User:Galathrax/Pirahã essay

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"Speak to an uninformed audience bent on the following belief: our way of understanding numerocity is the only 'real' (scientific) or correct way and all other ways of understanding are merely folk (superstitious) or primitive ideas."

       An approach to language as taken by Peter Gordon (2004) is summarized by the above assertion. In his study of a hunter-gatherer tribe the Pirahã, he confirms the astounding possibility that a certain group of human beings are only able to count as well as animals and infants. His causal mechanism for their inability and lack is summarized by a strong Whorfian approach to linguistics, namely language determines or limits our own thoughts. Gordon notes, "the Pirahã language is incommensurate with languages that have counting systems that enable exact enumeration" (Gordon, 2004, 498). If a human being lacks terminology for numbers, then that reflects lack of a concept or ability for numerocity.
       This approach to another language without numerocity is fundamentally flawed in two ways: first, it presumes a universal quality (counting) is grounded in the real and merely represented by our terms. Second, it posits people who possess such ability (to count) are in fact somehow superior to those who can/do not. These positions are concomitant with several fallacies, and ultimately those same flaws do not permit the researchers themselves to self-reflect on their own inherent bias when conducting such studies.
       Here is a reductio ad absurdum argument to the one presented by Gordon. In my register, I have a term "thermonuclear reactor." I approach you, and claim it is an easy concept to understand. Your register lacks this term, so you tell me you have no idea what I am talking about. To give you the benefit of the doubt, I conclude even though you lack the term (signifier) perhaps you can still understand the signified, so I produce blueprints of a thermonuclear reactor for you. I illustrate on a chalkboard the subatomic process of nuclear fission. You still cannot reproduce any of the schematics or equations I provided, nor a working definition as specific as mine. Therefore, I conclude that you must be inferior.
       This same argument is being used for numerocity. Gordon anticipates such an objection, and claims "when speaking of translatable concepts, we don not mean terms like 'molecule' or 'quark,' which would not exist in a culture without advanced scientific institutions… on the other hand, one would question someone's command of English if they did not understand the basic vocabulary and grammar" (Gordon, 2004, 496). Unlike thermonuclear reactor, the concept of quantification is seen as inherent in human beings, and an inability or "lack" of such a concept indicates sub-human or mentally challenged status. Gordon goes on to describe the Pirahã vocabulary as "limited", "simple", and "impoverished." Further, the Western approach is "privileged", has higher "cognitive demand", and in relation to their inability is "quite trivial" and "tricky". The supposed drastic difference between "advanced" science and numerocity can be attributed to a few sources.
       The first mistake in approaching the Pirahã system is assuming an objective, empirically grounded representation is even possible, let alone encapsulated by the English language. This is related to the drastically arbitrary nature of language. In language, the sound-images we use correspond to specific concepts in our mind. The easiest, or perhaps most apparent difference between languages involves differences in the sound-images, or signifiers, for what we believe is basically the same concept. Mandarin Chinese speakers use rèhéfǎnyīngqì, English speakers use thermonuclear reactor, but the concept seems basically the same.
       The second, much less apparent difference is cross-cultural variation in the concept, or signified. A concept like thermonuclear reactor is pretty fixed, or so it seems. To assume, however, that our individual concepts exist in a void or that they are direct representations of the things themselves would be false. In the former notion, as deSaussure notes, “instead of pre-existing ideas… we find… values emanating from the system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not” (1983, 117). These associations are tightly interwoven with the concepts themselves, and their nature is not even expressed in the concept. The latter, that our concepts correspond accurately and completely, is also taken for granted by the vast majority of language speakers. The immediacy of experience and the “empirical” scientific method practically insist we view them as such. However, is it the case that our mind does not completely mediate and regulate those objects? This gulf in translation occurs between the noumena, or objects in themselves, and phenomena, objects as we perceive them to be. Our linguistic and cultural framework further distorts those phenomena by transcribing them into a learned system of corresponding, symbolic associations.
