Fourth generation jet fighter
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Aircraft classified as fourth generation jet fighters are those in service approximately from 1980–2010, representing the design concepts of the 1970s. Fourth generation designs are heavily influenced by lessons learned from the previous generation of combat aircraft. Representative fighters include the "teen" series of American fighters (F-14, F-15, F-16, and F/A-18) and the Soviet MiG-29 and Su-27. The growing costs and the demonstrated success of multi-role aircraft such as the F-4 Phantom II gave rise to the popularity of multi-role fighters. Long-range air-to-air missiles, originally thought to make dogfighting obsolete, proved less influential than expected; designers responded with a renewed emphasis on maneuverability.
The rapid advance of microcomputers in the 1980s and 1990s permitted rapid upgrades to the avionics over the lifetimes of these fighters, incorporating system upgrades such as AESA, digital avionics buses, and IRST. Because of the drastic enhancement of capabilities in these upgraded fighters and in new designs of the 1990s that reflected these new capabilities, the designation 4.5th generation is sometimes used to refer to these later designs. It is intended to reflect a class of fighters that are evolutionary upgrades of the 4th generation to incorporate integrated avionics suite, advanced weapons, and elements of stealth technology (but not true stealth).[1][2]
A prime example of this generation is the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, a growth version of the 1970s Hornet design. While the basic aerodynamic features are largely the same, the Super Hornet features improved avionics in the form of an all-glass cockpit, a solid-state AESA active phased array radar, new engines, the structural use of composite materials to reduce weight, a slightly modified shape to minimize its radar signature, and IRST.
Contents |
[edit] Examples of fourth generation aircraft
[edit] Aircraft that entered service
- France: Dassault Mirage 2000 (NATO)
- Russia
- People's Republic of China:
- United States: (NATO)
[edit] Cancelled aircraft
- Argentina: FMA SAIA 90
- Brazil: Embraer MFT-LF
- People's Republic of China: Chengdu J-9
- Israel: IAI Lavi
- France: Dassault Mirage 4000
- Poland: PZL-230 Skorpion
- Romania: IAR 95
- South Africa: Atlas CAVA
- Switzerland: ALR Piranha
- Yugoslavia: Novi Avion
- United States: (NATO)
- Russia: Yak-141
[edit] "Fourth and half" generation
[edit] Aircraft that entered service
- United Kingdom / Germany / Italy / Spain)
- France:
- Russia
- Sukhoi Su-34
- MiG-29ME
- Mikoyan MiG-35
- Sukhoi Su-30/33/35/37 (Su-27 Derivatives)[3]
- Sukhoi Su-30MKK/MK2/MK3[3]
- Sweden
- Republic of China
- India
- United States
- F-15E/K/SG[6]
- F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
- F-16 Block 50/52 and later models
- Japan
[edit] Cancelled aircraft
- United States
- F-16XL (cancelled)
[edit] Fifth generation aircraft
[edit] In Service
- United States
- Lockheed Martin / Boeing F-22 Raptor (maiden flight achieved 1997)
[edit] In Production
- United States / United Kingdom
- Lockheed Martin / Northrop Grumman / BAE F-35 Lightning II / JCA (low rate production 2008)
[edit] In Development
- India
- Medium Combat Aircraft (maiden flight expected 2012)
- People's Republic of China
- Russia
- Sukhoi PAK FA (T-50) (maiden flight expected 2009)[7][8]
- Russia / India
- South Korea
[edit] Technology Demonstrators
- Japan
- Mitsubishi ATD-X (maiden flight expected 2014)
- Russia
- Sukhoi Su-47 Berkut (maiden flight achieved 1997)
- Mikoyan Project 1.44 'Flatpack' (maiden flight achieved 2000)
- United States
- Lockheed Martin YF-22 Lightning II (maiden flight achieved 1990)
- Northrop YF-23 Black Widow II (maiden flight achieved 1990)
- Boeing Bird of Prey (maiden flight achieved 1996)
- McDonnell Douglas X-36 (maiden flight achieved 1997)
- Lockheed Martin X-35 (maiden flight achieved 2000)
- Boeing X-32 JSF (maiden flight for X-32A was archived 2000, X-32B STOVL version maiden flight 2001)
[edit] Design considerations
[edit] Performance
Performance has traditionally been one of the most important design characteristics, as it enables a fighter to gain a favourable position to use its weapons while rendering the enemy unable to use theirs. This can occur at long range (beyond visual range or BVR) or short range (within visual range or WVR). At short range, the ideal position is to the rear of the enemy aircraft, where it is unable to aim or fire weapons and the hot exhaust makes a good target for IR-guided missiles. At long range, while optimal positions are not so clear, it is nonetheless an advantage to intercept enemy aircraft before they reach their targets.
