Georges Bonnet

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Georges-Étienne Bonnet (July 22/23, 1889 - June 18, 1973) was a French politician and leading figure in the Radical-Socialist Party.

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[edit] Early career

Bonnet was born in the Dordogne region, the son of a lawyer[1]. Bonnet studied law and political science at the Ecoce libre des sciences politiques and Sorbonne, and then went to work as an auditeur at the Conseil d'état.[2]. In 1911, he launched a political career after marrying Odette Pelletan, the grand-daughter of Eugene Pelletan[3]. Bonnet's wife, often known as Madame Soutien-Georges, ran a salon, and had great ambitions for her husband; one contemporary reported that Madame Bonnet was "so wildly ambitious for her husband that when a new ministry was being formed he was afraid to go home at night unless he had captured a post for himself"[4]. Many privately mocked Bonnet for the way in which his wife dominated him[5]. The moniker "Madame Soutien-Geogres" was a French pun on the word for brassiere (soutien-gorge), and which in turn was both a reference Bonnet's Christian name and to the size of Madame Bonnet's breasts[6]. In 1914, Bonnet joined the French Army, and in 1918 served as director of demobilization[7]. In 1919, Bonnet served as a secretary to the French delegation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and wrote a book Lettres á un Bourgeois de 1914 calling for widespread social reforms[8].

Bonnet served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1924-1928 and again from 1929-1940. He was appointed undersecretary of state in 1925, the first in a series of high ministerial positions throughout the 1920s and 1930s. During his time as in the Chamber, Bonnet was regarded as a leading expert in financial and economic matters[9]. As a minister, Bonnet had a reputation for hard work, always being well prepared and knowing his briefs in parliamentary debates, and for excelling at political intrigue[10]. In 1932, Bonnet headed the French delegation at the Lausanne Conference[11]. During the Lausanne Conference, the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, commenting on Bonnet's abilities, asked "Why isn't he in the Cabinet?"[12]. In 1933, Bonnet was a prominent member of the French delegation to the London Conference, where he was a leading critic of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's actions during the conference[13]. In 1936, Bonnet emerged as the leader of 18 Radical deputies who were not fond of their party's participation in the Front Populaire. As a result, the French Premier Léon Blum exiled Bonnet by appointing him the French Ambassador to the United States in January 1937, through Bonnet never learned English[14]. Upon hearing of Bonnet' appointment, the American Ambassador to France, William C. Bullitt wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt about Bonnet: "I don't think you'll like him. He is extremely intelligent and competent on economic and financial matters, but he's not a man of character. You may remember that he led the French delegation to the London economic conference where he led the attacks agaisnt you"[15].

On June 28, 1937, Bonnet returned to France when the Premier Camille Chautemps appointed him Finance Minister[16]. Bonnet first major act as Finance Minister was to oversee the devaluation of the franc (the second devaluation in less then nine months), with value of the franc going from 110.8 francs/per British pound to 147.20[17]. The devaluation had largely imposed on Bonnet by the fact that the 10 billion francs that had been set aside in September 1936 in a Currency Reserve Fund to defend the value of the franc following the devaluation of that year had been spent by middle of 1937[18]. As Finance Minister, Bonnet imposed sharp cuts to military spending[19]. Bonnet felt that the costs of the arms race with Germany were such that it was better for France to reach an understanding that might end the arms race, rather then continue to spend gargantuan sums on the military[20]. Besides for the economic problems associated with budgetary stability and the attempts to maintain the value of the franc against currency speculation, Bonnet was highly concerned with the social conflict caused by the need for increased taxation and decreased social services in order to pay for the arms race[21]. In a meeting with Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador to Austria, in November 1937, Bonnet together Chautempts expressed the hope that an understanding might be reached whereas France might accept Central and Eastern Europe as Germany's sphere of influence in return for German acceptance of Western Europe as France's sphere of influence[22]. Moreover, Bonnet became the leading spokesman within the French Cabinet for the idea that the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, the so-called Cordon sanitaire that far from representing a source of strength for France were rather a net liability that only served to embroil France in conflicts with Germany[23]. Throughout his career, Bonnet was noted as an advocate of "sacred egoism", namely the notion that France must do what was right for France with no regard for any other state[24]. Bonnet regarded himself as a "realist", and his thinking on foreign policy tended to be colored in equal measure by pragmatism and insularity[25]

Bonnet's cuts to military spending created a major row with the War Minister Édouard Daladier, who was able to persuade the Cabinet to rescind the most severe of Bonnet's economy measures to the French Army under the grounds in the current international climate, the French Army needed more, not less francs[26]. Since the Ministers of the Air and the Marine were not as substantial personalities as Daladier, the French Navy and French Air Force were not able to reversal the Finance Minister's cuts[27]. In January 1938, following the fall of Chautempts's government, Bonnet made a serious effort to form a new government, but in the end, had to content himself with being appointed Minister of State[28].

[edit] Foreign Minister, 1938-1939

[edit] To the Munich Conference

In April 1938, following the fall of the second Blum government, Bonnet was appointed as Foreign Minister under Premier Édouard Daladier (despite their quarrel of 1937, by this time Daladier and Bonnet were reconciled ). Bonnet was a staunch supporter of the Munich Agreement in 1938 and was firmly opposed to taking military action against Nazi expansion, for the most part, preferring to follow a course of appeasement. In 1938-1939, there were three fractions within the French government. One fraction led by Bonnet felt that France could not afford the crippling costs of an arms race with Germany (as an expert in financial matters and a former Finance minister, Bonnet was acutely aware of the damages inflicted by the arms race on an economy already weakened by the Great Depression), and so sought a détente with the Reich[29]. An second fraction led by Paul Reynaud, Jean Zay and Georges Mandel favored a policy of resistance to German expansionism, and a third fraction led by Daladier stood halfway between the two other fractions, and favored appeasement of the Reich as the way of buying time to rearm[30]. In 1938, Daladier believing that France need more time to rearm was willing to leave foreign policy largely in the hands of Bonnet as the best way of avoiding a war with Germany in 1938[31]. In addition, Daladier felt that the best way of watching Bonnet was to include him in the Cabinet, especially Daladier wished to see the Popular Front continue, whereas Bonnet wanted to see the end of the Popular Front[32]. In Daladier's viewpoint, if Bonnet were outside of the Cabinet, his ability to engage in intrigues to break up the Popular Front and seize the Premiership for himself would be corresponding increased while including in the Cabinet limited his room to manoeuvre[33]. Moreover, an additional complication in the Daladier-Bonnet relationship was posed by Bonnet's desire for the Premiership, which gradually led to a breakdown with his once warm relations with Daladier[34]. Bonnet was extremely critical of what he regarded as the "warmongers" of the Quai d'Orsay, and right from the beginning of his time as Foreign Minister, he tended to exclude his senior officials from the decision-making progress, preferring instead to concentrate authority in his hands.[35].

