Talk:Free will/Archive-to-Sept-2007

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Why is it that this article uses "she" as a sexless pronoun? I'll probably get around to changing it to "they" in a day or two. BioTube 18:40, 28 December 2006 (UTC)

The usage is common in current philosophy.1Z 20:15, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
Yeah, depending on the writer it's either an attempt to be neutral, to be feminist, or tongue-in-cheek. People complained about the male-centrism of using "he" as the default pronoun, so everyone switched to just using "she", since nobody complains about that, and the reader is left to interpret it as he or she wishes. I do agree it's uncommon in non-academic writing, though, so perhaps not appropriate for a general-audience encyclopedia. --Delirium 20:51, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

Too centered on determinism?

I know this article has been "peer reviewed" (in wikipedia's own sense) and featured, but I have a really fundamental criticism about its structure. The concept of "determinism", as (somewhat) opposed to that of "free will" has been mostly superseded by the broader concept of "physicalism". In a sense, the peculiar features of a deterministic world are not essential in understanding whether free will exists. Let me make the familiar example of "could I have done otherwise":

Suppose that you are taken back to the time a few seconds or minutes before you took your last hard decision between A and B, in the exact same physical state and with no foreknowledge of the following future. Suppose you had decided A, is it possible that "replaying" it you instead decide B? There are at least 3 possible answers:

  1. No, because the future is completely determined by the physical state of the universe at any given time.
  2. Yes, because there are intrinsically random variables involved in the physical evolution of the universe which can very well affect my decision; coming from quantum mechanics (in some interpretation) or from some other stochastic law of nature. However, if by sheer chance all these variables took exactly the same values as the first time, then I would take the same decision.
  3. Yes, because my decision process is at least in part independent of the laws of nature, so if the process is repeated even in the same exact physical state, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be the same.

-- Case 3 is impossible. Human behaviour can't be independent of the laws of nature, because human behaviour is part of the definition of the laws of nature. Once you posit a belief in laws of behaviour of all things within the universe (including humans and their thought processes), then the debate over free will ends.

Now, 1) is a statement of belief in physical determinism. 2) denies determinism, but denies free will also: in a sense one could call that position "hard physicalism". 3) is a statement of belief in free will, and denial of physicalism, (one such position is cartesian dualism) which is mostly independent of whether one believes in determinism or non-determinism regarding the physical evolution of the universe when uninfluenced by human will. The difference could come out when to the person who answered 3) is asked the question "How could it possibly be so?" Then one could answer (at least):

3a) Well, my conscious will could change the states of some underlying neuronal layers of my brain, down to ultimately changing the physical state of elementary particles composing them, according to its decision of A or B, to make sure that the whole "self" acts accordingly to such decision. Yes, physical dynamics would have a discontinuity in the evolution of some particles at the times corresponding to human conscius decisions, which would be extremely difficult, but not in principle impossible, to observe.

3b) Well, my conscius will could choose the outcome of intrinsically random events (coming from quantum mechanics in some interpretation or some other stochastic fundamental theory) happening in some neuronal layers of my brain, in agreement with its decision of A or B, to make sure that the whole "self" acts accordingly to such decision, rather than letting them happen by chance. No discontinuity in physical dynamics could be seen by an observer, since he would never know whether the relevant random variables were really chosen at random, or "choosen consciously".

Now here is the connection between physical determinism and the problem of free will, in the fact that non-determinist physical theories offer a perhaps more plausible (contradiction-free? non falsifiable? choose your own term here) solution to the enigma of the compatibility of laws of nature and human will (leaving out a myriad of other problems which the article, which is generally well done, considers: this is just a sketch). However, developements in chaos theory make the difference between 3a) and 3b) even more blurred, since they show that pseudo-random behaviour is possible even in in deterministic systems, thus offering the possibility of an answer very similar to 3b) even for someone believing in a deterministic fundamental theory. In all other respects, in any case, one shoud regard the fundamental dichotomy as the one between physicalism and free will. I am not giving specific references, as I believe all the partecipants to the current debate are aware of the above issues (Dennett, for example, states them quite clearly in The elbow room, as does Voss in the essay cited at the bottom of the current article [1]) and I am not asking that the article is redone overnight. After all, in an historical perspective the debate indeed has been centered on the dichotomy between free will and determinism: the clarification of these issues has happened recently, mainly following the last century developements in fundamental physics; and furthermore, there is the problem of including the position on theological determinism in an unifying view. However, I would like this problem to be taken more seriously: currently, the main graph in the article has simply an arrow that takes from "Determinism:False" to "Libertarianism", with the only warning being in the paragraph about Physics and free will:

The possibility that the universe at the macroscopic level may be governed by indeterministic laws, as it is at the quantum level, has revived interest in free will among physicists. Quantum mechanics predicts events only in terms of probabilities, casting doubt on whether the universe is deterministic at all. However, if an action is taken due to quantum randomness, this in itself, means that free will is still absent, as such action can not be controllable by someone claimed to posses such free will.

