Gulf of Tonkin Incident

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Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Part of Vietnam War
Chart showing the U.S. Navy's interpretation of the events of the first part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident
Chart showing the U.S. Navy's interpretation of the events of the first part of the Gulf of Tonkin incident
Date August 2, 1964
Location Gulf of Tonkin, Vietnam
Result United States victory
Belligerents
Flag of the United States United States Flag of Vietnam Vietnam
Commanders
Flag of the United States Admiral George Stephen Morrison N/A
Strength
2 Destroyers
several aircraft		 3 torpedo boats
Casualties and losses
1 destroyer lightly damaged 1 torpedo boat sunk
1 torpedo boat damaged

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident prompted the first large-scale involvement of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. It was a pair of attacks carried out by naval forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) against two American destroyers, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy. The incident occurred on August 2 and 4, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin.[1]

The outcome of the incident was the passage by Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Lyndon B. Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose government was considered to be jeopardized by "communist aggression". The resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for escalating American involvement in the Vietnam War, which lasted until 1975.

In 2005, it was revealed in an official NSA declassified report[2] that the USS Maddox first fired warning shots on the August 2 incident and that there may not have been North Vietnamese boats at the August 4 incident. The report said

[I]t is not simply that there is a different story as to what happened; it is that no attack happened that night. [...] In truth, Hanoi's navy was engaged in nothing that night but the salvage of two of the boats damaged on 2 August.[3]

Contents

[edit] Background

Main articles: Vietnam War, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, and Operation 34A

Although the United States attended the Geneva Conference (1954), which was intended to settle the Vietnam hostilities, it refused to sign the Geneva Accords (1954). The Accords mandated, among other measures, a ceasefire line, intended to separate Vietnamese independence and French forces, and elections to determine the governing power on each side of the line, within two years. The US was concerned about, among other things, the unreliability of elections under communist-controlled areas (which then were dominant), the competence of the ICC, and the harm that officially designating a line in the center of Vietnam would cause (given the previous experience in Korea). It also forbade the political interference of other countries in the area, the creation of new governments without the stipulated elections, and foreign military presence. By 1961, Ngo Dinh Diem faced significant discontent amongst some quarters of the southern population, including some Buddhists who were opposed to the rule of Catholics. In that year, a communist-led uprising intensified (it began in 1959 upon the decision of the North Vietnamese Politburo), headed by the National Liberation Front. The U.S. had begun providing direct support to the South Vietnamese in the form of military and financial aid and military advisers, the number of which grew from 600 in 1961 to 16,000 by the end of John F. Kennedy's presidency in 1963.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration. While Kennedy had originally supported the policy of sending military advisers to Vietnam, he had begun to alter his thinking due to what he perceived to be the ineptitude of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms. Shortly before his assassination in November 1963, he had begun limited recall of American forces. Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military escalation in Vietnam as a means to challenge what he perceived as the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of containment was to be applied to prevent the fall of Southeast Asia to communist governments under the precepts of the domino theory. After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more American forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia.

According to the U.S. Naval Institute,[4] a highly classified program of covert attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) known as Operation 34A, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964 the program was transferred to the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (SOG). For the maritime portion of the covert operation, Tjeld-class fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. Although the crews of the boats were South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval of the plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Jr., CINCPAC in Honolulu. After the coastal attacks began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva Accords, but the U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South Vietnamese attacks against the DRV. Maddox, although ostensibly aware of the operations, was not directly involved in these attacks.

[edit] The incident

Photograph taken from the USS Maddox August 2, 1964 and showing North Vietnamese patrol boats
Photograph taken from the USS Maddox August 2, 1964 and showing North Vietnamese patrol boats

Daniel Ellsberg, who was on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from the ship, reports that the ships were on a secret mission (codenamed Desoto) near North Vietnamese territorial waters. On 31 July 1964, the American destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began an electronic intelligence collection mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Admiral George Stephen Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his flagship USS Bon Homme Richard (CV-31). The ship was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles (13 km) from the North's coast and four miles (6 km) from Hon Nieu island.[5] When the SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was 120 miles (193 km) away from the attacked area.[6]

[edit] First attack

On 2 August the Maddox claimed it was attacked by three North Vietnamese P-4 patrol torpedo boats 28 miles (45 km) away from the North Vietnamese coast in international waters.[7] The Maddox claimed to have evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127 mm) guns, forcing the patrol craft away. U.S. aircraft launched from Ticonderoga then attacked the retiring P-4s, claiming one as sunk and one heavily damaged. The Maddox, suffering very minor damage from a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet, retired to South Vietnamese waters where she was joined by the destroyer Turner Joy.

