Frederick Townsend Ward
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Frederick Townsend Ward (1831–1862) was an American sailor, mercenary and soldier of fortune famous for his military victories for Imperial China during the Taiping Rebellion.
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[edit] Early life
Frederick Townsend Ward was born in Salem, Massachusetts on November 29, 1831. Ward led a life of youthful rebellion, which his father dealt with in 1847 by removing Ward from High School (or Ward demanding to leave, accounts are somewhat diverging) to become the second mate of the Hamilton, a clipper ship commanded by a family friend. (Carr, 40 & Smith, 25).
Onboard, he was introduced to an extremely hard, and in some cases, savage life, where he was given authority over many “old salts”, some of whom apparently threw him overboard after too many orders from the youthful mate, though again, accounts diverge (Carr, 40). Ward's captain, William Allen, later recalled him possessing traits of “reckless daring”, but being on the whole, a valuable officer. (Smith, 26).
On the Hamilton, Ward sailed from New York to Hong Kong in 1847. During his stay in Hong Kong, he likely saw relatively little beyond the port city itself, as Qing Dynasty travel restrictions forbade foreigners from venturing far inland.
Ward's movements after his initial trip to China become both frequent and occasionally nebulous after 1849. It has been established that in 1849 he enrolled in the “American Literary, Scientific and Military Academy”, now Norwich University, in Vermont, where the curriculum included military tactics, strategy and drill and ceremonies. He only remained enrolled for a few months, before he left school once again, never to return. In 1850 he shipped out as first mate of the clipper ship Russell Clover, captained by his father.
Frederick Townsend Ward in the 1850s
- 1850 First Mate, clipper ship Russell Clover, New York to San Francisco. Visits Gold Fields(?) Meets Giuseppe Garibaldi in Panama or Peru(?)
- 1851 First Mate, trading barque, San Francisco & Shanghai. Sailor, coastal cargo ships, China coast
- 1852 Sailor, coastal cargo ships, China coast, First Officer (XO), cargo ship Gold Hunter, carrying coolie labor to Mexico. Debarks in Tehauntapec, Mexico. Meets William Walker, joins Walker forces as Filibuster.
- 1853 Part of Walker's Sonora Filibuster Invasion of Mexico, resigns sometime in 1853 or 1854, remains in Mexico
- 1854 Mexico, scrap metal business. Venture fails, travels to San Francisco by mule. First Mate, Westward Ho! clipper ship, San Francisco – New York – Hong Kong. Refuses to filibuster for Taiping's(?) Manchu Government unwilling to employ Westerners. Ward returns to New York, enlists in French Army, Enters Crimean War
- 1855 Ward in Crimean War, allowed to resign after insubordination to superior
- 1856 Whereabouts unknown
- 1857 China, First Mate on coastal steamship Antelope
- 1858 Mercenary for Juarez in Mexico(?) Texas Ranger(?)
- 1859 New York City, clerk in father's shipping agency office. Travels to San Francisco en route to Shanghai (accompanied by brother Harry)
- 1860 Arrives in Shanghai, (never to return to United States). XO on the Confucius, armed pirate suppression river steamer. Commander, Foreign Army Corps.
Sources – Carr, Smith
[edit] Filibustering
Outside of his many engagements as a sailor during the 1850s, Ward would find employment, perhaps most satisfactorily, as a “Filibuster”. “Filibustering” is perhaps best described as “raising private mercenary armies and leading them into other countries to advance either [one's own] schemes or those of wealthy sponsors”. (Carr, 58). Ward would find employment with the infamous “King of the Filibusters”, William Walker, in Mexico, where he learned firsthand the actual practice of recruiting, training and commanding mercenary troops.
He would also learn a negative lesson from Walker, who had a reputation of being “excessively vain, weak minded and ambitious…his weakness renders him cruel…” (Carr 59). During Ward's later time in China, he would build upon his own already strong personal magnetism by showing both respect and personal concern for the Western and Chinese troops whom he referred to as “my people”. This, in addition to a certain mystique that he cultivated, cemented strong loyalty from his troops.
