Frankfurt counterexamples
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 |
This article or section has multiple issues. Please help improve the article or discuss these issues on the talk page.
|
Frankfurt counterexamples (also known as Frankfurt cases or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the "principle of alternative possibilities" or PAP:
PAP: An agent is morally responsible for an action only if she has free will (i.e. she could have done otherwise).
PAP is significant because it forms part of an influential argument for the incompatibility of responsibility and causal determinism, as follows:
(1) PAP: An agent is responsible for an action only if she is free.
(2) An agent is free only if causal determinism is false.
(3) Therefore, an agent is responsible for an action only if causal determinism is false.
Traditionally, compatibilists (defenders of the compatibility of responsibility and determinism) had tried to reject premise 2, arguing that, properly understood, freedom is not incompatible with determinism. For instance, according to the conditional analysis of free will, an agent is free to do otherwise when she would have done otherwise if she wanted to do otherwise (Ayer 1954). Agents may possess free will, according to the conditional analysis, even if determinism is true.
Frankfurt’s examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend compatibilism, in particular, by rejecting premise 1 of the argument. On this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility doesn’t require the freedom to do otherwise.
Frankfurt’s cases involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behaviour even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise. Here is a typical case:
Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote Democratic. In fact, he will not vote Democratic only in one particular circumstance: if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms. White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to make sure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald’s head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms. White will activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq war prior to voting. As things happen, Donald doesn’t think about the Democrats' promise to ensure defeat in Iraq prior to voting, Ms. White thus sees no reason to activate his device, and Donald votes Democratic on his own accord. Apparently, Donald is responsible for voting Democratic despite the fact that, due to Ms. White’s device, Donald lacks freedom to do otherwise.
If Frankfurt is right in suggesting both that Donald is morally responsible for voting Democratic and that he is not free to do otherwise, then this suggests that moral responsibility, in general, doesn't require the freedom to do otherwise. (I.e. PAP is false.) Thus, even if causal determinism is true and even if determinism removes everyone's freedom to do otherwise, there is no reason to doubt that people may be morally responsible for their behaviour.
[edit] References
- Frankfurt, Harry (1969). “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66, 829-39.
- Ayer, A. J. (1954) “Freedom and Necessity in Philosophical Essays, London: Macmillan.
