that area captured most of their assigned territory, but failed to capture strong German pockets of resistance (the Warsaw University buildings, PAST skyscraper, or the headquarters of the German garrison at Piłsudski square). They thus failed to create a central stronghold and secure communications links for other areas. The main failures were in establishing a secure land connection with the northern area of Żoliborz through the northern railway line and the Cytadela fortress as well as failure to capture the bridges over Vistula. The forces mobilized in the city centre also failed to capture the German-only area near the Szucha avenue.

Area II (Żoliborz, Marymont, Bielany): Units here failed to secure the most important military targets in the area of Żoliborz. Many units retreated outside of the city, into the forests. Although the main body of the area was captured, the soldiers of colonel Żywiciel failed to capture the Cytadela fortress area and break through German defences at Warszawa Gdańska railway station.

Area III (Wola): Units here initially succeeded in securing most of the territory, but sustained heavy losses (up to 30%). Some units retreated into the forests, while others retreated to the eastern part of the area. In the northern part of Wola the soldiers of colonel Radosław managed to capture the German barracks, the German supplies depot at Stawki Street, and the flanking position at the Jewish cemetery.

Area IV (Ochota): The units mobilized in this area did not capture either the territory or the military targets (the Warsaw concentration camp on Gęsia street, SS barracks and Sipo barracks located in former Students House on Narutowicz square, nick-named Alcatraz). After suffering heavy casualties most of the forces of the Armia Krajowa retreated to the forests west of Warsaw. Only two small units of approximately 200 to 300 men under lieut. Gustaw stayed in the area and managed to create strong pockets of resistance. They were later reinforced by units from the city centre. Units of Kedyw managed to secure most of the northern part of the area and captured all of the military targets there. However, they were soon tied down by German resistance from the south and west.

Area V (Mokotów): The situation in this area was very serious from the beginning of hostilities. The partisans were to capture the heavily-defended and fortified so-called Police Area (Dzielnica policyjna) on Rakowiecka street. Also, they were to establish a connection with the city centre through open terrain at Pola Mokotowskie. None of this succeeded. Some units retreated into the forests, while others managed to capture parts of Dolny Mokotów, which was, however, severed from most communications routes to other areas.

Area VI (Praga): The Uprising was also started on the right bank of the Vistula. The main task of the Area VI (Obwód VI) was to seize the bridges on the river and secure the bridgeheads until the arrival of the Red Army. It was clear that, since the situation was far worse than in other areas, there was no chance for any help from the outside. After some minor initial success, the forces of lt.col. Antoni Władysław Żurowski were badly outnumbered by the German forces concentrated there. The fights were halted, and the Home Army forces located in the Praga area went underground. After the Soviets finally reached the right bank of the Vistula on September 10, the officers proposed recreating the pre-war 36th 'Academic Legion' infantry regiment; however, they were all arrested by the NKVD and sent to Russia for interrogation.

Area VII (Powiat Warszawski): this area consisted of territories outside Warsaw city limits. Actions here mostly failed to capture their targets.

Zgrupowanie Kedywu Komendy Głównej: These units secured parts of Śródmieście and Wola; along with the units of Area I, they were the most successful during the first few hours.

Many primary targets were not achieved on the first and subsequent days. Those included the early plans to capture the PAST building and failed attacks on Okęcie, Pola Mokotowskie and Warszawa Gdańska train station. After the first several hours of fighting many units adopted a more defensive strategy, while the civilian population started erecting barricades throughout the city.

[edit] German reinforcements

The Uprising reached its apogee on August 4 when the Home Army soldiers managed to establish frontlines in the Wola and Ochota districts. However, they failed to secure the bridges over the Vistula or bridgeheads on the other side of the river. Also, there were still several German pockets of resistance inside the Polish-controlled territory, most notably the PAST skyscraper, the bridgeheads, and Headquarters of the police.

On that very same day SS general Erich von dem Bach was appointed commander of all the forces fighting the uprising and began concentrating the newly arrived troops. These included Units of Dirlewanger, Schmidt and Reinefarth. The main aim of the German forces was to break through to the German bridgeheads and then cut off the Uprising from the river by attacking both southward and northward.

[edit] Wola Massacre

For more details on this topic, see Wola Massacre.