Ward would learn both “negative” and positive lesson during a “Filibusteresque” experience in 1854, when he served as a lieutenant with the French Army in the Crimean War. There, it is often stated that he learned much about weapons, tactics, use of riflemen in mobile platoons rather than fixed firing lines and siege techniques (Carr 65, Smith 28). It is also likely that he also learned the limited value of the frontal assault upon disciplined long range firepower, and gained valuable experience under fire. He would not serve out the entire war, however, being allowed to resign after showing insubordination to a superior officer.
Ward's next accurately recorded movements would show him in China in 1857, seeking engagement as a mercenary, but settling for serving as the first mate on a coastal steamship (dangerous work in those waters). After that, it is known that in 1859 he found himself working in an office for his father, in New York City, as a shipping agent, alongside his brother.
At the end of the 1850s, Ward was in many respects like his near-contemporary, U.S. Grant, who would also go on to become a famed military commander. Both were former soldiers with uncertain prospects, dispiritedly working in offices for their fathers, with their brothers. It is almost certain neither know of the others existence at the time. However, while U.S. Grant has stated that he never anticipated the fate that awaited him in the Civil War, Ward was actively saving funds, and planning for another chance at military glory, this time on behalf of Imperial China.
[edit] Shanghai newcomer
According to a contemporary account written in early 1862, Ward and his brother arrived in Shanghai, China in 1860 for the purpose of trading, perhaps as an extension of their father's New York office. This may be true, but given Ward's activities in the 1850s it is almost certain that Ward had ulterior motives for his return. We can be sure he had little respect for the Shanghai business practices, which he dismissed as “lying, swindling and smuggling”. (Carr, 97). Their arrival coincided with a buildup of the forces of the Taiping Rebellion in the area.
While Ward's brother set up a trading business in Shanghai, Ward himself took up customary employment as the executive officer on the “Confucius”; an armed riverboat commanded by an American, employed by the “Shanghai Pirate Suppression Bureau”. The Bureau was organized by Hsüeh Huan and Wu Hsu, Shanghai governmental officials who took pains to shield explicit imperial association with Western mercenaries and military, and primarily funded by Yang Fang, a prominent Ning Po banker and mercantilist.
Ward's show of bravery and initiative onboard the “Confucius” reflected great credit upon him, and the prominent men of Shanghai took notice. His exploits, previous military experience, ability to rise above racism and empathize with local populations, and his stated mercenary intentions, made him an attractive candidate to lead a force of Foreign Nationals in defense of Shanghai against encroaching Taiping forces.
Wu Hsu and Yang Fang both increasingly recognized that such a force was necessary, as Imperial forces, frequently staffed by Confucian scholars and conscripts, rather than experienced commanders and soldiers, had all too often proven unequal to the task of defeating Taiping forces.
Through their contacts with the Western business community, and Ward's own relentless self promotion, in the spring of 1860 Hsu and Fang reached out to Ward and became his employers. Ward then began scouring the wharves of Shanghai for every Westerner, sober or otherwise, capable of firing a weapon. With this, the “Shanghai Foreign Arms Corps” was born, which in defeat, would form the nucleus for the “Ever Victorious Army”.
[edit] Shanghai Foreign Arms Corps
It may be surprising to modern American and Chinese readers to learn that in 1860, both Chinese and Westerners would place more faith in a small, motley group of mercenaries than readily available local citizenry, but one must realize that the average Chinese of the time had little understanding of marksmanship, nor much impetus to defend the Manchu throne. Further, with Taiping armies edging closer to Shanghai, there was no time to train native peasants in either conventional Chinese or Western warfare.
On the Shanghai docks, however, Westerners with diverse military experience existed as “discharged seamen, deserters, and other drifters who made Shanghai their temporary home, and even the gainfully employed could be tempted by the prospect of adventure, high pay, and loot.” (MacGowan, 103)
This weapon, already forged, was used by Ward against the Taipings, with the backing of local Shanghai ministers and merchants, in a highly charged political atmosphere in which the Manchu Imperial forces had no desire to show their reliance upon Western powers. By the same token, the diplomats and military men of the Western powers discouraged foreign involvement in domestic Chinese matters, even by Westerners in Chinese employ. The Western powers’ concerns did not relate to principle – they were most concerned about the power of the Taipings to block trade downriver from the interior to Shanghai if neutrality were violated.