These two scenarios have competing demands — interception requires excellent linear speed, while WVR engagements require excellent turn rate and acceleration. Prior to the 1970s, a popular view in the defence community was that missiles would render WVR combat obsolete and hence maneuverability useless. Combat experience proved this untrue due to the poor quality of missiles and the recurring need to identify targets visually. Though improvements in missile technology may make that vision a reality, experience has indicated that sensors are not foolproof and that fighters will still need to be able to fight and maneuver at close ranges. So whereas the premier third-generation jet fighters (e.g., the F-4 and MiG-23) were designed as interceptors with a secondary emphasis on maneuverability, interceptors have been relegated to a secondary role in the fourth generation, with a renewed emphasis on maneuverability.
There are two primary contributing factors to maneuverability — the amount of power delivered by the engines, and the ability of the aircraft's control surfaces to translate that power into changes in direction. Air combat maneuvering (ACM) involves a great deal of energy management, where energy is roughly the sum of altitude and airspeed. The greater energy a fighter has, the more flexibility it has to move where it wants. An aircraft with little energy is immobile, and a defenceless target. Note that power does not necessarily equal speed; while more power gives greater acceleration, the maximum speed of an aircraft is determined by how much drag it produces. Herein lies the trade-off. Low-drag configurations have small, stubby, highly swept wings that disrupt the airflow as little as possible. However, that also means they have greatly reduced ability to alter the airflow to maneuver the aircraft.
There are two rough indicators of these factors. A plane's turning ability can be roughly measured by its wing loading, defined as the mass of the aircraft divided by the area of its lifting surfaces. A highly loaded wing has little capacity to produce additional lift, and so has limited turning ability, whereas a lightly loaded wing has much greater potential lifting power. A rough measure of acceleration is a plane's thrust-to-weight ratio.
[edit] Thrust vectoring
Thrust vectoring is a new technology being introduced to further enhance a fighter's turning ability. By redirecting the jet exhaust, it is possible to directly translate the engine's power into directional changes, more efficiently than via the plane's control surfaces. The technology has been fitted to the Mikoyan MiG-35, Sukhoi Su-30MKI and later derivatives, and F-22 Raptor. The U.S. explored fitting the technology to the F-16 and the F-15, but only introduced it on the F-22 Raptor.
[edit] Supercruise
Supercruise is the ability of aircraft to cruise efficiently at supersonic speeds without the afterburner. Because of parasitic drag effects, fighters carrying external weapons stores encounter excessive drag near the speed of sound, making it impossible or prohibitively fuel-consuming to break the sound barrier. Though fighters easily break Mach 1 and 2 in clean configurations on afterburner, and the English Electric Lightning was able to break Mach 1 without the use of afterburner, these were academic exercises as they were not carrying combat loads.