On August 5 the three German groups started their advance westward along Wolska and Górczewska streets toward the main East-West communication line of Aleje Jerozolimskie Av. Their advance was halted, but the Reinefarth and Dirlewanger regiments started to carry out orders of Heinrich Himmler: behind the lines special groups of SS, police and Wehrmacht went from house to house shooting all inhabitants and burning their bodies. The aim of this policy was to crush the will to fight and put the uprising to an end without having to commit to heavy city fighting. In mass executions approximately 40,000 civilians were slaughtered. At the same time the Zośka and Wacek battalions managed to capture the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto and the Warsaw concentration camp. The area became one of the main communication links between the insurgents fighting in Wola and those defending the Old Town.

On August 7 the German forces were joined by tanks, with civilians being used as human shields. After two days of heavy fights they managed to cut Wola in two and reach the Bankowy square.

Until mid September, the Germans were shooting all captured insurgents on the spot. The main perpetrators were Oskar Dirlewanger and Bronislaw Kaminski, who committed the most cruel atrocities. After von dem Bachs arrived in Warsaw (August 7), it became clear that atrocities only stiffened the resistance and that some political solution should be found, considering the small forces at the disposal of the German commander. The aim was to gain a significant victory to show the Home Army the futility of further fighting and make them surrender. This did not succeed, but from the end of September on, some of the captured Polish soldiers were treated as POWs.

[edit] Ochota

Simultaneously with the German attack on Wola, the Kaminski Brigade started its onslaught on the Ochota district. The forces defending the area consisted of only two ill-equipped battalions, while the Germans were aided by tanks, artillery and Goliath self-propelled mines. However, the morale of German and Russian troops fighting in the area was low, and the main aim of the soldiers fighting there was to loot and rape rather than to attack enemy positions. As a result, the two battalions of the Home Army managed to defend the area with heavy casualties until August 11, when they retreated toward Mokotów.

[edit] Old Town

The Old Town area (Polish Starówka or Stare Miasto) was initially weak and almost undefended. However, it posed a great threat to the German-held bridgehead of the Kierbedź bridge. Also, the Polish positions were close enough to the northern railway line and the Cytadela stronghold to prevent the Germans from effectively using them. Knowing that, the Germans planned to cut off the Old Town both from the north (attack along the railway line toward Vistula) and from the south (attack from the Bankowy sq. Most Kierbedzia bridge). On August 9 the German units from the Mariensztat area managed to capture the Royal Castle, but failed to drive further inland. The Home Army counter-attacked and on August 12 forced the Germans out of Bankowy sq. However, German aerial bombardment and extensive usage of tanks imposed high casualties on both the defenders of the Old Town and the civilians. One of the first buildings to be bombed was a field hospital marked with a huge symbol of the Red Cross on the roof.

A German attack from the north was also halted with heavy casualties on both sides. Heavy city fighting started in the area of Plac Bankowy, with the square and the nearby barricade at Tłomackie street changing hands several times. The Germans managed to establish a link with the German forces under siege in the building of the German Garrison (Mostowski Palace) on August 15, but the huge building became a scene of heavy door-to-door and room-to-room fights. The fights lasted until August 18 when both sides withdrew from the ruins.

The no-mans-land and the covering positions of the Polish defence lines were composed of Warsaw Ghetto ruins and big open areas of Kercelak sq., Żytnia street and Leszno street. The Home Army was not well enough equipped to withstand a German armoured attack in open field. However, the main positions in the Old Town were densely urbanised and covered with small, narrow streets. Because of that, after initial successes in taking the outer rim, the German advance was halted. However, Germans amassed large numbers of artillery for the constant bombardment of the area behind Polish lines. According to von dem Bach himself the number of guns used in the bombardment was as follows:

• 220 guns of various calibres
• 1 heavy mortar Thor 610mm
• 50 Goliath self-propelled mines
• one company of Nebelwerfer 42/43
• one battery of Wurfgranate of various calibres (ranging from 150mm to 320mm)
• 4 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers operating from the Okęcie airport ¹

¹One of the planes was shot down by Polish troops with hand guns on August 26.

The usage of heavy artillery and constant air bombardment (the planes from Okęcie airport needed only 5 minutes to reach their targets) was to inflict heavy casualties on the civilians and destroy the city itself. This aim was expressed in direct orders of Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler and Heinz Guderian.

Despite German superiority, both technical and numerical, the Old Town was held until the end of August. However, the situation of both the Home Army and the civilians became critical: lack of food, water and munitions made further defence of the ruins impossible. Several plans to break through the German positions in Ogród Saski park to the downtown and through the northern railroad to Żoliborz failed. On September 2 the defenders of the Old Town withdrew through the sewers. More than 5,300 men and women were evacuated using this way.