I personally believe this is not enough, and that the structure of the article may give a mistaken impression about the debate to readers, privileging obsolete/historical positions and neglecting more modern ones. I of course am reluctant to make major edits on my own, given the featured state, presence of "listen to this artcle" etc; this comment (rather, this longish essay: sorry for that) is aimed at seeing whether there is consensus to start applying some changes in this direction. Massimamanno 05:20, 16 January 2007 (UTC)

The idea that physicalism, not determinism, is the problem presupposes that randomness is just as incompatible with FW as determinism. However, that is itself subject to debate currently.
Thought experiments where the entire state of the universe is rewound to time T make it look unlikely that physical indeterminism is much use: a random event at time T can only set you off on a different direction from the one you would have taken -- that is you would perform an action not fully determined by your state of mind (or rather brain) at the time.
However, most definitions of FW only require that a free action be not full determined by external circumstances. (Obviously, one's actions are determined in some sense by events inside one's body). That legitimises a different thought-experiment, in which external circumstances leading up to time T are the same, but events inside the central nervous system are not. Thus, there is a sense in which one could have thought (imagined, planned) differently leading up to time T, and then have done something different at time T on that basis -- without any disconnection between one's action and one's state of mind at time T.


Thus indeterministic FW is based on events leading up to to time T, and not just events at time T. What of control? You assume, as almost everybody does, that the only way to control indeterminism is to pre-ordain which way the quantum dice fall. However, the brain as a whole does not have to act on a single low-level indeterministic event any more than it has to act on a single low-level deterministic event. What one neuron or sub-system does is combined with a great deal of other activity to produce the final result. Thus the brain (or rather the more-or-less deterministic sub-systems of the brain) can "control" indeterminism by failing to act on it or filtering it out -- after it has occurred.
Note that at no time do I appeal to a "self" or "consciousness" separate from the activity of tht brain! 1Z 20:46, 16 January 2007 (UTC)
There are two comments I wish to make about what you write: the first is that I believe something you write is wrong, the second is that I believe something else you write is probably correct, but I don't understand it.
"However, most definitions of FW only require that a free action be not full determined by external circumstances. (Obviously, one's actions are determined in some sense by events inside one's body). That legitimises a different thought-experiment, in which external circumstances leading up to time T are the same, but events inside the central nervous system are not. Thus, there is a sense in which one could have thought (imagined, planned) differently leading up to time T, and then have done something different at time T on that basis -- without any disconnection between one's action and one's state of mind at time T."
What does this mean? According to the above definition, determinism has no problem with free will either! In a situation where I am taken back to when I decided A but my mental states (and only my mental states) have been changed so that I decide B, I of course will decide B. There is no problem whatsoever with this in classical mechanics. If you are troubled by the fact that I wrote "seconds or minutes" before the decision, take an year instead. Nothing changes! Is it possible that you decide B, rather than A, starting from identical physical states of one year before your decision and if by sheer chance all random variables in the universe take the same exact values during the whole year? If you think it is, tell me so and how.
Thus the brain (or rather the more-or-less deterministic sub-systems of the brain) can "control" indeterminism by failing to act on it or filtering it out -- after it has occurred.
I recognize this position exists (sometimes the wind and sail metaphor is used), but I don't understand it, mainly because I have mostly read it explained using quantum gravity, which is a theory I don't know (and am not even sure precisely exists).
I assume you are alluding to Penrose's theory. My "version" does not invlove quantum gravity or macroscopic superposed states, or any "new" physics beyond a source of indeterminism (which is not particularly new).1Z 15:18, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
However, it surely needs to be mentioned in Wikipedia: this, for me, is simply a case of a supposed "compatibilist" position between physicalism and free will. Massimamanno 14:33, 17 January 2007 (UTC)
The position I am selling is not compatibilist in the standard sense because 1) it does not seek to re-define FW 2) it require real, fundamental indeterminism and is therefore clearly not compatible with determinism.
It is similar to Kane's position, which is mentioned in the article.
As I said before, I resist the substitution of "physicalism" for "determinism" because it implies that there is no hope for showing the compatibility of FW and indeterminism.1Z 15:18, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

Reversion to featured version.

Figured I should probably explain myself.

Peterdjones: It's nice that you're being bold and updating Wikipedia. However, this is a featured article. This means that it's already been established to be pretty good; the people who helped get it here are real philosophers who know what's up. No offense, but the prose you're adding is not that great ("However, there is no reason to suppose that an single indeterministic event at the atomic or molecular level is the cause of an action, any more that there is to suppose that a single deterministic event is. The brain acts in concert as a total system, and acybernetic system can control itself even if it contains random elements." What does that mean? You can't just assert that it acts as a total system, and where's cybernetic coming from? This is just one example.), and it's not referenced, and... yeah. Standards are considerably higher for a featured article; please be really careful about any additions you make.

