Fouzi Khalid Abdullah Al Awda

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Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al-Odah

Born:	May 6, 1977(1977-05-06) Kuwait City, Kuwait
Detained at:	Guantanamo
ID number:	232
Conviction(s):	no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al-Odah is a Kuwaiti citizen who has been detained without charge in Guantanamo Bay since 2002.^[1]^[2] He is a plaintiff in the ongoing case, Al Odah v. United States, which challenges his detention, along with that of fellow detainees. The case is widely acknowledged to be one of the most significant to be heard by the Supreme Court in the current term.^[3] His Guantanamo detainee ID number is 232. The US Department of Defense reports that he was born on May 6, 1977, in Kuwait City, Kuwait.

1 Capture
2 Al Odah v. United States
3 Combatant Status Review Tribunal
- 3.1 Allegations
- 3.2 Testimony
4 Administrative Review Board hearing
- 4.1 The following primary factors favor continued detention:
- 4.2 The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
5 Meetings with attorneys
6 Media Editorials
7 Repatriation
8 References
9 External links

[edit] Capture

According to an interview Fawzi's father, Khalid al-Odah, gave to Amnesty International, Fawzi traveled in 2001 to the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area in order to do charitable outreach work,^[4] Following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, Fawzi fled Afghanistan, intending to return home to Kuwait. Fawzi successfully crossed the border into Pakistan but was then captured by Pakistani bounty hunters.

The bounty hunters handed Fawzi and eleven other Kuwaitis over to American authorities.^[4]^[5]^[6]^[7]^[8] The Kuwaitis were then transported to Cuba.

[edit] Al Odah v. United States

Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Al-Odah v. USA reply 6-22-07

Al Odah v. United States is a writ of habeas corpus petition on behalf of Guantanamo detainees. This consolidated case currently represents four plaintiffs: Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad Al Odah, Fayiz Mohammed, Ahmed Al Kandari, Khalid Abdullah Mishal Al Mutairi, and Fouad Mahmoud Al Rabiah. Al Odah v. United States was originally filed April 2002 on behalf of twelve imprisoned Kuwaitis, including Al Odah, seeking the right of habeas corpus. The case was dismissed in May 2002 following a government motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition.^[9]

On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on a related Guantanamo case, Rasul v. Bush, affirming the right of Guantanamo detainees to challenge their imprisonment in the U.S. federal court system. Under this ruling, detainees such as those represented in Al Odah would be able to file habeas corpus petitions in U.S. courts.

The consolidated cases of Al Odah v. United States and Boumediene v. Bush are scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court on December 5, 2007.^[10]

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[11]^[12] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[13]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that the protections of the Geneva Conventions do not apply to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.^{[citation needed]}

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

An officer working on Al Odah’s case reported that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals were often pressured into delivering verdicts favorable to the government, according to an affidavit filed in June 2007.^[14] Lt. Col. Stephen Abraham worked as a liaison between the CSRT’s and intelligence services, and stated that intelligence services regularly and arbitrarily denied both the defense and prosecution access to case-related information.^[15]

Al-Odah chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[1] He gave a detailed, point by point reply to the unclassified allegations against him. There were also some accusations his interrogators kept contronting him with, which were not included in the unclassified allegations, that he chose to address.

[edit] Allegations

The allegations Al-Odah faced during his Tribunal were:^[1]

a. Detainee is associated with Al-Qaida and the Taliban.

In August or early September 2001, Detainee admits traveling through Afghanistan with Taliban members.
Detainee admits firing an AK-47 at a training camp near Kandahar.
Detainee admitted staying at a guesthouse with fighters armed with AK-47 rifles.

b. Detainee engaged in hostilities against the US or its coalition partners.

The detainee admits carrying and AK-47 through the Tora Bora mountains for ten to eleven days during the U.S. air campaign in that region.
Detainee was captured with five other men by Pakistani border guards.

[edit] Testimony

Al-Odah said:

The reason for his trip was charity and religious education. His grandmother was dying of cancer. And she had asked him to seek out deserving people in need. His degree and his day job was Koran education He decided to go to Afghanistan to distribute his grandmother's gift. And he planned to pay visits to schools -- and training camps while there. He admitted having a Taliban escort -- necessary because the Taliban, as de-facto government, were run by the Taliban. He pointed out that representatives of the ICRC also required Taliban escorts.
He spent approximately six hours at a training camp, for 12 to 14 year old boys. He spent part of that time giving his lecture. He acknowledged being taken to the camp's rifle range, and firing a few rounds, which he argued fell short of any suggestion of military training. He said it was the only time he fired a rifle in his entire life.
He acknowledged being the guest of a hospitable resident of Jalalabad. His host did, intermittently, have two other guests. These guests carried rifles, just as all adult males carried rifles in this lawless country. He said he never talked with them and has no idea if they were members of the Taliban.