Between April 27-29, 1938, Bonnet visited London with Daladier for meetings with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax to discuss the possibility of a German-Czechoslovak war breaking out, and what the two governments could do to stop such a war. During the talks, the French ministers argued for firm statements that both nations would go to war in the event of a German aggression, and agreed to a British suggestion that the two nations pressure Prague into making concessions to the Sudeten Heimfront of Konrad Henlein. The London summit marked the beginning of a pattern that was to last throughout 1938, where the French would begin talks with the British by demanding a harder line against the Reich, and then agree to follow the British line[36]. In the viewpoint of Bonnet and Daladier, these tactics allowed them to carry out their foreign policy goals while providing them with a cover from domestic politics by presenting their foreign policy as the result of British pressure[37]. As Bonnet told the American Ambassador William C. Bullitt, his "whole policy was based on allowing the British full latitude to work out the dispute" because otherwise France would have to bear the main responsibility for pressure for concessions on Czechoslovakia[38]. Throughout the summer of 1938, Bonnet led most of the diplomatic pressure applied to President Edvard Beneš for concessions to Henlein come from London, leading to sharp complaints from the British that Bonnet should do more to apply pressure on Beneš[39].

Between May 9-14, 1938, Bonnet attended the meeting of the League Council of the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland[40]. During the meeting, Bonnet met with the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, who offered vague and evasive answers to Bonnet's questions about what the Soviet Union proposed to do in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia[41]. At the same time, Bonnet was informed by the Polish and Romanian delegations that if Germany invaded Czechoslovakia, they would refuse the Red Army transit rights to come to aid of Czechoslovakia, and that any Soviet violation of their neutrality would be resisted with force[42]. After the League meeting, Bonnet met with Lord Halifax in Paris, where he urged Halifax to "work as hard as he could for a settlement in Czechoslovakia so that the French would not be faced with a crisis which they definitely did not want to face"[43]. As Lord Halifax reported to the British Cabinet, Bonnet "wanted His Majesty's Government to put as much pressure as possible on Dr. Beneś to reach a settlement with the Sudeten-Deutsch in order to save France from the cruel dilemma between dishonouring her agreement [the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924] or becoming involved in war"[44].

During the May Crisis of 1938, on May 21, Bonnet advised Lord Halifax that Britain should warn Berlin that if the Germans attacked Czechoslovakia, then Britain would become involved in the ensuring war, only to be informed that London had already delivered such a warning[45]. In a talk with the British Ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps, Bonnet attacked Beneš for ordering Czechoslovak mobilization without informing France first, and criticized Prague's for its "hasty action", through at meeting with the Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, Štefan Osuský on May 21, Bonnet did not criticize Prague as he had promised Phipps he would do[46]. Phipps urged Bonnet to use the crisis as an excuse to renounce the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924, but this Bonnet refused to do unless France could secure a stronger commitment from Britain to come to France's aid in the event of war with Germany[47]. During the crisis, Bonnet issued a cautiously worded press statement supporting Prague, but refused to issue a démarche in Berlin[48]. At a subsequent meeting with Phipps on May 22, Bonnet was informed not to interpret the British warnings to Berlin during the May Crisis as blank cheque for British support for either Czechoslovkia or France[49]. Bonnet took "copious notes" of the British message, and stated that "if Czechoslovakia were really unreasonable, the French Government might well declare that France considered herself released from her bond"[50]. On May 25, 1938, Bonnet told the German Ambassador to France, Count Johannes von Welczeck that France would honour her alliance with Czechoslovakia should Germany invade that nation, and highlighted his main foreign policy goals when he declared:"if the problem of the minorities in Czechoslovakia was settled peacefully, economic and disarmament problems might be considered"[51].

On May 31, 1938, Bonnet refused a British request for an Anglo-French démarche to Beneš demanding concessions to the Sudeten German Heimfront, but promised to commit the French Minister in Prague, Victor de Lacroix to do more to pressure the Czechoslovaks[52]. In his instructions to Lacroix for the démarche, Bonnet instead merely asked for more information and stated: "The information that you have transmitted to me on the state of the negotiations between the Prime Minister and the representatives of the Sudetens does not allow me to pronounce as fully as the British Government believes itself able to do on the character and substance of M. Henlein's proposals...I ask you, therefore to obtain urgently the necessary details on the proposals submitted to M. Hodza..."[53]. The British discovery of Bonnet's instructions, which Lacroix inadvertently revealed to the British Minister in Prague, Sir Basil Newton led to much Anglo-French recriminations[54]. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1938, Bonnet refused to apply pressure through official channels, and instead used unofficial emissaries to carry the message that France might not go to war in the event of a German invasion, leading Prague to place more assurance on French statements of public support that was not warranted[55]. Bonnet had his friend, the journalist Jules Saurerwein tell Beneš in an interview that "Victory is not a state that endures forever" in the summer of 1938.[56]. Not until July 17,1938 did Bonnet issue a set of instructions to Lacroix which explicitly warned Beneš and his Prime Minister, Milan Hodža that because of the attitude of the British, France could not risk a war in 1938, and Prague should do its utmost to reach a settlement with Germany[57].

Starting with the May Crisis, Bonnet began a campaign of lobbying the United States to become involved in European affairs, asking that the Washington inform Prague that in the event of a German-Czechoslovak war the "Czech government would not have the sympathy of the American government if it should not attempt seriously to produce a peaceful solution...by making concessions to the Sudeten Germans which would satisfy Hitler and Henlein"[58]. In a meeting with the American Ambassador William C. Bullitt on May 16, 1938 Bonnet stated his belief that another war with Germany would be more dreadful then any previous war and "he [Bonnet] would fight to the limit against the involvement of France in the war".[59]. As part of his effort to gain Bullitt’s trust, Bonnet showed the American notes received from the British government during the Czechoslovak crisis.[60]. In a radio broadcast sent direct to the United States on July 4, 1938 Bonnet proclaimed his belief in the "common ideals" which linked France and the United States as a way of pressuring for greater American interest in the crisis in Central Europe[61].

In June 1938, there was a major dispute between Daladier and Bonnet over the question of continuing French arms shipments to the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. The Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War had created a major strategic problem for French policy-makers. Because of Germany’s greater population, it considered crucial in France to use the vast manpower of North Africa as a way of compensation, which in turn required French control of the western Mediterranean to ensure that no inference would be possible with the troop convoys from Algeria to Marseilles. As a result of the Italian intervention in Spain’s civil war, a number of Italian bases had been set up in the strategic Balearic Islands. It was widely feared in France that the Italians would at minimum receive permission from the Spanish Nationalists to make their presence in the Balerics permanent, and at maximum, would ask for and receive the cession of the Balearics. The prospect of a Franco-German war breaking out with the Italians siding with the latter and using the Balearics to make naval and air attacks on French troop convoys was considered to be highly undesirable by French decision-makers, and a major objective of French foreign policy in the late 1930s was to remove the Italians from the Balearics. Daladier was in favor of continuing arms shipments to the Spanish Republicans as long as the Italian forces were in Spain, whereas Bonnet argued for ending arms supplies as a way of improving relations with Italy, and went as far to tell the British Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps that his country should "lay great stress with Daladier on the importance to the Pyrenees frontier remaining closed"[62]. It was Bonnet’s hope that ending arms support for the Spanish Republic would be reciprocated by a total Italian withdraw from all Spanish territory, especially the Balearics. Bonnet was successful in having the frontier closed.