For consideration please can people look at the legal side as no section in the page relates Free will to Law both National and international. For example "Free will,Thought and Consciousness " is a legal part of the Human Rights Act so there must be other laws that legally grant us this basic right - I do feel that a section should be included showing how free will is protected legally - Mike Lohman MBA Cardiff University


Mr. Velmans, if you're actually published, that's great, but there's an inherent conflict of interest with you promoting yourself by saying "Max Velmans thinks this" and sticking yourself in the further reading section. Please read WP:COI. If you have interesting things to say on this topic, wait, and perhaps others will cite you. SnowFire 05:09, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

intro change

the intro was redundant and biased, suggesting what it was asking.

changed to: The controversy over the concept of free will is the question of whether or not actions are consciously controlled or merely witnessed. Jiohdi 21:46, 13 February 2007 (UTC) The problem of free will is the question of whether conscious agents have real or illusory control over their own actions and decisions. Is there a third option to random vs determined that would give agents mystical freedom that is beyond scientific understanding or are agents just part of a system that they cannot in any way effect?Jiohdi 22:02, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

1. You need to explain exactly what redundancy and bias you consider to be in the introduction.

2. Some of these issues you raise are valid, but too complex for an introduction

3. Phrases like "mystical freedom" and "sheer force of will" are pretty biased themselves.1Z 23:46, 14 February 2007 (UTC)

the problem ...the problem redundant and does not read well... why is it a problem, for who/m? its more of a question as I stated, of whether or not the experience is real or just an illusion. rational agents-- irrational people are not showing freewill? what does rational have to do with anything regarding freewill?Jiohdi 04:35, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

No, you've completely misunderstood. Rational agents, in this context, always refers to a species of animals and potentially artificially intelligent agents that possess the capacity to make rational decisions and actions. They have the brain capacity to think and then choose between diverse alternatives. These are generally "rational" beings as opposed to things such as cockroaches, slugs and bacteria. You're either thinking of a more specific usage of rational vs. irrational which has to do with "logical/mathematical" ability OR you're thinking of rationality vs. irrationality in the psychiatric sense of delusional thinking and so forth. In any case, it is generally accepted among psychiatrists/neurologists/lawyers/doctors/philosophers/theologians that people under the effects of profound mental disorder or drugs do NOT make free decisions. Hence, they are not held morally responsible in cases of murder, and other destructive actions that would ordinarily be described as immoral. The intro is not redundant. Actions and decisions are radically different things. Why DO certain types of people absolutely lose control of themselves over the choice of two or three words in introductions to articles anyway? The fact is: this is one of the TWO or THREE best articles in the philosophy section in all of Wikipedia. Period. It was no small accomplishment. Philosophy of mind is about to taken down for lack of "comprehensiveness". I wrote 90% myself and posted it up for review because of other considerations. But take a look at the state of this article immediately prior to the FAR period in which I, Brian Morton, EdHubbard, and a few others brought it back from post-apocalyptic nightmare to FA quality. It's up there somewhere, I'm not going to link to it. I'm tired of all this nonsense. --Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 10:02, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

I stated quite clearly the redundancy was in the use of the word problem, not in decision vs action... it does not read well is what I said... and was just trying to clean it up a bit, no need to lose it(^_^)over a few wordsJiohdi 14:28, 15 February 2007 (UTC) The problem of free will is whether or not rational agents imagine or really do exercise control over their own actions and decisions. the intro as it stood is not the REAL problem, so it does require some clarification or modification, perhaps you can live with this.Jiohdi 14:34, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

I don't know what is meant by "imagination" actually. A troublesome notion. Perhaps it should be linked. But I can live with this version.--Francesco Franco aka Lacatosias 15:05, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

of course whether it is imagined or real belongs in the intro because we are stating the ACTUAL problem... if its in the body, it should be, to expand on it..but it definitely belongs in the intro.Jiohdi 18:11, 17 February 2007 (UTC)


Philosophy banner

I have added the philosophy banner to the talk page of this article so that the members of the project will know that the article exists, is of FA status, and falls within the scope of the project, so that they might potentially assist in its upkeep. John Carter 16:56, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

corporation view

In buddhism there is the concept called NO SELF, which basically means that there is no enduring, permanent substance that one can point to as THE SELF such as an immortal soul, but the visible self is an ever changing system made of many unstable and changing parts much like a business corporation which is by definition a LEGAL entity, not necessarily a physical one. when viewed from this point of view, each one of us is a Legal corporation as well and our life consists of vying for resources and making deals to satisfy our current needs and the long term needs of our corporations survival. The freedom we have is relative to each other and is the only freedom that matters. Jiohdi 15:32, 21 March 2007 (UTC)

Get that book promo in there, eh??

Hmm....I've just been wondering all these years about what Jonathan Bricklin has to say on the topic of free will in William James!! (0:< --Francesco Franco 08:39, 6 May 2007 (UTC)

Here's an idea

Hey, why don't all the people who have ever published a book or article related to free will just reference those books and articles on the bottom of the page, without otherwise contributing anything of interest the article?? Fascinating the uses and benefits of expertise on Wikipedia: shameless self-promotion in some cases apparently. --Francesco Franco 08:47, 6 May 2007 (UTC)

Areas the article is lacking

I've been trying to think of any areas this article is lacking. It's fairly complete, though there are a couple of questions it still doesn't answer. In part it's difficult to deal with this subject since it overlaps so much with consciousness. Consciousness without some sense of being able to use sensory inputs to make decisions seems wholly pointless, in this respect free will is certainly a central aspect of consciousness. With regard to this, I'd like to know whether or not there are any theories as to why free will exists (again, this is basically just asking why consciousness exists, but I don't know how to separate the two questions). Is there some selective advantage to having 'free will', or is it just an coincidental emergent property of the mind?