By June 1860, Ward's had a polyglot force of 100 Westerners, trained in the best small arms (including Colt revolvers) and rifles available for purchase in Shanghai. Protesting that his forces were not fully trained, Ward was forced by his Shanghai backers to take his men into action alongside Imperial forces probing Taiping advances, retaking two captured towns. They were then forced by circumstances (and the urging of their Shanghai backers) to assault the Taiping occupied and fortified city of Sung-Chiang, without artillery – a near-impossible task.
The attack failed, sending the thoroughly defeated force back to Shanghai. However, by mid-July, Ward had recruited additional Westerners and over 80 Filipino "Manilamen", and purchased several artillery pieces, and once again, his forces assaulted Sung-Chiang. They were successful, but at enormous cost. Out of a force of roughly 250 men, 62 were killed, and 100 were wounded, including Ward himself.
Ward and his forces now gained a notoriety that attracted new recruits (for the pay was attractive, even if looting was discouraged by Ward), and enraged local Westerners who saw Ward as an inflammatory, filibustering element sure to force the Taipings to stop the flow of trade. More disconcertingly, the Taipings themselves were now aware of a new and potent force against them.
On August 2, 1860, Ward led the Foreign Arms Corps against Ch’ing-p’u, another fortified Taiping town on the approaches to Shanghai, and this time the Taiping were prepared. As the Corps stormed a garrison wall, Taiping forces lying in ambush waited for the optimum moment and then delivered a withering barrage of close-range musket fire. Within 10 minutes, the Foreign Arms Corps had suffered 50% casualties, and Ward himself was shot in the left jaw, with an exit wound in the right cheek, scarring him for life and leaving him with a speech impediment.
The force retreated and Ward returned to Shanghai for medical treatment and to attempt to recruit more forces and buy additional artillery. Within several days he and the remnants of the Foreign Arms Corps laid siege to Ch’ing-p’u and bombarded it with artillery. By this time, the Taiping's best military leader, the Chung Wang, “The Faithful King”, dispatched 20,000 troops downriver to break the siege, sending the Foreign Arms Corps fleeing back to the Sung-Chiang area, where Ward's second-in-command, Burgevine, held the Corps briefly together, but it soon” ceased to function as an organized entity” (Smith, 34)
Ward returned to Shanghai for further treatment of his injury, and was there while the Chung Wang's forces laid siege, and were beaten back by Western and Imperial forces within the City. Ward left Shanghai (apparently secretly) in late 1860 for further treatment of his facial wound, while the remnants of the Corps remained more or less under the command of Burgevine.
It is unclear as to whether Yang was still funding the Corps in the late fall of 1860, but upon Ward's return in spring 1861, Ward was able to attract desired elements of the Corps back to his employ. After his return, Ward tenaciously began to recruit and train replacements for the Foreign Arms Corps, offering terms attractive enough to cause desertion among the many British warships in port. Ward, facing arrest and numerous political difficulties arising from the Western governments’ desire to remain neutral, opted to become a Chinese subject, stymieing efforts by the British navy and other Western forces to stop him.
In May 1861, Ward once again led the Foreign Arms Corps into battle at Chi’ng-p’u, and once again, the assault failed, with heavy casualties. This was the last major engagement of the Foreign Arms Corps in its “primarily Western” configuration.
Judgments as to the effectiveness of the Foreign Army Corps vary depending upon the sympathies of the author. The most recent Ward biographer, Caleb Carr, seems fairly generous in his estimation of Ward's accomplishments in his 1992 work. However, perhaps the most authoritative judgment was rendered by Richard J. Smith, who stated:
“Repeatedly sent into the field without adequate preparation by Ward's frantic sponsors, the poorly trained and ill-disciplined contingent stood virtually no chance of success against [the Chung Wang,] Li Hsiu-ch'eng's seasoned troops. Sometimes drunk and always disorderly, the Foreign-Arms Corps depended primarily on the element of surprise and the superiority of Western weapons to obtain victory.” (Smith 33)
Ward clearly recognized the harsh truth of this statement. He soon embarked upon a new vision, in which he would reform the more reliable elements of the Corps into the nucleus of an effective fighting force, comprised primarily of local Chinese.