However, this account has come into sharp dispute with an official 2005 NSA declassified report[2] which stated on page 17:

"At 1500G, Captain Herrick ordered Ogier's gun crews to open fire if the boats approached within ten thousand yards. At about 1505G, the Maddox fired three rounds to warn off the communist boats. This initial action was never reported by the Johnson administration, which insisted that the Vietnamese boats fired first."[2]

Already before this was revealed, however, some had held that the actions of the Maddox (i.e., merely the presence of the Maddox in particular places and times) were provocative to the North Vietnamese because they coincided with the covert South Vietnamese raids. Since the Desoto patrols were conducted in order to gather just the sort of electronic emissions that the SOG 34A raids would provoke, it was a reasonable assumption that the two were "piggybacked." The destroyer's presence also may have been mistaken by the North Vietnamese as a sign that it was also involved directly in the raids.

Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the 2 August fight. He claimed that DRV radar had tracked Maddox along the coast, thus being aware that the destroyer had not actually attacked North Vietnam. Yet they ordered their patrol boats to engage it anyway. He also noted that orders given to Maddox to stay eight miles (13 km) off the DRV coast put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed only a five-mile (8 km) nautical limit as its territory. In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions all over the world, and the USS John R. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident.[8]

[edit] Second alleged attack

On 4 August, another Desoto patrol on the North Vietnam coast was launched by Maddox and the Turner Joy, led by Captain John J. Herrick. This time their orders indicated that the ships were to close to no more than 11 miles (18 km) from the coast of North Vietnam.[9] The destroyers received radar and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by the North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of enemies.

An hour later, at 1:27 p.m. Washington time, Herrick sent a cable in which he admitted that the attack may never have happened and that there may actually have been no Vietnamese naval craft in the area: "Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken"[10]

An hour later, Herrick sent another cable, stating, "Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft."[11] In response to requests for confirmation, at around 4:00 p.m. Washington time, Herrick cabled, "Details of action present a confusing picture although certain that the original ambush was bona fide."[11]

At 6:00 p.m. Washington time (5:00 a.m. in the Gulf of Tonkin), Herrick cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat to close the Maddox probably fired a torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but not seen. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller beat" [sic].[11]

[edit] Consequences

Main article: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

Lyndon Johnson, who was up for election that year, launched retaliatory air strikes and went on national television on 4 August. Although the Maddox had been involved in providing intelligence support for South Vietnamese attacks at Hon Me and Hon Ngu, Defense Secretary McNamara denied, in his testimony before Congress, that the U.S. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the Gulf. He thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in international waters.

As a result of his testimony, on 7 August, Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J. RES 1145), titled the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Johnson the authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a declaration of war. The Resolution gave President Johnson approval "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

[edit] Later statements about the incident

Just a few days after the incident, Lyndon Johnson commented privately: "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there." [12]

In 1981, Herrick and journalist Robert Scheer re-examined Herrick's ship's log and determined that the first 4 August torpedo report which Herrick had maintained had occurred—the "apparent ambush"—was in fact unfounded.[11]

Although information obtained well after the fact supported Turner Joy Captain Herrick's statements about the inaccuracy of the later torpedo reports as well as the 1981 Herrick/Scheer conclusion about the inaccuracy of the first, indicating that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, at the time U.S. authorities and all of the Maddox crew said they were convinced that an attack had taken place. As a result, planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities (Operation Pierce Arrow).

Squadron commander James Stockdale was one of the U.S. pilots flying overhead during the second alleged attack. Stockdale wrote in his 1984 book Love and War: "[I] had the best seat in the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets—there were no PT boats there… There was nothing there but black water and American fire power." Stockdale said his superiors ordered him to keep quiet about this. After he was captured, this knowledge became a heavy burden. He later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him to reveal what he knew about this terrible secret.[13][14]

In 1995, retired Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, meeting with former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, categorically denied that Vietnamese gunboats had attacked American destroyers on 4 August, while admitting to the attack on 2 August.[15][16] A taped conversation of a meeting several weeks after passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was released in 2001, revealing that McNamara expressed doubts to President Lyndon B. Johnson that the attack had even occurred.