Secondly and again related to the previous question, do non-human animals experience free will, and can it be called free will? Again, I find it impossible to untangle the existence of consciousness from that of free will, but it's quite an important question. A typical animal certainly can't consider the ethical aspects of its actions (well, a select few may be able to to some extent I suppose), but if I were a conscious animal, say a gazelle, I'm certain I would feel a very similar notion of 'being in control' and 'able to do anything I want' that a human feels. Does this qualify as free will though? And if not, what then shall we call it? Richard001 11:13, 22 May 2007 (UTC)

Consciousness, opponents of free-will argue, is more to do with the necessary illusion of freedom with which our brain provides us. Determinists who refuse to accept free will thus search for evolutionary mechanisms highlighting the necessity for consciousness and the apparent illusion of 'free'-will which it provides, as you suggest. I'm not sure it will ever be possible to demonstrate free-will in other creatures if we cannot demonstrate it conclusively in ourselves. Humans already struggle to differentiate between the work of human and robotic composers - it's even harder to tell if a sentient entity is 'conscious' or 'free.' To cite a common analogy; how, for example, can you tell that all your friends are not mindless zombies, merely programmed to imitate the actions of a human? - Psusennes 28th May 07
I can't demonstrate solipsism is false, no, but then I can't demonstrate there are no teapots floating around up there either. It's obvious this is a difficult subject to address due to epistemological issues, but then if we take that stance regarding writing about other animals and the evolution of free will, why should we bother writing about it at all? Richard001 04:34, 10 June 2007 (UTC)

Including Phineas Gage in the neuroethics/morality subsection?

Can we get Phineas Gage into the neuroscience/ethics area of Free will? I read it, and was instantly reminded of this case study which provided vehement debate in my philosophy class. If however, no serious scholars have provided a link (and it seems very likely that someone has), then it would be innaproppriate for inclusion:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phineas_Gage


Never mind that ancient story about Gage. If you want a REALLY interesting case to learn from, the entire modern medical profession should be studying ME. Idiots!!--Francesco Franco 15:39, 11 June 2007 (UTC)

Einstein and Schopenhauer

The Schopenhauer Yearbook (Schopenhauer–Jahrbuch) for the Schopenhauer Society (Schopenhauer–Gesellschaft) has the following words in its 1961 issue: Vor einiger Zeit hat der frühere Generalsekretär der "Deutschen Liga für Menschenrechte," Kurt R, Großmann, dem Regierenden Bürgermeister in Berlin, Willy Brandt, die Reproduktion einer Schallplatte übergeben, die Albert Einstein im November 1928 für die "Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte" besprochen hat. Die Platte, die den Titel "Mein Glaubensbekenntnis" trägt, ist im Jahr 1960 in New York aufgefunden worden. Wir zitieren folgenden Absatz: "Ich glaube nicht an die Freiheit des Willens. Schopenhauers Wort, der Mensch kann wohl tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will, begleitet mich in allen Lebenslagen und versöhnt mich mit den Handlungen der Menschen, auch wenn sie mir recht schmerzlich sind. Diese Erkenntnis von der Unfreiheit des Willens schützt mich davor, mich selbst und die Mitmenschen als handelnde und urteilende Individuen allzu Ernst zu nehmen und den guten Humor zu verlieren." This is translated as: Some time ago, the former Secretary–General of the German League for Human Rights, Kurt R. Grossmann, has delivered to the governing mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, a copy of a phonograph record of Albert Einstein's discussion in 1928 at the German League for Human Rights. The record, which carries the title "My Creed," was found again in New York in the year 1960. We quote the following paragraph: I don't believe in the freedom of the will. Schopenhauer's saying, that a human can very well do what he wants, but cannot will what he wants, accompanies me in all life's circumstances and reconciles me with the actions of humans, even when they are truly distressing. This knowledge of the non–freedom of the will protects me from losing my good humor and taking much too seriously myself and my fellow humans as acting and judging individuals." The dating of these words as having been spoken in 1928 is not in agreement with the dating as given from other sources. Those other sopurces claim that the date should be 1932.Lestrade 18:19, 3 June 2007 (UTC)Lestrade

