Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi

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Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi is a citizen of Yemen, held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internee Security Number is 026. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1982, in Bayt Ghazi, Yemen

Contents

[edit] Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor. Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.
Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[2][3] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[4]
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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Ghazi chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[5]

[edit] Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 16 August 2004.[6] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a. The detainee is an al-Qaida fighter:
  1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2001.
  2. The detainee attended training at the Al Farouq training camp.
  3. At the Al Farouq training camp, the detainee received training on the AK-47, explosives, the PK machine gun and RPG's [sic] [7].
  4. After attending training at the Al Farouq training camp, the detainee was chosen to go to Tora Bora and become one of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards.
b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee fought in the KTAL region of Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee attempted to flee AF[7] following the U.S. air strikes. He crossed the border into Pakistan, and surrendered to authorities, who accused him of being a terrorist trying to escape from AF[7].

[edit] Ghani’s polygraph

Ghani told his Tribunal that he had been administered a polygraph, that showed he had no knowledge of, or contact with, Al Qaeda.

[edit] Ghani’s answers to the allegations

  • Ghani denied having any contacts or assignments with Al Qaeda.
  • Ghani acknowledged traveling to Afghanistan, for military training. But his intention was to use that training to defend himself in Yemen - not in Afghanistan.
  • Ghani acknowledged going for training at the Al Farouq camp. He said he had no idea who it belonged to. He said it was the only training place he could find.
  • Ghani said that he had spent nine days in Al Farouq when the American bombings started, and the camp was closed down and everyone fled.
  • Ghani denied choosing to go to Tora Bora to fight with Al Qaeda.
  • Ghani questioned whether Osama Bin Laden would trust a newly arrived, 17 year old, with just nine days of military training to be a bodyguard. He pointed out that he only spent a few days in Tora Bora.
  • Ghani stated he was traveling with his trainer, and five other unarmed trainees. Only their trainer had a rifle. And he did not engage in any hostilities.

[edit] Administrative Review Board hearing

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[8]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

[edit] First annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi's first annual Administrative Review Board, on 13 September 2005.[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention. The three page memo listed 20 factors that it asserted favored continued detention, and three factors it asserted favored release or repatriation.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a Commitment
  1. The detainee was motivated to serve the Dawa and spread the word of the Koran as he believes that it is a Muslim obligation.
  2. The detainee claims he traveled to Sanaa, Yemen and met with Sheik Muqbil to discuss thevalidity of a Fatwa. Sheik Muqbil issued a Fatwa that stated Muslims had a right to train themselves for self-defense against enemies.
  3. Sheik Muqbil and a few other “Brotherhood” movement supporters recognized UBL as their leader. Sheik Muqbil was responsible for the jihadist movement in the geographical region of Sa’dah, Yemen.
  4. Sheik Muqbil advised the detainee to go for training in Afghanistan. Since he did not have any money for the trip Sheik Muqbil gave the detainee 500 to 600 United States dollars.
  5. Sheik Muqbil instructed the Detainee to go to the Jama’ah al Tabligh Mosque in Sanaa where he could get a visa and a plane ticket to Pakistan. Since the detainee was still in the twelfth grade, Sheik Muqbil told him to wait until after graduation to make travel arrangements. A year later the detainee went to the mosque, left his passport and some money and later returned to obtain his passport, visa and a ticket.
  6. The detainee flew from Sanaa, Yemen through Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan. He spent one night in a hotel then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed for two nights at the Lukanda Hotel
  7. The detainee crossed into Afghanistan. He taught the children in the villages around Spin Buldak, Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan.
  8. The detainee went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan by bus where he taught in another village for about two weeks. From there he went to Khost, Afghanistan, where he stayed in various villages for about two months.
  9. The detainee met a man named Asadullah who arranged for a guide to take the detainee back to Pakistan. The detainee eventually joined a group of 27 to 30 other people headed for the Pakistan border. The detainee paid the guide 200 to 300 rupees.
  10. The detainee claims he crossed the border back into Pakistan and surrendered to the authorities. The authorities accused him of being a terrorist trying to escape from Afghanistan. He did not have a passport or anything else when he crossed into Pakistan. All he took was his Koran and about 700 Pakistan rupees.
b Training
  1. The detainee trained at the al Farouq training camp for nine days before hearing the news about September 11th
  2. The detainee was recognized as training at the al Farouq training camp on or around April 2001. He received training on how to shoot the Kalashnikov, the PK machine gun, the rocket propelled grenade launcher (RPG), and how to detonate explosives.
c Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee spent four days at the Nabras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan where his passport and money were taken from him
  2. The Nabras guesthouse was used by fighters heading ot the al Farouq training camp and by UBL. Arabs bound for training would gather at the guesthouse until about 25-30 were in the group and then they were transported to al Farouq. UBL would come to al Farouq.to greet the fighters before they went to training. At Nabras, passports, money, tickets and other important documents were taken from each person.
  3. The detainee stayed at the Azzam guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan for 35 days where he received additional training until the bombing started
  4. Hamza al-Ghamdi ran the Azzam guesthouse in Kabul and in an intelligence agent who has been in Afghanistan for almost 15 years and has traveled to Bosnia and Chechnya for jihad. Hamza al Ghamdi is recognized as one of UBL’s most trusted people and reported directly to him.
d. Other relevant data
  1. The detainee traveled to Tora Bora and stayed there for 27 days to one month. He went with a group of men that included Sabi’ who is the group trainer from al Farouq and the only person with a Kalashnikob.
  2. The detainee was chosen to go to Tora Bora and become one of UBL’s bodyguards. Individuals from al Farouq would either go to Tora Bora to be one of UBL’s bodyguards or they went to Kabul to await further assignment. The detainee was also recognized as a fighter in the KTAL region.
  3. The detainee was recognized as one of UBL’s bodyguards and a member of his “dirty thirty” and a fighter in Tora Bora Afghanistan.
  4. The detainee was seen at Tora Bora carrying a Kalashnikov.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