[edit] Loss of Żoliborz and Old Town

The front lines stabilised for a short while, but during the upcoming days and weeks the German counter-offensive would recapture Żoliborz and the Old Town, splitting the area held by insurgents into three separate sectors, connected only by underground canals.

[edit] Sewers and barricades

The city sewer system became an important communication network for the insurgents, who used the sewers to move under the areas occupied by Germans, thus allowing contact between surrounded positions (insurgents had almost no radios). Sewers were also used as a means of evacuation of areas that couldn't be defended any longer.

[edit] Life behind the front lines

In the first weeks of the Uprising on Polish-controlled territory, people tried to recreate normal life in their free country. Cultural life was vibrant, with theatres, post offices, newspapers and similar activities. Boys and girls of the Polish Scouts acted as couriers for an underground postal service, risking their lives daily to transmit any information that might help their people. Near the end of the Uprising, lack of food, medicine, overcrowding and obviously indiscriminate German air and artillery assault on the city made the civilian situation more and more desperate.

Please help improve this section by expanding it. Further information might be found on the talk page or at requests for expansion.

[edit] Lack of outside support

According to many historians^{[citation needed]}, a major cause of the uprising's failure was the almost complete lack of outside support and the late arrival of the support which did arrive. The only support operation which ran continuously for the duration of the Uprising were night supply drops by long-range planes of the RAF, other Commonwealth air forces, and units of the Polish Air Force, which had to use distant airfields in Italy and so had very limited effect.

One explanation which has been given for the lack of outside support is that the uprising began too early and so the nearby Soviet forces were not ready to support. This explanation, however, appears to be contradicted by the fact that, at times during the uprising the NKVD was actively arresting Home Army forces in the East of Warsaw and that a large proportion of RAF losses were caused by Soviet anti-aircraft fire. Two further explanations have been given for the failure of Allied support. The first is that the Soviets misunderstood the circumstances of the uprising, though, again this cannot easily explain their attacks on their own allies, the British, without some further complication. The second is that the Soviet forces deliberately blocked the Western Allies from providing support to the Polish forces to support their desire to have Warsaw and any independent-minded Polish forces destroyed before their arrival.

An alternative explanation is that, regardless of Stalin's political intentions, the Red Army was simply exhausted and hence unable to extend effective support to the Uprising. In support of this thesis, it is often claimed that since the opening of Operation Bagration many of Red Army units had covered several hundred miles in a far-ranging offensive, and their advance elements were at the very end of their logistical tether. This, coupled with the presence of several fresh SS and Panzer divisions around Warsaw which administered a sharp reverse to the Soviet 2nd Tank Army in the final days of July, was, according to this view, sufficient to stop the Red Army in its tracks on the Warsaw front. However, it must be kept in mind that the units which reached Warsaw in late July 1944 were not part of Bagration, but instead advanced from Western Ukraine as part of the Lublin-Brest Operation, covering a much smaller distance. Those units were in fact able to operate quite effectively against German forces to the south and north of Warsaw during August and September, successfully securing bridgeheads over the Vistula and Narew rivers in those sectors. Given that Soviet success, the apparent inactivity on the most direct route of approach towards Warsaw, through the suburb of Praga, lasting through August and the first half of September, is to say the least puzzling. Furthermore, once the Soviet forces seized Praga in mid-September 1944, only poorly supported units of the inexperienced 1st Polish Army were assigned to attempt the crossing of the river Vistula to aid the insurgents. Those crossings failed to establish a durable foothold on the left bank of the river, and caused considerable casualties among the Polish units involved. It is an open question whether an earlier Soviet effort using more experienced units with adequate support would have been able to reach and cross the Vistula in the Warsaw sector, and provide timely and effective support to the Polish units fighting in the main part of the city. The continued difficulty in accessing the Soviet documents of the time presently located in the Russian archives makes it difficult for historians to answer this question with any degree of certainty.

