Fundamental ontology

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The project of 'fundamental ontology' appeared as a result of Heidegger's decision to re-interpret phenomenology, which he had developed earlier in collaboration with his mentor Husserl, using a neat set of ontological categories. For this project Heidegger had to look for new terminologies by means of which it would become possible for him adequately to represent the structure of his new brand of phenomenology. The significantly large change in terminology Heidegger made in the project also resulted in a reconsideration and redefinition of many traditional concepts. For instance, the thesis that phenomenon is essence of a thing could not be articulated by using traditional concepts alone; in fact, Heidegger consistently refused to use these concepts in their original (i.e. Husserl's) senses. He re-interpreted such basic philosophical categories as "subject", "object", "spirit", "body", "consciousness", "reality" and others with a new emphasis on "being", showing their inadequacy for his new philosophical explorations. Moreover, Heidegger went on to separate his pursuit of "ontology" from the kinds that previous researches of "essence" had conducted under the same label, which henceforth, according to Heidegger, should be engaged only in particular fields of science.

How was this project of Heidegger's of "fundamental ontology" possible or meaningful? All the earlier philosophers had stated that only in phenomenon was it possible to posit the essence of things. Thus the phenomenon was opposed to essence, and it was the moment of opposition of the subject and object. Husserl had differentiated his new notion of phenomenon from the traditionally accepted notion of phenomenon as "occurrence". The notion of "phenomenon" as introduced by Husserl in his phenomenology carries in itself the two faces of things: phenomenon as "representation of the world as it is reflected in consciousness" and the essence of a thing "as it is in itself". In Husserl's belief, phenomenon as he defined it appeared comprehensive and sufficient for his philosophical ventures. Husserl's perspective, as Heidegger saw it, left some room for new development in phenomenology: bringing "ontology" into "phenomenology" with a new force. For Heidegger, Husserl's ideas were "in exile" with their transcendental tendency, because they were exclusively concerned with consciousness, and they had to be "thrown" back into the historical, external world. From the Heidegger's point of view the attempt of his mentor to design and save life only inside human consciousness, i.e. "the world above" of the transcendental ego, was not sufficient. Thus, the first task that Heidegger took on was to work out how to refuse Husserl's immanence of consciousness while preserving all the achievements of his mentor's phenomenology.

On the other hand, why did Heidegger want to base his "new phenomenology" only on the category of being, and to set as his task a formulation and proof of it? Answering this question, he again refers to the phenomenological maxim: without any intention to address directly «things» («zur Sache selbst»), then what kind of intellectual outlook will be at all possible? To Heidegger the necessary focus is clear: the being in its various forms. Really, I exist, things surrounding me exist, and people surrounding me exist. Here it is important to understand that being is primary; things, I, and people, for instance, are all forms of being. Being reveals itself first of all in its multiplicity, in the form of separate essences (Seiendes).

Today there are only two ontological alternatives that seem serious enough in philosophy: the «objectivistic» variant of philosophy which was carefully developed by Nicolai Hartmann, - and the «subjectivistic» 'fundamental ontology' of Heidegger. For a variety of reasons, recently, the majority of philosophers give preference to the second, to Heidegger's alternative. And that may suggest that further research and development of the "fundamental ontology" may now have become a matter of vital importance. However, there remains a doubt: can the variant of philosophy developed by Heidegger in his later works really be called an "ontology", or should it be considered as belonging to some other philosophical dimension - a personal one which perhaps might come with a greater conviction that might be called, say, existentiology?