Following the reports from General Joseph Vuillemin of the French Air Force after a visit to Germany about the strength of the Luftwaffe, and a memo from André François-Poncet, the French Ambassador to Germany on August 18, 1938 stating it was quite likely that Adolf Hitler planned to attack Czechoslovakia sometime soon, Bonnet began quite insistent that the a joint Anglo-French warning be sent to Berlin, warning against invading Czechoslovakia[63]. On August 22, 1938, Bonnet had Charles Corbin, the French Ambassador in London press for an outright British commitment to come to France's side in the event of war breaking out in Central Europe, and used the ensuring British refusal as a reason in Cabinet discussions as why France could not go to war[64]. Starting in August 1938, Bonnet started to become hostile towards what he felt to Daladier's excessive belligerence and lack of willingness to compromise with the Germans, and often urged in private that Daladier change his stance[65]. In early September 1938 as part of his effort to prevent war through a mixture of threat and conciliation, Bonnet had a series of meetings with Count Welczeck, telling him that France would honor the terms of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty should the Germans invade Czechoslovakia, while insisting that his government was quite open to a compromise solution[66].

During a speech delivered on September 4, 1938 at the unveiling of a commemorative plaque at Pointe de Grave honoring the La Fayette's's departure to America in 1777 and the arrival of the A.E.F in 1917, Bonnet stated in an oblique way that France would go to war if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, and expressed the hope that the U.S would fight on France's side[67]. During the same ceremony, Ambassador Bullitt stated that "France and the United States were united in war and peace", leading to a major storm by American isolationists, and a statement from President Franklin D. Roosevelt that it was “100 per cent wrong” the U.S. would join a “stop-Hitler bloc”[68]. Roosevelt's statement had the effect of confirming Bonnet in his course of seeking to avoid a war with Germany[69]. In addition, a highly exaggerated estimate of the strength of the Luftwaffe presented by Charles Lindbergh in August 1938, supplemented by a highly negative assessment of the ability of the Armée de l'Air by the Air Force's General Joseph Vuillemin to survive a war had the effect of reinforcing Bonnet's determination to avoid a war with Germany[70].

When it appeared quite likely in mid-September 1938 that war could break out at any moment in Central Europe following Hitler's violent speech blasting Czechoslovakia on September 12 followed by a failed revolt in the Sudetenland, Bonnet become quite frantic in his efforts to save the peace[71]. Bonnet told Phipps: "I repeated all this with emotion to Sir Eric Phipps telling him that an no price should we allow ourselves to be involved in war without having weighted all the consequences and without having measured in particular the state of our military forces[72]. On September 14th, Phipps was informed by Bonnet: "We cannot sacrifice ten million men in order to prevent three and half million Sudetens joining the Reich"[73]. Bonnet went on to advocate as his preferred solution to the crisis as the neutralization of Czechoslovakia with wide-ranging autonomy for the Sudetenland, but was was prepared as "last resort" to accept a plebiscite on the Sudetenlanders joining Germany[74]. During the same talk, Bonnet "expressed great indignation with the Czechs who, it seems, mean to mobilise without consulting the French...he has therefore given a broad hint to Beneš that France may have to reconsider her obligations", and that "we are not ready for war and we must therefore make the most far-reaching concessions to the Sudetens and to Germany"[75]. At a summit meeting in London with the leading British ministers on September 18th, Bonnet and Daladier agreed formally to the idea of ceding the Sudetenland to Germany, but pressed strongly as the price for making such a concession, a British guarantee of the remainder of Czechoslovakia[76]. On his return to Paris, in a meeting with Osuský, Bonnet was very vehement that Prague agree to the Anglo-French plan agreed to in London at once[77]. In a letter to Daladier on September 24, 1938, Bonnet wrote : "If France declared war against Germany, her position would be weaker than at any time since 1919. In fact, France in this case would have to stand alone on land the force of the combined German and Italian armies, without counting Japan, which in the Far East, will doubtless attack Indo-China...For five months, night and day, in the course of our confident collaboration, we have struggled for peace. I beg you to continue in this course. It is the only one which can save the country..."[78]. At the same time, Bonnet's relations with René Massigli, the Quai d'Orsay's Political Director began to deteriorate quite rapidly as Massigli felt that Bonnet was too anxious to avoid a war at any price[79].

On September 25, 1938, Daladier and Bonnet returned to London for another set of meetings with British leaders; during this summit, Bonnet said almost nothing during the Anglo-French meetings[80]. When Britain rejected Hitler's Bad Godesberg ultimatum on September 26th, Bonnet sought to prevent the news of the British rejection appearing in the French press, as it now appeared that British were pushing the French towards war, and deprived Bonnet of using British pressure as an excuse[81]. As the crisis reached its climax in late September 1938, Bonnet called upon his "peace lobby" which comprised a collection of various politicians, journalists and industrialists to pressure the Cabinet against going to war for Czechoslovakia.[82]. Some of the prominent members of Bonnet's "peace lobby" were the politicians' Jean Mistler, Henri Bérenger, Jean Montigny, Anatole de Monzie, François Piétri, Lucien Lamoureux, Joseph Caillaux, the industrialist Marcel Boussac, and the journalists' Jacques Sauerwein, Emile Roche, Léon Bassée, and Emmanuel Berl[83]. Together with Bonnet, the "peace lobby" sought to influence the government both within the corridors of power and by appealing to public opinion[84]. In this regard, Bonnet especially valued the contribution of his close friend, Bassée who served as the political director of the Havas news agency[85]. Another unofficial member of the “peace lobby” was Phipps, whose dispatches to London often reflected Bonnet’s influence[86]. The most celebrated of Phipps’s dispatches was a message on September 24, 1938 which claimed that "all that is best in France is against war, almost at any price", who were opposed by a a "small, but noisy and corrupt, war group"[87].