[edit] The airdrops

From August 4 the Western Allies begun supporting the Warsaw Uprising with airdrops of munitions and other supplies. Initially the air raids were carried out mostly by 1568 Polish Flight of the PAF stationed in Bari and Brindisi in Italy flying Liberators, Halifaxes and DC-3 Dakotas. Later on at the insistence of the Polish government-in-exile they were joined by the Liberators of 2 Wing - 31 and 34 Squadrons of the SAAF based at Foggia in Southern Italy, and Halifaxes, flown by 148 and 178 Squadrons of the RAF. The drops continued September 21. The total weight of allied drops was 104 tons.

The Soviet Union did not give permission to the Allies for use of its airports for those supply operations and thus the planes were forced to use bases in the United Kingdom and Italy which reduced their carrying weight and number of sorties. The Allies specific request for the use of landing strips made on 20 August was denied by Stalin on 22 August (he referred to the insurgents as 'a handful of criminals').

United States planes did not join the operation. After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegrammed Roosevelt on August 25 and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to 'see what happens'. Roosevelt replied on August 26: 'I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe'.^[3]

Although German air defence over the Warsaw area itself was almost non-existent about 12% of the 296 planes taking part in the operations were lost because they had to fly 1,600 km out over heavily defended enemy territory and then back over the same route. Most of the drops were made during night, at no more than 100-300 feet altitude, and poor accuracy left many parachuted packages stranded behind German-controlled territory.

From September 13 on the Soviets began their own airdrop raids with supplies, and dropped about 55 tons in total. The drops continued until September 28. Since the Soviet airmen did not equip the containers with parachutes, the majority of recovered packages were damaged. Finally on September 18 the Soviets allowed one USAAF flight of 110 B-17s of the 3 division Eighth Air Force to re-fuel and reload at Soviet airfields used in Operation Frantic, but it was too little too late. On their return flight to Foggia and then back to England the B-17's bombed the rail yards in Budapest, Hungary, which of course was still in German-occupied territory.

[edit] Soviet 'help': Berling landings on Powiśle

The role of the Red Army during the Warsaw Uprising remains controversial and is still disputed by some historians. The Uprising started when the Red Army appeared on the city's doorstep, and the Poles in Warsaw were counting on Soviet aid coming in a matter of days. This basic scenario of an uprising against the Germans launched a few days before the arrival of Allied forces played out successfully in a number of European capitals, notably Paris and Prague. However, despite standing for about 40 days less than 10 km from Warsaw's city center, and then moving even closer, to the right bank of the Vistula river a few hundred meters away from the main battle of the uprising during its last two weeks, the Red Army did not extend effective aid to the desperate city. Some Western historians, as well as the official line of the Communist regime in Poland before 1989, claimed that the Red Army, exhausted by its long advance on its way to Warsaw, lacked sufficient fighting power to overcome the German forces around Warsaw and extend effective aid to the Uprising. However, the clear consensus among most historians^{[citation needed]} is that Stalin did not want to aid the Home Army in Warsaw, made up of likely opponents of the Communist regime that he wanted to impose on Poland after the war.

The Red Army reached the outskirts of Warsaw in the final days of July, 1944. The Soviet units belonged to the 1st Belorussian Front, participating in the Lublin-Brest Operation, between the Lvov-Sandomierz Operation on its left and Operation Bagration on its right. These two operations were colossal defeats for the German army and completely destroyed a large number of German formations. As a consequence, the Germans at this time were desperately trying to put together a new force to hold the line of the Vistula river, the last major river barrier between the Red Army and Germany proper, rushing in units in various stages of readiness from all over Europe. These units included a few high quality panzer and SS divisions pulled from their refits, but also many infantry units of poor quality. In terms of combat power this scratch force was considerably inferior to what the Soviets had available. On the other hand, after their long advances in June and July the Soviet suffered from the usual difficulties with supply accompanying any long-range Soviet offensive that has advanced far beyond its starting line. The Soviet plan was to seize bridgeheads across the Vistula and the Narew rivers as jumping off points for the next offensive and then stop to resupply their units. This put Warsaw, straddling the river Vistula, right at the limit of planned Soviet advance. From the operational viewpoint seizing Warsaw was not a major priority for the Soviets, though clearly having possession of the city would be advantageous to them, especially if it could be captured with its infrastructure intact. However, it was not essential, as the Soviets already seized a series of convenient bridgeheads to the south of Warsaw, and were concentrating on defending them against vigorous German counterattacks. The Red Army was also gearing for a major thrust into the Balkans through Romania at around this time and a large proportion of Soviet resources was being sent in that direction.