Schopenhauer*2

The quote "a human can very well do what he wants, but cannot will what he wants" is in the article twice, once direct from Schopenhauer, once from Einstein. I propose to delete the second since it really has nothing to do with physics, and is only a reflection of the vulgar tendency to regard Einstein as an all-purpose sage. 1Z 18:33, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Deleting Einstein's words is a very good idea. Maybe we can find quotes and references that are more suitable to Wikipedia articles, such as, whether the topic of free will is mentioned in The Matrix or if Bart Simpson has any comments on free will.Lestrade 18:45, 3 June 2007 (UTC)Lestrade
Lestrade, I don't think there's any need for you to be sarcastic here. I actually think that PeterDJones raises a good point. We have almost exactly the same quote presented in two places in the same article. It doesn't matter how famous, intelligent, or important the person who quotes some other famous, intelligent and important person is... what matters is that we have the same quote, almost verbatim, twice. How does this add to the article? If Einstein is the important point (although I'm not sure he should be on the free will article, as opposed, to say Theory of special relativity), is there some other Einstein quote that might make the same point without essentially echoing what Schopenhauer already said? Edhubbard 18:51, 3 June 2007 (UTC)
And preferably have something to do with physics. 1Z 18:54, 3 June 2007 (UTC)
In an article on Free Will, there would naturally be no interest in the opinion of a man like Einstein. "A shoemaker should stick to his last."Lestrade 21:04, 3 June 2007 (UTC)Lestrade
I think it's relevant enough; you don't have to be a 'philosopher' by trade just to have something to say on the matter. Einstein is an important figure in discussion of the physics perspective. I noted this repetition myself, though I couldn't see any reasonable way to remove it without substantially altering the meaning of either quote. Einstein's quote could have the repeated section removed and [...] (that's how you show you've removed text from a quote, yes?) added, perhaps with a footnote explaining what the removed text was, though I think it will just complicate things further to do so. Richard001 04:52, 10 June 2007 (UTC)


Lestrade: Einstein is of course relevant as a physicist.
Richard: WP's rules do kind-of require someone to be a philosopher by trade, or have some other degree of recognition in order to be quoted. There is also the question of why Einstein's philosophy is being quoted in the physics section. The impression is created that that his philosophy flows from his physics backing, but this is not really demonstrated with any rigour. 1Z 08:54, 10 June 2007 (UTC)
How about this: just leave it alone, for heaven's sakes. Aren't there more serious problems than this to address in the vast majority of philosophy articles on Wikipedia. Factual accuracy, correct referencing and coherent, intelligible writing, for example. What silliness. What are talking about "Why is Einstein's philosophy being quoted in the physics section?" Einstein's philosophy may or may nor "flow" from his physics backing, but it is most certainly deeply related to it. If you want to demonstrate it rigorously, that's fine with me. But it would really make for a much worse article than the present to go off on such an enormous tangent.--Francesco Franco 10:18, 10 June 2007 (UTC)


I agree with what many have said about Einstein. I am sorry to say this because he has been one of the marvels of mankind, but: A) His is just an opinion with no arguments to support. B) If his arguments were derived from his notion of strict determinism (Hidden Variables), Physics has moved forward, and it is time philosophers accept that. And as Feynman said once, you can be Albert Einstein, but Nature is still right and you can still be wrong. In fact, as a comment as a reader, I will say that the moment I saw Einstein's quotations I realized what the opinion of the author(s) is about free will. It is called argument from authority. Einstein is cited because it is nice that someone so authoritative agrees with me (the writer), and I will put him in. I am not saying that is necessarily the intent, but definitely the impression a skeptic mind like me gets from it, undoubtedly. I do not see the necessity here to find another quote as if Wiki's artricle would be incomplete or uninformative without at least one quote from Einstein's personal opinion --209.150.240.231 06:14, 16 June 2007 (UTC)


What are you talking about?? Look, this is Wikipedia. No one own's this article. And I can tell you that, at least as far as I'm concerned and I did a LOT of the editing on the philosophical sections and elsehwere, I tried to be as balanced as possible. One reason for this is that I have not yet, and may never, settle on a fixed and immutable position on this question. The Einstein quote, as I recall, was put in as a reasonable compromise to resolve as possible interminal confrontation and/or edit-warring on the issue of Shopenhauer/Einestin quotes. The article was chock full of extremely lengthy Shopenhaeur quotes in a previous incarnation. At a certain point, it was almost as if there was nothing but Shopenhauer/Einstein quotes and a giant portrait bust of Baron d'Holbach in the middle of the page. Your other points are irrelevant here and confused. The question of determinism vs. indeterminism in the macro-world is so far from being settled that it is not inappropriate to say that it hasn't even been touched yet. Quantum mechanics is about the extraordinarily small-scale word of sub-atomic particles and the oddities that are seen at that level almost certainly cancel out. Why else do we not experience them at the macro level. Further, quantum mechanics is irreconcibale with general relativity. One of the two, or both, is wrong. I think they will eventually both be replaced by a deterministic theory that does not involve the silly, question-begging hypothesis of undefined and mystical consciousness causing collapses of wave functions.
More to the point: if people want the Einstsin quote out, take it out. Have a vote or something. It doesn't seem to me to compromise the article in any way. --Francesco Franco 09:54, 16 June 2007 (UTC)


