Talk:Gough Whitlam/Archive 1

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Archive This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

What do you mean by "blocked supply" and why did it cause a crisis? --rmhermen

Refusing to pass the budget, so the Government has no money to run. I wasn't quite sure what to call it, so I just used the term people always use when discussing Australian politics or constitutional law. -- Simon J Kissane

Americans usually just say budget crisis and we have had a few of those too. Of course we can't dissolve congress or boot the president for it. All we can do is complain. ---rmhermen


O.K., how DO you say his name? Guff? Goooch? --MichaelTinkler

  • Goff. It's a rare name in Australia. I don't know of anyone else with this first name. It does occur as a surname, but not very frequently.
  • It's not his first name - his first name was Edward. Gough is his middle name. Using one's middle name was a common habit in Australia for some reason (not sure why, or for how long). As middle names were frequently family names (still are, eg William Jefferson Clinton) people then began to be known by names which were otherwise used as surnames. Sidenote: Why am I such an expert on this topic? Because my own mother made the mistake of naming me after a famous australian historian Manning Clark, only to find out that his real first name was William. Anyway I got stuck with "Manning" as a first name - ManningBartlett
  • I know someone like that -- I have a friend called Antonio, whose middle name is Carlos, yet everyone calls him Carlos, not Antonio. Carlos is in fact his dad's name... He tells me the explanation in this case was that his father used to always call him Carlitos (spanish for "little carlos"), but school teachers mistook that for Carlos... -- Simon J Kissane


Still not worded quite right, but the point of this para should be that the WG is unique in post-war Australian history - no other government achieved anywhere near as much as the WG achieved, not even under the 17 years of Menzies. Before anyone leaps in and says this is POV, these are objectively verifiable reforms. The fact that the WG also achieved a remarkable number of king-sized stuff-ups is irrelevant to this para - but should most certainly be made clear in a para of its own! (If no one else does it first, I'll do this myself in a future edit.)

The reverence of the left for W is mentioned in a following para. Better to leave it there, in the "how people today feel about W today" section, I think. (Expand on it? Or is it clear enough as is?) The fear and hatred that the right still have for the WG (and, I think it's fair to say, a great slab of middle Australia feels this way too, though more mildly) should also be made clear, and should, I think, be expanded a little.

I'm aiming for something like the following structure:

  • Intro, earlier life
  • Rise to leadership
  • Achievements in government (defining "an achievement" as, more or less, "something the WG did that still lasts today")
  • Failures in government (a different definition as, more or less by definition, failures don't last - someone else comes along and fixes them up)
  • Reactions (what people say about the WG: hate, love)
  • Later life

Subject to discussion, I intend to move the "reactions to W" in the following "failures" para to a seperate para on its own. Objective achievements; objective failures; reactions seems like a good structure to me. (Indeed, it mightn't be a bad structure for other PM's bios either.) (Again, unless someone beats me to it - Robert is better at this "how people feel about it" stuff than I am.)Tannin 08:40 Dec 20, 2002 (UTC)

Jtdirl - that is a flagrantly partisan discussion of the constitutional crisis, which correctly identifies but overstates Whitlam's violation of convention, but then entirely obscures Kerr's violation, which the more significant of the two. I don't have the time to correct it at present, nor, to be honest, a great deal of interest, but it should not be allowed to stand unchallenged. Tannin

A fair and non-partisan description of the sequence of events would include three main violations of convention:

  1. The Senate's refusal to pass supply
  2. Whitlam's intransigence
  3. Kerr's actions, in particular his decision to appoint a Prime Minister in defiance of the clearly expressed will of the house.

Tannin

Incorrect, Tannin. Whitlam wasn't merely intransigent. He explicitly broke the rules by which Loss of Supply is governed in parliamentary democracies. One European ex-president I spoke to about the issue once said that if he'd been in Kerr's position, he'd have told Whitlam 'get your arse in your car, get up here now, and either have a resignation or a dissolution request with you.' The Senate and Kerr broke convention, but then convention is basically a gentleman's agreement with no legal enforceability.