       Taking this primary gap into consideration, we can begin to see how such a study into numerocity would be fundamentally flawed from the very beginning. To explain numerocity to another and elicit their use or possession of a similar concept, one must either use a definition or demonstration of enumeration, both tautological. As Whorf notes, "we cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it this way- an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language" (Whorf, 1964, 213). This intrinsic viewpoint extends all the way into the experimentations, when hunter-gatherer tribesmen are asked to “arrange batteries”, “count cartoon fish” for candy, and “draw sticks” on a piece of paper, all actions outside both their language (“lack” of terminology) and culture (“lack” of need to perform those types of tasks). To use the thermonuclear reactor example, the examples of schematics and equations would be of little value to someone who did not possess a register for belonging to such a speech community. The value judgments derived from these unseen differences leads to a form of autometry (measuring others with one’s own standards, not theirs), and has its origin in another equally disingenuous/misleading concept, deficit theory.
       According to Agar, the deficit theory is to “notice all the things that the other person lacks when compared to you” (Agar, 1994, 23). In my assessment of your ability to comprehend my concepts, I assume your functional understanding of "thermonuclear reactor" is essential for authentic "humanness." Of course, Gordon clearly does not expect “backwards natives” to possess such concepts of “advanced” science on their own. However, if one takes for granted certain human capabilities (like numerocity) and presupposes such practices are the norm, an aura of legitimacy is established.
       For example, causal and correlative factors are being implicitly assumed between numerocity and the Pirahã’s “backwardness” with Holden’s qualifying assessment, “they have little social stricture and no art, and they barter instead of using currency. They also have one of the world’s most phonemically limited languages” (2004, 1093). This is a ridiculous approach, especially for supposed anthropologists. The proper approach for linguistic anthropology, according to Duranti, is “a view of language as a set of practices, which play an essential role in mediating the ideational and material aspects of human existence and, hence, in bringing about particular ways of being-in-the-world” (1997, 4). Does the lack of enumeration somehow drastically impact the daily lives of the Pirahã? Furthermore, do they have a pressing need to develop such a system? In mentioning their lack of currency, their inability to “effectively” trade with the Portuguese, and that “participants were trying hard to get the answers correct” these claims are subversively implied (Gordon, 2004, 498). The assumption is that they are deprived of such a system, and their inability to develop one indicates mental handicap through inbreeding, or just genetically inferior “cognitive abilities.” The “number-one” mentality is so pervasive because of its simplicity; when placing judgment, we simultaneously define the terms by which to judge, so we naturally end up on top.
       To claim the concept of thermonuclear reactor implies superiority seems farfetched, even in a scientifically “advanced” culture like ours, because it is not taken for granted. However, what if I grew up in an even “more” technologically advanced culture, and I’m exceptionally bright (i.e., capable of high cognitive demands)? From a very young age, I possessed a comprehensive concept of thermonuclear reactor, and everyone else in my society did as well. Furthermore, thermonuclear reactors are used in everyday tasks, from powering the microwave to incinerating garbage waste. This brings up an interesting point, also made by Whorf: Which was first: the language patterns or the cultural norms? Language is a system, not just an assemblage of norms. Large systematic outlines can change to something really new only very slowly, while many other cultural innovations are made with comparative quickness. Language thus represents the mass mind; it is affected by inventions and innovations, but affected little and slowly, whereas TO inventors and innovators it legislates with the decree of immediacy (1995, 156).
       My approach is well founded, if considered from such an angle. My expectations, as such, do not seem as egregious if viewed from such a context. However, at what point do I become aware that such differences are codified by my culture and language use? For Agar, “[Culture]’s something that happens to people when they realize that their way of doing things isn’t natural law, that other ways are possible” (1994, 27). However, numerocity is very deceptively framed in terms of “natural law,” so much so that the researchers never once questioned their own ingrained assumptions.