With improvements to engine power output and careful aeronautical design of weapons stores, it is now possible for fighters to supercruise with combat loads. The F-22 can supercruise over 1.5 Mach.[11] According to the German Luftwaffe the Typhoon can cruise at about Mach 1.2 without afterburner.[12]The manufacturer claims on their Austrian publicity website that the maximum speed possible without reheat is Mach 1.5. [13][14] Rafale's supercruise capabilities have been described as marginal with the current engine (the aircraft failed to demonstrate the capability during the Singapore evaluation). A EF T1 DA (Development Aircraft trainer version) demonstrate Supercuise(1,21M) with 2 SRAAM, 4 MRAAM and drop tank (plus one tonne flight test equiment, plus 700kg more weight for the trainer version) during the Singapore evaluation. [15]
[edit] Avionics
Avionics is a catch-all phrase for the electronic systems aboard an aircraft, which have been growing in complexity and importance. The main elements of an aircraft's avionics are its sensors (Radar and IR sensors), computers and data bus, and user interface. Because they can be readily swapped out as new technologies become available, they are often upgraded over the lifetime of an aircraft. Details about these systems are highly protected. Since many export aircraft have downgraded avionics, many buyers substitute domestically developed avionics, (sometimes considered superior to the original). For example, the Sukhoi Su-30MKI sold to India, the F-15I and F-16I sold to Israel, and the F-15K sold to South Korea.
The primary sensor for all modern fighters is radar. The U.S. pioneered the use of solid-state AESA radars,[citation needed] which have no moving parts and are capable of projecting a much tighter beam and quicker scans. It is fitted to F-15C, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and the block 60 (export) F-16, and will be used for future American fighters. A European coalition GTDAR is developing an AESA radar for use on the Typhoon and Rafale, Russia has an AESA radar on MIG-35 and the newest SU-27 versions. For the next generation F-22 and F-35, the U.S. will utilize Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) capacity. This will spread the energy of a radar pulse over several frequencies, so as not to trip the radar warning receivers that all aircraft carry.
In reaction to the increasing American emphasis on radar-evading stealth designs, the Soviet Union turned to alternate sensors. This drove them to emphasize infra-red search and track (IRST) sensors, first introduced on the American F-101 Voodoo and F-102 Delta Dagger fighters in the 1960s, for detection and tracking of airborne targets. These are essentially a TV camera in the IR wavelength, passively measuring the emitted IR radiation from targets. However, as a passive sensor it has limited range, and contains no inherent data about position and direction of targets - these must be inferred from the images captured. To offset this, IRST systems can incorporate laser range-finders in order to provide full fire-control solutions for cannon fire or launching missiles. German Mig-29 using helmet-displayed IRST systems were able to acquire a missile lock with greater efficiency than USAF F-16 in wargame exercises. IRST sensors have now become standard on Russian aircraft. With the exception of the F-14D (officially retired as of September 2006), no 4th generation Western fighters carry built-in IRST sensors for air-to-air detection, though the similar FLIR is often used to acquire ground targets. The next-generation Eurofighter Typhoon (beginning with Tranche 1 Block 5 aircraft,[16] while previously build aircraft are being retrofited since spring 2007[17]), F-22 and F-35 will all have built-in IRST sensors. Beginning in 2012 the Super Hornet will also have an IRST.[18]
The tactical implications of the computing and data bus capabilities of aircraft are hard to determine. A more sophisticated computer bus would allow more flexible uses of the existing avionics. For example, it is speculated that the F-22 is able to jam or damage enemy electronics with a focused application of its radar. A computing feature of significant tactical importance is the datalink. All of the modern European and American aircraft are capable of sharing targeting data with allied fighters and from AWACS planes (see JTIDS). The Russian MiG-31 interceptor also has some datalink capability, so it is reasonable to assume that other Russian planes can also do so. The sharing of targeting and sensor data allows pilots to put radiating, highly visible sensors further from enemy forces, while using that data to vector silent fighters toward the enemy.
[edit] Cost
The per unit cost is difficult to accurately determine, as the amortization of a large development cost over a varying number of units produced can greatly vary the price. Moreover, the purchase price does not reflect lifetime costs of maintenance, parts, and training. A useful guide to costs come from export prices, which are widely reported, and represent a mix of the marginal cost of production plus some recouperation of development costs.
[edit] Stealth technology
Stealth technology is an extension of the notion of visual camouflage to modern radar and IR detection sensors. While not rendering an aircraft "invisible" as is popularly conceived, stealth makes an aircraft much more difficult to discern from the sky, clouds, or distant aircraft, conferring a significant tactical advantage. While the basic principles of shaping aircraft to avoid detection were known at least since the 1960s, it was not until the availability of supercomputers that shape computations could be performed from every angle, a complex task. The use of computer-aided shaping, combined with radar-absorbent materials, produced aircraft of drastically reduced radar cross section (RCS) and were much more difficult to detect on radar.