Whitlam didn't just break convention, he broke the explicit RULES re loss of supply. No UK PM, French PM, Irish PM, Italian PM, etc would have dared to act as Whitlam did. He created the crisis by how he handled the supply issue.

The central problem wasn't with Kerr, it was with the Aust. Constitution that contains two contradictory flaws that produced the crisis and made solving it so difficult. 1. Government responsibility to the lower house, yet financial responsibility to both. 2. A de facto head of state who can't use informal influence because he lacks the BASIC requirement found in almost every constitution, security of tenure. So if he puts pressure on privately, he can be sacked, in the process causing yet more constitutional problems. Neither flaw has been corrected, and indeed Number 2 would have been made even worse under the proposed republic, which left the proposed president similarly exposed (even though all internal advice (eg, the Appendices of the Republic Advisory Committee, etc) said a president MUST have security of tenure as a basic fundamental requirement.

If Kerr had appointed a PM against the express will of the lower house, and kept it in session, that would have been completely unacceptable. But he appointed a PM on the explicit guarantee of an immediate general election request to solve the crisis Whitlam's failure to act had created, helped by the design flaws in the constitution. If Fraser had not sought a dissolution, and sought to remain with a hostile lower house, he too would have been immediately dismissed.

I haven't got my copy of the Aust. constitution here right now (its in a box somewhere and at 3am here I'm not going to chase it down), but one option other heads of state suggested which might have solved the issue if constitutionally possible was to appoint what some states call 'technical govts'. Some states explicitly require a prime minister be a member of parliament. Others imply it. Others have leeway during an election, when via a dissolution there is no parliament to be a member of. Where there is an absolute political stalemate (and Aust.'s govt financial responsibility to both houses is a classic case of how to cause one!) and a resulting constitutional stalemate because the PM won't obey the law, and where there is the constitutional leeway is there, a non-political govt is appointed simply to get a pm who will advice the dissolution. Such a pm would be a totally non-political figure, a senior civil servant, retired diplomat, etc,. whose only function is to advise the required dissolution. He then would be either immediately replaced, with the previous PM again asked to assume office, or remain in office for the duration of the general election, and replaced once an election result is in. Some states have used that technique. Others name a formateur to form a temporary government, or an informateur to put a govt together under someone else. If it was possible, that might have been a better option for Kerr than in chosing a partisan in the crisis like Fraser.

This is probably mediaeval if not ancient history in this discussion by now, but although the Governor-General can appoint a government consisting entirely of non-MPs for a term not exceeding three months, such a government would have been useless in 1975 because Supply could not have been guaranteed by such a government. Certainly such a Prime Minister could have advised a double dissolution, but it would have taken over a month before the new Parliament could sit and by that time the nation would have been in grave finacial difficulties. Skyring 20:36, 3 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Kerr's role in the affair is the most famous. But it was reactive, dealing with a mess that Whitlam by his refusal to offer Advice left. Most heads of state have nightmares about having such a mess, and such a prime minister putting his own political survival above solving a national crisis. Internationally, in terms of constitutional law and procedure, Kerr is regarded as clumsely and niaive, but Whitlam is the one regarded as the guilty one. It is nothing to do with politics (I'd share some of his politics). His behaviour is seen as unacceptable, indeed so blatently unconstitutional that if a prime minister elsewhere tried it, he would be drummed out of public life and never get a public post again. In Ireland's case, when Haughey claimed he had 'up to one week' to consider his options, one cabinet colleague told him 'sure you've got time, as much time as it takes to type up your resignation and get through to traffic to the President.' Other politicians considered going to court and getting him judicially ordered to resign. (And remember Haughey was forced to back down in a matter of hours, not days or longer!) The President himself was apoplectic with rage and the position he was very nearly left in. A previous president in his private papers expressed sympathy for Kerr, as he too was dealing with a govt that treated fundamental constitutional rules as optional extras.