Of course by "the writer" I was using a figure of speech. It may be a collectivity, it is still "the writer" and it does have an imprinting overall. That quantum mechanics applies solely to the microscopic world (untrue but I will explain) is only partly relevant, because it is the fundamental basis of reality (and I mind that it is on the opposite view on "this" very fundamental nature of the physical world that Einstein based his opinions, not on things that cancel out). Although some randomness does cancel, it is still fundamentally true that even if we were to know with infallible accuracy the present state of all the matter in the universe, the future would still be intrinsically unpredictable. Most philosophers from the past relied obviously on the opposite prevailing notion, but that has been forcefully falsified (randomness is not just the effect of chaos and incomplete knowledge). This is all but irrelevant in a discussion about determinism (especially the one referred to by Einstein who did have in mind fundamental forces, not statistical averages). Furthermore, there would be no place for statistical mechanics (and so thermodynamics) without quantum effects, like indistinguishability of identical particles in homologous state. Therefore, the macroscopic world too is aboslutely, undeniably as it is because of the quantum nature of the physical world. To say that the randomness cancels out, without noticing this, means not to tell the full story. Without quantum effects, water wouldn't become ice, no matter how macroscopic. So it is not as if some randomness cancels out, but the quantum randomness, and if the world appears causal to us it may well be due to that averaging of that intrinsic quantum randomness. Finally, that general relativity cannot be reconciled yet with quantum physics does not in any way entail that they are wrong, but only that they are incomplete (as magnetism was irreconcilable with electricity before Maxwell, this did not imply that either magnetism or electricity do not exist). It's been one century that quantum physics has resisted all the attacks. Collapse is by no means the only interpretation (luckily), but that there are alternative interpretations does not mean that the world is deterministic. Einstein's view is untenable today, not because of collapse or whatever, but because of experimentation, and therefore because of nature. I am talking about the science, which I guess must have something to do with our brain somewhere in some largely unknown way. Not about philosophy. I will not change a bit on the page unilaterally because I'm here to propose a view and a debate, if nobody agrees with me then Wikipedia's readers will have the view as it is. --209.150.255.84 07:49, 17 June 2007 (UTC)
Consciousness causes collapse is by no means the only theory of wave function collapse. See, eg. Objective collapse theory. 1Z 17:37, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
Ummmmm....yeah, I know that quite well, master. I have studied with Giancarlo Ghirardi (Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber interpretaion??) in the past. --Francesco Franco 17:22, 24 June 2007 (UTC)
Quantum indeterminism is so far from disappearing at the macroscopic level that you can buy commercial gadgets -- hardware random number generators -- which, it is promised, amplify it into a data stream that can be fed into a computer of other device. I might mention this in the article.1Z 17:33, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
Fact: There are still interpretations which strongly suggest that there is NO quantum indeterminacy, even at the microscopic level. The example is very weak, I think. But of there is no collapse of the wave function, then it is complete nonsense. That would also be stated in the article, in order to be NPOV, no??--Francesco Franco 17:22, 24 June 2007 (UTC)
Can you explain what theories you are referring to? I hope not Bohm. There is one little irrelevant problem with, for example, Bohm mechanics (started by DeBroglie). In almost ninety years it hasn't reproduced reletivistic phenomena (Dirac did it in the late 1920s with the conventional approach). Until this is accomplished, that a deterministic microscopic theory might be out there is, scientifically speaking, speculation. It might be out there indeed. But it is by no means equivalent to say that we know it exists for a fact. To imply that in any way would be POV. Quite the contrary, it is only rational to suspect there isn't (dissenters carry the burden of proof). In fact, such theory must be non-local, and a non-local theory is difficult to be reconciled with special relativity, it appears. Maybe, not a coincidence after all. For how controversial it is, even the collapse interpretation itself is as of today scientifically more acceptable than Bohmian mechanincs (for example), because it has more predictive power. What I cannot really understand is why, to many, the own personal understadning of (and feeling about) physical reality should prevail with respect to empirical observation. I, personally speaking, would be thrilled and excited to discover that there is such a theory. However, nature has no interest in getting me excited, nor in proving me right. Anyway, you might have referred to other deterministic intepretations. If you know of any of the such that complies with special relativity I promise I will study that. --209.150.240.231 01:10, 6 July 2007 (UTC)
There is no "local" interpretation of Quantum mechanics consistent with special relativity and bell-aspect either. This is entire section on QM and determinism is dubious and suspect. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.91.196.100 (talk) 03:43, 28 November 2007 (UTC)
That microscopic' events can be amplified it beyond doubt. QM would not be an experimental science otherwise. Whether that means the macroscopic world is indeterministic is another question. 1Z 17:47, 24 June 2007 (UTC)
I agree. The section is now much improved, BTW. But.....the Einstein quote (which started off this whole thing) now looks, IMO, absolutely ridiculously out of place!! --Francesco Franco 08:01, 25 June 2007 (UTC)
Why?Lestrade 12:40, 25 June 2007 (UTC)Lestrade
So, are you suggesting that it has been definitively demonstrated that the universe is indeterminstic in nature, that determinism has been falsified (the issue of compatibilism versus incompatibilism are obviously irrelevant in that case!! Wonder why there are so many scientifically well-informed philosophers like Daniel Dennet, etc, who adopt such effete and falsified positions??), that determinism is only an illusion that arises out of randomness, and so on? Or have I misunderstood? (I'm being sincere, not sarcastic, BTW) If I have not, please provide very, VERY strong evidence and sources to back this up!! You are absolutely right about wrong versus incomplete. I apologize for the confusion. Also, I was not suggesting that there is only ONE interpretation (didn't mean to anyway), just that that that is the dominant one (and many people I have studied with find it quite.....ummmm wacko (0;). Nor was I suggesting that Einstein's was RIGHT about hidden variables( he was indeed profoundly WRONG), principle of indeterminacy, and so on. It's just that he may have been right that quantum mechanics will eventually be incorporated into some grander theory (strings or what have you). In turn, this grander theory may be deterministic in nature at the most fundemantal level of forces and fields. That's it. No one knows yet. But, on the serious side, if you want to remove or revise the quite, go ahead and remove it.--Francesco Franco 10:38, 17 June 2007 (UTC) --Francesco Franco 10:38, 17 June 2007 (UTC)
Local determinism is disproved by the Aspect experiment, and that will apply to any future theories too.1Z 17:26, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
That wasn't my question, in any case. Go ahead push your agenda. Why do I even bother??--Francesco Franco 17:22, 24 June 2007 (UTC)
I am sorry, I should have been more specific. By indeterminism I was referring to in-determinism or non-determinism, a negation of a positive. I would say A is deterministic if given knowledge of all elements in A, then for every element a in A there is one and only a' in A in the future of a. To falsify that A is deterministic it is sufficient that I prove that there is at least one element a in A such that both a' and b are possible in the future of a. Of course by indeterministic I did not mean that for all elements in A this must be true, this is of course false. In fact, quantum mechanics has quite a great deal of determinism, as does reality (it is much more helpful to view them as inextricably intertwined, as they are both major actors not only of course in Physics but also in, e.g., development of life). If you wish, I could say that reality is not integrally deterministic (nor integrally not so).
Well, this certainly makes more sense. When expressed in that way, something like this has been my own private view for many years. I suspect the universe has both deterministic and indeterministic elements. I can't see how it could be otherwise really. Thanks for clarifying these points. But, as far as the article is concerned (I'm thinking primarily of the philosophy sections, BTW) we must base ourselves on the standard literature which, still today and I can back this up with many sources, overwhelmingly speaks of causal determinism as something absolute and counterpoised against indeterminism. This is almost certainly be a sort of hueristic , simplying assumption in many cases: it makes things much easier to just say assume determinism is compeltely and universally true, then the folowing shows that free will is still possible. Assume determinism is false, then the following argument shows NOT P, and so on. That is, they are usually discussed as if the the universe in general is either deterministically causally closed or it is not (indeterminism): hence one speaks of determinism versus indeterminism , compatibilism and incompatibilism defined as determinism plus free or minus free will respectively, and so. Dennett and some others may be exceptions to this. But we can't just write here, e.g. in the philosophy section, "determinism has been falsified" everywhere and therefore we will discuss ONLY indeterministic views, etc., which is what I thought you were attempting to suggest for the article.