In the initial battle of Radzymin Soviet advance armored units of the 2nd Tank Army suffered a setback which prevented them from taking Warsaw from the march. It was the presence of Soviet tanks in nearby Wołomin that sealed the decision of the Home Army leaders in Warsaw to launch the uprising. As a result of the battle, the Soviet tank army was pushed out of Wołomin to the east of Warsaw and pushed back about 10 km.^[4][5][6][7] However, the defeat did not change the fact of the overwhelming Soviet superiority over the Germans in the sector. The Soviets retained their positions to the south-east of Warsaw along the Vistula river, barely 10 km away from the city center, at the outskirts of the Warsaw right bank suburb Praga. The Poles fighting in the Uprising were counting that the Soviet forces would seize Praga in a matter of days and then be in a position to have Red Army units cross to the left bank where the main battle of the Uprising was occurring and come to its aid.

However, on that line along the outskirts of Praga, on the most direct route of advance towards Warsaw, the Soviets stopped their advance and the front line did not move for the next 45 days. The sector was held by the understrength German 73rd infantry division, destroyed many times on the Eastern Front and recently reconstituted.^[8] The division, though weak, did not experience significant Soviet pressure during that period. At the same time, the Red Army was fighting intense battles to the south of Warsaw, to seize and maintain bridgeheads over the Vistula river, and to the north, to gain bridgeheads over the river Narew. It was on those sectors that the best panzer and armored divisions that the Germans had were fighting. Despite that, both of these objectives have been mostly secured by early September. The inactivity of the Red Army directly in front of Warsaw elicited this reaction of amazement from Germans, recorded in the operations journal of German 9th Army on 16 August 1944: Contrary to our expectations, the enemy has halted all of their offensive actions alongside the entire front of the 9th Army.

Finally, on September 11, the Soviet 47th army began its advance into Praga. The resistance by the German 73rd division was weak and collapsed quickly, with the Soviets gaining control of the suburb by September 14. With the taking of Praga, the Soviet forces were now directly across the river from the Uprising fighting in left-bank Warsaw. If the Soviets had reached this stage in early August, the crossing of the river would have been easy, as the Poles then held considerable stretches of the riverfront. By mid-September a series of German attacks have reduced the Poles to holding one narrow stretch of the riverbank, in the district of Czerniakow. Nevertheless, the Soviets now made an attempt to aid the Uprising, but not by using Red Army units.

In the Praga area Polish units under command of General Zygmunt Berling (thus sometimes known as 'berlingowcy' - 'the Berling men'), the 1st Polish Army (1 Armia Wojska Polskiego) were in position. On the night of 14/15th of September three patrols from landed on the shore of Czerniaków and Powiśle areas and made contacts with Home Army forces. Under heavy German fire only small elements of main units made it ashore (I and III battalions of 9th infantry regiment, 3rd Infantry Division). At the same time the commanders of the Red Army declined to support the Polish troops with artillery, tanks or bombers.

The Germans intensified their attacks on the Home Army positions near the river to prevent any further landings, which could seriously compromise their line of defence, but weren't able to made any significant advances for several days, while Polish forces held those vital positions in preparation for new expected wave of Soviet landings. Polish units from the eastern shore attempted several more landings, and during the next few days sustained heavy losses (including destruction of all landing boats and most of other river crossing equipment). Other Soviet units limited their assistance to sporadic and insignificant artillery and air support.

Shortly after the Berling landings, the Soviets decide to postpone all plans for a river crossing in Warsaw "for at least 4 months" and soon afterwards general Berling was relieved of his command. On the night of September 19, after no further attempts from the other side of the river were made and the promised evacuation of wounded did not take place, Home Army soldiers and landed elements of Wojsko Polskie were forced to begin a retreat from their positions on the bank of the river.

Out of approximately 3,000 men who made it ashore only around 900 made it back to the eastern shores of Vistula, approximately 600 of them seriously wounded.

[edit] Closed or destroyed military archives

Research into the lack of support of the Warsaw Uprising is (according to historians such as Norman Davies) currently very difficult due to lack of access to archives. For records related to the period, currently both the United Kingdom archives and Russian archives (where the majority of Soviet archives are kept) remain mostly closed to the public. Further complicating the matter is the United Kingdom's claim that they accidentally destroyed the archives of the Polish Government in Exile.^[9]

[edit] Capitulation

[edit] The signing of the Capitulation Agreement

On October 2 General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski signed the capitulation of remaining Polish forces (Warszawski Korpus Armii Krajowej or Home Army Warsaw Corps) in the German headquarters in presence of general von dem Bach. According to the capitulation treaty the Home Army soldiers were to be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the civilian population was to be treated humanely.