In the aftermath of the British rejection of the Bad Godesberg ultimatum, Daladier stated at a Cabinet meeting that if Hitler persisted with the terms of the ultimatum, then France "intended to go to war"[88]. At a Cabinet meeting on September 27th, Bonnet spoke out against French mobilization, and threatened to resign if the Cabinet were to order such a step[89]. The atmosphere at the Cabinet meeting was very tense as Daldadier insisted upon mobilization, leading to many heated words between the Premier and his Foreign Minister[90]. The crisis was suddenly averted on September 29th when Chamberlain announced that he had received an invitation from Benito Mussolini for a four-power conference to be held on September 30th in Munich, Germany to settle the crisis. Bonnet was very much in favor of the Munich conference of September 30th, which averted the war Bonnet labored against, but was not part of the French delegation to Munich[91]. After the Munich Conference, Bonnet visited his hometown of Périgeueux, where he was greeted with a deluge of flowers and shouts of "Vive Bonnet" and "Merci Bonnet"[92].

[edit] From Munich to Danzig

Relations between Bonnet and his officials at the Quai d'Orsay, especially René Massigli were very poor, leading to Bonnet to condemn Massigli quite strongly in his memoirs[93]. In turn, Massigli was to accuse Bonnet of seeking to alter the documentary record in his favor[94]. In the aftermath of Munich, relations between Bonnet and Massigli, which were poor to begin with, declined even further. On October 24, 1938, Bonnet had Massigli sacked as the Quai d'Orsay's Political Director and exiled him as Ambassador to Turkey[95]. Massilgi first learnt of his sacking by reading his morning newspaper, where it was stated he had just been appointed French Ambassador to Turkey[96]. On the same day that Massilgi was exiled, Pierre Comert, the Director of the Quai d'Orsay's Press Service, whose news releases during the Czechoslovak crisis were not in accord with the line that Bonnet wanted to hear was fired. Bonnet had also wanted to sack the Quai d'Orsay's Secretary-General Alexis Saint-Legér Léger and replace him with a man more in tune with Bonnet's views, but because of Saint-Legér Léger's increasing friendship with Daladier served to protect the former[97]. A popular legand has it that Saint-Legér Léger was not fired because he knew too much about stock market speculations that Bonnet was alleged to have engaged in during the war crisis of September 1938, but there is no evidence to support this story[98].

On October 19, 1938, at the last meeting between the French Ambassador to Germany André François-Poncet and Adolf Hitler, the former had suggested to the latter that a Franco-German Declaration of Friendship might offer a way of improving relations between the two countries and avoiding a repeat of the crisis of September 1938[99]. When François-Poncet reported to Paris Hitler's favorable attitude towards such a declaration, and his willingess to send his Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop to Paris to sign the proposed declaration, Bonnet enthusiastically embraced the idea[100]. Bonnet felt that such a declaration might open the way for a series of economic and cultural agreements that would end forever the prospect of another Franco-German war[101].

Throughout his career, Bonnet was widely respected for his intelligence, but often inspired great mistrust in others, in part because of his highly secretive methods of working and his preference for verbal as opposed to written instructions[102]. During his time as Foreign Minister, Bonnet was distrusted by the British, Daladier and by the senior officials in the Quai d'Orsay, all of whom suspected that Bonnet was in some way not quite being honest with them[103]. Neville Chamberlain described Bonnet as "Clever, but ambitious and an intriguer"[104]. Georges Mandel proclaimed his belief that "His long nose sniffs danger and responsiblity from afar. He will hide under any flat stone to avoid it"[105]. The French columnist André Géraud who wrote the pen-name Pertinax stated that Bonnet was capable of only pursuing the line "of least resistance"[106]. Sir Winston Churchill described Bonnet as "The quintessence of defeatism"[107]. In December 1938, Lord Halifax's private secretary Oliver Harvey referred to Bonnet as "a public danger to his own country and to ours"[108]. In December 1939, the British Chief Diplomatic Advisor Robert Vansittart wrote: "As to M. Bonnet he had better trust to time and oblivion rather than to coloured self-defence. He did a lot of really dirty work in 1938...if I ever had to play cards with M. Bonnet again I would always run through the pack first, just to make sure that the joker had been duly removed"[109].

Others were more sympathetic to Bonnet. Lord Halifax wrote in response to Vansittart's memo that "I am disposed to think but I know it is a minority view that M. Bonnet is not so black (or so yellow) as he is often painted"[110]. Joseph Paul-Boncour, a political opponent of Bonnet's spoke of his great "kindness and help"[111]. The editor of the Le Petit Parisien, Élie J. Bois felt that Bonnet had "the makings of a good, perhaps a great, foreign minister"[112]. On another occasion, Bois, who disliked Bonnet wrote of Bonnet's "features...instinct with...the intelligence of a fox on the alert"[113]. Bonnet's friend and follow "peace lobby" member, Anatole de Monzie commented that "Whilst very courageous in the long run, he is much less so in the heat of the moment...Because he is reticent, he is accused of lying or of deceit. False accusation...Bonnet is discreet so that his policy may be successful...There is in him an obvious ability, an excessive flexibility. He jumps too quickly, on to the bandwagon, on to all bandwagons. What does it matter to me?...If he aims for the goal and means to reach it by devious means, I care only for the goal. Now I note that having adopted the peace party, he is sticking to it with all the foresight of a statesman"[114]. The French historian Yvon Lacaze has argued against the popular image of Bonnet as a slick and amoral opportunist, and instead attributed Bonnet’s views about avoiding another war with Germany to his memories of service in the trenches of World War I[115].

In the fall of 1938, Bonnet started to advocate the ending of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe, and ordered his officials at the Quai d'Orsay to start preparing grounds for renouncing the French treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland[116]. Speaking before the Foreign Affairs Commission on the Chamber of Deputies in October 1938, Bonnet spoke of his desire to "restructure" the French alliance system in Eastern Europe and of his wish to "renegotiate" treaties which might bring France into a war "when French security is not directly threatened"[117]. In his efforts to end the eastern alliances, Bonnet found his hands tied by opposition from other members of the French government. As he noted during talks in October with a group of Deputies who had formally asked the Foreign Minister to end French commitments in Eastern Europe: "If I was free, I would carry out your policy; but I am not: I would have against me the majority of the Cabinet, led by Reynaud and Mandel, and I cannot count on Daladier, for Gamelin believes that in the event of war Polish military assistance would be indispensable"[118]. As part of his general tendency towards seeking to weaken the French eastern alliances, Bonnet did his best to put off giving the international guarantee to Czecho-Slovakia that France had promised in the Munich Agreement[119]. On November 25, 1938 Bonnet informed the French Ambassador to Poland, Léon Noel that France should find an excuse for terminating the 1921 Franco-Polish alliance, but found that his views on this issue created considerable opposition within the Quai d'Orsay, who argued that Poland was too valuable ally to be abandoned, and that if France renounced the Polish alliance, then Warsaw would align herself with Berlin (the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Józef Beck was widely if erroneously believed in France to be pro-German)[120]. In December 1938, during the visit of the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Paris to sign the largely meaningless Declaration of Franco-German Friendship, Ribbentrop was later claim that Bonnet had promised him that France recognized all of Eastern Europe as Germany's exclusive sphere of influence, leading to a long war of words between the two foreign ministers in the summer of 1939 over just what precisely Bonnet said to Ribbentrop[121]. Ribbentrop was to use Bonnet's alleged statement to convince Hitler that France would not go to war in the defence of Poland in 1939. In January 1939, Bonnet commissioned a study for the French Cabinet which concluded that for all intents and purposes that the 1935 Franco-Soviet alliance was now defunct, and hence there no grounds for hope about help from the Soviet Union[122]. Moreover, rumors in the French press over the winter of 1938-39 that France was seeking the the end of the eastern alliances generated concerns both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the press, leading Bonnet to state in a speech to the Chamber on January 26, 1939: "So, gentlemen, let us dispose of the legand that our policy has destroyed the engagements that we have contracted in Eastern Europe with the USSR and with Poland. These engagements remain in force and they must be applied in the same spirit in which they were conceived"[123]. In response to Bonnet’s speech, Ribbentrop summoned the French Ambassador to Germany, Robert Coulondre on February 6, 1939 to offer a formal protest over his speech[124]. Ribbentrop told Coulondre that because of Bonnet’s alleged statement of December 6, 1938 accepting Eastern Europe as Germany’s zone of influence meant that “France’s commitments in Eastern Europe” were now “off limits”[125].