During the 1970s, the rudimentary level of stealth shaping (as seen in the faceted design of the F-117 Nighthawk) resulted in too severe a performance penalty to be used on fighters. Faster computers enabled smoother designs such as the B-2 Spirit, and thought was given to applying the basic ideas to decrease, if not drastically reduce, the RCS of fighter aircraft. These techniques are also combined with methods of decreasing the IR, visual, and aural signature of the aircraft.
Recent American fighter aircraft development has focused on stealth, and the recently deployed F-22 is the first fighter designed from the ground up with a consideration for stealth. However, the stealthiness of the F-22 from angles other than head-on is not clear. The F-35 incorporates the same degree of stealth shaping, although its exposed rear turbine blades render it significantly less stealthy from the rear (the thrust vectoring nozzles of the F-22 also serve to conceal the turbine blades).[citation needed] Several late 4.5th generation fighters have been given stealth shaping and other refinements to reduce their RCS, including the Super Hornet, Typhoon, and Rafale.
There are some reports that the Rafale’s avionics, the Thales Spectra, includes "stealthy" radar jamming technology, a radar cancellation systems analogous to the acoustic noise suppression systems on the De Havilland Canada Dash 8. Conventional jammers make locating an aircraft more difficult, but their operation is itself detectable; the French system is hypothesised to interfere with detection without revealing that jamming is in operation. In effect, such a system could potentially offer stealth advantages similar in effect to, but likely less effective than, the F-22 and F-35. However, it is unclear how effective the system is, or even whether it is fully operational yet.
Research continues into other ways of decreasing observability by radar. There are claims that the Russians are working on "plasma stealth".[19] Obviously, such techniques might well remove some of the current advantage of the F-22 and F-35, but American defence research also continues unabated.
There are ways to detect fighters other than radar. For instance, passive infra-red sensors can detect the heat of engines, and even the sound of a sonic boom (which any supersonic aircraft will make) can be tracked with a network of sensors and computers. However, using these to provide precise targeting information for a long-range missile is considerably less straightforward than radar.
[edit] Combat performance
The F-15 and F-16 have the first and second best known overall combat record of any other modern jet fighter. F-15s have a combat record of 101 victories and zero loses in actual air to air combat.[20] The F-16 has a combat record of 71 victories and zero loses in actual air to air combat.[21]
- 1991 Gulf War
- On 17 January 1991, the first night of the Gulf War, an Iraqi MiG-25PD shot down a U.S. Navy F/A-18C (piloted by Lt Cdr Scott Speicher), which was lost 29 nautical miles southeast of Baghdad.[22][23][24]
- During the 1991 Gulf War, USAF F-15 pilots shot down five Iraqi MiG-29s.[25]
- On 17 January 1993, a USAF F-16 pilot shot down a MiG-29 in the Iraqi no-fly zone. Some sources claim it was a MiG-23.[25][26][27]
- 1999 Kosovo War,
- a Dutch F-16 pilot shot down a Yugoslavian MiG-29 and a USAF F-16 pilot also shot down a MiG-29.[28][29]
- USAF F-15 pilots shot down four MiG-29s.[28]
- Eritrean-Ethiopian War. In February 1999, according to some reports, Ethiopian Su-27 pilots shot down four Eritrean MiG-29s. Some of these sources claim that the Ethiopian planes were flown by Russian pilots, and the Eritrean planes by Ukrainians. (It is certainly true that local pilots were trained by instructors from those nations.[30])
[edit] Exercise reports
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Different air forces regularly practice against each other in exercises, and when they fly different aircraft some indication of the relative capabilities of the aircraft can be gained. [31]
During the "Cope India '04" exercise (2004), USAF F-15 Eagles were pitted against Indian Air Force Su-30MKs, Mirage 2000s, MiG-29s and elderly MiG-21. The results have been widely publicized, with the Indians winning "90% of the mock combat missions".[32] [33] The "Cope India 2005" exercise was conducted with teams that used a combination of United States and Russian-designed aircraft. The Christian Science Monitor (CSM) reported that “both the Americans and the Indians won, and lost.”[34] However, it also noted “that in a surprising number of encounters — particularly between the American F-16s and the Indian Sukhoi-30 MKIs — the Indian pilots came out the winners. According to the same article the Indian air force designed Cope 2005 in that the rules of engagement be that the forces fight within visual range, and both forces could not take advantage of their long range sensors or weapons. The article goes on to state that a retired Indian Air Force General stated that: "The Sukhoi is a... better plane than the F-16." The USAF was said to be “most impressed by the MiG-21 Bisons and the Su-30 MKIs”.
