Hafizullah Shabaz Khail

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Hafizullah Shabaz Khail is a citizen of Afghanistan, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.[1] Khail's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 1001. American intelligence analysts estimate he was born in 1946, in Paktia, Afghanistan.

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed. The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[4]
The neutrality of this section is disputed.
Please see the discussion on the talk page.(December 2007)
Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved.

Initially the Bush administration asserted that captives from the war on terror were not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunal to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The tribunals were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants, but were only empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Khail chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[5]

[edit] Khail's opening statement

Khail's Personal Representative read Khail's statement, which started with his appointment as mayor of Zormat: say whatever:"I've never been part of the Taliban. I have not worked one day under the Taliban. When Karzai came into power, the elders of the city came to my house and asked me to be their representative. I was given the position of mayor of the city because I was trusted. Taj Mohammed Wardak was assigned as governor of Paktia province.

Khail was mayor of Zormat for six months, and according to Khail, he was able to maintain order, and had an excellent relationship with the Americans, in contrast with his successor. According to Khail, when his successor's incompetence and corruption were obvious to all, the tribal elders and Karzai's new governor, Raz Mohammed Dalili, asked Khail to become mayor again.

Khail told his Tribunal that when he became mayor the second time, corrupt police officers appointed by previous mayor were still using their uniforms and their positions to rob and kill citizens, not protect them.

A businessman was robbed of 200,000 Khaldars. Khail's Personal Representative reminded Khail to tell the Tribunal that the thief was determined to be the commander of security in the district, Taj Mohammed. Khail forced the corrupt officer to return the money and when the Governor was in Kabul, the corrupt officer's corrupt boss, Abdullah Mujahid, arrested Khail.

[edit] allegations

'a. The Detainee is a member of the Taliban and participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.
  1. The Detainee served as the commander for two separate military units operating in Zormat, Afghanistan from July 2002 to November 2002.
  2. The anti-coalition militia in Zormat District considered themselves al Qaida.
  3. Between April and June 2002, while serving as the Zormat Assistant Governor, the Detainee had three known al Qaida suspects released from jail after they were captured at a checkpoint.
  4. On 31 August 2002, the Detainee met with Saifullah Rahman Mansour to organize and receive funding for an attack on coalition forces.
  5. In early September 2002, the Detainee led a 12-man unit of former al Qaida and Taliban in planning an attack on coalition forces.
  6. The Detainee was arrested by Afghan authorities at the command of Abdullah Muhajed, head of security in Zormat, Afghanistan, and then turned over to the U.S. Forces.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

Khail chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[6]

[edit] The following factors favor continued detention:

a. Detainee Actions and Statements
  1. In mid February 2002, al Qaida fighters in the Paktia Province, Afghanistan, were providing payments of $3,000.00 United States Dollars to the detainee. The payments were intended to ensure that the detainee provided support to al Qaida and facilitate the departure of al Qaida family members from Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee was identified as a military commander, leading a 12-man unit of former Taliban and al Qaida members who were planning to attack U.S. and Afghani Transitional Administration facilities using Guerilla warfare techniques in September 2002.
  3. The detainee claimed that he was never in any military service and never received any military training, but he did fight against the Russians. The detainee also stated that he participated in several fights under the command of Niaz Ghal, a village elected Commander. The detainee also stated that the District Commander was a man named Momein.
  4. The detainee released three suspected al Qaida without investigation.
  5. The detainee held a meeting at his residence in Menzi in Zormat with an extremist cell leader.
  6. The detainee distributed arms for an ambush against his replacement. The detainee also gave out money to those who agreed to fight on his behalf. The detainee issued weapons to volunteers, including RPG's [sic] , Kalashnikov's [sic] , and at least on [sic] "ZK-1" anti-aircraft gun.
b. Connections and Associations
  1. The detainee's brother was identified as a senior Lieutenant for a former Taliban Commander.
  2. The detainee's brother has a well-known car dealership in Zormat. The detainee's brother also keeps an arsenal at his car dealership, including AK-47s RPGs, and IEDs.
  3. The detainee was identified as being the Commander [sic] of Samoud Khan.
  4. Samoud Khan is a known Anti-Coalition Militia member.
  5. The detainee's telephone number and name was associated with a Taliban cell.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release of transfer:

a. The detainee stated he does not know why the Americans detained him, and that he had helped them in the past by giving them information about al Qaida.
b. The detainee denied leading a 12-man unit of former al Qaida and Taliban in planning an attack on Coalition Forces.
c. The detainee stated "I don't like al Qaida, I don't like its name, and I don't like him [[[Usama Bin Ladin]]], and it's up to you to accept it or not."
d. The detainee denied having any military training.
e. The detainee denied knowing anything about Samoud Khan.

[edit] Presiding Officer's behavior

Khail's Presiding Officer kept interrupting him. He told him he would have an opportunity to return to those points, at the end of the hearing. But, at the end of the hearing, he continued to cut him off, telling him he was off-topic. Khail was not allowed to return to address the points he thought were important to address the allegations against him.

[edit] testimony in response to the factors favoring continued detention

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  5. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Hafizullah Shabaz Khail's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 11-21
  6. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Hafizullah Shabaz Khail's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 178-192 - November 2005

[edit] External links