       The basic breakdown involves the nature of numerocity as indexical or symbolic; indexical associations have “some kind of existential relation with what they refer to” (Duranti, 1997, 17). Enumeration seems to occur spontaneously, so indexicality is presumed. As Deacon notes, “a word does not refer to some thing or condition by virtue of habitually being associated with it… but rather by virtue of carving out a kind of logical space [in hierarchical, combinatorial symbolic associations]… there can be an exponential growth of reference with each new added element” (Deacon, 1996, 124). In terms of numerocity, the issue remains: does quantification fill its own logical space, or is it indexical to the objects themselves? An easy test is as follows: can you picture 23 batteries in purely conceptual form, especially without resorting to smaller intervals? As Gilman and Gallistel note, “the language learner comes to believe that [counting terms] have those meanings, precisely because she observes that their use is consistent with those meanings (2004, 442). Furthermore, Western children experience a “crystallization” of discrete numbers from numerical magnitudes at an early age. While the article says the process is not well delineated, it seems fairly obvious that Western culture supports and nurtures this system from birth. At the same time, Pica et al. conclude “sophisticated numerical competence can be present in the absence of a well-developed lexicon of number words” (2004, 503). The resultant role of language can be relegated to mediating the expansion of such a concept but by no means does it guarantee, or by lack preclude, a system of numerocity.
       Despite the myriad issues involved with simple reductionism and generalization arguments, the impetus for hierarchical ratings of cultures is enticing. The concept of thermonuclear reactor is surely rather high for scientific achievements of man, whereas simple numerocity seems so basic as to be generic. However, despite this, using Gordon et al.’s own arguments, it is possible to show their conclusions are contradictory. The initial hypothesis tentatively assumes enumeration is not a learned process, and all human cultures have some variation on the concept. In Gordon’s findings, however, he posits the lack of enumeration can be attributed to a strong Whorfian hypothesis, in that the lack of “exact numerical terms” the Pirahã never developed “exact enumeration” (Gordon, 2004, 498). When taken in the context of the entire article, the Pirahã are inferior and lacking without this learned process. The presence of “cultural constraints against quantification” would lead one to presume such a system is neither necessary nor desired, yet Gordon clearly attributes both qualities to numerocity from the Pirahã perspective (Holden, 2004, 1093). Thus, the circle of logic is established: presumption of universality of numerocity, explanation of lack through linguistic determinism, and finally an associated inferiority with lack of need as causative factor for lack of development. So, the need for numerocity is hierarchically superior, yet that very need is not present in Pirahã culture. This is equivalent to faulting a culture for lack of a “thermonuclear reactor” concept, irrespective of their scientific institutions... the very thing Gordon says is specious logic.
Sources cited:
Agar, Michael. 1994. Language Shock: Understanding the Culture of Conversation. New York: William Murrow & Co.
Deacon, Terrence. 1996. Prefrontal cortex and symbol learning: why a brain capable of language evolved only once. In Communicating Meaning: The Evolution and Development of Language. B. Velichkovsky & D. Rumbaugh, eds. New Jersey: Erbaum. Pp. 103-138.
deSaussure, Ferdinand. 1983. Linguistic Value. In Course in General Linguistics. Trans. Roy Harris. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, Pp. 111-122.
Duranti, Alessandro. 1997. The Scope of Linguistic Anthropology. In Linguistic Anthropology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-21.
Duranti, Alessandro. 1997. Linguistic Diversity. In Linguistic Anthropology. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp.51-83.
Gelman, P. & Gallistel, C.R. 2004. Language and the Origin of Numerical Concepts. Science, Vol 306, 441-443, 15 October 2004.
Gordon, Peter. 2004. Numercial Cognition Without Words: Evidence from Amazonia. Science, Vol 306, 496-499, 15 October 2004.
Holden, Contance. 2004. Life Without Numbers in the Amazon. Science, Vol 305, 1093, 20 August 2004.
Pica, P., Lemer, C., Izard, V., Dehaene, S. 2004. Exact and Approximate Arithmetic in an Amazonian Indigene Group. Science, Vol 306, 499-503, 15 October 2004.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1964. Science and Linguistics. In Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Pp. 207-219.
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1995. The relation of habitual thought and behavior to language. In Language, Culture and Society: a Book of Readings. Ben Blount, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pp. 64-84.