The next day the Germans begun to disarm the Home Army soldiers. Most of them were later sent to POW camps in various part of Germany. At the same time the civilian population (approximately 700,000) was resettled to concentration camps west of Warsaw. Many soldiers, fearing German atrocities in captivity, chose to blend into civilian population, escape Warsaw among then and continue the fight later. Depending on where they were sent they were later either liberated by U.S., British or Soviet forces. This could have a big effect on their later life.

[edit] Reasons for failure

There are several factors responsible for the failure, although there is no consensus about all of them nor their relative importance.

One of the main reasons for the failure of the uprising was the lack of expected support from the Soviet Red Army. Soviet assistance to the Home Army on the eastern territories was limited to small collaboration on a tactical level at best, with common incidents of shooting or imprisoning of Home Army soldiers after the area was liberated. During the Warsaw Uprising the Red Army stood on the other bank of the Vistula River and only elements from the Polish 1 Armia Wojska Polskiego attempted to make a crossing and received artillery support. The Soviet High Command did not allow pilots from the RAF and the Polish Air-forces to use Soviet landing strips. After the initial radio and leaflet propaganda campaign, the Moscow-backed Wanda radio station remained silent until the very end of fighting. It has been argued that the Soviets deliberately allowed the Germans to defeat the Home Army in order to eliminate a force in Poland which would oppose the communist puppet government which the Soviets planned to install in Poland. This is consistent with Soviet later treatment of many Home Army soldiers, who were usually imprisoned, tortured and executed.

The decision to begin the Uprising can be viewed more as a political one (a demonstration to show the Soviets and the Western Allies that the Polish government-in-exile had control over the country) than a military one (since the military situation was worsening, as German troops in Warsaw were being strengthened and reinforced). The decision to start the Uprising was rushed several times: first on 20 July, when plans for Operation Tempest were changed to include Warsaw (after the series of reports on aggressive actions by Soviets toward Home Army units in the eastern territories), then on 31 July when exaggerated reports of approaching Russian forces convinced some decision makers that if they did not start the Uprising soon it would be too late to aid the Russians and 'make a stand'. Due to this rushed change of plans, personnel and ammunition available at the time of "W-hour" in Warsaw were not optimal.

[edit] Casualties

Overall Polish losses were between 150,000 and 200,000. Most of them died as a result of mass executions and massive bombardment - eg. after taking Wola district German soldiers executed approximately 40,000 civilians. Importantly, many of those lost were the people who would have played important and even critical roles in the country's recovery (although many of the Polish intelligentsia had already been killed at the time of the Soviet and German invasions in 1939).

The exact number of casualties on both sides is unknown to this day. According to various estimates^[10] the casualties were as follows:

Side	KIA	WIA	MIA	POW
Polish [11]	10,000 to 18,000	8,000 to 28,000	all declared dead	15,000
German[12]	10,000 to 17,000	9,000	7,000 [13]	2,000 to 5,000

[edit] Aftermath

[edit] Expulsion of civilians

In 1944 a large transit camp (Durchgangslager) was constructed in Pruszków, in the Train Repair Shops (Zakłady Naprawcze Taboru Kolejowego), to house the evacuees expelled from Warsaw by the Nazis. In the course of the Warsaw Uprising and its suppression, the Germans deported approximately 550,000 of the city’s residents and approximately 100,000 civilians from its outskirts, sending them to this Durchgangslager 121 (Dulag 121), a transit camp. The security police and the SS segregated the deportees and decided their fate. Approximately 650,000 people passed through the Pruszków camp in August, September, and October. Approximately 55,000 were sent to concentration camps, including 13,000 to Auschwitz. They included people from a variety of social classes and occupations (government officials, scholars, artists, physicians, merchants, and blue-collar workers), in varying physical condition (the injured, the sick, invalids, and pregnant women), and of various ages, from infants only a few weeks old to the elderly, aged 86 or more. In a few cases, these were also people of different ethnic backgrounds, including Jews living on “Aryan papers.” (from: Księga Pamięci. Transporty Polaków z Warszawy do KL Auschwitz 1940-1944, Memorial Book: Transports of Poles from Warsaw to Auschwitz Concentration Camp 1940-1944)

Some people were hiding in the remnants of the city, eg. Władysław Szpilman, who later wrote his memoir " The Pianist", filmed by Roman Polanski (The Pianist, 2002).

