Talk:Freedom of religion in the United States

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Contents 1 whats this "in the United States" crap? 2 Separation of church and state 3 Deletion of some items from The Establishment Clause subsection 4 Merge proposal 5 School Prayer 6 Freedom of religion & age

[edit] whats this "in the United States" crap?

This is an American website. Why do liberals have to Europeanize everything?

--69.37.150.195 (talk) 18:03, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Uh, no it's not an American site, it's a English-language website. May I direct you to List of countries where English is an official language so that you can educate yourself that this is not an American site? Also try List of countries by English-speaking population. Thanks for giving me the chance to educate you. --David Shankbone 18:08, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

On a less confrontational and perhaps more helpful note, the reason this article is named "Freedom of religion in the United States" and not simply "Freedom of religion" is that the Freedom of religion article attempts to address that topic in general terms and this article attempts the topic of Freedom of religion within the context of the country and culture of the United States. -- Boracay Bill (talk) 23:21, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Separation of church and state

Even though the topic has its own article, should separation of church and state in the United States and state be briefly mentioned in this article? --J. Cal. 22:15, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

[edit] Deletion of some items from The Establishment Clause subsection

Part of this section makes the (POV?) argument that "However, since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has seemed to sidestep the Lemon test altogether."

I have deleted the citation of Agostini v. Felton in support of that argument. The court did not sidestep the Lemon test in that case. The decision says, in part,

[...] the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to placing public employees in a sectarian school, Zobrest, 509 U.S., at 13 , and n. 10, but the rejection of such a per se rule was hinged expressly on the nature of the employee's job, sign language interpretation (or signing) and the circumscribed role of the signer. On this point (and without reference to the facts that the benefited student had received the same aid before enrolling in the religious school and the employee was to be assigned to the student not to the school) the Court explained itself this way: "[T]he task of a sign language interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor. . . . Nothing in this record suggests that a sign language interpreter would do more than accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the class as a whole. In fact, ethical guidelines require interpreters to `transmit everything that is said in exactly the same way it was intended.' " Id., at 13. The signer could thus be seen as more like a hearing aid than a teacher, and the signing could not be understood as an opportunity to inject religious content in what was supposed to be secular instruction. Zobrest accordingly holds only that in these limited circumstances where a public employee simply translates for one student the material presented to the class for the benefit of all students, the employee's presence in the sectarian school does not violate the Establishment Clause. Id., at 13-14. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971) ("[T]eachers have a substantially different ideological character from books [and] [i]n terms of potential for involving some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not.

Also, I have deleted the citation of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in support of that argument. The court did not sidestep the Lemon test in that case. The decision says, in part:

[...] A central tool in our analysis of cases in this area has been the Lemon test. As originally formulated, a statute passed this test only if it had "a secular legislative purpose," if its "principal or primary effect" was one that "neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion," and if it did "not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 218, 232-233 (1997), we folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry. This made sense because both inquiries rely on the same evidence, see ibid., and the degree of entanglement has implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits religion, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The test today is basically the same as that set forth in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 222 (1963) (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961)), over 40 years ago. The Court's opinion in these cases focuses on a narrow question related to the Lemon test: how to apply the primary effects prong in indirect aid cases? Specifically, it clarifies the basic inquiry when trying to determine whether a program that distributes aid to beneficiaries, rather than directly to service providers, has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 613-614, or, as I have put it, of "endors[ing] or disapprov[ing] ... religion," Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 691-692 (concurring opinion); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). See also ante, at 10. Courts are instructed to consider two factors: first, whether the program administers aid in a neutral fashion, without differentiation based on the religious status of beneficiaries or providers of services; second, and more importantly, whether beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. If the answer to either query is "no," the program should be struck down under the Establishment Clause. See ante, at 10-11. Justice Souter portrays this inquiry as a departure from Everson. See post, at 2-3 (dissenting opinion). A fair reading of the holding in that case suggests quite the opposite. Justice Black's opinion for the Court held that the "[First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary." Everson, supra, at 18; see also Schempp, supra, at 218, 222. How else could the Court have upheld a state program to provide students transportation to public and religious schools alike? What the Court clarifies in these cases is that the Establishment Clause also requires that state aid flowing to religious organizations through the hands of beneficiaries must do so only at the direction of those beneficiaries. Such a refinement of the Lemon test surely does not betray Everson.

The court may have interpreted the lemon test differently that the author of this portion of the article would have, but it did not sidestep the Lemon test. (or is that just my own POV talking?) -- Boracay Bill 02:06, 18 April 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Merge proposal

I just found this article and could have sworn I'd seen the same thing elsewhere; eventually I found it here. For all I can tell these are the same thing, while this seems the better name. Merge and redirect? Mackan79 16:17, 11 September 2007 (UTC)

Unless someone objects, I'm going to start moving material in from there to here. I see this article is fairly uneven as well, so hopefully the two can combine to form something better. Of course, if the other title is better for some reason we can always move it. Mackan79 17:14, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

Merge completed, hopefully alright with others. Thanks, Mackan79 18:12, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

[edit] School Prayer

Under Lemon Test there was a discussion of School Prayer citing multiple Supreme Court Rulings. I am commenting here to point out that I have not only substantially altered the text, but in some ways nearly reversed its apparent meaning. The original text repeatedly stated or implied that the Supreme Court ruled to deny students the freedom to pray in school. I changed it to state that the rulings only prohibited government acts to establish official prayer activity. The already existing links to the specific court cases back me up on that. I am commenting here to invite dispute, or for people preserve the more accurate presentation if there is no dispute.

Also the School Prayer discussion seems awkwardly placed under the Lemon Test section or poorly integrated to that section. I wasn't up for a restructuring attempt, but maybe someone else wants to take a try at fixing the flow? Alsee (talk) 02:05, 25 December 2007 (UTC)

[edit] Freedom of religion & age

I am badly missing informations about freedom of religion & age. Which is the minimum age for persons to claim freedom of religion in the U. S. and elsewhere? The law in Germany provides a term of religious majority (de:Religionsmündigkeit) which applies on kids 14+ who have the right to follow their own beliefs even if their parents don't share those. --Stilfehler (talk) 15:45, 10 April 2008 (UTC)