During the time he traveled in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the detainee says he had not heard anyone speak about recruiters for fighting in Afghanistan against the enemies of Islam. He also doesn’t believe that there is currently a jihad.
b.

An al Qaida operative and facilitator did not name the detainee as a UBL bodyguard.
c.

A chief al Qaida recruiter, planner and top strategist did not identify the detainee.

[edit] Transcript

Ghazi chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[10] In the spring of 2006, in compliance with a court order, the DoD released an undated eight page summarized transcript of his hearing, and a two page statement written by the captive.

[edit] Second annual Administrative Review Board

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Fahed Ghazi's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 31 August 2006.[11] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention. The four page memo listed 25 factors that it asserted favored continued detention, and five factors it asserted favored release or repatriation.

[edit] The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee stated he chose to teach Arabic and how to read the Koran in Afghanistan because he heard it was a country of ignorance, the people there worshiped the graves of the dead, and there were no people to teach them.
  2. The detainee stated he decided to train in Afghanistan after seeking the advice of Sheik Muqbil al Wadi [sic] in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee traveled to Sanaa after he found out about a fatwa which al Wadi issued stating that Muslims had a right to train themselves for self-defense against enemies.
  3. Shaykh [sic] Muqbil al Wadia [sic] had the most direct role and influence in spreading Wahabism in Yemen.
  4. Shaykh [sic] Muqbil al Wadia [sic] was responsible for the jihadist movement in the Sadah, Yemen region. The jihadist movement recognized Usama bin Laden as their leader.
  5. Since the detainee did not have money for the trip, Sheik Muqbil al Wadi [sic] gave the detainee the Yemen currency equivalent of 500 to 600 United States Dollars. Additionally, al Wadi instructed the detainee to go to the Jamaah al Tabeegh [sic] mosque in Sanaa, Yemen where he could obtain a visa and plane ticket to Pakistan.
  6. Jamaat Tabligh is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization, which is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
  7. After staying one night in a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee claimed he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he stayed for two nights at a hotel. The detainee then crossed the border into Afghanistan using a taxi arranged for by the hotel owner.
  8. The detainee stated he travele to Kandahar, Kabul, Jalalabad, and Boldak [sic] , Afghanistan teaching Arabic to children.
  9. The detainee stated he began teaching in the villages around Spin Buldak [sic] , Afghanistan. The detainee stayed in the region for about one week, using the village mosque as a place to sleep.
  10. The detainee claimed he traveled to a village near Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he remained for about one week. The detainee then went by bus to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he stayed at a mosque in a village outside of Kabul for about one week.
  11. The detainee stated he went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, by bus where he taught in a village for about two weeks. From Jalalabad the detainee went to Khost, Afghanistan because he heard that more of the people there spoke Arabic. The detainee staying in various villages around Khost for about two months.
  12. The detainee states he was told that a war had started between America and Afghanistan while he was teaching in the villages around Khost, Afghanistan. The detainee first learned of the war on 5 December 2001 and left the village on 7 December 2001.
  13. The detainee stated he decided to flee Afghanistan and return to Yemen because he was frightened for his safety. The detainee stated he was escorted to a village where an Afghan guide was preparing to escort Arab men across the mountains into Pakistan.
  14. The detainee stated he joined a group of 27 to 30 other people headed for the Pakistan border. The detainee walked with the group for eight days. The detainee claims he paid the group's guide about 200 to 300 rupee [sic] .
  15. The detainee stated that when he crossed the border back into Pakistan, he surrendered to the authorities. The authorities accused the detainee of being a terrorist trying to escape from Afghanistan.