[edit] Commander of the Ever Victorious Army
Credit for the concept of training Chinese in Western military tactics and arming them with the best available weaponry is sometimes given to Ward, other times to Li Heng-sung, a local Imperial commander “ordered to cooperate with—and keep an eye on—Ward's unruly contingent” and other times to Burgevine, who according to some began the training while Ward was recuperating, having been inspired by the sight of a Chinese gun crew acting under French direction. (Smith, 37)
Perhaps another factor in the reconsideration of local Chinese troops was the changing mood of the local peasantry. Where before they had been unwilling to fight for Manchu primacy, they were now constantly threatened and in some cases occupied by Taiping forces that were, despite their “heavenly” origin, ruthless in their treatment of local populations. Indeed, in many cases informal militias were formed to drive Taiping forces out, and conduct guerilla operations. (Spence, 307)
Regardless of the concept's true origin, Ward became its champion and after his untimely death, no other commander could quite repeat his success. Ward's decision to turn to local Chinese forces would ensure his place in history, and help to end the Taiping rebellion.
By the summer of 1861, a training camp was established by Xue Huan's “right hand man” Wu Xu at Songjiang, where Ward set up operations. Working with the best of the survivors of the Foreign Arms Corp, and supported by a strong Headquarters staff, Ward trained an increasing number (see below) of Chinese in western small arms, gunnery, tactics, customs and drill and ceremonies. Particular care was taken to train the Chinese to hold their fire until their targets were within effective range. Chinese troops, both Taiping and Imperial, “had a lingering faith…in the intimidating power of noise”. (Carr, 165).
He even trained them to respond to western bugle calls and verbal commands, and most strikingly, outfitted them in Western-style utility uniforms, color-coded for branch of arms (Infantry or Artillery), with Indian “Sepoy” style turbans. This garb, at first distressing to the Chinese troops, earned them the nickname “Imitation Foreign Devils” among the local populace, as well as a fair share of mockery. In time, as the troops proved themselves the equal of their European counterparts, both on the parade ground and the battlefield, their distinct uniforms would become a point of pride.
Another point of pride was their pay, which was both high and consistent by Chinese standards – a strong recruiting driver that trumped most discomfort over unfamiliar uniforms. The pay was high in part to attract new recruits to dangerous work, but also to compensate for the lack of “looting” opportunity. Ward strongly discouraged looting, as he knew the practice turned local populaces against their “liberators”. Other benefits offered to Ward's men included better rations, billets, and of course, better chance of survival in combat.
By January 1862, with about one thousand Chinese soldiers trained and ready, Ward stated that his unit was ready for the field – much to the relief of his Shanghai backers, particularly Hsu and Yang, who had significantly invested both government and private funds into the force's recruitment, arms and supplies. This was timely, as within the same month, the Chung Wang's forces reentered that region with over 120,000 troops, in an attempt to first cut off, and then enter and occupy Shanghai.
Ward, ever hungry for glory and no doubt seeking redress for his facial injury, welcomed the conflict, and was absolutely confident in his troops' ability to defend his Sung-Chiang headquarters, while simultaneously operating as “flying columns” to be directed to strategic areas and Taiping vulnerabilities. He soon had several opportunities to test this confidence.
In the middle of January, about 10 miles north of Shanghai in Wu-Sung, and over 25 snow-covered miles from their own headquarters, Ward lead his new army into action, under a banner carrying a Chinese rendering of his own name reading “HUA” (Hw-ahh”). His forces drove the Taipings from their entrenched positions, despite greater rebel numbers. A week later, after a return march, Ward's forces struck at the city of Kuang-fu-lin, occupied by over 20,000 Taiping troops, just five miles from Ward's own headquarters.
Ward, at the head of five hundred men, attacked the city without artillery support. The defenders, seeing the strange attire, military skill and foreign leadership of their own countrymen, wavered and “were filled with dismay and fled precipitately” (Carr, 181).