Besides for seeking to end the cordon sanitaire, Bonnet’s major initiative in foreign policy after Munich were a series of economic agreements he sought to negotiate with the Germans[126]. Bonnet’s economic diplomacy was intended to achieve four goals, namely:

  • Alleviate the effects of the Great Depression in France
  • Like many other appeasers on both sides of the Channel, Bonnet believed that German foreign policy was driven by economic grievances, not by Nazi racial theories about Lebensraum, which Bonnet thought were so farfetched that he felt that the Nazis themselves did not take their ideology seriously. Thus, arrangements that offered Germany greater prosperity would tame German complaints against the existing international order, and thereby reduce international tension.
  • In common with many other economic experts around the world in the 1930s, Bonnet was disturbed by the implications of the increasing tendency in Germany towards protectionism, currency manipulation, use of “blocked accounts” for foreign businesses in Germany and foreign holders of German debt, autarky, a growing etatism in the German economy, and the German drive to create their own economic zone in Europe. At minimum, Bonnet felt that Franco-German economic agreements would ensure that France would not be locked out of the German economic sphere of influence, and might moderate some of the more worrisome German economic practices.
  • Lay the groundwork for a Franco-German friendship that would both banish the prospect of an another war, and end the arms race that had placed such a burden on the French economy.

However, during the winter of 1938-39, negotiations with the Germans proceeded slowly, in large part because the Germans did not wish to abandon the economic practices that caused such concern. In the atmosphere following the German destruction of Czecho-Slovakia (as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938) on March 15, 1939 was not considered conductive for France to be pursuing any sort of agreements with the Germans, and the talks were called off, never to be resumed.

On November 30, 1938, there were "spontaneous" demonstrations in the Italian Chamber of Deputies organized by Benito Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano demanding that France cede Tunisia, Corsica and French Somaliland to Italy[127]. In response, Bonnet sent out a message to André François-Poncet, who by this time was now the French Ambassador in Rome informing the latter that he should see Count Ciano to complain about that “Such behavior may appear rather unusual in the presence of the French Ambassador and immediately following the unconditional recognition of the Italian Empire"[128]. At the same time, Bonnet had ordered Charles Corbin, the French Ambassador in London to tell Chamberlain and Lord Halifax during their scheduled visit to Rome in January 1939 that they should allow any weakening of Anglo-French relations at the expense of improved Anglo-Italian relations[129]. During a meeting between François-Poncet and Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister claimed that the demonstrations were purely "spontaneous", and did not reflect the views of his government[130]. In early January 1939, Bonnet and Daladier approved of the idea of sending the banker Paul Baudoin as an unofficial diplomat to find out just what exactly the Italians wanted from France[131]. The reasoning for the Baudoin mission was if the price of Italian friendship was not too expensive, then it might be worth paying as a way of detaching Italy from Germany, and thus reducing France's potential enemies. When Baudoin visited Rome in February 1939, he reported that the Italians were only asking for some economic concessions from the French in the Horn of Africa and for Italian representation on the board of the Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez[132]. But before any decisions were made in Paris about accepting the Italian demands or not, the news of Baudoin's secret visit was leaked to the French press, thereby forcing Bonnet to disallow Baudoin[133]. In response to furious complaints from François-Poncet about Baudoin's mission, which he had first learned about after the story had been leaked, Bonnet replied to François-Poncet that: "The rumors you are telling me have no basis in fact. You are fully aware that any conversation, any Franco-Italian negotiation offical or unofficial could only be handled by you, and that no direct or indirect transaction could not be considered outside your purview"[134].

In January 1939, negotiations were opened between the French and the Turks over resolving the Hatay dispute[135]. Leading the French term were Gabriel Puaux, the High Commissioner of Syria and Massigli, the French Ambassador in Ankara[136]. The continuing feud between Massigli and Bonnet was reflected in Bonnet's habit of refusing Massigli negotiating instructions for weeks on end, thereby placing Massigli in an embarrassing situation when he attempted talks with the Turks[137]. During the talks, Bonnet had first backed Paaux, who was opposed to any weakening of French control over the Sanjak of Alexandretta, before deciding upon settling the dispute in favor of the Turks as a way of potentially winning Turkish support in the event of a war with Germany[138]. Despite efforts of maintain some sort of French presence in Alexandretta, the Franco-Turkish talks were to end in June 1939 with the Turks being given total control over the disputed region[139].

By early 1939, it was clear that the days of the Spanish Republic were numbered, and Bonnet felt it was time for France to recognize the Spanish Nationalists as the legitimate government of Spain (Until that time, Paris had recognized the Republican government as the legitimate government)[140]. On January 20, 1939, Bonnet had a meeting with the former president of Mexico, Francisco León de la Barra who was living in exile in Paris and asked that de la Barra serve as an unofficial French diplomat in talks with the Spanish Nationalists[141]. In response to reports from de la Barra that ties between General Francisco Franco and the Axis powers were strained, Bonnet then sent out Senator Léon Bérard to sound out the Nationalists about establishing diplomatic relations[142]. Bonnet told Bérard to inform General Jordana, the Nationalist Foreign Minister that provided that General Franco was willing to promise that all German and Italian forces were to be withdrawn after the end of the Spanish Civil War, then Paris would recognize the Nationalists[143]. The major dispute during the talks between Bérard and Jourdana concerned whatever the recognition of the Burgos government would be de jure as Franco wanted or de facto as Bonnet wanted, and if Franco would promise to remain neutral should a Frano-German war occur[144]. However by February 1939, Bonnet believed that the rapid collapse of the Republican war effort made recognition of the Burgos government imperative if France were to have any hope of having influence with General Franco, and on February 28, 1939 France broke diplomatic relations with the Republican government in Madrid and recognized the Nationalist government in Burgos[145]. Much to the relief of Bonnet, General Franco kept his word about ensuring the withdrawal of Axis forces from Spanish territory, especially the departure of the Italians from the Balearic Islands.

