User:Halibutt/Kowel
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Battle of Kowel (also known as the Raid on Kowel) was a motorized raid of an improvized unit of the Polish Army on the important railway node of Kowel (modern Kovil, Ukraine) behind the lines of the Red Army, during the Polish-Bolshevik War. The assault started on September 12, 1920, and resulted in taking the city the following day, with negligible losses on the Polish side. In the effect of the raid, the entire Bolshevik 12th Army was routed and the Poles managed to capture a significant booty in war materiel and prisoners of war.
Although carried out by an improvised force, the battle of Kowel is considered one of the first examples of motorized warfare in the history of mankind. The Polish assault group was composed of motorised infantry and a number of Ford FT-B armoured cars.
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[edit] Before the battle
Following the victorious battle of Warsaw, the Polish Army successfully broke the ranks of the Bolshevik forces and managed to retake much of central Poland, up to the Bug River. By the end of August the Polish forces reached the river and managed to organize bridgeheads on the other side. However, as much of the Russian army retreated northwards, toward East Prussia, the Polish Army became divided onto two fronts: one facing Prussia and the other facing eastwards. In addition, a separate front was struggling with the 1st Cavalry Army of Semyon Budyonny in the south, in the vicinity of the cities of Lwów (modern Lviv, Ukraine) and Zamość. This situation proved to be a major problem for the Polish commander-in-chief and in early September a short interruption in operations took place for the purpose of reorganising the forces for strategic pursuit.
Following the defeat of Budyonny's forces at the battle of Komarów, the advance by the 3rd Army under General Władysław Sikorski to the line of the river Bug, decisive action was taken by the Commander-in-Chief, and the 3rd and 6th Armies constituting the southern front were pushed eastwards.
[edit] Plans and opposing forces
Following the reorganization of the Polish ranks, the northern flank started a pursuit north of the Pripet Marshes that eventually led it to the Battle of the Niemen River. At the same time the southern flank was to advance south of the marshes, towards the city of Kowel. A group commanded by General Józef Haller, consisting of two divisions of infantry and one corps of cavalry, had the task of capturing Łuck (modern Lutsk, Ukraine) by a swift attack pushing the enemy in the direction of Sarny. At the same time General Franciszek Krajowski was to advance with his forces directly on Kowel.
The aim of Krajowski's action was striking a wedge between the Red 4th and 12th armies and disruption of the latter unit's reorganization. According to the reports of the Polish intelligence, the 12th Army was preparing for an counter-offensive scheduled on September 12. Because of that, the Polish assault was scheduled a day before.
The assault on the city was to be carried out by Krajowski's force consisting of two infantry divisions (the 7th and 18th, as well as General Stanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz's group. The northern flank of the Polish forces was secured by the Polish 11th Infantry Division operating from the area of Brześć nad Bugiem. The latter unit stroke a wedge between the Bolshevik 4th and 12th Armies and on September 11th captured the town of Małoryta (modern Malaryta, Belarus), halfways between Kobryn and Kowel.
The town of Kowel itself was to be taken by an improvised motorised group created on September 10 under the command of Maj. Bochenek in the town of Włodawa. The group consisted of 7 Ford FT-B armoured cars, 2 White armoured cars and a single Packard, as well as four columns of different lorries (54 motors altogether) manned by two battalions of infantry of the 7th Infantry Division and two batteries of field artillery adapted to be motor-drawn.
[edit] Assault
The group received orders to raid Kovel by way of Wlodawa - Mokrany, a distance of 160 km (in direct line from the line of the Bug [river] to Kovel, the distance being 70 km). The attack of the armoured group on Kovel was to be synchronal with the frontal attack from the Bug line of the 7th and 18th Infantry Divisions (the group of General Krajewski). The commander of the 12th Soviet Army, in spite of the fact that contact with the 4th Soviet Army had been broken through the Polish attack in the region of Malorita - Mokrany, considered the Polish action in that direction purely a demonstration; he decided to make for the weakest point, which in his opinion lay in the north west, and in this direction he threw his last reserves - one infantry division - thus completely neglecting the Brzesc [now Brest on the Bug, Belarus] - Kovel road. The coming of the motor group over this very same Brzesc - Kovel road took the Bolsheviks unawares, and in this element of surprise lay one of the conditions of success. The surprise was, moreover, effected by a very sudden change of direction by the motor-group. The original direction of Wlodawa - Kobryn had threatened only Kobryn, while it placed the group at an even greater distance from Kowel. On the 11th September at 10 a.m. the group set off on the road leading to Mokrany, by way of Malorita.