[edit] Destruction of the city

After the remaining population had been expelled, the Germans started the destruction of the remains of the city. Special groups of German engineers were dispatched throughout the city in order to burn and demolish the remaining buildings. According to German plans, after the war Warsaw was to be turned into a lake. The demolition squads used flame-throwers and explosives to methodically destroy house after house. They paid special attention to historical monuments, Polish national archives and places of interest: nothing was to be left of what used to be a city. By January 1945 85% of the buildings were destroyed: 25% as a result of the Uprising, 35% as a result of systematic German actions after the uprising, the rest as a result of the earlier Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (15%) and other combat including the September 1939 campaign (10%).

Material losses were estimated at 10,455 buildings, 923 historical buildings (94 percent), 25 churches, 14 libraries including the National Library, 81 primary schools, 64 high schools, University of Warsaw and Warsaw University of Technology, and most of the historical monuments. Almost a million inhabitants lost all of their possessions. The exact amount of losses of private and public property as well as pieces of art, monuments of science and culture is unknown but considered enormous. However, various estimates place it at an equivalent of approximately 40 billion 1939 US dollars. In 2004 the Warsaw self-government authorities estimated that the approximate loss of the municipal property is 45 billion 2004 US dollars (this includes only the property owned by the city of Warsaw on August 31, 1939, and not the properties owned by the inhabitants themselves). The municipal council of Warsaw is currently disputing whether claims for German reparations should be made. Destruction was so bad that in order to rebuild much of Warsaw, a detailed landscape of the city which had been commissioned by the government before the Partitions of Poland (18th century), painted by two Italian artists Bacciarelli and Canaletto who ran an arts school there as well, had to be used as a model to recreate most of the buildings^{[citation needed]}.

The city of Warsaw was rebuilt, with the Old Town being partially restored to its former state. However, complete recovery as a major European capital only began in the early 1990s after the fall of communism.

In 2004 President of Warsaw Lech Kaczyński, now President of Poland, established a historical commission to estimate material losses that were inflicted upon the city by German authorities. The commission estimated the losses on at least $31.5 billion in 2004 value.^[14]

[edit] Political arena

Due to a lack of cooperation and often the active aggressive moves on the part of the Soviets and several other factors, the Warsaw Uprising and Operation Tempest failed in their primary goal: to free part of the Polish territories so that a government loyal to the Polish government-in-exile could be established there instead of a Soviet puppet state. There is no consensus among historians as to whether that was ever possible, or whether those operations had any other lasting effect. Some argue that without Operation Tempest and the Warsaw Uprising, Poland would have ended as a Soviet republic, a fate definitely worse than that of an "independent" puppet state, and thus the Operation succeeded at least partially in being a political demonstration to the Soviets and Western Allies.^{[citation needed]} In addition, the Warsaw Uprising compelled the Soviets to stopped their offensive in Poland to let the Germans suppress the uprising. Some historians speculate that if they had not stopped their march, they would have occupied all of Germany rather than just the eastern section. ^{[citation needed]}

[edit] The legacy

Due to lack of cooperation and often the active aggressive moves on the part of the Soviets and several other factors, Warsaw Uprising and Operation Tempest failed in their primary goal - to free part of Polish territories, so that a government loyal to Polish government in exile could be established there instead of a Soviet puppet state. There is no consensus among historians if that was ever possible, and if those operations had other lasting effect. Some argue that without Operation Tempest and Warsaw Uprising, Poland would end as a Soviet republic, a fate definitely worse than that of independent puppet state, and thus the Operation succeeded at least partially in being a political demonstration to Soviets and Western Allies.

[edit] Armia Krajowa soldiers who remained in Poland

Most soldiers of the Home Army (including those who took part in the Warsaw Uprising) were persecuted after the war; captured by the NKVD or SB, interrogated and imprisoned, awaiting trials on various charges. Many of them were sent to Gulags or executed.

[edit] Armia Krajowa soldiers who were liberated by the Allies

Most of those sent to POW camps in Germany were later liberated by British, American and Polish forces and stayed in the West, including uprising leaders Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and Antoni Chruściel, who stayed in London and the United States, respectively. Some chose to return to Poland in the hope of rejoining their families. In many cases, those who returned shared the fate of their comrades who had spent their entire time in Poland.