b. Training
  1. According to the detainee, he trained at al Farouq for nine days before hearing the news about 11 September 2001.
  2. The detainee was identified at the al Farouq training camp on or around April 2001. The source stated the detainee was trained on how to shoot the Kalashnikov [sic] , explosives, the PK machine gun and the rocket-propelled grenade.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee stated he stayed at the al Nabras guest house for four days until being sent to the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan.
  2. A source stated that Arabs bound for training at al Farouq would gather at Nebras until about 25 to 30 were in the group. Usama bin Laden would come to Nebras to greet the fighters before they went to training.
  3. The detainee stated that after leaving al Farouq he was taken to Kabul, Afghanist, and stayed at the Azzam guest house for approximately 35 days.
  4. A source stated the Azzam guest house was run by one of Usama bin Laden's most trusted people who reported directly to Usama bin Laden. The Azzam guest house was used to house all types of people to include newly arrived people, fighters from the front lines, wounded people and Usama bin Laden's associates.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee stated he traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan and remained there for 27 days to one month.
  2. A source claimed the detainee received additional military training while in Tora Bora, Afghanistan since the group the detainee traveled with had a number of instructors.
  3. A source claimed the detainee was chosen to go to Tora Bora, Afghanistan to be one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards. Additionally, the source claimed to have seen the detainee again at Tora Bora after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and stated that the detainee had been fighting.
  4. A source stated he and the detaiene fought together in Tora Bora, Afghanistan. According to the source, after bin Laden left Tora Bora, the detainee joined a group of 30 individuals who attempted to cross the Pakistan border. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.

[edit] The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee stated that during the time he traveled in Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan, he had not heard anyone speak about recruiters for fighting in Afghanistan against the enemies of Islam. The detainee believes that there is not currently a jihad.
b.

The detainee stated he was not recruited by anyone to go to Afghanistan.
c.

The detainee denied being involved with al Qaida or the Taliban. The detainee denied being one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
d.

The detainee claimed that prior to 11 September 2001 he had not heard of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.
e.

The detainee stated that if he is released he wants to go home to Yemen and continue his education, get married and raise a family.

[edit] References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15, 2006
  2. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11, 2004 - mirror
  3. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11, 2004
  4. ^ Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials. United States Department of Defense (March 6, 2007). Retrieved on 2007-09-22.
  5. ^ Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Fahed Abdullah Ahmad Ghazi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 62-67
  6. ^ OARDEC (16 August 2004). Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Ghazi, Fahed Abdullah Ahmad page 23. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-02-20.
  7. ^ a b c The acronyms RPG and AF was spelled out when the allegations were read aloud during his Tribunal.
  8. ^ Spc Timothy Book. "Review process unprecedented", JTF-GTMO Public Affairs Office, Friday March 10, 2006, pp. pg 1. Retrieved on 2007-10-10. 
  9. ^ OARDEC (13 September 2005). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ghazi, Fahed Abdullah Ahmad pages 16-18. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-02-20.
  10. ^ OARDEC (date redacted). Summary of Administrative Review Board Proceedings of ISN 26 pages 11-21. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-01-09.
  11. ^ OARDEC (31 August 2006). Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Ghazi, Fahed pages 26-29. United States Department of Defense. Retrieved on 2008-02-20.