In February, again facing Taiping forces moving near his training area, Ward took five hundred troops and in joint operations with local Imperial commanders, drove the rebels from Ying-ch'i-peng, Ch'en-shan, T'ien-ma-shan, and other areas around Sung-chiang. (Smith, 40) In the course of these actions against superior numbers, thousands of Taiping were killed or wounded, while Ward himself suffered five wounds, including the loss of a finger to a musket ball. (Carr, 181)
The Chung Wang, enraged at this foreign irritant, had a force of 20,000 attack Sung-chiang, defended only by Ward's force of 1500 men (or less). Upon approach, rebel forces came under the fire of camouflaged artillery and lost over 2000 men. Immediately thereafter infantry struck out of the city at the rebels, and cut off and captured another 800, while capturing a large number of boats bearing Taiping supplies and arms.
The Taipings beat a hasty retreat, rather than lay siege to such a hornet's nest. It was this moment, perhaps, that secured Ward's reputation among all the peoples of the Shanghai area; Chinese, Western and Taiping alike. From this moment on, the key Western commanders and politicians would support him, funds for troops would flow relatively freely from Imperial coffers, and his decisions would no longer be second-guessed by his backers in Shanghai.
By March 1862, Ward's force would be officially named by the Qing government, and to history, as “The Ever Victorious Army”, and Ward himself would be made first a 4th-rank, and then a 3rd-rank mandarin, high honors indeed for a Barbarian from the Manchu court.
Through the course of 1862, “The Ever Victorious Army” would essentially live up to its name, again and again defeating numerically superior opponents, often in entrenched positions. Further, its presence on the battlefield and example of effective Chinese soldiering served as a “force multiplier” for Imperial Anhui units commanded by Li Heng-sung, between whom and Ward mutual respect grew during joint operations.
During the summer, Ward's “duckfoot” background found immediate application to the problems of land warfare. The Chung Wang's growing Taiping forces in the area, led to multiple threats at multiple points across the region. Clearly, mobility was needed for Ward's limited forces, but the road system was inadequate.
While another commander might have tried to solve the problem through additional wagons and horses, Ward saw the rivers and canals criss-crossing the region not as obstacles, but as passageways. He quickly secured the use of several river steamers, fitted them out as mobile artillery and troop transports, and increased his army's effectiveness several times over. The Chung Wang himself later “attributed his defeats in the Soochow area to Western steamers. Taiping land forces could contend with "foreign devils", he believed, but rebel water forces could not.” (Smith, 95).
Throughout this time, Ward's reputation continued to grow. Ward himself, outwardly caring little for public adulation, still sought to quench some inner need for further glory, and hoped to participate in an eventual strike against Nanking, the Taiping capital, but this would not be. The Manchu court, suspicious of Ward from the beginning, grew even more concerned that as time passed, he refused to shave his forehead, wear a queue or even appear in his fine Mandarin robes. These and other comments regarding his ambitions led the court to limit the size of his unit far beneath his potential to recruit for it, and to give Ward far less rein than they would have to a commander with more Confucian leanings.
By September, the Ever Victorious Army would number over 5,000 men, organized in four battalions as well as an artillery corps, with several riverboats used for transport and mobile artillery.
[edit] Ward's army - troop strength over time
- June 1860 100 Foreign mercenaries, (no artillery at this time)
- July 1860 250 Foreign mercenaries, artillery present from this date on
- August 1860 200+ Foreign mercenaries, severe casualties, perhaps 50% effective
- December 1860 Corps inactive (and unpaid?) while Ward absent
- May 1861 200+ Foreign mercenaries, severe casualties
- June 1861 50+ Foreign mercenaries, Chinese training camp established
- July 1861 150 Chinese + foreign officers
- October 1861 400 Chinese + foreign officers
- November 1861 Officially 430 Chinese + foreign officers, Spence states perhaps 3,000 more in actuality + armed riverboats & transports
- January 1862 1,000 Chinese + foreign officers
- May 1862 3,000 Chinese + foreign officers
- September 1862 5,000 Chinese + foreign & chinese officers
Sources – Carr, Smith, Spence
[edit] Death in battle
Ward would lose his life at the head of his force in an attack against the city of Tz’u-ch-i, (the Battle of Cixi) in a coordinated attack with Western (British and French) and Imperial forces. On September 21, at the base of the city wall, he fell, shot in the abdomen. For the first time in a career that included 15 battlefield wounds, he allowed himself to be taken from his men.