Is this definitely demonstrated? Nothing is in Science, because of skepticism and falsifiability, but there is wide consensus. And I can go on to say that the existence of at least one such element as referred to above is suggested not by any quantum theory or interpretation thereof, but by experimentation (in regard to experimentation, Bell's inequalities have been successfully tested to be violated, as he predicted, and that is one of the several major blows to traditional Newtonian determinism, not the inequalities per se). Is it conceivable that a "deterministic" theory for the quantum world is just one step behind the curtain? Of course it is a possibility. But it would have to be one totally different from the traditional historical view of it, maybe with implications about logic, reality, maybe even dualism, and about our understanding of possibilities and probabilities. In a word, not Einstein's determinism, that is with a pretty high probability gone forever. With regard to Dennet, I think this is exactly what he observed, that determinism is in any case limited (one way or another) by quantum randomness and deterministic chaos, and so it cannot be taken to pervade all reality. He did point this out, so he too must not believe in the idea of an integrally deterministic reality, which I find easy to believe given that he is scientifically well informed. To come back to the quote. The Physics section starts on to say that physicists got a revived interest with the advent of QM. There are not many citations and reports on the views of either early thinkers nor modern contemporary physicists. The final quote changes the balance, and it is pre-Bell-ian. It can be kept, but in the meantime I will look for explicit quotes or discussions coming from the other side of the fence. --209.150.240.231 03:14, 18 June 2007 (UTC)