Put simply, without Whitlam's blatent refusal to follow the elementary rules on loss of supply, there would have been no crisis, no intervention by Kerr, no dismissal by Kerr. Leaving aside the Australian politics of the situation (pro- and anti-Whitlam, monarchist, republican, etc) the issue all boils down Whitlam's actions and inactions. Kerr found himself in the mother of all constitutional nightmares, and came up with a technically correct but politically unwise solution. He should never have been placed in that position. Only one man did so, Whitlam.

Let's start with your "put simply, without Whitlam's blatent refusal to follow the elementary rules" statement. This is both true and false, correct and misleading. There was a whole series of "refusals to follow the elementary rules", and to focus on one is to completely mislead the reader:

  • Two state governmemts replaced casual Senate vacancies with appointed men opposed to senators they were replacing. This was naked cheating which the Constitution had never thought to explicitly forbid: Malcom Fraser himself proposed a constitutional ammendment two years later to make sure that it could never happen again. The immediate result, however, was that the Senate was unrepresentative of the electorate - in a word, rigged. (It had been split 30/30 and therefore unable to reject money bills prior to the casual vacancies).
  • The now-unrepresentative Senate broke convention by blocking supply.
  • Whitlam did not resign, but indicates his intention to call a half-Senate election if supply is not passed. (In fact, it is a matter of public record that two Liberal Senators were determined to cross the floor and pass supply in any case.) (References available if required, by the way.)
  • Kerr requested advice from the very same judiciary that might perhaps be required to try a case on the matter - namely, the Chief Justice of the High Court Sir Garfield Barwick.
  • Kerr sacked Whitlam without warning, and appointed Fraser, meanwhile instructing Fraser's driver to take him in the back door, and hiding Fraser in a waiting room while he sees Whitlam
  • The Senate passes supply, Fraser moves that the House be adjourned and is defeated, the House passes a vote of no confidence in Fraser and the Speaker asks for an appointment to see Kerr (thus forcing Kerr to appoint the member with the confidence of the Lower House as Prime Minister - i.e., Whitlam) but Kerr refuses to see the Speaker of the House for almost two hours, giving himself time to dissolve Parliment.

There was, in short, a whole series of unfortunate acts, each one of them at best very questionable, and at worst (the first and last ones listed) naked cheating. The account as it stands at present is dreadfully biased.

I hope I'm not going to get sucked into this debate any further. I used to follow politics keenly years ago but ... well .. that was years ago and there are other matters that interest me far more now. But I hate to see partisan views take over what should be an unbiased, strictly factual account. The present stress on just one breech of convention to the exclusion of all the others is unacceptable, and the great weight of words devoted to one short (albeit dramatic) event as compared to the enormous changes that came over Australian society (for both good and ill) as a direct result of Whitlam's time in government is more so. In any case, this is the wrong article for this topic: there is already a "dismissal". It should go there. Tannin