In the Fall of 1999, retired senior CIA engineering executive S. Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August 1964 to determine if the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an imagined one. He asked for further details on time, weather and surface conditions. No further details were forthcoming. In the end he concluded that there were no torpedo boats on the night in question, and that the White House was interested only in confirmation of an attack, not that there was no such attack.[17]

[edit] NSA report

In October, 2005 the New York Times reported that Robert J. Hanyok, a historian for the U.S. National Security Agency, had concluded that the NSA deliberately distorted the intelligence reports that it had passed on to policy-makers regarding the 4 August incident. He concluded that the motive was not political but was probably to cover up honest intelligence errors. [18]

Mr. Hanyok's conclusions were initially published within the NSA in the Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition of Cryptologic Quarterly, about five years before they were revealed in the Times article. According to intelligence officials, the view of government historians that the report should become public was rebuffed by policymakers concerned that comparisons might be made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq War that commenced in 2003.[19]

Reviewing the NSA's archives, Mr. Hanyok concluded that the NSA had initially misinterpreted North Vietnamese intercepts, believing there was an attack on 4 August. Midlevel NSA officials almost immediately discovered the error, he concluded, but covered it up by altering documents, so as to make it appear the second attack had happened.

On 30 November 2005, the NSA released the first installment of previously classified information regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including Mr. Hanyok's article, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.

The Hanyok article stated that intelligence information was presented to the Johnson administration "in such a manner as to preclude responsible decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete and objective narrative of events." Instead, "only information that supported the claim that the communists had attacked the two destroyers was given to Johnson administration officials." [20]

With regards to why this happened, Hanyok wrote:

As much as anything else, it was an awareness that President Johnson would brook no uncertainty that could undermine his position. Faced with this attitude, Ray Cline was quoted as saying "... we knew it was bum dope that we were getting from Seventh Fleet, but we were told only to give facts with no elaboration on the nature of the evidence. Everyone know how volatile LBJ was. He did not like to deal with uncertainties."[21]

The full NSA report[22] was released in January 2008 by the National Security Agency and published by the Federation of American Scientists, retelling the Vietnam War from the perspective of "signals intelligence".[23]

[edit] Navy Anniversary Day

Vietnam's Navy Anniversary Day is August 5, the date of the second attack, Vietnamese time, where "one of our torpedo squadrons chased the U.S.S. Maddox from our coastal waters, our first victory over the U.S. Navy".[24]

[edit] See also

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf
  2. ^ a b c "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964"
  3. ^ Hanyok article (page 177)
  4. ^ Naval History Archive Index - U.S. Naval Institute
  5. ^ Pentagon Papers
  6. ^ Pentagon Papers
  7. ^ Pentagon Papers
  8. ^ Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat — Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) P. 42
  9. ^ Pentagon Papers
  10. ^ Ellsberg, pp. 9-10.
  11. ^ a b c d Ellsberg, pg. 10.
  12. ^ Cohen, Jeff (1994-07-27). 30-year Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam War. Retrieved on 2007-05-09. 
  13. ^ Jim Stockdale, Sybil Stockdale. In Love and War: The Story of a Family's Ordeal and Sacrifice During the Vietnam Years. Harpercollins; 1st ed. edition (October 1984). ISBN 0060153180. 
  14. ^ http://www.vho.org/tr/2003/1/Pfitzner114f.html
  15. ^ "McNamara asks Giap: What happened in Tonkin Gulf?". (November 9, 1995). Associated Press
  16. ^ CNN Cold War - Interviews: Robert McNamara, retrieved January 23, 2007
  17. ^ S. Eugene Poteat, "Engineering in the CIA: ELINT, Stealth and the Beginnings of Information Warfare", The Bent of Tau Beta Pi, Fall 1999
  18. ^ Shane, Scott (2005-12-02). "Vietnam War Intelligence 'Deliberately Skewed,' Secret Study Says". New York Times. 
  19. ^ "Robert J. Hanyok: His NSC study on Tonkin Gulf Deception". (October 31, 2005). New York Times.
  20. ^ Hanyok article (page 177)
  21. ^ Hanyok article (page 213)
  22. ^ Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2002
  23. ^ Report reveals Vietnam War hoaxes, faked attacks
  24. ^ Pike, PAVN, p. 110

[edit] References

  • Ellsberg, Daniel (2002). Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking.

[edit] External links