In early 1939, the British Embassy in Paris was bombarded with a series of reports that public opinion in France was highly dejected and demoralized, and that unless Britain made the “continental commitment” (i.e. unequivocally linked British security to French security and committ to sending a large British Expeditionary Force to France like the one ultimately sent in World War I), then the French would resign themselves to becoming a German satellite state[146]. These reports which secretly originated with the French government, which hoped to pressure the British into making the long-sought “continental commitment”[147]. The French were assisted in a conspiracy of convenience by the leadership of the British Army, who disliked the funding implications of Chamberlain’s “limited liability” doctrine, which held that in the next war, British efforts were to be largely limited to the sea and air, with the British Army playing an ancillary role at best[148]. The French effort for a British “continental commitment” was given a huge and unexpected boost by the “Dutch war scare” of January 1939. In response to the "Dutch war scare" which gripped London in late January 1939 when the British government received false reports of an imminent German invasion of the Netherlands, Lord Halifax had Phipps inquire what the France would do if such an invasion were to take place.[149]. According to the misinformation, the Germans planned to overrun the Netherlands, and then use Dutch airfields to launch a bombing campaign meant to achieve a “knock-out” blow against Britain by razing British cities to the ground[150]. The French attitude towards a German invasion of the Netherlands was crucial because France was the only country in Western Europe that possessed an Army large enough and modern enough to save the Dutch. Moreover, the importance of France to British security had increased following a violent anti-British propaganda launched in Germany in November 1938, which had led the Chamberlain government to increasingly perceive German foreign policy as anti-British combined with rumors that Bonnet was secretly attempting to negotiate a Franco-German "special relationship" that might leave Britain facing a hostile Germany without any allies who possessed the large armies that Britain lacked. In response to Phipps's message, Bonnet had Corbin inform Lord Halifax that the French attitude towards German aggression towards the Netherlands would depend upon what was the British attitude was towards France if the latter were the victim of aggression.[151]. The British response to Bonnet's message was Chamberlain's statement to the House of Commons on February 6, 1939 that any German attack on France would be automatically considered an attack on Britain, thereby leading the British to making the "continental commitment" to once again send a large army to the defense of France that successive French diplomats had struggled to obtain since 1919[152].

In March 1939, following the German destruction of the rump state of Czecho-Slovakia and the proclamation of the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Bonnet had Hervé Alphand of the Ministry of Commerce, who was in Berlin to negotiate a trade treaty recalled in protest[153]. The German move badly damaged Bonnet's creditability, and as part of the aftermath, the Union des Intellectuels francais sent out a letter signed by 17 intellectuals calling for an inquiry into Bonnet's conduct of foreign affairs[154]. Ties between Daladier and Bonnet were stressed when in protest over the German coup Daladier ordered the recall of Robert Coulondre, the French Ambassador to Germany without consulting Bonnet, who was much offended by Daladier's act[155]. In April 1939, Bonnet in turn went behind Daladier's back in suggesting that Britain apply pressure on the French Premier to make more concessions to Italy regarding the Franco-Italian disputes over influence in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea regions[156]. The differences on opinion between Daladier and Bonnet over question of making concessions to Italy, which Daladier was firmly opposed to, led Daladier to increasing taking direct control of foreign policy by dealing directly with the Quai d'Orsay's Secretary-General Alexis Saint-Legér Léger, and pushing Bonnet aside from April 1939 onwards[157]. In April 1939, Daladier told the Romanian foreign minister Grigore Gafencu "he was going to get rid of Bonnet quite shortly", and on May 6th, Daladier stated to Bullit he had a great deal of "...mistrust of Bonnet and said that he might replace him in the immediate future"[158]. As Count Welczeck noted in May 1939: "Bonnet was ...a man who would go to the utmost limits to avoid a European war up to the last moment. He regretted therefore that foreign affairs were so much more in the hands of M. Daladier than M. Bonnet"[159].

Following the British "guarantee" of Polish independence on March 31, 1939 followed by the announcements that London wished to build a "peace front" to resist aggression in April 1939, Bonnet felt there was now a great opportunity of building an Anglo-French-Soviet combination that might deter Germany from war[160]. In mid-April 1939, Bonnet had a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to France, Jakob Suritz and asked "in a form to be determined" for the Soviet Union to provide military support for Poland and Romania should those nations be attacked by Germany.[161]. In particular, Bonnet stated that "It was obvious that there had to be an agreement between the USSR and Romania or the USSR and Poland for the Franco-Soviet Pact to come usefully into play".[162]. Suritz commented that unless the Poles and Romanians allowed the Red Army transit rights, there was little the Soviet Union could do for those nations, leading Bonnet to reply that he felt he could pressure both nations into agreeing to provide the desired transit rights.[163]. Bonnet commented that he felt it was time to "begin immediate discussions between France and the USSR in order to precisely determine the help the USSR could provide to Romania and Poland in the event of German aggression".[164].

In contrast to his enthusiasm for improving ties with Moscow in the spring of 1939, Bonnet felt the opposite about relations with Warsaw. In May 1939, during talks in Paris with the Poles aimed at strengthening the political and military aspects of the Franco-Polish alliance, Bonnet sabotaged the negotiations by bogging down the talks on the political accord on procedural details, and ensured that no political accord was signed, which was the precondition for the military accords (not until September 3, 1939 was the political accord finally signed)[165]. Bonnet's reasons in seeking to block the signing of the Franco-Polish political accord were a way of applying pressure on the Poles to grant the Soviets transit rights, and because in case, the negotiations for the “grand alliance” failed, Bonnet did not wish to see France anymore committed to Poland’s defense. In June of 1939, Bonnet's reputation was badly damaged when the French agent of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Otto Abetz was expelled from France for engaging in espionage, two French newspaper editors were charged with receiving bribes from Abetz, and the name of Madame Bonnet was prominently mentioned in connection with the Abetz case as a close friend of the two editors, through it should be noted that despite much lucid speculation in the French press at the time, that no evidence has ever emerged linking Bonnet or his wife to German espionage or bribery[166].

