Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia

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Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia is a Kuwaiti, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detainment camps, in Cuba.^[1] Al Rabia's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 551.^[2] The Department of Defense reports that he was born on June 24, 1959, in Kuwait City, Kuwait.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[3][4] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[5]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Al Rabia chose to appear before his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[6]

[edit] polygraph

Al Rabia had a polygraph administered, although the Tribunals had refused the requests of other detainees to be polygraphed.

[edit] allegations

The allegations Al Rabia faced, during his Tribunal, were:^[7]

a The detainee provided material support to the Taliban and al Qaida.

1. Detainee traveled to Afghanistan in October 2001.
2. Detainee met with Usama Bin Laden on four occasions during July 2001.
3. Detainee delivered money to Usama Bin Laden.
4. Detainee’s name and telephone numbere were found in an address book recovered from the residence where senior al Qaida operative Khalid Shaykh Muhammad ^[sic] was captured.
5. Detainee provided coordination and logistical support to Taliban fighters in Tora Bora.
6. Detainee was present at an al Qaida meeting in the Tora Bora mountains in which the topics discussed included the distribution of SAM-7s and other anti-aircraft weapons.
7. Detainee was an operator for the Al-Wafa NGO and likely transferred large sums of money through a front company.

[edit] testimony

Al Rabia offered his testimony in English.

Al Rabia introduced himself to the Tribunal. He said he was a 45 year old married man, with four children who had worked for Kuwaiti Airways for thirty-four years. He works for the airline as an engineer, and also has a Masters of Business Administration. He is also the part owner and manager of a health club in Kuwait. In addition he does some volunteer work.

[edit] four meetings with Bin Laden

Al Rabia first traveled to Afghanistan on June 1, 2001.

Al Rabia described how one of the patrons of his health club, named Abu Suliyman, convinced him he should travel to Afghanistan, to see for himself the magnitude of the famine and refugee problems. Suliyman was going to make the travel arrangements. He was to travel with a distinguished scholar named Abu Muldah.

The purpose of his visit was to meet with public health officials. Abu Muldah was planning to meet with Bin Laden, because he was worried he might be a false prophet. When Al Rabia's appointments were all finished during his first two days he was free to join Abu Muldah during his meeting with Bin Laden.

When they got close to the border the contact who had met them at the airport told them they looked too rich, and should surrender to him everything that showed they were rich men, and ride in to Afghanistan on the back of motorbikes.

Al Rabia remembered some of the question Abu Muldah had asked Bin Laden. In answer to a question about whether Bin Laden approved of killing innocent people, Bin Laden replied that he had not ordered the bombing of the African embassies, but he was not disappointed.

Al Rabia described the other occasions he was in the same room as Bin Laden - two banquets with many guests, and a brief courtesy farewell visit.

Al Rabia decided he would coordinate aid for the refugees from Afghanistan. But he decided that he would avoid all contact with Abu Suliyman, Bin Laden or any of their associates, because he and Abu Muldah were not impressed by Bin Laden's answers.

[edit] Al Rabia's orange uniform and his stay in camp 5

Al Rabia attended his Tribunal in an orange uniform. "Compliant" captives are issued white uniforms, and are allowed to live in communal barracks in camp 4, where they are allowed to play games with one another and have access to an exercise yard. "Non-compliant" captives are issued orange uniforms, are held in individual cells, and are permitted one twenty minute visit to an exercise yard per week. Al Rabia explained to his Tribunal:

"Please do not think of me, because I am in Camp 5, that they have something. If you came here a year back, I would be wearing white because I was in Camp 4. Why was I in Camp 4? Because they had given me the polygraph, they asked me about all these things I am accused of, and I answered truthfully. I have nothing to do with any of this. Then they said no, I was lying."

Main article: Guantanamo captive's uniforms

[edit] Computerized Voice Stress Analysis tests

Al Rabia made frequent reference to the positive results from his CVSA, which he believed were further confirmation, over and above his polygraph tests, confirming that his story was truthful.^[8]

His dossier also contains a series of three e-mails, from unnamed officers to David L. Taylor, a senior administrator in the Office of Administrative Review of Detained Enemy Combatants about the use of computerized voice stress analysis tests.^[9] Those memos explain that Stephen Cambone, the Deputy Secretary of Defense responsible for intelligence, had directed that the CVSA were not reliable. CVSA were to be administered only as a prop. Officers were directed not to request copies of the CVSA tests administered, in order to keep unreliable tests from confusing the permanent record.

[edit] March 4th 2005 Summary of Al Rabia's role

Joint Task Force Guantanamo published a six page summary of the intelligence it claimed it had gained from the detainees, on March 4, 2005.^[10] A paragraph of that summary, in the Financial Issues section, reads:

"Another detainee claims to have traveled to Cambodia to assist with relief efforts at an unidentified orphanage on the behalf of an Islamic organization. By his own admission, this detainee met UBL as many as four times during July 2001 and is believed to have substantial ties to al-Qaida. He was approached by an al-Qaida leader to straighten out logistics and supply problems that al-Qaida was experiencing in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan."