In June 2005, a Royal Air Force Eurofighter trainer two seater was reportedly able, in a mock confrontation, to avoid two pursuing F-15E fighter-bombers and outmaneuver them, to get into a shooting position.[35]
During Exercise "Northern Edge 2006" (a simulated war game), in Alaska (June 2006), the F-22 reportedly proved its mettle against as many as 40 U.S Air Force simulated "enemy aircraft" during simulated battles. The Raptor is claimed to have achieved a 108:0 kill ratio at that exercise.[36]
In April 2006, During a Red Air exercise a Super Hornet F/A-18 F guns a F-22 down. [37]
An F-16C pilot assigned to the 64th Aggressor Squadron gained the first-ever F-22 simulated kill in Red Flag, February 2007. [94th commander] Lt. Col. Dirk Smith told AFM. [38] While all of the above is alleged to have happened it should be noted the following:
[edit] Comparative analysis
It's misleading to extrapolate comparisons regarding these fighters from the combat history, as fighters function in a combined arms environment in which many other factors, including C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) assets and pilot training determine success. For example, the undefeated records of the F-15 and F-16 should not be taken as unambiguous indicators of their superiority as airframes, as their combat action involved action by American and Israeli pilots with superior training and C4I assets against poorly trained adversaries with much poorer C4I assets. [33]
However, for purchasing considerations, nations often consider comparative analyses of fighters to fill their specific mission requirements. Additionally, joint exercises are often revealing about the performance of fighters in a system, even as their validity is compromised by the inherent assumptions about the systems on either side.
[edit] DERA study[39]
Britain’s Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (now split into QinetiQ and DSTL) did an evaluation in 1994 (simulation based on the available data) comparing the Typhoon with some other modern fighters in how well they performed against an expected adversary aircraft, the Sukhoi Su-35. Due to the lack of information gathered on the 5th generation combat aircraft, the inability to take into account advances in avionics and weapons now fitted to the fighters tested, and lack of knowledge on the capabilities of the Su-35 during the time of this study it is not meant to be considered official and its results should be taken with a grain of salt.
The study used real pilots flying the JOUST system of networked simulators. Various western aircraft supposed data were put in simulated combat against the Su-35. The results were:
Aircraft | Odds vs. Su-35 |
---|---|
Lockheed Martin/Boeing F-22 Raptor | 10.1:1 |
Eurofighter Typhoon | 4.5:1 |
Sukhoi Su-35 'Flanker' | 1.0:1 |
Dassault Rafale C | 1.0:1 |
McDonnell Douglas F-15C Eagle | 0.8:1 |
Boeing F/A-18+ | 0.4:1 |
McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C | 0.3:1 |
General Dynamics F-16C | 0.3:1 |
These results mean, for example, that in simulated combat, 4.5 Su-35s were shot down for every Typhoon lost. Missiles such as the KS-172 may be intended for large targets and not fighters, but their impact on a long range BVR engagement needs to be factored in.
The "F/A-18+" in the study was apparently not the current F/A-18E/F, but an improved version. All the western aircraft in the simulation were using an older version of the AMRAAM missile, except the Rafale which was using the MICA missile. This does not reflect the likely long-term air-to-air armament of Eurofighters (as well as Rafales), which will ultimately be equipped with the longer-range MBDA Meteor (while carrying the AMRAAM as an interim measure).