During the ultimately failed talks for an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance in the spring and summer of 1939, Bonnet together with the rest of the French leadership pressed quite strongly for the revived Triple Entente, often to the considerable discomfort of the British[167]. In the spring and summer of 1939, Bonnet was a very strong advocate of the revived Triple Entente concept, believing that a "grand alliance" of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France would deter Germany from attacking Poland[168]. At a meeting with Lord Halifax on May 20-21, 1939 in Geneva, Daladier, Bonnet and Saint-Legér Léger pressured the British Foreign Secretary quite strongly for a "grand alliance" as the only way of stopping another world war[169]. In the spring of 1939, Bonnet went so far as to inform Moscow that he supported turning over all of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union regardless of what the Poles felt about the issue, if that was to be the price of the Soviet alliance[170]. On June 2, 1939 when the Soviet government offered up its definition of what constituted "aggression", upon which the intended alliance was come into play, Bonnet sided with the Soviets against the British, who felt that the Soviet definition of "aggression", especially "indirect aggression" was too loose a definition and phrased in such a manner as to imply the Soviet right of inference in the internal affairs of nations of Eastern Europe[171]. On July 1, 1939 in response to message from the Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov about what nations the intended "grand alliance" was meant to protect, Bonnet sent a telegraph in reply stating the purpose of the "grand alliance" was "the mutual solidarity of the three great powers...in those conditions the number of countries guaranteed is unimportant"[172]. By early July 1939, Bonnet grew increasingly irritated over what he regarded as British foot-dragging in the talks with the Soviets, and with the Poles for refusing to grant transit rights to the Red Army[173]. Bonnet wrote to Lord Halifax at this time stating "We reaching a critical moment, where we find it necessary to do everything possible to succeed"[174]. As part of an effort to save the talks, Bonnet wrote up and presented to both London and Moscow the text of a joint communiqué stating to the world their determination to resist aggression and that they "agreed on the main points of the political agreement"[175]. Bonnet's effort was blocked by Molotov, who stated his government had no interest in issuing such a communiqué[176].

When the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks were on the verge of breaking down in August 1939 over the issue of transit rights for the Red Army in Poland, Bonnet instructed the French Embassy in Moscow to falsely inform the Kremlin that the Poles had granted the desired transit rights as part of a desperate bid to rescue the alliance talks with the Soviets[177]. At the same time, immense French diplomatic pressure was applied in Warsaw for the Poles to agree to the transit rights for the Red Army, but the Polish Foreign Minister Colonel Józef Beck was very firm in refusing to consider such an idea. On August 19th, 1939, Colonel Beck stated in a message to Paris: "We have not got a military agreement with the USSR. We do not want to have one"[178]. The conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939 left Bonnet highly dejected, believing the prospect of Soviet economic support for Germany would undermine the effectiveness of a British naval blockade of Germany (which was widely assumed in France to be a prerequisite of defeating Germany), and hence his return to advocating renouncing the Polish alliance as the best way of avoiding war for France[179]. After the Non-Aggression Pact, Bonnet urged Daladier that the French should inform the Poles that they should allow the Free City of Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) to rejoin Germany, and if the Poles refused, then the French should use that refusal as a excuse to renounce the alliance with Poland[180].

At a Cabinet meeting on August 22, 1939, Bonnet spoke against French mobilization and argued that France should seek to find a way to end the alliance with Poland[181]. At an another meeting of the French Cabinet and leading French military officials that comprised the National Defense Committee on August 23, 1939, Bonnet sought to pressure General Maurice Gamelin into stating that France could not risk a war in 1939, and stated that France should find a way of renouncing the 1921 alliance with Poland[182]. At that meeting, Bonnet's arguments for abandoning Poland were countered by General Gamelin, who argued that if war came, there was little France could do for the Poles (whom Gamelin felt could hold out for about 3 months), but that to abandon Poland would be equivalent to abandoning Great Power status for France[183]. As Bonnet continued his efforts against going to war for Poland, Daladier came to increasingly to feel that appointing Bonnet to the Qui d'Orsay had been a mistake[184]. Juliusz Łukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador to France accused Bonnet of "preparing a new Munich behind our backs"[185]. On August 30, 1939, Bonnet was the leading spokesman for the idea of using the peace mediation proposals of Benito Mussolini as a pretext for ending the alliance with Poland, but was overruled by the French Cabinet led by Daladier[186]. Daladier, who was strongly supported by General Gamelin argued that the Mussolini's proposed peace conference was a trap, and that the French should find a reason not to attend Mussolini's proposed conference[187]. After the German aggression against Poland began on September 1, 1939, Bonnet continued to argue against a French declaration of war, and instead urged that the French take up Mussolini's mediation offer; if the Poles refused to attend Mussolini's conference (which was widely expected since Mussolini's revised peace plan on September 1 called for an armistice, but did not call for the removal of German troops from Poland, which was the major Polish precondition to accepting the Italian plan), then the French should denounce the Polish alliance[188]. Bonnet together with his allies in the "peace lobby" both within and without the government such as Anatole de Monzie, Jean Mistler, Marcel Déat, Paul Faure, Paul Baudoin, Pierre Laval, René Belin, Adrien Marquet, and Gaston Bergery all spent the days September 1-3 lobbying the Daladier government, the Senate and the Chamber against going to war with Germany[189]. On September 3, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany, which had the effect of resolving the debate in Paris, and led to Daladier finally having the French declaration of war issued later that same day. Bonnet was demoted to minister of justice with the coming of war on September 13, 1939.

[edit] Later career

On June 21, 1940, Bonnet together with Pierre Laval helped to pressure President Albert Lebrun into changing his mind about leaving for Algeria[190]. Bonnet supported the Vichy government and served on the National Council from December 1940, but since the council never met, Bonnet's role in Vichy was not a large one[191]. Bonnet spent most of World War II living on his estate in the Dordongne, and attempting to secure himself an office in Vichy, through Bonnet was later to claim to have been involved in the Resistance[192]. According to the Gestapo records, Bonnet contracted the Germans once in February 1941 to see if it were possible if the Germans would pressure Laval to include him in the Cabinet, and again in June 1943 to reassure them that he had no intention of leaving France to join the Allies[193]. On April 5, 1944, Bonnet left France for Switzerland, where he was to stay until March 1950[194]. After the war, proceedings were begun against him but eventually dropped, though he was expelled from the Radical Party in 1944. During his time in exile, Bonnet was to write a five-volume set of memoirs[195]. Bonnet throughout his career had been very much concerned with his reputation, and during his time as Foreign Minister, had a team of journalists to engage in what is known in France as Bonnetiste writing, namely a series of books and pamphlets meant to glorify Bonnet as the defender of the peace and Europe’s savior [196]. After leaving the Quai d'Orsay, Bonnet took with him a large number of official papers, which he then used to support the claims made in his voluminous memoirs, where Bonnet depicted himself as waging a single-handed heroic battle to save the peace[197]. Many have charged Bonnet with "editing" his papers to present himself in the best possible light, regardless of the facts[198]. In particular, criticism has centered some of the contradictory claims in the Bonnet memoirs. At various points, Bonnet claimed it was British pressure that driven France towards Munich in 1938, and that his government would very much liked to gone to war for Czechoslovakia[199]. At other times, Bonnet states the military and economic situation in 1938 was such that France could not risk a war that year[200]. In the early 1950s, Bonnet had a celebrated debate on the pages of the Times Literary Supplement with one of his leading critics, the British historian Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier over some of the claims contained in his memoirs[201]. At issue was the question whether Bonnet had, as Namier charged, snubbed an offer by the Polish foreign minister Colonel Józef Beck in May 1938 to have Poland come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event of a German attack[202]. Bonnet denied that such an offer had been made, which led Namier to accuse Bonnet of seeking to falsify the documentary record[203]. Namier was able to establish that Bonnet had been less then honest in his account, and concluded the debate in 1953 with words "The Polish offer, for what it was worth, was first torpedoed by Bonnet the statesman, and next obliterated by Bonnet the historian"[204]. Beyond the narrow question of whatever a Polish offer in May 1938 had been made or not, the real significance of the debate was over Bonnet’s freedom of maneuver. In his memoirs, Bonnet claimed that he had been often forced by circumstances beyond his control to carry out a foreign policy that he may not have necessarily wanted to carry out. By contrast, Namier charged that Bonnet had other options, and was merely carrying out the foreign policy he had wanted to carry out.

