Fourth generation warfare

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Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is combat characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, peace and conflict, battlefield and safety. The military doctrine was first defined in 1989 by a team of American analysts, including William S. Lind, used to describe warfare's return to a decentralized form. In terms of generational modern warfare, the fourth generation signifies the nation states' loss of their monopoly on combat forces, returning in a sense to the uncontrolled combat of pre-modern times. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network. While this term is similar to terrorism and asymmetric warfare, it is much narrower. Classical examples, such as the slave uprising under Spartacus or the assassination of Julius Caesar by the Roman senate, predate the modern concept of warfare and are examples of the type of combat modern warfare sought to eliminate. As such, fourth generation warfare uses classical tactics—tactics deemed unacceptable by the preceding generations—to weaken the advantaged opponent's will to win.

Contents

[edit] Elements

Fourth Generation Warfare is defined as conflicts which involve the following elements:

  • Complex and long term
  • Terrorism
  • A non-national or transnational base
  • A direct attack on the enemy's culture
  • Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
  • All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
  • Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
  • Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

[edit] History

The concept was first described by the authors William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR) in a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation”.

The generations of warfare described by these authors are:

  • 3rd Generation: tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them; and defense in depth.

The use of fourth generation warfare can be traced to the post-World War II Cold War period, as superpowers and major powers attempted to retain their grip on colonies and captured territories. Unable to withstand direct combat against bombers, tanks, and machine guns, non-state entities used tactics of secrecy, terror, and confusion to overcome the technological gap. Mao's concept of the People's war and Ho Chi Minh's conduct in the Indochina Wars are contemporary examples of 4GW.

Fourth Generation warfare has often involved an insurgent group or non-state entity trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the current ruling power. However, a fourth generation war is most successful when the non-state entity does not attempt, at least in the short term, to impose its own rule, but tries simply to disorganize and delegitimize the state in which the warfare takes place. The aim is to force the state adversary to expend manpower and money in an attempt to establish order, ideally in such a highhanded way that it merely increases disorder, until the state surrenders or withdraws. Fourth generation war could be said to be the ultimate strategy of scorched earth, leaving nothing for the occupier to occupy. Speaking figuratively, the non-state adversary, not being able to expel the invader from his home, tries to bring it down on both their heads, leaving the invader no choice but to leave the ruins alone.

Fourth Generation Warfare is often seen in conflicts involving failed states and civil wars, particularly in conflicts involving non-state actors, intractable ethnic or religious issues, or gross conventional military disparities. Many of these conflicts occur in the geographic area described by author Thomas Barnett as the Non-Integrating Gap, fought by countries from the globalised Functioning Core.

[edit] Characteristics of 4th Generation War

Fourth Generation War is normally characterized by a “stateless” entity fighting a state. Fighting can be physically such as Hezbollah or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) to use two modern examples. In this realm the 4GW entity uses all three levels of Fourth Generation War. These are the physical (actual combat; it is considered the least important), mental (the will to fight, belief in victory, etc) and moral (the most important, this includes cultural norms, etc) levels. Fighting can also be without the physical level of war. This is via non-violent means. Examples of this could be Gandhi’s opposition to the British Empire or by Martin Luther King’s marches. Both desired their factions to deescalate the conflict while the state escalates against them, the objective being to target the opponent on the moral and mental levels rather than the physical level. The state is then seen as a bully and loses support.

Another characteristic of 4GW is that as with 3rd Generation War the 4GW combatant’s forces are decentralized. With 4GW there may even be no one combatant and that smaller groups organize into impromptu alliances to target a bigger threat (that being the state armed forces or another faction). As a result these alliances are weak and if the state’s military leadership is smart enough they can split their enemy and cause them to fight amongst themselves.

Fourth Generation Warfare Goals:[1]

  • Survival
  • To convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit[2]

Yet another factor is that centers of gravity have changed. These centers of gravity may revolve around nationalism, family or clan honor, proving one’s manhood or a belief that one is ordered to fight perceived enemies of one’s religion. Disaggregated forces, such as guerillas, terrorists and rioters, lacking a center of gravity, deny to their enemies a focal point at which to deliver a conflict ending blow.[3] As a result strategy becomes more problematic while combating a 4GW entity.

It has been theorized that a state vs. state conflict in the 4GW realm would involve the use of computer hackers and law fare to obtain the weaker side’s objectives. The logic being that the civilians of the stronger state would lose the will to fight as a result of seeing their state engage in alleged atrocities and having their own bank accounts harmed.

[edit] Coping with 4GW

 This article or section may contain original research or unverified claims.
Please improve the article by adding references. See the talk page for details. (October 2007)

There are few examples of the state being effective in a 4GW conflict. The only major example is that of the British Army in Northern Ireland after the events of Bloody Sunday. A notable theorist of 4GW by the name of William Lind believes that the reason for the British being successful in that conflict was that the British Army did not use heavy weapons in that period and that the British Government forces attempted to get to know the areas involved in the conflict. Also according to Lind the British did not engage in collective punishment and desired to keep civilian casualties to a minimum. In other words they won over the population by reducing the risk of damage to civilians and their property and by getting to know the local area.

Another highly successful example is the Indian Army in Jammu & Kashmir state of India. The Indian Armed forces doctrine of using minimum force, "Iron fist in a velvet glove", non use of heavy weapons or offensive air power and minimizing human rights violations has been successful in this war. Another factor is the capability of Indian state to keep large number of forces on the ground and sustain them over a long period of time due to adequate availability of manpower resources.

[edit] Examples

[edit] Criticism

Writer Antulio J. Echevarria II in an article Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths argues what is being called fourth generation warfare are simply insurgencies. He also claims that 4GW was "reinvented" by Lind to create the appearance of having predicted the future. Echevarria writes: “the generational model is an ineffective way to depict changes in warfare. Simple displacement rarely takes place, significant developments typically occur in parallel."

[edit] See also

General

[edit] References

  1. ^ Beyond Fourth Generation Warfare, Dr. George Friedman, Stratfor Forecasting, p. 1, July 17, 2007
  2. ^ Colonel Thomas X Hammes, 'Four Generations of Warfare' in The Sling and the Stone, On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul, MN, 2006, p 293.
  3. ^ Beyond Fourth Generation Warfare, Dr. George Friedman, Stratfor Forecasting, p. 1, July 17, 2007

[edit] External links

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