Details of the simulation have not been released, making it harder to verify whether it gives an accurate evaluation (for instance, whether they had adequate knowledge of the Sukhoi and Raptor to realistically simulate their combat performance). Another problem with the study is the scenarios under which the combat took place are unclear; it is possible that they were deliberately or accidentally skewed to combat scenarios that favoured certain aircraft over others; For instance, long-range engagements favour planes with stealth, good radar and advanced missiles, whereas the Su-35’s alleged above-average maneuverability may prove advantageous in short-range combat. Nor is it clear whether the Su-35 was modeled with thrust vector control (as the present MKIs, MKMs have).
Additionally, the DERA simulation was made in the mid 90s with limited knowledge about the Radar Cross Section, the ECM and the radar performances of the actual aircraft: indeed, at that time, the 4th/5th generation fighters were all at the prototype stage.
[edit] References
- Notes
- ^ "F-22 Tops Japan's Military Wish List." Aviation Week and Space Technology.
- ^ a b "The Gray Threat." Air Force Magazine.
- ^ a b c d e Cate, Devin L. "The Air Superiority Fighter and Defense Transformation." Air University Press.
- ^ Austrian Eurofiger committee of inquiry: Dipl.Ing.Knoll about Eurofighter and Stealth p.76+77
- ^ Richardson 1989, p. 114.
- ^ [1]
- ^ Russia's fifth generation combat aircraft to fly by late 2008-Ivanov
- ^ Russia to build fifth-generation fighter prototype soon
- ^ Times of India
- ^ Flight Global
- ^ [2]
- ^ Deutsche Luftwaffe Supercruis ueber Mach 1.2 Translation: Supercuise at about Mach 1.2
- ^ Supercrusise Mach 1.5 German Translation
- ^ Eurofighter capability, p.53 Supercruis 2 SRAAM 6 MRAAM
- ^ AFM September 2004 "Eastern smile" p.41-p.43
- ^ Eurofighter Typhoon
- ^ "Type Acceptance for Block 5 Standard Eurofighter Typhoon." www.eurofighter.com, Eurofighter GmbH, 15 February 2007. Retrieved: 20 June 2007.
- ^ Ultra Hornet
- ^ http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/research_literature/aviation_articles/Aviation%20Week/topics/plasma_stealth/index.htm
- ^ F-15K - Republic of Korea
- ^ [3]
- ^ Intelligence Community Assessment of the Lieutenant Commander Speicher Case
- ^ "Operation Desert Storm Downed Pilot." Central Intelligence Agency, USA.
- ^ ACIG.
- ^ a b Sci.
- ^ F-16 Airframe.
- ^ F-16.
- ^ a b F-16 Timeline 1999.
- ^ Zap 16.
- ^ ACIG
- ^ Cox, Jody D. ; Severs, Hugh G.. "The Relationship Between Realism in Air Force Exercises and Combat Readiness". AIR FORCE ISSUES TEAM WASHINGTON DC, , Pages 1 - 114.
- ^ Russian fighters superior, says Pentagon
- ^ a b "Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'." Aviation Week and Space Technology copy on archive.org
- ^ Indian Air Force, in war games, gives US a run
- ^ MacLeod, Murdo (19 June 2005). "Eurofighter a shooting star in clash with US jets", Scotsman.
- ^ F-22 excels at establishing air dominance.
- ^ F/A-18 guns F22 down
- ^ First Ever F-22 Raptor "Shot Down"
- ^ http://www.eurofighter-typhoon.co.uk/Eurofighter/tech.php
- Bibliography
- Kelly, Orr. Hornet: The Inside story of the F/A-18. Novato, California: Presido Press, 1990. ISBN 0-89141-344-8.
- Kopp, Carlo. "Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Analysis 2002." Air Power Australia, 2002. Retrieved: 10 April 2006.
- Richardson, Doug. Stealth Warplanes: Deception, Evasion and Concealment in the Air. London: Salamander. 1989, First Edition. ISBN 0-7603-1051-3.
- Shaw, Robert. Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985. ISBN 0-87021-059-9.
- Sweetman, Bill. "Fighter Tactics." Jane's International Defense Review. Retrieved: 10 April 2006.