In 1953, an amnesty for those convicted of "national disgrace" allowed to run for office again, and in 1956, Bonnet returned to his old seat in the Dordonge[205]. Readmitted to the Radicals in 1952, he was once again expelled in 1955 for refusing to support Pierre Mendès-France. Nevertheless, he was once again elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1956 and continued to serve in that body until 1968, when he lost his seat.[206].

[edit] Endnotes

  1. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 98.
  2. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 98.
  3. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 98.
  4. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 104.
  5. ^ May, Ernest Strange Victory, New York: Hill & Wang, 2000 page 160.
  6. ^ May, Ernest Strange Victory, New York: Hill & Wang, 2000 page 160.
  7. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 98.
  8. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 98.
  9. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 98.
  10. ^ May, Ernest Strange Victory, New York: Hill & Wang, 2000 page 160.
  11. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 99.
  12. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 104.
  13. ^ Morrison, Rodney “The London Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933: A Public Goods Analysis” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 52, Number. 3, July 1993 pages 312 & 314.
  14. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 99.
  15. ^ Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste France and the Nazi Threat, New York: Enigma Books, 2004 page 254.
  16. ^ Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste France and the Nazi Threat, New York: Enigma Books, 2004 page 251.
  17. ^ Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste France and the Nazi Threat, New York: Enigma Books, 2004 page 251.
  18. ^ Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste France and the Nazi Threat, New York: Enigma Books, 2004 page 251.
  19. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 pages 240-242.
  20. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 page 240.
  21. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 pages 242-244.
  22. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 page 241.
  23. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Lettenacke, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 page 240.
  24. ^ Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste France and the Nazi Threat, New York: Enigma Books, 2004 page 272.
  25. ^ Overy, Richard & Wheatcroft, Andrew The Road to War, London: Macmillan, 1989 page 130.
  26. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Lettenacke, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 pages 241-242.
  27. ^ Frankstein, Robert "French Appeasement Polices" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen & Lothar Lettenacke, George Allen & Unwin: London, United Kingdom, 1983 page 242.
  28. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 pages 99-100.
  29. ^ Frankenstein, Robert "The Decline of France and French Appeasement Policies, 1936-9" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin, London, United Kingdom, 1983 pages 240-243; Jackson, Peter "Intelligence and the End of Appeasement" pages 234-260 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998 page 246.
  30. ^ Frankenstein, Robert "The Decline of France and French Appeasement Policies, 1936-9" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin, London, United Kingdom, 1983 pages 240-243; Jackson, Peter "Intelligence and the End of Appeasement" pages 234-260 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998 page 246.
  31. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 225.
  32. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power pages 224-225.
  33. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 225.
  34. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 pages 109-110.
  35. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 224.
  36. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 180.
  37. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 180.
  38. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 180.
  39. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 pages 189 & 194.
  40. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 363.
  41. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 363.
  42. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 pages 363-364.
  43. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 364.
  44. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 364.
  45. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 190.
  46. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 190.
  47. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 190.
  48. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 191.
  49. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 190.
  50. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 190.
  51. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 191.
  52. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 191.
  53. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 192.
  54. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 192.
  55. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 194.
  56. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 217.
  57. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 197.
  58. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 208.
  59. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 209.
  60. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 177.
  61. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 209.
  62. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 188
  63. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 217.
  64. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 pages 202-203
  65. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 225.
  66. ^ Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power page 218.
  67. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 209.
  68. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 page 209.
  69. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 pages 209-210.
  70. ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977 pages 240-242.
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[edit] Reference

  • Adamthwaite, Anthony France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939, London: Frank Cass, 1977, ISBN 0 7146 3035 7.
  • Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste France and the Nazi Threat The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939, New York: Enigma Books, 2004, ISBN 1-029631-15-4.
  • Frankenstein, Robert "The Decline of France and French Appeasement Policies, 1936-9" pages 236-245 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement edited by Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, George Allen & Unwin, London, United Kingdom, 1983, ISBN 0049400681.
  • Jackson, Peter "Intelligence and the End of Appeasement" pages 234-260 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998, ISBN 0-415-15039-6.
  • Lacaze, Yvon “Daladier, Bonnet and the Decision-Making Process During the Munich Crisis, 1938” pages 215-233 from French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918-1940 The Decline and Fall of A Great Power edited by Robert Boyce, London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998, ISBN 0-415-15039-6.
  • Watt, D.C. How War Came : The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, New York : Pantheon Books, 1989, ISBN 039457916X.
Preceded by
—		 Minister of Budget
1925		 Succeeded by
—
Preceded by
Paul Jourdain		 Minister of Pensions
1926		 Succeeded by
Louis Marin
Preceded by
Pierre Étienne Flandin		 Minister of Commerce and Industry
1930		 Succeeded by
Pierre Étienne Flandin
Preceded by
André Mallarmé		 Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Telegrams
1930–1931		 Succeeded by
Charles Guernier
Preceded by
Édouard Daladier		 Minister of Public Works
1932–1933		 Succeeded by
Joseph Paganon
Preceded by
Henry Chéron		 Minister of Finance
1933–1934		 Succeeded by
François Piétri
Preceded by
Laurent Eynac		 Minister of Commerce and Industry
1935–1936		 Succeeded by
Paul Bastid
Preceded by
Vincent Auriol		 Minister of Finance
1937–1938		 Succeeded by
Paul Marchandeau
Preceded by
Paul Faure, Maurice Viollette, Albert Sarraut		 Minister of State
1938		 Succeeded by
Paul Faure, Théodore Steeg, Maurice Viollette
Preceded by
Joseph Paul-Boncour		 Minister of Foreign Affairs
1938–1939		 Succeeded by
Édouard Daladier
Preceded by
Paul Marchandeau		 Minister of Justice
1939–1940		 Succeeded by
Albert Sérol