Well, of course you are more than welcome to improve on any perceived imbalance or lack of historical rigor in the physics section (not my field, for one thing), but also any other sections that you know something about since this is an open collaborative project. I would just ask that you get solid sources, back everything up and otherwise play by the general rules. In that case, I don't think the main editors here will take issue with you and there should be no problems. BE BOLD.--Francesco Franco 09:06, 18 June 2007 (UTC)
And as a small note still on the Physics section. It is rightly pointed out that quantum randomness does not imply directly the existence of free will. However, I suspect that is not the argument it is used for. What it does is that it questions forcefully the idea that pervasive ineludible determinism can be used as a proof that free will does not exist, because the postulate would appear to have been falsified. Therefore other principles must be used in the demonstration. If I say: Free will does not exist because everything is determined. Then someone points out that not everything is determined. I cannot then say: That something is indetermined proves that free will does not exist. --209.150.240.231 03:58, 18 June 2007 (UTC)
Well, there are those who sustain that indeterminism is either incompatible with or not really relevant to the question of the existence of free will, of course. Galen Strawson, in particular, but also Ted Honderich and some others maintain such a position. These should be probably be mentioned in that regard. --Francesco Franco 09:06, 18 June 2007 (UTC)
Yes, that's interesting. However, I was digressing maybe, but I was just pointing out a weird logical inconsistency in the way the Physics section is presented. Few lines apart, first we have: "Early scientific thought often pictured the universe as deterministic [...]. This vision entailed that free will must be an illusion"; And then we have "However, if an action is taken due to quantum randomness, this in itself, means that free will is still absent, as such action cannot be controllable by someone claiming to possess such free will [citation needed]". I fail to understand the logic behind the second assertion, if the first holds. It goes as this. The first claim: If my action A follows a prior P, and if the prior is determined, then A is not free because it is due to P which is determined. The second claim: But if my action A follows a prior P, and if P is undetermined, then A is not free because it is due to P which is undetermined. However, this is what I'm pointing out, P can only be either determined or undetermined. So, what the article is saying is that because any action has a prior (any prior), then it is not free. But noone of the proponents of free will denies that every action has a prior! What that argument is saying, then, is to assume the conclusion it was supposed to prove.
The quantum argument does not purport to prove anything about free will in the positive, but only attempts to disprove that the "all priors are completely determined" argument could be used as a proof (given that the hypothesis would fail). It shouldn't be down-played by asserting something sounding: But if one wants to find a proof against free will he will find it nevertheless, even with randomness. Of course he can find it, but because of some QM features, you would have to severely restrict your set of possible proofs.
I agree completely, the randomness/deterministic arguments may be completely useless to prove anything in the positive, and this is a personal conviction (I have no idea one way or the other, actually). But the arguments related to them should be fairly treated. --128.253.229.167 21:59, 22 June 2007 (UTC)
Yeah, I just scanned over that section and you're absolutely right: the whole damned thing is question-begging and sort of messy. I've indicated the phrases that are matters of opinion but that are presented as factual assertions and put in some hidden comments. If noone else cares to, I'll try a small rewrite at some point. It's too hot and muggy for me to do anything more. --Francesco Franco 09:22, 23 June 2007 (UTC)
Einstein's opinion on Free-will deflects the objetivity aim on this article; He may be a genious in physics,but, as far as I know, there is no exclusive opinion on these philosopical subjects, neihter a straitforward authorithy on the Free-Will Subject. Propositions of models /evidence or logical demostration is not what Einstein offer's in this Article; He belongs to other article.

Where is Christianity?

Why does Hinduism and Buddhism have a section in this article yet Christianity and other religions have not been included? A simple word search on this article shows that Christianity is not even worthy of mention on this article while Judaism is is ever so lightly represented. Does not western civilization's greatest movements have an opinion on this matter of free will? Does this demonstrate Wikipedians bias? I'll let the reader decide that for himself. (Gaytan 19:28, 10 August 2007 (UTC))

Please examine Free will in theology for more on that; half the article used to be on Christian views of free will, so it got spun off. The Hinduism and Buddhism sections randomly bloated and should probably be moved to that article as well. SnowFire 19:36, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
I agree. If Christianity, Judaism, and Islam are in another "Theology" page on free will, then Buddhism and Hinduism should also be moved there. Gaytan 19:38, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
The point of "summary style" is to mention topics which require a fuller exposition, while also linking to the larger articles that deal with this material. A short summary here, covering theology (broadly) is perfectly appropriate for summary style. The other two sections have been growing since the article was re-FA'd, and could probably use some trimming, but they should not be outright ignored on this page. There is also a slightly tricky issue of Buddhist philosophy as a philosophical, rather than theological, tradition. Part of the problem is that we haven't had many editors who are willing to work on the Free will in theology page, and then come here to make the summary coherent with that page. If this is something you are willing to work on improving, your input would be appreciated. Edhubbard 19:52, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
Exactly. In Eastern thought, philosophy and religion are just about inextricably intermeshed (or, certainly, much more intermeshed than they are in Western traditions and history). So, there was certainly no intentional bias on the part of any of the editors. I think we just felt that there should be SOME very brief discussion of Eastern views or it would seem obviously Western-biased. But if you touch on Eastern views of this issue, you end up nessarily mentioning Hinduism, Buddhis, etc.

On the other hand, throwing Christianity, Judaism, etc.. back in would result in explosion. --Francesco Franco 09:41, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

It seems to me that free will in science and philosophy really is a different topic than free will in theology. If, as is often claimed, in Asia religion and science are inseparable, it should still be possible to separate, for example, Hinayana Buddhist views, which are primarily philosophical, from Mahayana Buddhist views, which are primarily religious, just as it is possible to separate Isaac Newton's writing on Physics from his writing on Angels -- even if they are in adjacent sentences in the same text. Rick Norwood 16:54, 28 August 2007 (UTC)

No, it's often claimed that religion and philosophy are inseparable. Of course, this is true of the West as well, during various periods such as Scholasticism. Personally, I meant to say "very hard to separate" not "inseparable". I'm no expert on the topic of free will in Eastern thought. If someone who knows the subject better wants to break it up along finer lines, such as those you suggest, that's fine with me. Further, when you get to such things as Ch'an Buddhism and Toaism, I see no reason to call it theology at all!! But I'm not really clear about the views on free will of many of these schools of thought, so I won't edit there.--Francesco Franco 07:41, 29 August 2007 (UTC)