Again, Tannin, you keep missing the point.
  • The appointments to the Senate were legal, constitutional and wrong.
  • The Aust. Senate (like the French Senate, the Irish Senate, etc) is not meant to be the 'representative House', so whether it reflected public opinion is irrelevant. It should not have had the power to block or not grant supply. In 1975 it did (because negligent politicians over the decades never bothered to change the constitution to bring the Aus. constitution into line with almost all other 20th century world constitutions) which meant that legally, the Senate was entitled to do what it did. I personally think it was wrong to do so.
This is very incorrect. The authors of the Australian constitution explicitly the modelled Australia Senate after the United States Senate rather than the House of Lords. It was and is intended to reflect public opinion, and is completely unlike the upper house of most every other parliamentary system. Unlike the Canadian Senate or the House of Lords, the Australian Senate is elected and plays a very active role in the legislative process.
In fact, it was the representative nature of the Senate that allowed it to do what it did. If the Canadian Senate tried to block supply it would have had its head handed to it (as occurred with the House of Lords). The Liberals under Malcolm Fraser were able to do what they did because they were arguing that in this particular case, the Senate was closer to public opinion than the House of Representatives. Note that Australia has had several opportunities to reduce the power of the Senate since 1975 and has chosen not to do so.
  • The Senate, the Opposition and the Governor-General all breached Australian conventions. Whitlam didn't break a convention, he broke a BASIC, FUNDAMENTAL RULE regarding Loss of Supply, followed in parliamentary democracies worldwide. The others breached unwritten, legally unenforceable local Australian conventions, many of which ran contrary to the actual text of the constitution (but which had evolved unlike the constitution, which remained stuck in 1900 political theory). Whitlam broke a RULE that is applied worldwide, from London to Copenhagen, Ottawa to Cape Town, Berlin to Dublin. To put it another way, they broke a gentleman's agreement, he broke one of the constitutional ten commandments.
It's not applied worldwide. Budget crises similar to what happened in Australia are a very common occurence in the United States, and in a number of cases the President has had to literally shut down the government and put the United States technically in default. One might argue that the United States system is different and the rules don't apply to Australia, but on the other hand, the fact that parts of the Australian system (such as the Senate and the Federal system) are modelled after the United States rather than the UK makes it relevant. For example, the procedure for filling senate vacancies in the Senate was explicitly modelled after the American procedure.
My objection to what you wrote in this and in the Australian constitutional crisis of 1975 is not that your arguments are bad. They aren't. It's the implication that they are so obviously correct that any person who holds a different opinion is so obviously wrong that they aren't worth mentioning. This is a topic for which rational and thinking people have come to different conclusions and the article ought to be written as such.
He probably thought he could simply balls the crisis out, in the belief that the opposition would blink first. You can't do that with the constitution. If he hadn't Supply from the Houses charged with granting supply, he was constitutionally obliged to resign, something he seemed to treat as a technicality that didn't apply to him.
This is debatable. The Australian Constitution has explicit procedures to be followed in case of deadlock between the House and the Senate and these procedures have been followed six times. The objection to the Governor-General's actions in 1975 was that rather than follow the procedure in article 57 of the Constitution, the Governor-General and opposition short circuited them.

JTD 19:59 Jan 4, 2003 (UTC)

JTD, you are putting forward a sensible, reasoned argument. However, you need to distinguish clearly between your opinions and the facts of the matter - viz, that the argument you put forward as if it were Holy Writ is, in fact, highly controversial. Somewhat against my better judgement - for I have more interesting things to read and write about - I thought to reply to your sensible and reasoned but clearly partisan post just now by reminding you that the view you are putting forward, both in the article and here in talk, is far from being a consensus view. Opinion in Australia over the Dismissal remains as divided as it ever was. Lest you doubt me, I though I had better pick a half-dozen examples to cite, so I typed "supply convention Whitlam" into Google and the very first hit included these words (to which I have added my own emphasis):

Kerr's third error was to conclude that once the Senate denied supply Whitlam was bound by a convention to advise an election or resign. For that conclusion he relied on the analogy of the undoubted convention that a Prime Minister denied supply by the Lower House or losing its confidence must take one of those courses. It is not a valid analogy. The supposed convention does not satisfy the essential test for a convention: it is not clearly necessary for the effective operation of the constitutional system or preservation of its democratic character. Denial of supply by the Senate or the absence of its confidence does not, at least while there is supply money still available, bring a necessity for the Government to advise an election or resign. It remains the elected Government, with the authority and legitimacy of such a Government, because, having majority support in the House of Representatives, it is the Government chosen by Parliament in the way that Parliament makes such a choice. Kerr puts it that one reason why a Government in that situation should resign or advise an election is to avoid the risk of weakening the office of Governor-General by imposing on it the burden of forcing dissolution and an election through dismissal of the Government.89 That would carry more weight in the United Kingdom, where the monarch is the operative head of state, than in Australia, where all institutions are expected to be of obvious evident utility. Concern for the strength of that office is a consideration which should impel a Governor-General to give the fullest weight to the need for absolute necessity before use of reserve authority. The notion that any Government in the position of the Whitlam Government in 1975 would resign so as to ease the burden on the Governor-General, is not realistic.
Because Whitlam had taken the position that he would not advise an election, Kerr regarded him as improperly retaining office in breach of convention. It followed that Kerr regarded himself as under a constitutional duty to use reserve authority not only to dissolve Parliament for an election but also to dismiss Whitlam from office.
'There never was a convention that bound Gough Whitlam, the leader of the elected Government, to resign or advise an election.