The marching order was as follows: advance guard, 3 Ford and 1 White armoured cars, half a battalion of infantry and half a battery of artillery, and, behind the advance guard, 2 Ford armoured cars at a distance of 2 km to act in connecting files with the main force. The main force: 1 1/2 battalions of infantry, 1 1/2 batteries of artillery, supply cars and cisterns, the rearguard consisting of 2 Ford and 1 White armoured cars.
A distance of 65 km. was made in one day, i.e. until evening of the 11th September; during this time it was necessary to stop the whole marching column in order to repair the bridges. At 1 a.m. on the 12th the raiding column resumed its march. At 2 a.m. the first rattle of the machine guns was already heard - the head of the column rushed into the village of Horniki; the armoured cars of the advance guard dashed into the village before the surprised enemy could organise resistance, and 2 guns and some score of prisoners were taken. On reaching the next village, Ratno, the column encountered heavy fire which was silenced by the swift entrance of the advance guard into the village. When abandoning the place the Bolsheviks set a bridge on fire; there was no time to extinguish this fire, and the whole column crossed the burning bridge at top speed. A few minutes after the passage of the last car the bridge came down with a crash. At Bucyn the enemy tried to stop the advancing column by shelling it from a battery placed on the road in front; fortunately the shells, owing to the nervousness of the gunners, fell far from the armoured cars, and a few minutes later the cars of the advance guard were in the midst of the gunners. After breaking the resistance of the enemy at Bucyn the advance guard made for Kovel with the utmost speed; it rushed into the town and through the streets firing in all directions.
In the meantime the main force was carrying out an artillery engagement with 3 armoured trains [only 2 armoured trains: BP no.72 "Im. N. Rudnyeva" and probably BP no. 82 "Smiert' Direktorii", and a freight train] which had pushed through from the side of Brzesc and Chelm to Kovel; the motor cars which were on the road formed a splendid target for the Bolshevik artillery, and as a result of its fire several cars were damaged and a number of soldiers wounded: batteries of the main force occupied positions from which they made severe damage to one of the Bolshevik armoured trains which with great difficulty managed to reach Kovel [reportedly BP no.72]. The other 2 trains were forced to retreat in a westerly direction under sever fire from the Polish artillery. Towards the end of the artillery engagement against the Bolshevik armoured trains, the commander of the group, Major Bochenek, received the report of the capture of the Kovel railway station by the advance guard and of the enemy's flight. The column of the main force entered the town at 4 p.m. The effect of the sudden appearance in the streets of Kovel of armoured cars firing on all sides was such that within the space of a few minutes the Bolshevik troops, about 2 infantry divisions, were leaving the town in considerable disorder. The commander of the 12th Soviet Army escaped in a motor car.
There was no time to make an inventory of the prodigious quantity of war material which fell into Polish hands; it was necessary to plan the defence and weigh the possibilities of holding the town should the enemy perceive, as he easily could, with what a small force he had to deal. The infantry, jointly with the artillery, the latter strengthened by the captured Bolshevik guns, occupied positions to the east and west of the town. All night armoured cars patrolled the neighbouring roads. It was only next morning at 10 o'clock that the advance guard of the 7th and 18th Polish Infantry Divisions, which had been fighting the enemy the whole of the preceding day, made their entrace into Kovel. (The autor, who was on the staff of 7th Infantry Division, entered the town with the advance guard and could see the effect of the action of our armoured force.) The Soviet detachments retreating under pressure of the above-mentioned divisions were forced to take an easterly direction from both sides of the city.
Only then was it possible to count the vast spoil fallen into Polish hands: 2 armoured trains [BP no. 39 "Subbotnik" and BP no. 13 "Krasnyi Kavalerist"], several scores of guns [36], 12 aeroplanes [other sources: 3 aeroplanes and 12 cars], several hundreds of railway carriages loaded with large amount of war material, and, besides, all that the staff archives the 12th Soviet Army contained. Thus did the briliantly conducted raid on Kowel result not only in bringing immense spoil at a very inconsiderable loss, but it produced a tremendous operational effect which rendered possible the accomplishment of the strategic plan of the Commander-in-Chief, and at the same time it seriously weakened the strength and shook the morale of the 12th Soviet Army