As he lay dying, Ward dictated a will to ensure his brother, sister and Chinese wife would be cared for after his death. On the morning of September 22, 1862, at the height of his fame, Ward died, leaving behind an unusual army forged by an even more unusual commander.
[edit] In modern memory
Just as in life, the events of the American Civil War would overshadow Ward's accomplishments, in death, the fame he deserved would be overshadowed by that of another man. After Ward's death the command of the Ever-Victorious army would pass to his second in command, Burgevine, but ultimately to Charles George Gordon, aka "Chinese Gordon", an officer of the British Army.
Gordon's biographers would frequently diminish, and occasionally completely disregard Ward's accomplishments in creating an effective Army for Gordon to command. Today, the name “Chinese Gordon” has much more lasting fame than that of Ward, in part due to Gordon's spectacularly dramatic death in Khartoum, many years after the Taiping Rebellion was quelled.
However, there have been several attempts by Ward's contemporaries and biographers to grant Ward the credit he so sought. Several books on Ward and the Ever Victorious Army have been published, in the century since his death, including the bestselling 1992 book, The Devil Soldier by renowned historian and novelist Caleb Carr. The book was immediately “optioned”, and for some time Tom Cruise and director John Woo worked to develop a movie, working from a script by Carr, but over time, the project simply lost steam.
It is speculated that had Ward not been in China or, if his untimely death prevented him from returning to the U.S., he could have become one of the United States' greatest military leaders during the Civil War. As it is, Western historians remembered him as one of China's greatest military heroes and many believe the salvation of Shanghai is owed to him.
[edit] Physical remains and monuments
Physical monuments to Ward are limited to the headstone of an unfilled grave in Salem, Massachusetts, and a historical collection dedicated to him by the Essex Institute in Salem, consigning knowledge of Ward himself to professors, students and amateur historians - a prospect that no doubt would have dismayed Ward.
At the time The Devil Soldier was published, Caleb Carr wrote that “Ward's remains were dug up, and his grave site and shrine were destroyed and paved over. The whereabouts of Ward's bones today are unknown. They have almost certainly been destroyed. A plain headstone over a cenotaph in Salem, is the only memorial to this most noteworthy of nineteenth-century American adventurers.” (Carr, 5) But Ward, in death as in life, would prove a hard man to keep down.
Visitors to Sung-Chiang today seeking knowledge of Ward from local authorities will be directed to a local Catholic Church. As one visitor wrote “The grave of Ward, a Protestant, revered as a Chinese Confucian hero, with a temple in his honour, now lies under the altar of a Roman Catholic church [built in 1982], whilst the land itself is the property of the local Buddhist monastery in a Communist state…Ward has not been forgotten in Sungkiang and local memory still has Ward's bones under the high altar of the Catholic church.” (Stevens)
In Nanjing, Ward would be pleased to know that in the Taiping Rebellion museum, his memory and accomplishments are acknowledged today. As one visitor discovered “To my surprise I saw, in a museum in Nanjing, a tribute to Ward—a large headstone bearing Ward's name, put in place by the American Legion on May 29, 1923.“ (Maher)
[edit] In fiction
Ward turns up in George MacDonald Fraser's fictional Flashman Papers (Flashman and the Dragon) as a Yangtse opium smuggler (apocryphal) and as the embryonic leader of the Ever Victorious Army.
[edit] Notes
[edit] Further reading
- Biography Yankee Adventurer By Holger Cahill (1930)
- Carr, Caleb Devil Soldier: The Story of Frederick Townsend Ward (1992)
- Macgowan, D. J. Memoirs of Generals Ward, Burgevine and the Ever-Conquering Legion.
- Smith, Richard J. Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China. (1978)
- Spence, Jonathan D. God's Chinese Son, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (2002)
- ---. To Change China: Western Advisers in China (1969)