So who is this writing? Some party hack? Some fanatic left-winger?

Ordinarily, I would expect to see more than one single contrary point of view to demonstrate that another view (your view, in this instance) is controversial and cannot be agreed on as the sole statement of events. In this case, however, I think the expertise and stature of the writer is sufficient to make my point without my troubling to harvest supporting views from others. He is both a retired Supreme Court judge and a former Governor of Victoria.

You can read the full text at http://www.mup.unimelb.edu.au/democracy/176.html and on the pages linked from there. Tannin

Some more information

http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/briefs/brief9.htm

is a Senate document which describes the origins of the Australian Senate.

and more importantly

http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/briefs/brief7.htm

which describes the conventions to be followed when the House and the Senate disagree. One thing that comes out of this is that the Australian Senate is a totally different beast than upper houses in other countries.


Why don't we shift most of the discussion of the dismissal to the page specifically on it? That way, we can discuss it once properly rather than three times (on the articles for Kerr, Fraser, and Whitlam respectively)? --Robert Merkel 00:26 Jan 6, 2003 (UTC)

An interesting interpretation, Tannin. However you have to go back to the basic question, 'What is Supply'? It is, quite simply the FIRST REQUIREMENT of a government, ie, funding. If you don't have Supply, you cannot govern. The problem both Kerr and Whitlam faced was that, through negligence, Australia's 1900 constitution, which initially allowed both houses to control Supply (not abnormal in 1900), was never changed by Australia to give control of Supply where it belonged, to the lower house. It was morally questionable, even though legal, for the opposition to use the power of the Senate to deny Supply. But that was, and is, the constitution. And worldwide in every parliamentary democracy, withdrawing Supply is quite literally pulling the rug from under the government. You CANNOT function without Supply, and the methodology for solving this situation applies even where it is not the popular house has not blocked Supply. Either you resign, in which someone else can seek Supply, or you put the issue to the ultimate arbiters, the people, in an election. I have immense sympathy for Whitlam. He was a victim of a constitutional mugging by the opposition, who underhandedly used a fundamental flaw in the constitution to catch him. But doing nothing is not an option, not least because while the previous Appropriations Act had not run out, holding an election and possibly some delay if a hung parliament resulted, takes time and it was his duty to his country to ensure that whatever solution was arrived at, left sufficient time to solve the problem before funds completely ran out. Going to the country on the issue of the constitutional mugging would have given Whitlam the moral high ground, though given his unpopularity (thanks to scandals) he might not have won even with that.

Kerr too was left in a nightmare. There are two normal golden rule for heads of state. (1) don't interfere until there is no alternative (ie, you are the last person left who can intervene!). (2) The Prime Minister must do everything in his power to avoid putting a head of state in a position like that. What Kerr was faced with was the sort of nightmare heads of state dread. Stubborn politicians on all sides, a constitutional crisis caused by a gaping hole in the constitution, and the clock ticking with time and money running out. If he had security of tenure, he could (and perhaps should) and intervened with all politicians, 'banging heads together' as King George V once put it when he intervened in the row over Irish Home Rule in 1914 but summoning a Buckingham Palace Conference of all parties. But without security of tenure (another gaping hole in the constitution), a governor-general is literally at the mercy of a government that could sack him on the spot. His handling was niaive and clumsy, but part of the problem was that trust had broken down between him and Whitlam, for which Whitlam was entirely at fault. Kerr should have used Bagehot's third right, to warn Whitlam 'look Prime Minister, I have every sympathy with the position you are in, and the way the Senate has behaved. But you cannot continue in office without Supply. A solution has got to be found immediately. This situation is constitutionally unsustainable.'