[edit] Long term effect on Communist Poland

The courage of the Warsaw Uprising, and its utter betrayal by the Soviet Union, kept anti-Soviet sentiment high in Poland throughout the Cold War. Memories of the uprising helped to inspire the Polish labour movement Solidarity, which led a peaceful movement against the Communist government during the 1980s, leading to the downfall of that government in 1989 and the emergence of democracy.

[edit] After the war

Most soldiers of the Home Army (including those who took part in the Warsaw Uprising) were persecuted after the war: captured by the NKVD or UB, interrogated and imprisoned, awaiting trials on various charges. Many of them were sent to gulags or executed or just "disappeared". Most of those sent to POW camps in Germany were later liberated by British, American and Polish forces and remained in the West, including uprising leaders Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and Antoni Chruściel (in London and the United States, respectively).

In addition, members of the Polish Air Force flying supplies to the Home Army, were likewise persecuted after the war and many others "disappeared" after their return to Poland. Once word got back to the Polish flyers still in England, many decided not to return to Poland.

Factual knowledge of the Warsaw Uprising, inconvenient to Stalin, was twisted by propaganda of the People's Republic of Poland, which stressed the failings of the Home Army and the Polish government-in-exile, and forbade all criticism of the Red Army or the political goals of Soviet strategy. Until the late sixties the very name of the Home Army was censored, and most films and novels covering the 1944 Uprising were either banned or modified so that the name of the Home Army did not appear. Further, the official propaganda of both communist Poland and the USSR suggested that the Home Army was some sort of a group of right-wing collaborators with Nazi Germany. From 1956 on, the image of the Warsaw Uprising in Polish propaganda was changed a little bit to underline that the soldiers were indeed brave, while the officers were treacherous and the commanders were characterised by disregard of the losses. The first serious publications on the topic were not issued until the late eighties. In Warsaw no monument to the Home Army could be built until 1989. Instead, efforts of the Soviet-backed Armia Ludowa were glorified and exaggerated.

In the West, the story of the Polish fight for Warsaw with little support was an embarrassment, as was the shock of Home Army soldiers as Western Allies recognised the Soviet controlled pro-Communist regime installed by Stalin; as a result, the story was not publicised for many years.

The courage of soldiers and civilians involved in the Warsaw Uprising, and its betrayal by the Soviet Union, contributed to keeping anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland at a high level throughout the Cold War. Memories of the Uprising helped to inspire the Polish labour movement Solidarity, which led a peaceful opposition movement against the Communist government during the 1980s, leading to the downfall of that government in 1989 and the emergence of democratic political representation.

After 1989 censorship of the facts of the Uprising ceased, and 1 August has now become a celebrated anniversary. On 1 August 1994, Poland held a ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Uprising. Germany and Russia were invited to the ceremony, although there was opposition to Russia's invitation. Moreover, a joke making the rounds suggested that "Yeltsin should be given a pair of binoculars so he can observe the ceremony from across the [Vistula] river." On July 31, 2004, a Warsaw Uprising Museum opened in Warsaw.

[edit] See also

• Polish contribution to World War II
• Warsaw Uprising atrocities
• Western betrayal
• Krzyż Powstania Warszawskiego
• Kubuś

[edit] Notes and references

See also this external link for more English language books on the topic.

[edit] External links

• Warsaw Uprising Museum in Warsaw
• Warsaw Uprising 1944 A source for checking data used in this page and offers of material and help.
• The Warsaw Uprising on the Polish Resistance page provides information and maps which may be freely copied with attribution.
• Warsaw Rising: The Forgotten Soldiers of World War II. Educator Guide
• Photographs of the Warsaw Uprising
• The Warsaw Rising
• The Warsaw Uprising - 1.VIII.1944
• Warsaw Uprising CNN Special
• Warsaw Life: A detailed account of the 1944 Warsaw Rising, including the facts, the politics and first-hand accounts
• Polish Boy Scouts Deliver "AK" Mail
• The Warsaw Uprising daily diary, written in English by Eugenuisz Melech, on the events as they happened. Edited and published by Dr Lester Gideon & Associates.
• (Polish) Dariusz Baliszewski, Przerwać tę rzeź! Tygodnik "Wprost", Nr 1132 (08 August 2004)
• (German) Warschau- Der letzte Blick German aerial photos of Warsaw taken during the last days before the Warsaw Uprising

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