He acknowledged carrying a rifle as he tried to make his way to the Pakistan border. Travel was very unsafe. He was asked what he would have done if he had encountered American soldiers. He replied he would have immediately and gratefully surrendered.
He denied travelling with other men. He said he travelled alone, speaking as little as possible, as his accent would have betrayed that he was an Arab, not an Afghani. He denied being captured. He said he surrenedered himself when he got to the border, and reguested access to the Kuwaiti Consulate.

Al Odah said his interrogators kept accusing him of making ties to terrorist organizations during his trips to the United States. He acknowledged travelling to the United States many times, first, as a child, when his father, an officer in the Kuwaiti Air Force was serving as a liaison, and later as an adult. But he denied the accusation that those trips had anything to do with terrorism, or that he had ever had any association with terrorism.

The Tribunal's determination was that Al Odah had correctly been classified as an "enemy combatant".

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[16]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

The factors for and against continuing to detain Fouzi Khalid Abdullah Al Awda were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3, 2006.^[17]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee traveled to Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Karachi, Pakistan; Quetta, Pakistan; then drove across the Afghanistan border to Buldak.
In August or early September 2001, detainee admits traveling through Afghanistan with Taliban members.
The detainee had approximately 4000 United States dollars, 4000 Saudi Riyals and 400 Deutschmarks when he departed for Afghanistan.
On November 18,2001, the detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities attempting to leave Afghanistan through the Tora Bora Mountains. The detainee was armed with an AK-47 at the time of his capture.
The detainee speculated that the group of men he traveled with through Tora Bora to the Pakistani border may have included members of al Qaida and the Taliban.

b. Training

The detainee first went to a camp in Buldak, Afghanistan where the Iman introduced him to a Taliban government representative.
Detainee admits firing an AK-47 at a training camp near Kandahar.

c. Connection/Associations

The detainee's name was recovered from computer file ^[sic] which lists contact points and telephone numbers for al Qaida Mujahadeen in Pakistan.
The detainee's name was found on a computer used by suspected al Qaida members containing a list of associates incarcerated in Pakistan.
The detainee's name and telephone number were on a list of captured mujahidin that was discovered on a computer hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
The detainee admitted receiving assistance from the Taliban in locating places to teach.

d. Intent

Detainee admitted staying at a guesthouse with fighters armed with AK-47 rifles.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee denies attending any training camps and stated he never fought or knew anyone belonging to al Qaida.
b.	The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interest.
c.	The detainee stated he was not a soldier and has had no formal military training. He stated he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
d.	The detainee indicated he has never met Usama Bin Laden and has never fought against coalition forces. He would like to return to Kuwait and attempt to obtain a teaching position, get married and have a family.
e.	The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to fight the jihad, as he stated there were Muslims on both sides of the fight and he could not kill Muslims. He could not kill anyone, as he was a "chicken."

[edit] Meetings with attorneys

On September 28, 2005, the Associated Press reported on a meeting between attorneys Thomas Wilner and Kristine Huskey and their Kuwaiti clients.^[18] According to Wilner and Huskey, al-Odah and four of his compatriots, were on a hunger strike and had lost a dangerous amount of weight. They reported that al-Odah had been force-fed and could barely sit up.

Human Rights critics argue that the detainees retain the right to give or withhold consent to all medical procedures.

According to Fawzi's lawyer, Thomas Wilner, Fawzi wanted Wilner to file a legal request ordering the removal of his feeding tube. Wilner did file such a request because Fawzi's family was "frantic" and opposed the motion.

Wilner said that at the time, Fawzi looked "like a skeleton".

Al-Odah told his lawyers that camp authorities had warned the hunger strikers that they would start strapping them in "restraint chairs" during their force-feedings.^[19]

In an interview in Marie Claire magazine Huskey described her surprise that when she first met with Guantanamo clients, like al-Odah, they preferred food brought from Guantanamo fast food outlets to the Arabic delicacies she and her colleagues had brought from the Continental US.^[20] She reported that Al-Odah's favorite was MacDonald's French Fries and ice cream.

[edit] Media Editorials

Fawzi Al-Odah's father, Khalid al-Odah, wrote an Op-Ed in the Washington Post, on September 2, 2006, entitled: "Put My Son on Trial -- or Free Him".^[21] In the article Khalid argues that "hundreds of innocent men sit in prison", who could have been freed, if American authorities had granted them the protections of the rule of law and granted them a fair trial in a traditional court of law.

Al Odah's father stated that Fawzi had always been an admirer of the American system.^[21]

The Washington Post identifies Khalid Al-Odah as the founder of the Kuwaiti Family Committee.^[21] It states:

"The writer founded the Kuwaiti Family Committee four years ago to secure the legal rights of foreign nationals imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay."

The New York Times editorial board has spoken out in favor of the plaintiffs in the Al Odah v. United States case, calling it "the Supreme Court showdown of the year".“Civil liberties groups — and this Editorial Board", write the editors, "believe it is important for the Supreme Court to make clear that the detainees have a constitutional right to have a judge determine whether they are being properly held.”^[22].

[edit] Repatriation

On May 12, 2007, the Kuwait Times reported that Kuwait and the USA concluded negotiations regarding the repatriation of the remaining Kuwaiti captives.^[23]