Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani

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Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, in Cuba.^[1] Al Sani's Guantanamo detainee ID number is 554. The Department of Defense reports that Al Sani was born on May 17, 1977, in Mikala, Yemen.

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.^[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.^[4]

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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

[edit] Allegations

The Department of Defense complied with a Freedom of Information Act request, and released memoranda prepared for 507 of the 558 detainees whose classifications were reviewed by Combatant Status Review Tribunals. A memorandum summarizing the allegations Al Sani faced during his Tribunal in March of 2005.^[5] The allegations Al Sani faced were:

a. The detainee is associated with an al Qaida and the Taliban:

1. The detainee departed Yemen for Afghanistan on 16 July 2002.
2. The detainee was recruited in Yemen for jihad training in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee along with others received travel documents and instructions from a facilitator in Yemen.
4. The detainee received tickets from a facilitator in Yemen.
5. The detainee along with others were required to leave passport, money, all other forms of identification at a guest house (Mudafa) in Kandahar, Afghanistan in return for a receipt of these inventoried items.
6. The detainee's name, alias, along with other personal property information was found on a list recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses.
7. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle at al Farouq.
8. The detainee received additional military training at another camp located near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

b. The detainee participated in military operations against the United States and its coalition partners.

1. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora.
2. The detainee was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle during the Tora Bora campaign.
3. The detainee was injured by a United States air strike while retreating to Pakistan with other soldiers.
4. The detainee's group surrendered to Northern Alliance forces.

[edit] Testimony

Al Sani chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.^[6]

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".^[7]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 20 June 2005.^[8] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend, Salam. Salam provided the detainee money from the bus trip from his home to Sana, Yemen.
2. The detainee's travel from Sana, Yemen, to Afghanistan was facilitated by Muath.
3. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.
4. The detainee was required to leave passport, money, and all other forms of identification at a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in return for a receipt of those inventoried items.
5. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after hearing about the events of September 11, 2001.
6. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
7. The detainee was injured during a U.S. bombing campaign in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in December 2001.

b. Training

1. The detainee completed military training at al Farouq.
2. The detainee received additional training at a camp located in a mountainous region very far from Kabul on the road towards Jalalabad.
3. Tje detaomee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) while at the al Farouq training camp.
2. The detainee saw Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
3. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is believed to be UBL's advisor and policy maker.
4. The detainee saw Abu Gayth, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
5. Abu Gayth is the official spokesman for al Qaida.

d. Intent

1. The detainee stayed at the Al-Nibras guesthouse.
2. The Al-Nibras guesthouse is a known collection point for al Qaida recruits.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's name and information on his alias, nationality, passport, and personal belongings was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safehouse raids in Karachi, Pakistan.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	While at Guantanamo Bay, the detainee has very few citations, primarily for non-aggressive infractions including physical training, prayer, and eating in cell; talking with other detainees; and limited verbal assaults on guards.
b.	The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.

[edit] Transcript

There is no record that Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 26 March 2006.^[9]

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was encouraged to go to Afghanistan for training by his friend, Salam. Salam provided the detainee money fro the bus trip from his home to Sana, Yemen.
2. The detainee traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan via Pakistan in August 2001.
3. The detainee's travel from Sana, Yemen, to Afghanistan was facilitated by Muath.
4. Muath presented the detainee with a passport for the detainee that had a visa for Pakistan. Muath also provided the detainee and two other men with tickets from Sanaa to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai.
5. After arriving in Karachi, the detainee and two other men met three other males of similar age who were also traveling with the detainee. They were all traveling to Pakistan to receive training in Afghanistan.
6. The detainee was required to leave his passport, money, and all other forms of identification at a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in return for a receipt of those inventoried items.
7. The detainee remained in Afghanistan after hearing about the events of September 11, 2001.
8. The detainee traveled with approximately 45 others from the Mudafa to the al Farouq training camp, Afghanistan where the detainee stayed for approximately two and a half weeks.
9. Training stopped in October 2001 due to United States attacks on Taliban targets.
10. The detainee was assigned to augment Taliban and al Qaida forces already in defensive positions in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
11. The detainee was injured during a U.S. bombing campaign in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in December 2001.
12. Near the end of Ramadan (16 December 2001) United States Forces began bombing the detainee's location. With the assistance of a guide, the detainee and his group withdrew to another unspecified location. At this unspecified location, the detainee was injured in his lower right side by shrapnel from United States bombing.
13. The group subsequently surrendered to Afghan soldiers. The Afghan soldiers took the injured to a hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan where the detainee spent a month and a half recuperating from his injuries.

b. Training

1. The detainee completed military training at al Farouq.
2. Tje detaomee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle.
3. Training conducted at al Farouq training camp in September 2001 through October 2001 included three weeks of operation and maintenance of the Kalashnikov rifle.
4. The detainee received additional training at a camp located in a mountainous region very far from Kabul on the road towards Jalalabad.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee heard a speech from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) while at the al Farouq training camp.
2. The detainee saw Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
3. Ayman Al-Zawahiri is believed to be UBL's advisor and policy maker.
4. The detainee saw Abu Gayth, who accompanied UBL on his visit to the al Farouq training camp.
5. Abu Gayth is the official spokesman for al Qaida.
6. The detainee stayed at the Al-Nibras guesthouse.
7. The Al-Nibras guesthouse is a known collection point for al Qaida recruits.
8. The detainee's name and information on his alias, nationality, passport, and personal belongings was found on a list of 324 suspected al Qaida members recovered from safehouse raids in Karachi, Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee had surgery on his back for wounds sustained in Afghanistan.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.	The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee was queried if he knew where Usama bin Laden is, if Usama bin Laden spoke publicly about anti-American feelings, or planned attacks on the United States, with negative results.
b.	The detainee was queried about plans to escape Guantanamo Bay or harm the guards, with negative results.
c.	The detainee stated his intention was to go to Afghanistan for a couple of months of training and then to return home. The detainee cited his inability to receive the mandatory military training in his own country as another reason he desired to receive the training.
d.	The detainee wants to go home. He wants to serve his parents if he ever goes home. The detainee has no specific career aspirations and believes that Allah will find him a job.

[edit] References

1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
5. ^ CSRT Summary of Evidence memoranda (.pdf) prepared for Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 13, 2004 - page 146
6. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Fahmi Salem Said Al Sani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 30-32
7. ^ (Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
8. ^ OARDEC (20 June 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Sani, Fahmi Salem Said 3-5. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.
9. ^ OARDEC (26 March 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Sani, Fahmi Salem Said 42-44. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2007-11-06.