He could even have offered to host all party consultations, or named a neutral chairman for talks to find a compromise. But if all else failed, either a general election or a resignation had to follow. Whitlam's 'wait and see' approach was in breach of the fundamental rule of government. No Supply. No government. And that applies irrespective of which house blocks supply. As long as you allow your constitution to allow your senate to block Supply, the effect of blocking Supply is the same, irrespective of which house does it. (That's why the Irish senate, for example, cannot block Supply or vote down financial Bills, merely make non-binding suggestions that can be ignored.) And it is a disgrace that twenty-eight years on, your politicians still haven't fixed the farce of a Senate having a right to block Supply, or the GG not having security of tenure. This same crisis could erupt again the next time an Appropriation Bill is going to the Senate. One can only hope that prime ministers, oppositions and governors-general have all learned from the farce of 1975. But having studied in depth how headships of state work worldwide, I for one would hate to be left in the nightmare senario Kerr faced in 1975. One ex-head of state joked how he'd give his 'left testicle' rather than face such a nightmare.

JTD, you almost put your finger on the issue when you say: And it is a disgrace that twenty-eight years on, your politicians still haven't fixed the farce. It is indeed a farce. Why does it continue? Because the interpretation of events in 1975 is still so controversial that no-one can agree on how to fix it. It remains a running sore in Australian political life to this day. While the main participants remain alive and voters on both sides of the issue maintan their rage, the chance of constitutional change on the supply issue (in my estimation, and that of nearly all other observers) is nil. I doubt that it will happen before ... oh.. maybe 2030 or 2040.

Robert, I agree, let's shift this discussion over the the other place. It should be worked through in depth and, as you say, only once. Tannin 03:35 Jan 6, 2003 (UTC)

Moving hopelessly POV section to here, en route to a more appropriate location (in sutiably edited form) Tannin 10:56 Apr 8, 2003 (UTC) Quoted text follows:

While such conventions (and indeed others that Whitlam himself had been lax, to put it mildly, in following) have existed since the creation of the Australian commonwealth, like other conventions in parliamentary democracies, they were, as they say, 'not worth the paper they were written on' (ie, unwritten and unenforceable). While many argue about whether it was proper for the Senate to act as it did, even though Whitlam himself had shown conventions scant regard (on one occasion, trying to take cabinet decisions at informal gatherings of ministers in his house, not at formal meetings chaired by the Governor-General, which was required in law) the Australian Senate is legally entitled to block Supply. Having done so, the same constitutional rules apply in every parliamentary democracy. Where a constitutionally entitled House blocks Supply, a prime minister must immediately take one of two courses; (a) resign, or (b) seek a parliamentary dissolution. In typical style, Whitlam refused to budge, leaving Australia in a unique constitutional limbo. On November 11, 1975, after the Senate still refused to pass the budget (but substantially before the old appropriations bill had expired) the Governor-General, a former Chief Justice of New South Wales, envoked his constitutional powers and removed a prime minister who refused to offer the required advice. Instead he appointed a caretaker prime minister who guaranteed to follow international constitutional principles and seek a dissolution, which was duly granted.

Just as legally, the Australian Senate was entitled to do as it did (the issue was should it do as it did?), so the dismissal of Whitlam by the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr raised the same question. He was constitutionally entitled to what he did, given that the Prime Minister blatently disregarded a fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy, by refusing to either resign or advice a dissolution having lost supply, and the Governor-General could legally terminate 'His' prime minister's appointment at any stage. But the issue was, should he have done what he did? The fact that the old appropriations Act was still in force did mean there was a theoretical timeframe within which the Senate could back down.