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[11]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. On approximately September 18,2001, an individual asked the detainee if he wanted to go to Afghanistan for jihad. The detainee agreed to go.
2. The individual was one of seven people, identified by senior al Qaida personnel, who were to become martyrs for a later operation associated with the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States.
3. The detainee began his travel to Afghanistan in October 2001. The detainee flew from Kuwait to Tehran, Iran via Dubayy. The detainee then flew to Meshaad, Iran and took a car to Herat. The detainee then traveled to Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee spent two months, with Taliban forces, trying to flee Afghanistan. Upon arriving at a Jalalabad checkpoint, the detainee was captured.
4. The detainee is a significant al Qaida member who attended training at the al-Faruq camp in Afghanistan. In February 1992, the detainee was at Gardez supervising the front.

b. Training

1. The detainee attended basic training and spent three months in the Kuwaiti military.

c. Connections / Associations

1. The detainee managed the Summit Health Institute from 1998 to 2000. The Muslim Brotherhood owns the building that housed the Isla Health Institute/Club, of which the detainee is a business partner. The detainee managed the club from 2000 to 2001.
2. Hamas originated as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (Executive Order 13224 designates Hamas as a global terrorist entity).
3. The Summit Health Club trains young men to prepare them for jihad.
4. The detainee traveled to Bosnia and contacted the Islamic Revival Society and the Patients Helping Fund (Executive Order 13224 designates the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society as a global terrorist entity).
5. The detainee identified three men who trained at the health club he managed. One of the three men was a recruiter of the jihadist movement. Another man left his job during the summer to fight in Afghanistan. The third man safeguarded possessions of mujahid at his house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
6. The detainee admits that one of the individuals is a member of al Qaida. The detainee alluded to another man being a probable member of al Qaida.
7. The detainee collected money from mosques and businessmen in Kuwait City and gave it to a man. This man instructed terrorists to join Jama'at Al Tabligh in order to obtain legitimate cover to travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad.
8. Jama'at al Tabligh, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization, is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
9. The detainee met with Usama Bin Laden on four occasions during July 2001.
10. The detainee was approached by individuals from the Patients Helping Fund and the International Islamic Relief Organization, about setting up offices in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
11. Media reports indicate that the International Islamic Relief Organization is a nongovernmental organization (NGO), which has ties to al Qaida and other terrorist organizations, to include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Manilla (Executive Order 13224 designates the Abu Sayyaf Group as a global terrorist entity).
12. The detainee was an operator for the Al-Wafa NGO and likely transferred large sums of money through a front company (Executive Order 13224 designates al Wafa as a global terrorist entity).
13. The detainee was present at the al Qaida Media House with individuals associated with the al Wafa Organization and al Qaida.
14. The al Qaida Media House, which houses the al Qaida Media Committee, was located in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Senior members of al Qaida were associated with the Media Committee.
15. The detainee's name and telephone number were found in an address book recovered from the residence where senior al Qaida operative Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was captured.
16. The detainee's telephone number was found in a notebook belonging to a Libyan Islamic extremist in Europe.
17. The Libyan Islamic extremist is a representative of the Islamic Relief Agency in Europe, who has contact with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Hamas (Executive Order 13224 designates the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Hamas as global terrorist entities).

d. Intent

1. On 12 October 2001, the detainee arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed in a facility which housed 100 people, some of whom were mujahideen fighters.
2. The detainee was chief of supply for the Taliban and al Qaida in Jalalabad and Tora Bora. The detainee supplied money, weapons, ammunition and food. The detainee also led a ten to twenty-five man group of fighters.
3. The detainee was in Bagram, Afghanistan, at Camp Malik and in Tora Bora, where he was carrying a bag of ammunition.
4. The detainee was present at an al Qaida meeting in the Tora Bora mountains in which the topics discussed included the distribution of SAM-7s and other anti-aircraft weapons.

e. Other Relevant Data

The detainee attended Embry Riddle Aeronautical Institute in Daytona Beach, Florida, where he earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration in aviation management. The detainee previously earned a bachelor's degree in engine and airframe maintenance in Perth, United Kingdom.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

1. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
2. The detainee states that he has no knowledge of anyone in a Kuwaiti relief organization being involved in terrorist activity.

[edit] Transcript

Al Rabia chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.^[12]

[edit] Repatriation

On May 12, 2007, the Kuwait Times reported that Kuwait and the USA concluded negotiations regarding the repatriation of the remaining Kuwaiti captives.^[13]

[edit] References

1. ^ Sketches of Guantanamo Detainees-Part II, The Guardian, March 15, 2006
2. ^ OARDEC (May 15, 2006). List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-09-29.
3. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
4. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
5. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
6. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, pages 13-43
7. ^ Summary of Evidence (.pdf) from Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, page 47
8. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf) from page 26 of Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
9. ^ Re: CSRT using CVSA results (.pdf) from page 55 of Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia's Combatant Status Review Tribunal
10. ^ JTF-GTMO Information on Detainees, Department of Defense, March 4, 2005
11. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", The Wire (JTF-GTMO), Friday March 10, 2006, pp. 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-12. 
12. ^ Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Fouad Mahoud Hasan Al Rabia's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 115
13. ^ B Izzak. "US to free last Kuwaiti Guantanamo detainees", Kuwait Times, May 12, 2007. Retrieved on May 14.