But technically, that is irrelevant as in the event of the loss of supply, a prime minister is expected to act immediately, not stall and wait around to see if things change, and so risk precipitating a constitutional crisis. In most parliamentary democracies, Whitlam's behaviour would have led to an outcry. (The failure of Irish Prime Minister Charles J. Haughey to resign immediately after a parliamentary defeat in 1989 (and to say that he had up to one week to make up his mind what to do) led to an outcry that forced his immediate trip to the President of Ireland that afternoon to resign.) But by his actions, Kerr made himself not Whitlam the focus of attention, as Whitlam was and is the only Australian Prime Minister to ever have been removed from office by the Governor-General.

Constitutional writer Walter Bagehot described a head of state having three rights; to be consulted, to advise and to warn. It is arguable that Kerr like other heads of state or governors-general in his position should have used the 'warn' option first, by telling Whitlam he had to offer some form of advice, whether a resignation or a dissolution, immediately, and that if he didn't, the Governor-General would have to act. But in another fundamental flaw in the Australian constitution (like allowing both Houses of parliament control over Supply), the Governor-General (unlike most heads of state) has no security of tenure, and could himself have been dismissed by Whitlam if he had issued such a warning, complicating the situation even more so. The issue of the dismissal remains controversial to this day, with people blaming Whitlam or Kerr in many ways because of their own political views. Some called the Governor-General's actions a 'coup', others blamed the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while one writer went so far as to say that Australia should be called a 'governor-generalate', not a democracy. At best Whitlam contributed to his own downfall but his handling of the Senate's withdrawal of Supply. At worst he was the author of his own downfall.

The Governor-General, rightly or wrongly, dismissed Whitlam, commissioned Opposition Leader Malcolm Fraser to form a caretaker administration, and as promised, Fraser requested a parliamentary dissolution to solve the stalemate over Supply. Whitlam was roundly defeated in the elections. See also Australian constitutional crisis of 1975.

(end quoted text) Tannin


PML, I see your point WRT the symbolic or other nature of ties to the British monarchy (more accurately, I don't see the point at all but I accept that some people feel that way), so rather than discussing it on this page I have removed the reference to symbolism entirely and pointed to the republicanism in Australia article instead. Is that OK? --Robert Merkel 05:41, 16 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Sorry, but is there any possible way we could get a better picture of Whitlam on there? I understand the former one was rather old and autographed, which rather doesn't work, but this one makes him look rather bug-eyed and deranged, which I feel is unbefitting his character or, failing that, his status as an ex-PM. Anyone disagree? Wally 02:55, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

I agree, I have put up another picture. Richardchilton
A very bland publicity photo which everyone has seen a million times before. I will try to find a more original one. Adam 02:25, 2 Mar 2004 (UTC)
Why do we need a more original one? PMA 08:33, Mar 2, 2004 (UTC)

Is a compromise possible? In "American" English, "He was Australia's first Labor Prime Minister for 23 years" is cumbersome and implies that he was in office for 23 years. Does "in 23 years" really mean that much different in Australian English? --Golbez 07:26, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)

He could hardly have been in office for 23 years "when elected". Markalexander100 07:30, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)

"In 23 years" means the same thing as "for 23 years," but it sticks out as very American in an article which is otherwise written in good Anglo-Australian English. I suppose the way round it is to say "he was the first Labor Prime Minister since 1949." Adam 07:46, 26 Mar 2004 (UTC)

should it mention that the decission to withdraw from vietnam was that of the previous gvt. and that whitlam was the one to implement it. Xtra 21:59, 23 Dec 2004 (UTC)

No. Apart from a few embassy guards, there were no Australian troops left in Vietnam when Whitlam came to power. As a matter of solid historical fact, Whitlam actually sent more Australian servicemen and assets into Vietnam, albeit not combat troops and only for a short time. Check the chronology. Skyring 22:17, 23 Dec 2004 (UTC)